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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to elucidate the nature of Paul’s apostleship and apostolic 
authority by investigating how Paul portrays himself as an oikonomos of God in 1 
Corinthians (4.1-5; 9.16-23). Modern studies on the metaphor have failed to 
ascertain what apostolic attributes are implied by the image and how Paul utilised 
the metaphor to meet his rhetorical and theological objectives, largely because they 
neither identify the appropriate source domain of Paul’s metaphor nor conduct the 
necessary socio-historical research to illumine its application. Utilising a host of 
ancient sources to reconstruct the characteristics of the regal, municipal, and 
private administrators bearing this title, this study seeks to identify the metaphor’s 
source domain and to interpret the relevant Pauline discourses accordingly. 
 Part 1 surveys the three administrative contexts from Graeco-Roman 
antiquity in which oikonomoi are most frequently attested: Hellenistic kingdoms 
(Chapter 2), Graeco-Roman cities (Chapter 3), and private estates and enterprises 
(Chapter 4). While minor variations existed within these administrative contexts, a 
general profile is discernable in and constructed for each. Moreover, although the 
profiles of the oikonomoi serving in these contexts share certain similar social, 
structural, and disciplinary characteristics, these administrators are also shown to 
have significant differences.  
Part 2 engages 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 seeking to identify and interpret Paul’s 
metaphor in both discourses. Chapter 5 demonstrates that, of the three source 
domains examined in Part 1, private commercial administration functions as the 
most plausible context in which to interpret Paul’s metaphor. Chapters 6 and 7 then 
utilise the profile of the private commercial administrator as a model to illumine 
Paul’s apostleship in 1 Cor 4.1-5 and 9.16-23 respectively and explains how Paul 
employs the image to meet his rhetorical and theological objectives in both 
passages. 
Chapter 8 summarises the argument of the thesis and draws out the 
implications of Paul’s metaphor for understanding Paul’s theology of apostolic 
authority. 
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Chapter 1. Apostleship and Authority in 1 Corinthians 
 
Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians1 provides a unique and fascinating insight into 
the social realities and ethical pitfalls that enveloped one of the apostle’s earliest 
and most cherished faith-communities. Throughout its sixteen chapters, Paul’s 
letter repeatedly attests to the conflicts that erupted within the church in Corinth 
and the volatility of the community’s boundaries with the unbelieving world. The 
church’s discord, apparent through political factions (1.10-4.21), civil litigation (6.1-
8), abuse of Christian liberties (8.1-11.1), disputes about gender roles (11.3-16), 
exclusivity over the Eucharist (11.17-34), and elevation of particular ecclesial 
responsibilities (12.4-31), is indicative of the competitive and dissenting spirit that 
permeated the congregation. Further, the high level of fragmentation that plagued 
the community seems to have been fuelled intensely by the church’s widespread 
integration with non-Christian society; indeed, there was almost no sense of 
separation between the congregation and the unbelieving world from which it was 
called.2 As John Barclay has astutely observed, 
One of the most significant, but least noticed, features of Corinthian church life is the absence of 
conflict in the relationship between Christians and ‘outsiders’. In contrast to the Thessalonian 
church, the believers in Corinth appear neither to feel hostility towards, nor to experience hostility 
from, non-Christians. . . . Clearly, whatever individual exceptions there may be, Paul does not regard 
social alienation as the characteristic state of the Corinthian church.3 
A congregation obviously fraught with internal conflict, preoccupied with non-
Christian ethics, and absorbed with popular forms of education and leadership, the 
church in Corinth struggled perhaps more than any other of the apostle’s early 
                                                        
1 I am aware that the canonical 1 Corinthians was not Paul’s initial correspondence with the 
Corinthian church (1 Cor 5.9-11), but this form of reference will be utilised throughout for the sake of 
convenience. 
2 See, e.g., Andrew D. Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and 
Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-6 (AGJU 18; Leiden: Brill, 1993); Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left 
Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), x. For Paul’s 
portrayal of the Corinthian church as an ideologically distinct community, see Richard A. Horsley, 
'Paul's Assembly in Corinth: An Alternative Society', in Urban Religion (2005), 371-95; Edward Adams, 
Constructing the World: A Study in Paul's Cosmological Language (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 147-
49. 
3 John M. G. Barclay, 'Thessalonica and Corinth: Social Contrasts in Pauline Christianity', 
JSNT 47 (1992): 49-74, at 57-58; cf. Craig Steven de Vos, Church and Community Conflicts: The 
Relationships of the Thessalonian, Corinthian, and Philippian Churches with Their Wider Civic Communities 
(SBLDS 168; Atlanta: Scholars, 1999); C. K. Robertson, Conflict in Corinth: Redefining the System (SBL 42; 
Bern: Peter Lang, 2001), 53-113. 
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congregations to grasp and embody the new ‘symbolic order’ of Pauline 
Christianity.4 
But while the nature of the Corinthians’ shortcomings distinguished them 
from Paul’s other churches, it is the manner in which Paul utilised the gospel to 
remedy these complications that distinguishes 1 Corinthians from the rest of the 
Pauline corpus. Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians reveals in a way unlike any 
other Pauline epistle Paul’s theology in practice, that is, the applicability of the 
gospel to real people and ordinary problems.5 According to Gordon Fee, it is this 
ability of Paul to bring the good news to bear in the marketplace, to facilitate the 
message as it works its way out in the exigencies of everyday life, which 
demonstrates the ‘truth[fulness] of his gospel’, and finds unique expression in 1 
Corinthians.6 
 
A. Paul’s Apostolic Authority 
Among the many ways that Paul applies his theology to the lives of the 
believers in Corinth, few are as prevalent and important in 1 Corinthians as the 
elucidation of apostleship and apostolic authority.7 As James Dunn has remarked, 
‘The opportunity to compare Paul’s theology and his practice, or, better, his 
theology in practice, is nowhere so promising as in the case of apostolic authority’, 
and ‘[o]n the day-to-day reality of Paul’s apostolic authority, the most instructive 
text is undoubtedly 1 Corinthians’.8 The basis for Dunn’s two assertions seems 
obvious enough: the way that the Corinthians conceived apostles was a matter of 
great concern between the believers themselves as well as between the church and 
                                                        
4 David G. Horrell, The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 
Corinthians to 1 Clement (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 53-59; Stephen J. Chester, Conversion at 
Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul's Theology and the Corinthian Church (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2003). 
5 C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 
1968), 26;  Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians 
(Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1975), 9; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians (Sacra Pagina 7; 
Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 29; Victor P. Furnish, The Theology of the First Letter to the 
Corinthians (New Testament Theology; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 122-23. 
6 Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 16 
7 John Scott, Power (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 3, defines ‘social power’ as ‘the socially 
significant affecting of one agent by another in the face of possible resistance’. In this investigation 
various forms of power will be identified. One such form is authority, which we understand to be an 
expression of what Scott refers to as ‘persuasive influence’, which involves ‘processes of legitimation 
and signification that can be organised into complex structures of command and expertise’ (17). 
8 James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 571-72.  
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its founder, and so much so that it was the first topic Paul sought to resolve in the 
letter (1.10-4.21), one he would soon revisit (9.1-27), and one that would eventually 
occupy further reflection in later correspondence (2 Corinthians). Clarifying who, or 
what, Paul and the other apostles were and how they were to be understood, 
therefore, was a matter of real urgency in Paul’s rhetorical strategy as he undertook 
to direct the church toward ecclesial unity and Christian maturity. At the same 
time, because the letter is not as polemical as Galatians or 2 Corinthians, it provides 
an exceptional window into the power dynamics of an apostle playing a relatively 
unscripted role. 
But just as the nature of apostolic power and authority remains a pertinent 
topic of study in Pauline theology and in 1 Corinthians in particular, the enquiry 
remains complicated in modern research by the multiplicity of scholarly 
approaches being employed. Not only do these different avenues leave many 
interpreters with competing perspectives about the nature of Paul’s apostleship, but 
as the following survey seeks to demonstrate, they too often fail to consider 
important hermeneutical factors relevant to interpreting Paul’s discourse, including 
its socio-historical and rhetorical contexts. 
 
1. Authority Constructed 
Numerous studies in 1 Corinthians have sought to illumine the nature of 
apostleship and the authority Paul possessed by examining the theological 
implications of the many illustrative ways the apostle constructs, or describes, the 
apostolate. Countless studies, for instance, have investigated Paul’s use of the title 
ἀpiόστολος (1 Cor 1.1, 17; 4.9; 9.1-2, 5; 12.28-29; 15.7, 9), aiming to expose the nature 
of apostleship by deciphering the origin of the title. While a few interpreters have 
suggested that the Pauline concept originated in Christianity or Gnosticism,9 a 
growing consensus of scholars—following the initial proposal of J. B. Lightfoot and 
its later development by Karl Rengstorf—suggest that Paul’s particular brand of 
                                                        
9 For the apostolate as a Christian invention, see, e.g., Johannes Munck, 'Paul, the Apostles, 
and the Twelve', Studia Theologica 3 (1950): 96-110; Arnold Ehrhardt, The Apostolic Succession in the First 
Two Centuries of the Church (London: Lutterworth Press, 1953), 15-20; L. Cerfaux, 'Pour l'histoire du 
titre Apostolos dans le Nouveau Testament', Recherches de science religieuse 48 (1960): 76-92; Günter  
Klein, Die zwölf Apostel: Ursprung und Gehalt einer Idee (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des 
Alten und Neuen Testaments 77; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 25-52. For its origin in 
Gnosticism, see, e.g., Walter Schmithals, The Office of Apostle in the Early Church (trans. John E. Steely; 
Nashville: Abingdon, 1969), 98-110. 
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apostleship had its origin in Judaism and was in some way related to the office of 
the xyl# (‘delegate’).10 Going in a similar direction, Karl Sandnes has examined 
Paul’s identification with the Hebrew prophets (2.6-16; 9.15-18), suggesting that Paul 
understood and portrayed his apostolic role as an extension of the OT prophetic 
tradition.11 John N. Collins, on the other hand, has focused on Paul’s use of the term 
διάκονος (3.5), arguing quite controversially that Paul’s metaphor depicts the 
apostle as an embassy from God to the church, rather than as a servile position as 
the term is traditionally understood to mean.12 Stephan Joubert and Trevor Burke 
have independently targeted Paul’s father metaphor (4.14-21), while Beverly 
Gaventa has concentrated on Paul’s maternal language (3.1-2).13 Finally, Zeba Crook, 
utilising the relational framework of patronage, portrays Paul as a client and 
beneficiary who out of loyalty labours to ‘convert’ other clients to his patron God 
(9.1, 16-17; 15.8-10).14 
But most studies investigating Paul’s metaphorical representations of 
apostleship, while they are normally socio-historically and exegetically focused, 
neither seek nor are able to address what are arguably the most fundamental 
theological matters concerning apostolic authority, namely its basis, scope, purpose, 
and limits. However, this lacuna has in large part been filled by John Schütz, who 
was one of the first to address Paul’s authority utilising modern theory. Combining 
                                                        
10 J. B. Lightfoot, The Epistle of St Paul to the Galatians (London: MacMillan, 1865), 92-101; Karl 
Heinrich Rengstorf, 'ἀpiόστολος', in TDNT, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 1:407-
45. More recently, F. H. Agnew, 'The Origin of the NT Apostle-Concept: A Review of Research', JBL 105 
(1986): 75-96; Jörg Frey, 'Apostelbegriff, Apostelamt und Apostolizität: Neutestamentliche 
Perspektiven zur Frage nach der "Apostolizität der Kirche"', in Das kirchliche Amt in apostolischer 
Nachfolge. I, Grundlagen und Grundfragen, ed. Theodor Schneider and Gunther Wenz (Dialog der 
Kirchen 12.1; Freiburg im Breisgau; Göttingen: Herder; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 91-188, at 
180. 
11 Karl Olav Sandnes, Paul - One of the Prophets? A Contribution to the Apostle's Self-Understanding 
(WUNT 2/43; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1991), 77-130. 
12 John N. Collins, Diakonia: Re-Interpreting the Ancient Sources (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 195-97. Contra Andrew D. Clarke, Serve the Community of the Church: Christians as Leaders 
and Ministers (First-Century Christians in the Graeco-Roman World; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 
233-43; Anni Hentschel, Diakonia im Neuen Testament: Studien zur Semantik unter besonderer 
Berucksichtigung der Rolle von Grauen (WUNT 2/226; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 91-98. 
13 Stephan J. Joubert, 'Managing the Household: Paul as paterfamilias of the Christian 
Household Group in Corinth', in Modelling Early Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the New Testament 
in Its Context, ed. Philip F. Esler (London: Routledge, 1995), 213-23; Trevor J. Burke, 'Paul's Role as 
"Father" to his Corinthian "Children" in Socio-Historical Context (1 Corinthians 4:14-21)', in Paul and 
the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of Margaret Thrall, ed. Trevor J. Burke 
and J. K. Elliott (NovTSup 109; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 95-113; Beverly R. Gaventa, Our Mother Saint Paul 
(Louisville: WJK, 2007), 41-50. 
14 Zeba Crook, Reconceptualising Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, and Conversion in the Religions of 
the Ancient Mediterranean (BZNW 130; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 155-69. 
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detailed exegesis and sociology, Schütz demonstrated that Paul’s conception of 
apostolic authority greatly varied from Max Weber’s model of charismatic authority, 
since the apostle’s authority did not rest on the legitimation of others.15 Instead, 
Schütz, after examining a number of Pauline texts (including 1 Corinthians 1-4 and 
15), reasoned that Paul’s authority transcended the legitimating power of the 
community and rested on two ‘figures of interpretation’: (i) the gospel, itself ‘a 
power or force in human affairs, the field or sphere in which those called by it now 
stand and through which they move to a future already adumbrated and in some 
sense present in the gospel’; and (ii) the apostle himself, whose power derives not 
from an institution—‘Paul does not regard apostolic authorization as a sometime 
thing, as a limited endowment of representative authority’—rather, as the apostle 
embodies the gospel in his life and ministry, his authority becomes ‘inseparable 
from the whole of the person authorized’.16 ‘Hence, both the gospel and the apostle 
are manifestations of a single power and are “authority” in that sense’.17 Deeply 
learned and nearly comprehensive in scope, Schütz’s work remains a leading 
theological analysis of Paul’s authority-concept. 
But even Schütz’s investigation was not able to address every significant 
facet of Pauline apostolic power and authority, as he himself failed to provide a 
detailed account for how Paul’s authority was actually exercised. That is to say, 
while Schütz’s treatment provides an intriguing study on Paul’s ideology of 
authority, it remains one dimensional in so far as it fails to analyse how Paul 
asserted his authority over the Christian community. 
 
2. Authority Asserted 
As the studies mentioned above have sought to examine how Paul constructed 
apostolic power and authority, a number of other studies have sought to expose and 
evaluate how Paul asserted that power and authority. Looking beyond Paul’s 
apostolic representations, these studies often utilise modern theory to detect, 
compare, and assess the use of power and authority in Paul’s letters. Bengt 
Holmberg, whose investigation of the ‘structures of authority’ in the early church is 
                                                        
15 John H. Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority (SNTSMS 26; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), 268-69. 
16 Schütz, Authority, 284. 
17 Schütz, Authority, 284. 
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now quite famous for helping to usher in an age of sociological exploration of the 
NT, is another who has left a massive imprint on the landscape of Pauline authority 
studies. Whereas Schütz examined Paul’s authority as an ideological abstraction, 
Holmberg pursued the matter as a sociological reality, utilising ‘concrete social 
facts’ to establish what ‘actually happened between Paul and his churches’.18 
Relying, therefore, on both Acts and the Pauline letters to supply his historical data, 
Holmberg compared Paul’s power with the Weberian authority models and 
concluded that the primitive church operated under the influence of a complex 
structure of ecclesial power based mainly on charismatic authority, and contained 
mixed degrees of institutionalisation. Moreover, while Holmberg contended that 
Paul’s Gentile mission was largely dependent on, though not subordinate to, the 
Jerusalem church,19 he argued that Paul possessed a large measure of regional 
authority, having been superordinate to his missionary co-workers and having had 
the necessary leverage over the local churches he founded to admonish them and to 
expect from them financial support in return for preaching.20 In fact, according to 
Holmberg, it was Paul’s over-involvement in those churches that disrupted their 
development of local political structures (cf. 1 Corinthians 12 and 14).21 
But while Holmberg’s analysis has yielded rich results, his methodology has 
been criticised by scholars reluctant to impose anachronistic and unsubstantiated 
models onto the ancient NT text.22 There is, to be sure, much to be gained by using 
modern theory in the study of biblical literature; theories, frameworks, and models 
can at the very least function as useful heuristic tools ‘for the purpose of developing 
new approaches to and opening up new questions about early Christianity’.23 Still, 
the criticisms directed toward Holmberg’s analysis have served to remind 
                                                        
18 Bengt Holmberg, Paul and Power: The Structure of Authority in the Primitive Church as Reflected 
in the Pauline Epistles (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 203. Holmberg charges Schütz and his 
methodological predecessors with committing ‘the fallacy of idealism’. 
19 Holmberg, Power, 55-56. 
20 Holmberg, Power, 70-93.  
21 Holmberg, Power, 116. 
22 E. A. Judge, 'The Social Identity of the First Christians: A Question of Method in Religious 
History', Journal of Religious History 11 (1980): 201–17, at 210; cf. Clarke, Secular, 3-6. 
23 David G. Horrell, 'Models and Methods in Social-Scientific Interpretation: A Response to 
Philip Esler', JSNT 78 (2000): 83-105, at 93. See also, e.g., Philip F. Esler, 'Models in New Testament 
Interpretation: A Reply to David Horrell', JSNT 78 (2000): 107-113; David G. Horrell, 'Whither Social-
Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation: Reflections on Contested Methodologies and 
the Future', in Urban Christians (2009), 6-20. 
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interpreters of the need to verify interpretive claims and methodologies with 
sufficient historical data. As Holmberg himself remarks, 
[A] detailed knowledge of the historical setting of the early Christians is indispensable for any 
historical reconstruction of their real life. Historiography cannot operate without historical data 
that can serve as evidence, nor can it neglect any available historical data, just because they cannot 
be easily fitted into one’s own outlook or ‘model’. Socio-historical fieldwork is what hypotheses, 
models, and theories work on and are constructed from. This means also that models or theories 
cannot substitute for evidence, by filling in gaps in the data, as it were.24 
Future efforts to elucidate and appraise Paul’s apostolic authority, therefore, must 
situate Paul’s letters in their historic context and validate the use of theory with 
sufficient ancient evidence. 
This warning is particularly germane for critics who are expressly suspicious 
of the apostle’s exercise of authority and have sought to expose its suppressive 
nature without reconstructing the context in which it was employed. Graham Shaw, 
for instance, while conceding that Paul’s letters advocate liberation and 
reconciliation, (aggressively) argues that those tenets are wholly incompatible with 
the oppressive ethos of Paul’s political practice.25 Paul’s assertion of authority is, 
according to Shaw, ‘complex but unrelenting’, as he manipulated churches to rely 
on him, all the while concealing his dependence on them and alienating those 
believers who failed to ally.26 Further, Paul’s abusive exercise of power is to be 
credited to the apostle’s mistaken sense of authorisation. ‘[T]he brittle, arbitrary 
and divisive nature of Paul’s leadership’, Shaw remarks, ‘is intimately connected 
with self-delusion about the resurrection, and a mistaken value attributed to 
charismatic phenomena’.27 Targeting several Pauline letters, in addition to Mark’s 
Gospel, Shaw has particularly harsh words for Paul’s rhetoric in 1 Corinthians: 
This letter, which contains the most famous of all Paul’s writings, the lyrical passage on love in ch. 
13, is in other respects an exercise of magisterial authority. Its keynote is struck in the second verse 
– the Lordship of Christ. In the name of that Lord Paul demands unity and obedience. He is to be seen 
subduing critics, subjecting the faithful to his unsolicited censure, and giving firm rulings to their 
most intimate queries. It is a style that the officials of the Vatican can rightly claim as their own. It is 
perhaps a sign of Paul’s confidence in the exercise of his authority that only a few verses of the letter 
are devoted to prayer. He briefly thanks God for the spiritual achievement of the Corinthians . . . and 
                                                        
24 Bengt Holmberg, 'The Methods of Historical Reconstruction in the Scholarly "Recovery" of 
Corinthian Christianity', in Christianity at Corinth (2004), 255-71, at 269-70. Cf. Bengt Holmberg, 
Sociology and the New Testament: An Appraisal (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990). 
25 Graham Shaw, The Cost of Authority: Manipulation and Freedom in the New Testament 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 181-84. Despite his criticisms of Paul’s assertion of authority, Shaw 
attempts to maintain the integrity and non-malicious intentions of Paul by conceding that the 
apostle was learning to wed theology and practice throughout his career: ‘[A]lthough the texts 
contain much anxiety, aggression and illusion, they also portray a man learning to exercise freedom 
and love’ (184). 
26 Shaw, Authority, 181. 
27 Shaw, Authority, 182.  
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declares his confidence that God will maintain their loyalty – sentiments which both confirm the 
Corinthians in their position of obedience and rule out of court the possibility of their defection. 
Here he needs neither to flatter nor cajole, and so he proceeds to command.28 
But though Shaw’s concerns are refreshingly candid, his rhetoric is habitually 
overstated and his analysis fails to place any of Paul’s discourses in their historic 
contexts. As Dunn remarks with reference to Shaw’s criticisms on 1 Corinthians, ‘A 
fairer reading . . . would be much more sensitive to the rhetorical character of the 
letter and to the social factors at play in Corinth, particularly when we cannot hear 
the other sides of the debates and do not know how much the issues were caught up 
in the social tensions of Corinth, not least between patrons and their clients’.29 
Elizabeth Castelli’s treatment of Paul’s call to μιμήσις, though it offers 
another stimulating appraisal of the apostle’s ‘strategy of power’, ultimately suffers 
from a similar kind of contextual neglect.30 Critical of past interpreters who ‘either 
have ignored the implicit articulation of power present in the advocacy of mimetic 
relations or have rendered the power relationship unproblematic and self-
evident’,31 Castelli has sought, on the basis of the theory of Michel Foucault, to 
expose the power buried in Paul’s rhetoric by showing how the perpetuation of 
sameness was used to repress deviance and proliferate a single Christian ideology—
Paul’s own—with the ultimate consequence of monopolising truth and determining 
who would and would not be saved. Castelli’s thesis has particular relevance for 1 
Corinthians, where Paul’s call to become his imitators surfaces twice and in key 
sections within the letter (4.16; 11.1). ‘Imitation of Paul in both contexts (4:16 and 
11:1)’, Castelli states, ‘has to do fundamentally with the social arrangement of the 
Corinthian community (unity and identity) and always refers back to the singular 
authoritative model of Paul’.32 But Castelli’s insistence on Paul’s manipulation of the 
Corinthians fails to account for how his call to imitation originally functioned in the 
letter, that is, as a pattern of sacrificing one’s authority, rather than exploiting it (11.1; 
cf. 9.19). Castelli attempts to circumvent the matter of authorial intention by 
                                                        
28 Shaw, Authority, 62. 
29 Dunn, Theology, 575-76. 
30 Elizabeth A. Castelli, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power (Louisville: WJK, 1991), 15. 
31 Castelli, Imitating, 33. 
32 Castelli, Imitating, 114-15. See also Charles A. Wanamaker, 'A Rhetoric of Power: Ideology 
and 1 Corinthians 1-4', in Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of 
Margaret Thrall, ed. Trevor J. Burke and J. K. Elliott (NovTSup 109; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 115-37, who is 
indebted to Castelli’s approach and further emphasises Paul’s use of ideology to assert power. 
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dismissing its accessibility to modern exegetes.33 As Margaret Mitchell has noted, 
however, such neglect is at odds with Castelli’s own rhetoric as well as the 
postmodern theory on which her thesis rests.34 Moreover, once the socio-rhetorical 
context of 1 Corinthians is given fuller attention, it is plain that the Corinthians, not 
Paul, were those fixated on power.35 
Sandra Polaski, who is also informed by Foucauldian methods of detecting 
power, analyses Paul’s autobiographical discourses in order to move behind what 
Paul states about his power to identify what Paul implies about it. While she wishes 
neither to apply a ‘hostile reading’ to the text, nor ‘to vilify Paul’s power claims 
from the outset’, nor ‘to dismiss them as deceitfully self-serving’, Polaski openly 
employs a hermeneutic of suspicion whereby she attempts to detect in Paul 
‘evidence of power relations which the surface meaning of the text may mask’.36 
This leads her to investigate Philemon, Galatians, and Paul’s references to the divine 
grace given to him (cf. 1 Cor 3.10) in order to demonstrate that the apostle 
possessed a sense of revelatory authority which he used to plead and persuade his 
audiences to obey. While he always left his audiences the opportunity to refuse, to 
do so would have clearly been an affront to him and, just as Castelli observed, would 
have resulted in placement outside the ideological community.37 
Although Shaw, Castelli, and Polaski have raised serious questions about the 
motives and effects of Paul’s apostolic authority, other scholars have suggested that 
the power relations operating between Paul and his communities were far more 
complex than those critics wish to realise. Ernest Best, for instance, while 
recognising that Paul possessed authority derived from the gospel, argued that Paul 
only made claim to his apostleship and apostolic authority when addressing his 
                                                        
33 It is significant that Scott, Power, 2, notes that a ‘power relation cannot . . . be identified 
unless there is some reference to the intentions and interests of the actors involved and, especially, 
to those of the principal’. 
34 Margaret M. Mitchell, 'Review: Elizabeth A. Castelli, Imitating Paul', Journal of Religion 72 
(1992): 581-82. 
35 Cf. Andrew D. Clarke, '"Be Imitators of Me": Paul's Model of Leadership', TynBul 49.2 (1998): 
329-60, at 342-47; Victor Copan, Saint Paul as Spiritual Director: An Analysis of the Imitation of Paul with 
Implications and Applications to the Practice of Spiritual Direction (Milton Keynes, England: Paternoster, 
2007), 181-218. 
36 Sandra Hack Polaski, Paul and the Discourse of Power (The Biblical Seminar 62; Gender, 
Culture, Theory 8; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 21. 
37 Polaski, Power, 71: ‘Paul moves from relationship-language that is already accepted by his 
readers . . . to another set of terms, commercial, familial, and even corporeal in nature, which, taken 
together, describe a universe in which Paul is very close to God in authority’. 
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relationship with other church leaders.38 In so doing Best attempted to mitigate the 
charge of Paul’s abuse of specifically apostolic authority, insisting that Paul exercised 
authority over his churches only on the basis of his status as their founder 
(‘father’).39 But Best’s distinction between Paul’s roles as apostle and church founder 
seems artificial; despite Best’s attempts to do so, there does not appear to be any 
reason to separate Paul’s apostolic and evangelistic roles. Moreover, how one can 
determine which role Paul occupies when he exercises authority over his converts 
seems to require evidence beyond what his letters provide. 
Kathy Ehrensperger has also given Paul’s exercise of apostolic authority a 
sympathetic reading, attempting to explain how Paul used his authority, not to 
suppress his churches, but to empower them toward Christian maturity. While she 
grants that Paul and others in the early Christian movement exercised power over 
their communities and operated within an asymmetrical hierarchy, Ehrensperger 
places Paul’s rhetoric in conversation with contemporary feminist theories of 
power in order to explain that Paul’s authority, far from being domineering, had a 
transformative objective which sought to enable the early believers to reach a status 
of maturity on par with their leaders.40 As Ehrensperger herself remarks, ‘Paul 
emphasizes again and again that the aim of his teaching is to empower those within 
his communities to support each other. He acts as a parent-teacher using power-over 
them to empower them and thus render himself, and the power-over exercised in 
this role, obsolete’.41 Ehrensperger’s approach involved analysing and re-evaluating 
many of the same metaphors and motifs examined by her predecessors, such as 
Paul’s grace language, apostleship terminology, parental metaphors, and imitation 
motif. But though her exegesis is socio-historically grounded and her thesis about 
the empowering role of the apostolate deserves serious consideration, the 
assumption that the apostles sought eventually to eliminate the ecclesial hierarchy 
seems unwarranted. At what point was apostolic authority rendered obsolete, and 
was this goal actually achievable, or simply hypothetical? Ehrensperger simply goes 
beyond the evidence when she utilises her framework to expose this ecclesiological 
goal. 
                                                        
38 Ernest Best, 'Paul's Apostolic Authority–?', JSNT 27 (1986): 3-25, at 8-12, 22. 
39 Best, 'Authority': 12-18. 
40 Kathy Ehrensperger, Paul and the Dynamics of Power: Communication and Interaction in the 
Early Christ-Movement (LNTS 325; London: T&T Clark, 2007), 179. 
 41 Ehrensperger, Power, 136 (original emphasis). 
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3. Authority Contested 
As well as understanding the social context of power, one of the most 
significant complications with analysing Paul’s power and authority in Corinth was 
that there were within and without the community various contestants for power 
and various understandings of it. Reconstructing the competing power relations 
operative in the church therefore is an essential hermeneutical step in the 
interpretive process. Although there is certainly no consensus in modern 
scholarship about the precise social circumstances facing the community at the 
time 1 Corinthians was written, what is known (or hitherto found to be historically 
plausible) must be taken into serious consideration, especially when assessing Paul’s 
power claims and assertions. As Dunn explains, ‘Difficult though it is, the 
reconstruction of social context is necessary for any full understanding of the 
letter’; indeed, ‘as different reconstructions are proffered, or as different facets of 
the complex historical context of 1 Corinthians are illuminated, so different 
emphases and facets of the letter itself will be thrown into prominence (and others 
into shadow)’.42 
Dunn’s warning is particularly applicable in our case. Few would object, for 
instance, that one of the major ethical failings of the Corinthian community was its 
preoccupation with personal power as expressed through honour, boasting, and 
patronage, and perhaps most apparent in its political, legal, and dietary disputes.43 
Thus, L. L. Welborn has rightly and memorably remarked, ‘It is a power struggle, not 
a theological controversy, which motivates the writing of 1 Corinthians 1-4’.44 
Intensifying these local feuds still further was the disproportionate power and 
patronage ascribed to individual leaders, including not only apostolic figures such 
as Paul, Apollos, and Cephas, but perhaps also local dissenters, such as the 
Corinthian prophetesses and popular orators.45 Finally, it is important also to recall 
the role occupied by God/Christ in Paul’s apostolic ministry, particularly as the one 
who exercised power over him and promised to judge his ministry upon its 
                                                        
42 James D. G. Dunn, 'Reconstructions of Corinthian Christianity and the Interpretation of 1 
Corinthians', in Christianity at Corinth (2004), 295-310, at 296, 309. 
43 See, e.g., John K. Chow, Patronage and Power: A Study of Social Networks in Corinth (JSNTSup 
75; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 113-66; Clarke, Secular, 59-107. 
44 L. L. Welborn, 'On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Ancient Politics', JBL 106 
(1987): 85-111, at 89. 
45 Antoinette Clark Wire, The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul's 
Rhetoric (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990); Bruce W. Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists: Alexandrian 
and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). 
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completion. These kinds of power relations must be factored into any discussion of 
Paul’s portrayal and assertion of apostolic authority, as they are foundational to the 
reconstruction of the occasion of the letter and indispensible for identifying its 
rhetorical, perhaps even apologetic, objectives. 
 
4. Summary 
As this survey has shown, Pauline interpreters have employed a variety of 
methods and approaches in an effort to elucidate Paul’s apostolic authority. But 
generally speaking, those who investigate the concept restrict their analyses either 
(ideologically) to the construction of Paul’s authority or (sociologically) to his 
assertion of authority. For Paul, however, theology is inseparable from practice and 
thus it is important that both aspects be examined together when possible. It was 
also shown that many studies neglect certain fundamental hermeneutical factors 
which should be accounted for when addressing apostolic power and authority. 
Scholars utilising modern theories of analysis are especially prone to identify power 
claims without adequately demonstrating that such forms and expressions of power 
are substantied by historical data. Beyond this, many of these same studies ignore 
that there were in Corinth various contestants for power whose own power 
assertions disrupted the community and thus set the tone for Paul’s subsequent 
response. Because Paul’s power relations are so complex, it is important that his 
exercise of authority not be, as Andrew Clarke warns, ‘treated in simplified terms, 
essentially dealing exclusively with Paul’s mechanisms of asserting power’.46 Rather, 
as Clarke recommends, ‘Paul’s power rhetoric and his power dealings need to be 
explored within their wider context, including the ways in which Paul defined the 
limits of his power, the ways in which he undermined the power that was inherent 
in his own position, [and] how he responded to the power plays of others’.47 What is 
needed, therefore, is an investigation that considers both Paul’s construction and 
assertion of authority and that is sensitive to the letter’s socio-historical and 
rhetorical contexts. 
 
                                                        
46 Andrew D. Clarke, A Pauline Theology of Church Leadership (LNTS 362; London: T&T Clark, 
2008), 106; cf. 108-109. 
47 Clarke, Theology, 106. 
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B. Paul, the Oikonomos of God: A Neglected Metaphor 
One apostolic image that too often goes overlooked, yet can be utilised to 
address the concerns raised by Clarke, is Paul’s portrayal of apostleship as an 
administration (οἰκονομία).48 Paul’s oikonomos metaphor appears in two important 
passages in 1 Corinthians (4.1-5; 9.16-23) and in each pericope he reveals that his 
apostleship was being criticised by his own converts. Paul, therefore, employs the 
metaphor in both texts to correct fundamental misunderstandings about his 
apostolic role, rights, and responsibilities. The strategic placement of this metaphor, 
in fact, indicates that Paul thought it accurately communicated his chief apostolic 
attributes; indeed, the initial directive in 1 Cor 4.1 (οὕτως ἡμᾶς λογιζέσθω 
ἄνθρωpiος) shows that Paul probably considered this metaphor to be a better 
illustration of the apostolate for his current readership than the other images he 
deployed in 1 Corinthians 3-4. Further, Paul’s reinstatement of the same metaphor 
in 9.17 is suggestive of his continued confidence in the image’s ability to convey his 
role to this particular church. But beyond this, Paul’s metaphor affords a promising 
way into analysing Paul’s construction and assertion of authority in 1 Corinthians. 
Both 1 Cor 4.1-5 and 9.16-23 provide the reader with a portrait of apostleship and 
the authority inherent in that position in addition to showing how the apostle 
asserted (or even refused to assert) his authority in an effort to resolve specific 
problems in the church. Paul’s use of this metaphor, therefore, provides a multi-
faceted portrait of apostleship and emphasises aspects of his authority which many 
previous scholarly investigations have overlooked. 
Unfortunately, there remains much confusion and debate in Pauline studies 
about the oikonomos metaphor and the way that Paul used it to portray his 
apostleship. This confusion is, on the surface, due to the fact that there have been 
an insufficient number of studies completed on the metaphor by biblical scholars; 
                                                        
48 The terms οἰκονόμος and οἰκονομία are used metaphorically with reference to apostleship 
in four passages in the Pauline epistles. Although Paul uses οἰκονόμος in Rom 16.23 for the civic 
magistracy held by Erastus and in Gal 4.2 as a metaphor for the pre-Christian function of the Mosaic 
Law, the only undisputed Pauline letter where the metaphor is used in relation to apostleship is 1 
Corinthians, where it appears in 4.1-2 (οἰκονόμος [2x]) and 9.17 (οἰκονομία). In the disputed letters, 
the abstract noun οἰκονομία appears metaphorically for Paul’s apostolic commission twice, in Col 
1.25 and Eph 3.2; οἰκονόμος is also used in Titus 1.7 as a metaphor for the role of an ἐpiίσκοpiος and 
oἰκονομία surfaces in Eph 1.10, 3.9, and 1 Tim 1.4 for the divine plan/administration of God. The 
metaphor is also implied in the NT Haustafeln; cf. J. Albert Harrill, 'Subordinate to Another: Elite 
Slaves in the Agricultural Handbooks and the Household Codes', in Slaves in the New Testament: 
Literary, Social, and Moral Dimensions (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 85-117. 
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there exists, for instance, no book-length treatment to date exclusively devoted to 
explaining this analogy, whether in 1 Corinthians or anywhere else in Paul. But this 
oversight by biblical scholars is perhaps only indicative of the fact that there is a 
general unfamiliarity with the concept among ancient historians; indeed, there 
remains a conspicuous lacuna even in ancient historical scholarship due to the lack 
of a definitive treatment of the term οἰκονόμος by classicists. Although some 
studies have been conducted on the use of the Greek terms οἰκονόμος, οἰκονομία, 
and related terminology, they are few, quite dated, generally lack accessibility as 
unpublished doctoral theses, and have limited aims so that they do not bring much 
light to bear directly on Paul’s metaphor.49 As will be demonstrated in this study, in 
fact, Paul’s oikonomos metaphor assumes knowledge about the socio-legal and 
economic world of the first-century Roman empire that is not immediately obvious 
in 1 Corinthians and which previous studies of Paul’s metaphor have not adequately 
addressed heretofore. 
What is more, certain recent treatments of Paul’s metaphor have failed to 
notice how the title oikonomos was used in antiquity and have as a consequence 
advanced interpretations built on almost no evidence, or have misused source 
materials to construct arguments which their evidence does not adequately 
support. It is important at the outset, therefore, to raise the following questions: 
What were the main contexts in which oikonomoi appeared in antiquity? What were 
the major social, legal, and structural differences between oikonomoi in each of those 
contexts? What kind of oikonomos did Paul portray himself to be? What were the 
attributes of oikonomoi that Paul was applying to his apostolic role through the 
metaphor? Addressing these socio-historical and exegetical issues will comprise the 
bulk of the following study, since the answers to these questions will determine how 
the relevant Pauline texts are to be interpreted and how Paul’s apostleship and 
apostolic authority should therefore be comprehended. 
 
 
                                                        
49 Peter Landvogt, 'Epigraphische Untersuchungen über den Οἰκονόμος: Ein Beitrag zum 
hellenistischen Beamtenwesen' (PhD Diss., Univ. of Strassburg, 1908); John Reumann, 'The Use of 
"Oikonomia" and Related Terms in Greek Sources to about A.D. 100, as a Background for Patristic 
Applications' (PhD Diss., Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1957). Cf. Karin Lehmeier, Oikos und Oikonomia: Antike 
Konzepte der Haushaltsführung und der Bau der Gemeinde bei Paulus (Marburger theologische Studien 92; 
Marburg: Elwert, 2006). 
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C. Survey of Interpretations of Paul’s Oikonomos Metaphor 
Paul’s portrayal of himself as an oikonomos in 1 Cor 4.1-2 and 9.17 has long 
been recognised as a metaphor whose source domain50 is found somewhere in the 
administrative landscape of the first-century world. But while the oikonomos 
metaphor has significant implications for Paul’s theology of Christian apostleship, 
the precise social context and connotations of the analogy remain disputed in 
Pauline scholarship. Some interpreters, for instance, have proposed that Paul 
adopted the title from the administration of religious cults (John Reumann), while 
others have suggested that it was taken from estate management (Dale Martin). 
Again some suggest that Paul borrowed the metaphor from Jewish apocalyptic 
(Benjamin Gladd), others propose Graeco-Roman philosophy (Abraham Malherbe), 
and still others are reluctant to identify a specific area of derivation, since oikonomoi 
were ubiquitous in Paul’s world.51 But failing to identify the metaphor’s source 
domain accurately will bring, and indeed has already brought, confusion onto Paul’s 
apostolic self-portrayal. Not only do the various opinions about the metaphor 
attribute competing legal statuses to Paul’s apostolic profile, which affects, for 
instance, the social perception of apostleship as well as how one regards the 
volitional aspect of his preaching in 1 Corinthians 9, but the failure to distinguish 
between source domains can easily lead to the indiscriminate use of source materials. 
It is therefore critical that Paul’s metaphor be situated in the right context in order 
to ensure that it is interpreted accurately. 
A number of alternative source domains for the oikonomos metaphor have 
been proposed by Pauline interpreters. Some interpreters, for instance, following 
the religionsgeschichtliche Schule, have attempted to locate the origin of Paul’s 
oikonomos metaphor in the religious matrix of the Graeco-Roman world. In the 
middle of the last century, John Reumann pursued the expression οἰκονόμους 
                                                        
50 Zoltán Kövecses, Metaphor: A Practical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
4: ‘The conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another 
conceptual domain is called source domain, while the conceptual domain that is understood this way 
is the target domain. . . . The target domain is the domain that we try to understand through the use 
of the source domain’. 
51 See, e.g., Wilfred Tooley, 'Stewards of God: An Examination of the Terms οἰκονόμος and 
οἰκονομία in the New Testament', SJT 19 (1966): 74-86, at 75-76, who considers 1 Cor 4.1-2 to be ‘the 
most pregnant use of the metaphor in the NT’, yet fails to suggest a possible source domain despite 
having already distinguished between the private and civic contexts. See also the indecision of 
Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 83; Richard A. Horsley, 1 Corinthians (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), 67, 
129-30; Collins, First Corinthians, 168-69; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary (AYB; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 212. 
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μυστηρίων θεοῦ (1 Cor 4.1) by examining a number of Greek inscriptions that depict 
variously ranked oikonomoi in a range of religious capacities. Reumann then 
proposed that Paul may have adopted the title ‘stewards of the mysteries of God’ 
from the religious world of his day, especially the mystery cults. Reumann 
remarked, 
[R]ather than any . . . theological explanation, it is the background in Greco-Roman life and use of 
the term with already existing religious connotations which provide the immediate and most 
obvious insight into Paul's designation of himself and others as “stewards of God” and his mysteries; 
as in other instances, he is borrowing terminology current in the religious world of his day.52 
But despite Reumann’s impressive sample of texts featuring oikonomoi performing 
religious rites and responsibilities, the mystery cult hypothesis influenced very few 
interpreters. Not only does the reading fail to account for the monetary use of the 
metaphor apparent in 1 Cor 9.17 where Paul’s apostolic wage (μισθός) is the issue in 
dispute, but nearly a decade later Reumann himself abandoned his own proposal in 
favour of a more ambiguous reading.53 Moreover, in this later work Reumann 
intimated that the phrase ‘stewards of the mysteries of God’ may have in fact been a 
Semitism borrowed from Second Temple Judaism, a theory that continues to carry 
some currency in modern scholarship. 
The Semitic hypothesis has, for instance, been advocated by Benjamin Gladd 
in his recent monograph on Paul’s use of μυστήριον in 1 Corinthians. Although 
Gladd concedes that ‘Paul may have invented this stewardship metaphor without 
                                                        
52 John Reumann, '"Stewards of God": Pre-Christian Religious Application of Oikonomos in 
Greek', JBL 77 (1958): 339-49, at 349. Cf. Hans Windisch, Paulus und Christus: Ein biblisch-
religionsgeschichtlicher Vergleich (Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 24; Leipzig: 1934), 221. Much 
of Reumann’s work in Paul was directed against Oscar Cullmann’s decontextualised rendering of 
oikonomia as Heilsgeschichte. Cullmann’s application of the word was largely influenced by the term’s 
later-Pauline occurrences (Eph 1.10; 3.2, 9; Col 1.25); cf. Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive 
Christian Conception of Time and History (trans. Floyd V. Filson; London: SCM, 1951), 33. Cullmann, Christ 
and Time, 223, then imported this later cosmic sense into Paul’s self-designation as an ‘oikonomos of 
God’s mysteries’ (1 Cor 4.1) to the effect that Paul’s metaphor indicated that the apostle was not just 
entrusted ‘an administration of the divine teaching about salvation but also of the active realization 
of the redemptive history’. In support of Cullmann’s reading is the fact that a number of patristic 
authors subsequently utilised oikonomia to refer to God’s cosmic plan of redemption; cf. Gerhard 
Richter, Oikonomia: Der Gebrauch des Wortes Oikonomia im Neuen Testament, bei den Kirchenvätern und in 
der theologischen Literatur bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 90; Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2005). Nevertheless, John Reumann, 'ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ-Terms in Paul in Comparison with Lucan 
Heilsgeschichte', NTS 13 (1966-67): 147-67, convincingly showed that the earlier Pauline uses of 
oikonomia-terminology do not refer to God’s redemptive plan. 
53 Reumann, 'ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ-Terms': 161. Still, John Reumann, Stewardship & the Economy of God 
(Library of Christian Stewardship; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 14, maintains that the mystery 
cult interpretation would have resonated with many in Paul’s world. But as Wolfgang Schrage, Der 
erste Brief an die Korinther (EKK 7; Zurich: Benziger, 1991), 1:321, maintains, ‘Obwohl ihnen nach Paulus 
μυστήρια θεοῦ anvertraut sind, ist zu bezweifeln, daß der Sprachgebrauch der Mysterienkulte von 
Einfluß war. Die Apostel sind keine Mystagogen’. 
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any reference to the OT, Second Temple Judaism, or Mystery Religions’, Gladd 
observes certain resonances between 1 Cor 4.1-5 and the Greek text of Daniel which 
eventually leads him to suppose that Paul’s oikonomos metaphor was a familiar topos 
in Jewish apocalyptic.54 But Gladd’s proposal fails to convince, since, as he himself 
admits, the Greek phrase is found nowhere in Jewish literature or anywhere else in 
Graeco-Roman antiquity.55 Raymond Brown and Markus Bockmuehl, on the other 
hand, suggest that a Hebrew parallel may in fact exist from Qumran, both briefly 
noting the similarities between Paul’s designation of apostles as οἰκονόμοι 
μυστηρίων (1 Cor 4.1) and the phrase hkyzrl trm#m y#n[)] (‘the men who guard 
your mysteries’ [1Q36 16.2]).56 The resemblance is certainly striking, but we should 
not minimise the differences between the actions and responsibilities implied in the 
Greek noun οἰκονόμος and the Hebrew verb rm#, especially because the former was 
directed to Gentile urbanites and the latter to sectarian Jews. While there may be 
some functional overlap implied between the two terms, they are not strictly 
equivalent, οἰκονόμος implying the administration and often accumulation of 
resources and rm# indicating protection and safekeeping more generally. 
Furthermore, the fragmentary nature of 1Q36 leaves us with virtually nothing by 
which to identify who the guardians were and how they were supposed to protect 
their mysteries, rendering the text basically useless to interpreters of Paul’s 
metaphor.57 Beyond this, a Jewish apocalyptic context, just as the mystery religions 
hypothesis, fails to offer an explanation for Paul’s clear monetary use of the 
metaphor in 1 Cor 9.17. 
                                                        
54 Benjamin L. Gladd, Revealing the Mysterion: The Use of Mystery in Daniel and Second Temple 
Judaism with Its Bearings on First Corinthians (BZNW 160; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 172. Gladd, 
who regards Daniel as a ‘steward of mysteries’, argues that the shared use of εὑρίσκω and piιστός in 1 
Cor 4.2 and Dan 6.4 [Theo] substantiates the claim that Paul was alluding to the Danielic episode. But 
in the latter text, εὑρίσκω has no syntactical relationship with piιστός; God is not even the subject of 
the verb, as he is implied to be in 1 Cor 4.2. 
55 Gladd, Mysterion, 171; cf. Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism 
and Pauline Christianity (WUNT 2/36; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1990), 166 n. 42. The 
infrequent and insignificant use of οἰκονομία-terminology in the LXX (οἰκονομέω [3x]; οἰκονόμος 
[15x]; οἰκονομία [2x]) has been noted by Reumann, 'ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ-Terms': 151. 
56 Raymond E. Brown, 'The Semitic Background of the New Testament Mysterion', Biblica 39 
(1958): 426-48, at 441; Raymond E. Brown, The Semitic Background of the Term "Mystery" in the New 
Testament (Facet Books/Biblical Series 21; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968), 45; Bockmuehl, Revelation, 
166. 
57 Such is perhaps the reason why neither Brown nor Bockmuehl suggest that 1Q36 in any 
way illumines the Pauline phrase, and why Gladd, Mysterion, 270, who is aware of the text, draws no 
comparisons between it and 1 Cor 4.1. Even A. E. Harvey, 'The Use of Mystery Language in the Bible', 
JTS 31 (1980): 320-36, at 331, who refers to the Qumran expression as an ‘almost exact equivalent’ to 
the Pauline metaphor, cannot exclude the possibility of other Pauline influences. 
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It has also become common in recent years to propose that Paul adopted his 
oikonomos metaphor from the Hellenistic moral philosophers. Abraham Malherbe, 
for instance, followed by John Byron and Lincoln Galloway, suggests that Paul’s use 
of the analogy in 1 Cor 9.17 should be read in the light of the figurative use of 
oikonomos in Epictetus (Diatr. 3.22.3).58 Epictetus’ oikonomos metaphor has as its target 
domain the ‘true Cynic’, and likens the person who assumes the Cynic lifestyle 
without first being assigned to it by God to the person who appoints himself to be 
the oikonomos of a well-ordered house and begins insolently giving orders; he will of 
course be disciplined by his κύριος. But though there are fascinating similarities 
between Epictetus’ construal of the true Cynic and Paul’s portrayal of Christian 
apostleship (cf. Diatr. 3.22.23; 1 Cor 1.17), those who rely exclusively on Epictetus’ 
metaphor to make sense of Paul’s analogy face one major problem: Epictetus’ 
portrayal of the true Cynic as an oikonomos is itself a metaphor! Epictetus, just as 
Paul, drew from a particular source domain, namely estate management, and then 
applied very specific attributes of the manager to the Cynic, several of which are 
different than what Paul himself underscores. Conspicuously absent from Epictetus’ 
metaphor, for instance, is the subject of money. Yet remuneration is plainly a 
central concern in Paul’s metaphor in 1 Cor 9.17. Therefore, unless it can be 
demonstrated that Paul and Epictetus used their metaphors identically, which they 
clearly did not, then it is imperative that the interpreter trace Paul’s oikonomos 
metaphor back to its original, literal source domain prior to applying attributes to 
the apostle. 
The most common approach to Paul’s oikonomos metaphor has been to 
interpret it against the backdrop of literal, managerial slavery. Dale Martin’s 
treatment of the metaphor has been particularly influential in this respect. Martin, 
who limits his focus to 1 Corinthians 9, argues that the expression οἰκονομίαν 
piεpiίστευμαι (9.17) implied that Paul identified himself as Christ’s enslaved, 
                                                        
58 Abraham J. Malherbe, 'Determinism and Free Will in Paul: The Argument of 1 Corinthians 
8 and 9', in Paul in His Hellenistic Context, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1994), 231-55, at 249-51; John Byron, Slavery Metaphors in Early Judaism and Pauline Christianity: A 
Traditio-Historical and Exegetical Examination (WUNT 2/162; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 249-53; 
Lincoln E. Galloway, Freedom in the Gospel: Paul's Exemplum in 1 Cor 9 in Conversation with the Discourses of 
Epictetus and Philo (CBET 38; Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 184-86. 
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representative leader.59 Although most biblical scholars regard ancient slavery only 
as a brutal and oppressive institution, Martin sought to demonstrate that slavery 
functioned for some in the Roman world as an opportunity for social advancement. 
Slaves legally had no family, possessed no money, and were normally restricted to a 
low social status. Martin, however, through an extensive use of literary and non-
literary evidence, argued that some slaves circumvented these restrictions, 
acquiring spouses, children, allowances (peculia), and even relatively prominent 
social standing, experiencing significant social mobility through association with a 
high-power owner. Martin, therefore, contended that Paul’s metaphorical depiction 
of himself as the οἰκονόμος of the divine κύριος would have elicited a positive 
impression from persons of a low social condition. While free persons within the 
church would have responded negatively to Paul’s menial self-representation, 
slaves and others from humble origins would have regarded the metaphor as a 
designation of power and authority.60 
But even as many interpreters agree that the phrase οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι 
(9.17) indicates a claim to slavery and leadership, others contend that the title is 
legally ambiguous and cannot support the social implications advanced by Martin. 
Murray Harris, for example, states that Paul’s designation in 1 Cor 9.17 ‘scarcely 
validates the inference that Paul views himself as a high-status managerial slave 
(oikonomos) in Christ’s household, especially since Paul has already used that actual 
term oikonomos twice in the same letter in reference to stewards who are 
commissioned to expound “the mysteries of God” (1 Cor. 4:1-2), “managers” 
authorized to divulge God’s hidden truths (= the gospel), a role that in fact makes 
Paul “the scum of the earth” (1 Cor. 4:13)’.61 Harris also challenges the assumption 
that either Paul or the Corinthians would have associated managerial slavery with 
                                                        
59 Dale B. Martin, Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); cf. Ritva H. Williams, Stewards, Prophets, Keepers of the Word: 
Leadership in the Early Church (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2006), 76-83; Lehmeier, Oikonomia, 219-65. 
60 Martin, Slavery, 84: ‘It is important to see . . .  that up through [1 Cor] 9:18, according to one 
form of discourse, at least, Paul has made no move toward humility or self-lowering, even though he 
has defined himself as a slave of Christ. He has, however, redefined the categories for leadership and 
authority. Instead of thinking about leaders in the normal ways—as patrons, wealthy, kings, those 
who are free and do as they will—Paul moves the debate into the common discourses of early 
Christianity, which talks of its leaders as slaves of Christ. Again, this is not to make Christian leaders 
less powerful or authoritative but to insist that the discussion be carried on in the context of 
Christian discourse rather than in that of the upper class or of moral philosophers. Far from giving 
up his authority, Paul seeks in 9:1-18 to establish it beyond question’. 
61 Murray J. Harris, Slave of Christ: A New Testament Metaphor for Total Devotion to Christ (NSBT 8; 
Downers Grove; Leicester: IVP; Apollos, 1999), 129. 
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the positive social implications advanced by Martin. According to Harris, 
managerial slaves ‘formed such a small minority that we may question whether that 
particular connotation of slavery would have ousted the dominant notion of slavery 
as humble subjection to a master in the minds of Paul’s converts’.62 Moreover, ‘Any 
suggestion of Paul’s personal concern about “status” . . . seems foreign to an 
evangelist-pastor who earlier in 1 Corinthians has depicted himself and the other 
apostles as doomed gladiators entering the arena of human scorn at the end of the 
procession (1 Cor. 4:9-10), and who aligned himself with menial slavery by pursuing 
the servile, manual trade of tent-making (Acts 18:3)’.63 
John Byron has also challenged Martin’s treatment of the oikonomos 
metaphor. Byron conducted his study firstly by critically assessing Martin’s 
historical analysis of oikonomoi, especially in the inscriptions, and eventually 
assembled a case for the legal ambiguity of the title.64 Unlike Martin, Byron took 
into consideration Paul’s metaphor in 1 Cor 4.1-2, where Paul used ὑpiηρέτης 
together with οἰκονόμος. But while Byron supposed that the title οἰκονόμος is 
legally ambiguous, he argued that ὑpiηρέτης plainly indicates free status. This, along 
with an untraditional reading of 1 Cor 9.17, led Byron to conclude that Paul’s 
oikonomos metaphor implies that Paul was a free-will servant. 
But Byron’s analysis is not without its own problems. In his reassessment of 
the legal status of oikonomoi, Byron failed to distinguish between the very different 
kinds of administrators in antiquity that bore this one title, comparing municipal 
oikonomoi of the likes of Erastus from Rom 16.23 with private oikonomoi of the likes of 
the Unjust Steward from Luke 16.1-8.65 Such is an obvious case of verbal 
parallelomania (‘excerpt versus context’),66 for Byron conflates the evidence, 
assuming that different kinds of oikonomoi in antiquity can at once serve as 
appropriate parallels for Paul’s use of the term in 1 Corinthians. Nevertheless, Byron 
(perhaps inadvertently) has brought into question Martin’s assumption that 
                                                        
62 Harris, Slave, 129-30. 
63 Harris, Slave, 130. 
64 Byron, Slavery, 241-53; also published as John Byron, 'Slave of Christ or Willing Servant? 
Paul's Self-Description in 1 Corinthians 4:1-2 and 9:16-18', Neotestamentica 37 (2003): 179-98. 
65 Byron, Slavery, 243-44. 
66 Samuel Sandmel, 'Parallelomania', JBL 81 (1962): 1-13, at 7: ‘It would seem to me to follow 
that, in dealing with similarities we can sometimes discover exact parallels, some with and some 
devoid of significance; seeming parallels which are so only imperfectly; and statements which can be 
called parallels only by taking them out of context. I must go on to allege that I encounter from time to 
time scholarly writings which go astray in this last regard. It is the question of excerpt versus context’ 
(emphasis added). 
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managerial slavery serves as the most plausible source domain of Paul’s metaphor.67 
It is therefore imperative that we revisit the ancient evidence to identify from 
which source domain Paul was borrowing and what apostolic attributes the 
metaphor implies. 
 
D. Research Aims and Methods 
Given the confusion that continues to shroud the interpretation of Paul’s 
oikonomos metaphor, it is appropriate for us to revisit the issue in this study in order 
to provide clarity on those socio-historical, exegetical, and theological matters in 
dispute. The aims of the following project, then, are threefold. Firstly (socio-
historically), in Chapters 2-4 the main three administrative contexts in which the 
title oikonomos was used (regal, municipal, private) will be independently examined 
in order to illumine the varying social, structural, legal, and disciplinary 
characteristics associated with each context. The analyses of these contexts will 
enable us to develop a general profile of the oikonomoi who served in them so that in 
Chapter 5 those profiles can be compared to Paul’s own apostolic portrait 
constructed in 1 Cor 4.1-5 and 9.16-23. By comparing those profiles with the 
characteristics of Paul’s metaphor, a plausible source domain for the analogy will 
become apparent. Secondly (exegetically), after having identified the metaphor’s 
source domain, in Chapters 6-7 those two passages where Paul applies the metaphor 
(4.1-5; 9.16-23) will be analysed in order to determine how an accurate 
understanding of the analogy influences the interpretation of those important 
Pauline texts. Thirdly (theologically), in Chapter 8 (the conclusion), and on the basis 
of our understanding of how Paul utilised the oikonomos metaphor in 1 Corinthians, 
the implications of this self-portrayal will be articulated and their significance for 
Paul’s apostolic authority accounted for. 
 
1. Distinguishing Words and Concepts 
One of the key methodological contributions of this study will be the 
differentiation it makes between words and concepts in a way that certain previous 
studies have neglected. The first way this differentiation will be observed is by 
                                                        
67 Byron, for instance, has significantly influenced Galloway, Freedom, 184 n. 148. 
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distinguishing between the various persons (concepts) designated as oikonomoi. By 
giving careful attention to these diverse source domains, this study seeks to use the 
relevant source materials responsibly, so as to avoid any parallelomanic pitfalls. 
The second way that the word-concept distinction will be observed is by 
analysing each of those diverse roles (concepts), not only through the designation 
oikonomos, but when possible also through a variety of Greek synonyms and Latin 
correlatives. Along these lines L. Michael White and John Fitzgerald have 
emphasised the importance of examining ‘semantic fields’, rather than ‘individual 
key words’, when drawing parallels, warning that ‘the data used in making 
comparisons must not be restricted to instances of verbal identity or similarity’, 
since ‘[s]ome of the most striking parallels between Christian and non-Christian 
texts are primarily conceptual and involve little or no verbal agreement between 
the two’. ‘In future studies’, they therefore advise, ‘it will be crucial to investigate 
such terms, not simply in isolation from one another but as part of the conceptual 
“linkage group” to which they belong and with increased attention to the social 
worlds in which they are used. Similarly, attention will need to be given to 
combinations of Greek words as well as to equivalent terms and similar expressions 
in Latin and other languages’.68  
Awareness of both of these kinds of word-concept distinctions will be of 
central importance in this investigation, since each has been overlooked in previous 
studies. If, for example, Byron had focused on the same concept, or role, that Martin 
had expressly targeted, that is, private estate managers, Byron would have 
eliminated from his investigation those free oikonomoi who served in municipal roles 
and then probably reached different conclusions. Alternatively, had Byron opened 
up his study to Greek and Latin correlatives for private estate managers (e.g. 
ἐpiίτροpiος, piραγματευτής, vilicus, actor, dispensator), he would have also realised that 
the slave status of private oikonomoi during the Roman period was far more uniform 
than he supposed, since the legal status of estate managers is generally clearer in 
the evidence bearing those other terms. 
 
 
                                                        
68 L. M. White and J. T. Fitzgerald, 'Quod est comparandum: The Problem of Parallels', in Early 
Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald, 
T. H. Olbricht, and M. L. White (NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 13-39, at 31. 
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2. Utilising Ancient Sources 
There has been a growing concern among NT scholars over the past several 
decades regarding the kinds of extra-biblical materials which should be employed to 
establish an interpretive context for early Christianity. Those working especially in 
the Pauline epistles have been challenged to be discriminate about their use of 
ancient sources due to the limited light certain kinds of evidence can bring to bear 
on the sociocultural environment of Paul’s churches, not least the Corinthian 
community. According to Justin Meggitt, for instance, there exists ‘a fundamental 
problem that hampers all interpretations of the Corinthian epistles to a significant 
extent: the problem of dependence on elite sources (written and nonwritten)’.69 Meggitt 
remarks, ‘Although most scholars use a variety of sources in their analysis of the 
letters, and believe that their employment of them is increasingly sensitive and 
sophisticated, failure to recognise the atypical and unrepresentative nature of much of 
the material that is employed to reconstruct the context within which the letters 
are interpreted renders much of what is written about them of little value’.70 
Therefore, NT scholars, Meggitt maintains, must reconsider their ‘evidential 
presuppositions’ and ‘undergo a significant change in perspective’.71 Meggitt makes 
his recommendation clearer still: ‘If New Testament scholars wish to make sense of 
the preoccupations and expectations of both Paul and the Corinthian community, 
we must seek out . . . those sources, both literary and nonliterary, that give voice to 
the world of the nonelite, that articulate what could be termed the popular culture of 
the first century’.72 What precisely Meggitt means by ‘popular culture’ is less than 
clear. Nevertheless, his warning is applicable for many working in Pauline studies 
and 1 Corinthians in particular. One cannot simply assume that most or even many 
of the numerous extant literary works from antiquity characterise the thoughts and 
attitudes, practices and beliefs of the early believers just because they are 
contemporary, correspond geographically, and relate thematically with Paul’s 
letters. As Meggitt states, ‘If we wish to find more representative sources with 
which to construct our understanding of the context within which the Corinthian 
correspondence was written and read, and to interpret such sources appropriately, 
                                                        
69 Justin J. Meggitt, 'Sources: Use, Abuse, Neglect. The Importance of Ancient Popular 
Culture', in Christianity at Corinth (2004), 241-53, at 242 (original emphasis). 
70 Meggitt, 'Sources', 242 (original emphasis). 
71 Meggitt, 'Sources', 242 
72 Meggitt, 'Sources', 241-42 
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it is necessary to look beyond New Testament scholarship’ and ‘to benefit from 
those who have made the study of “popular culture” their central preoccupation’.73 
Accordingly, much of the evidence to be assembled in this study will rely on 
the work of classicists as well as social, economic, and legal historians, that is, the 
specialists in the periods, regions, and subjects central to this investigation. 
Moreover, the reconstructions will necessarily rely on an eclectic collection of 
evidence, including ancient literature, inscriptions, and papyri. Admittedly, when 
describing ancient forms of servile administration, every type of evidence has 
limitations. As J. Albert Harrill laments, ‘In the end, we find that none of our sources 
fulfills our expectations; together, they allow a reconstruction of slavery that few 
historians specializing in modern periods would find satisfactory’.74 But Harrill 
concedes that a diligent pursuit of reliable sources can result in a faithful 
reconstruction of ancient slavery. This requires that the highly informative 
theoretical sources (e.g. agricultural handbooks, novels, dreambooks, biblical 
literature, legal texts, etc.) be supplemented with actual portrayals of real-life slaves 
(e.g. inscriptions, papyri, etc.).75 Harrill, in fact, provides as an example how the 
profile of Petronius’ fictional and seemingly exaggerated ex-steward Trimalchio 
(Satyr. 26-78), an archetypal nouveau riche, is in certain ways validated by Seneca’s 
real-life counterpart Calvisius Sabinus (Ep. 27). ‘With care’, Harrill thus concludes, 
‘imaginative literature can yield important historical insights’.76 
Harrill’s sentiment is shared by Fergus Millar, whose analysis of Apuleius’ 
second-century CE novel the Metamorphoses reveals the historical and contextual 
insights that can be obtained from certain kinds of ancient fiction. ‘[T]he invented 
world of fiction’, Millar affirms, ‘may yet represent—perhaps cannot help 
representing—important features of the real world’.77 Similar kinds of general 
historical insights can also be ascertained from certain gospel parables. ‘At its 
simplest’, explained C. H. Dodd, ‘the parable is a metaphor or simile drawn from 
                                                        
73 Meggitt, 'Sources', 243 
74 J. Albert Harrill, The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity (HUT 32; Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1995), 29; cf. William Fitzgerald, Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination 
(Roman Literature and its Contexts; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8. 
75 Harrill, Manumission, 28-29. 
76 Harrill, Manumission, 29; cf. Kathleen McCarthy, Slaves, Masters, and the Art of Authority in 
Plautine Comedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8. 
77 Fergus Millar, 'The World of the Golden Ass', JRS 71 (1981): 63-75, at 75. 
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nature or common life’.78 More suitable definitions of the parable genre have been 
offered in recent years,79 but Dodd nonetheless discerns how several of Jesus’ 
parables reflect conceivable scenarios, and thus provide reasonably reliable data 
with which to produce sketches of the ancient world. Even Fabian Udoh, who 
remarks that the NT slave parables are, on the one hand, ‘literary constructs that 
transmit the slaveholders’ fantasies, fears, ideals, values, and agenda’ and therefore 
‘do not completely “reflect” the practice of slavery in the Roman Empire’, ultimately 
maintains that the parabolic slave, ‘if he is to be comprehensible’, must have ‘an 
underlying social reality’.80 Thus, in this investigation a host of sources will be 
utilised to reconstruct the relevant forms of ancient administration, not least 
ancient fiction and biblical parables for the private context. These theoretical and 
occasionally elitist sources will be especially useful in this investigation, since even 
Paul’s metaphor considers, to a certain extent, the expectations of his 
administrative superior (ζητεῖται ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις [1 Cor 4.2]). By relying on the 
testimonies of various kinds of texts, a range of voices will be heard and the 
portraits which are assembled will as a result be all the more reliable. 
Cognisant of these methodological concerns, this study will proceed now to 
analyse the various contexts and characteristics of oikonomoi as Graeco-Roman 
administrators. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
78 C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd, 1935), 16 (emphasis 
added). 
79 See, e.g., Klyne Snodgrass, Stories with Intent: A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 7-9. 
80 Fabian E. Udoh, 'The Tale of an Unrighteous Slave (Luke 16: 1-8 [13])', JBL 128 (2009): 311-
35, at 328. 
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Part 1. OIKONOMOI AS ADMINISTRATORS IN ANTIQUITY 
 
‘A good modern treatment of the office of the oeconomus is still a desideratum’.1 
Almost eighty years have passed since eminent ancient historian Michael 
Rostovtzeff expressed this lament, yet the scholarly lacuna remains. This is not to 
suggest that in modern scholarship no studies have appeared which treat oikonomoi 
in any detail; in the past half-century several works have been published which 
examine the individuals bearing the title in specifically defined geopolitical 
contexts. Virtually nothing, however, has appeared which attempts a 
comprehensive analysis of oikonomoi from the time of Alexander to the beginning of 
the Common Era and much confusion regarding the nature of these offices remains 
as a result. Indeed, many important questions have been inadequately treated and 
some have never been advanced in scholarly dialogue: What are the main contexts 
in which oikonomoi were employed? What are the constituent parts of the office in 
each context? What responsibilities were entrusted to them? Where were oikonomoi 
located in their respective administrative hierarchies? Were oikonomoi recognised as 
persons of authority, menial servitude, or somewhere in between? What other 
characteristics were normally attributed to them and what methods of 
accountability, or disciplinary measures including rewards and punishment, would 
they have faced from their superiors? Such questions require answers if biblical 
scholars, as well as ancient historians, desire a satisfactory understanding of the use 
of this title. 
But the conspicuous absence of a full-scale analysis of oikonomoi comes as 
little surprise once one is introduced to the difficulty of such a task. The abundance 
of the documentary evidence together with the elasticity of the term and the 
evolution of its use from Classical Greece to the Hellenistic era through the early 
Roman empire and into the Byzantine period demonstrates that oikonomoi 
performed a variety of regal, civic, commercial, and even ecclesial services within a 
number of social contexts while belonging to several different social strata. The 
term, then, must be treated carefully by paying close attention to its uses in 
                                                        
1 Michael I. Rostovtzeff, '§703', in The Tebtunis Papyri, ed. J. Gilbart Smyly, Arthur S. Hunt, 
with assistance from B.P. Grenfell, E. Lobel and M. Rostovtzeff (London: Humphrey Milford, 1933), 66-
102, at 67. 
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particular regions and time periods, so as not to confuse its meaning and 
connotations in one historical context with that in another. In the following three 
chapters we will survey the administrators who bore the title oikonomos in regal, 
civic, and private contexts—those in which oikonomoi have been most often attested 
during the periods just before and immediately following the birth of the church—
in order to construct a general profile of those officials and their respective offices. 
Of central importance in our reconstruction of these positions are their structural 
hierarchy, administrative responsibilities, socio-legal status, and methods of 
accountability. By analysing their attributes it will become clear that, though these 
administrators share some fundamental similarities, their significant differences 
require that the offices be conceptually distinguished. 
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Chapter 2. Oikonomoi as Regal Administrators 
 
Within just a few years following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE, his 
vast empire was partitioned into territories which were then disproportionately 
issued to his military generals. Alexander’s ‘successors’ (διάδοχοι), which included 
the likes of Ptolemy, Seleucis, Antigonus, Lysimachus, and others, established 
independent kingdoms in the regions which they formerly governed while under 
Alexander’s regime. Although individually these civilisations paled in comparison to 
the size of Alexander’s empire, each procured large territories and great wealth 
while developing the administrative infrastructure necessary to operate 
independently of one another. Indeed, while they were often preoccupied with 
lengthy military campaigns, in just a short span of time each of the kingdoms from 
the Hellenistic era (ca. 323-31 BCE) implemented its own political, military, and 
economic structure, ‘a structure that was to survive almost unchanged until they 
were incorporated in the Roman Empire and even later’.1 
Some of the earliest non-literary evidence for oikonomoi in the 
Mediterranean basin attests to their functioning as financial administrators in these 
very kingdoms. Among the Hellenistic monarchies, the Ptolemies, Seleucids, 
Attalids, and Macedonians deposited the most illuminating evidence for the regal 
oikonomos. Between the literary, epigraphic, and papyrological data from this period, 
the papyri provide the fullest portrait of oikonomoi, although they derive strictly 
from Egypt and so are limited in relevance almost exclusively to Ptolemaic 
administration. The inscriptions, on the other hand, reveal less detail than do the 
papyri about the nature of the office, but on the whole they provide more reliable 
testimony than do the literary works and represent the office in a wider 
geographical spread than do the papyri, attesting to the title’s use in the 
administrations of each of the main Hellenistic political powers.2 All of these 
documents, whose dates range from the mid-fourth century BCE and extend to the 
end of the Hellenistic era, exhibit many of the same traits of oikonomoi, including (i) 
                                                        
1 Michael I. Rostovtzeff, The Social & Economic History of the Hellenistic World (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1941), 189. 
2 F. W. Walbank, 'Sources for the Period', in The Cambridge Ancient History: The Hellenistic World 
(Vol. 7.1), ed. F. W. Walbank et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-22, at 11. 
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their elevated social and administrative rank as regional managers within their 
respective hierarchies, (ii) their many delegated responsibilities concerning the 
financial matters of a particular territory, and (iii) the promise of professional 
advancement or penalty depending on the outcome of their administration.  
The Hellenistic administrations, although patterned after the scheme 
instituted by Alexander, each also to some degree resembled the political and 
economic models inherited from the governments which preceded Alexander. Most 
historians therefore agree, ‘The regions brought under the control of the Hellenistic 
kingdoms showed little economic unity or uniformity’.3 Thus, even though the 
oikonomoi who served in each of these kingdoms share many of the same attributes, 
in our survey we will examine kingdoms individually, due to the structural 
dissimilarities that existed between them. 
 
A. In the Ptolemaic Kingdom 
The Ptolemaic kingdom has provided historians a wealth of data with which 
to reconstruct the office of the oikonomos as a regal administrator. Much of the 
evidence for the office has been preserved in papyri from Egypt. But mainland 
Egypt was not the only region controlled by the Ptolemies. For almost the entire 
period of Ptolemaic rule (ca. 305-30 BCE), the Ptolemies also inhabited and 
efficiently governed the more distant ‘possessions’ of Cyprus, Cyrene, Cyrenaica, 
Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine. Furthermore, for some years of this period Lycia, 
Caria, parts of Ionia, the Black Sea region, certain Aegean islands, and even the 
Peloponnese formed the distant sub-sections of the kingdom.4 Due, then, to the 
abundance of the epigraphic and papyrological evidence left by the Ptolemies, as 
well as their possible influence upon the administrations of other Hellenistic states, 
we will begin our examination with the Ptolemaic kingdom. 
 
1. Hierarchy 
Among the most notable traits of the regal oikonomos was his middle-
managerial rank in the kingdom’s administrative hierarchy. Although he was given 
                                                        
3 John Kenyon Davies, 'Economy: Hellenistic', in OCD (2003), 504. 
4 Cf. Roger S. Bagnall, The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions Outside Egypt (CSCT 4; 
Leiden: Brill, 1976). 
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charge of an administrative division, the oikonomos was by nature a delegate and in 
that respect subservient to a chain of organisational superiors. Precisely where in 
the administrative hierarchy of the Ptolemaic kingdom his post was located is of 
some debate and is especially dependent on the period in view.5 Nevertheless, a 
generally accepted structure of the kingdom will underscore the subordination of 
oikonomoi to the king and his immediate delegates. For the sake of the present study 
we will adopt the structure of the third-century BCE kingdom,6 from where most of 
the relevant primary evidence derives.7 
Τhe Ptolemaic state, from the vantage point of the king, was a household 
(οἶκος). Its administration began with the king himself as head of the household 
(κύριος), and all civil, financial, military, and legal matters ultimately reported to 
him.8 But with the arrival of new economic institutions imported from the Greek 
world (e.g. banking, tax farming, auctions of property), the Ptolemaic economy 
became in need of an infrastructure that would support itself.9 The king, therefore, 
delegated many of his responsibilities to royal officials, most notably the διοικητής, 
in order to administer the kingdom efficiently. As the chief financial officer, the 
διοικητής oversaw all of the kingdom’s financial matters including its revenue and 
expenditures.10 He in turn appointed oikonomoi to manage the kingdom’s regional 
divisions, the nomes (νομοί). 
                                                        
5 For a comparison between the third-century BCE chain of command with that from the 
second and first centuries BCE, see Reumann, 'Oikonomia', 253-54. 
6 On the terminus post quem for the disappearance of the Ptolemaic oikonomos in the early first 
century BCE, see Maria Rosaria Falivene, 'Geography and Administration in Egypt (332 BCE—642 CE)', 
in The Oxford Handbook of Papyrology, ed. Roger S. Bagnall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 521-
40, at 527; Thomas Kruse, Der königliche Schreiber und die Gauverwaltung: Untersuchungen zur 
Verwaltungsgeschichte Ägyptens in der Zeit von Augustus bis Philippus Arabs (30 v. Chr.-245 n. Chr.) (2 vols.; 
Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete, Beiheft 11; München: K.G. Saur, 2002), 890. 
7 For the chronological gaps in the papyrological record, see E. G. Turner, 'Ptolemaic Egypt', 
in The Cambridge Ancient History: The Hellenistic World (Vol. 7.1), ed. F. W. Walbank et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 118-74, at 118. 
8 For the Ptolemaic administrative divisions, see Maria Rosaria Falivene, 'Government, 
Management, Literacy: Aspects of Ptolemaic Administration in the Early Hellenistic Period', Ancient 
Society 22 (1991): 203-27. 
9 Joseph Gilbert Manning, Land and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt: The Structure of Land Tenure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 137. 
10 Some debate remains concerning whether or not the centrally located διοικητής 
supervised a group of subordinate regional διοικηταί; see, e.g., J. David Thomas, 'Aspects of the 
Ptolemaic Civil Service: The Dioiketes and the Nomarch', in Das Ptolemäische Ägypten, ed. Herwig 
Maehler and Volker Michael Strocka (Aspects of the Ptolemaic Civil Service; Mainz: Philipp von 
Zabern, 1978), 187-94. Thomas argues that papyri which suggest διοικηταί held regional offices either 
utilised the title as shorthand for ὑpiοδιοικηταί (P.Cair.Zen. II 59236), or belonged to a phase in the 
second century BCE when power may have been temporarily decentralised. Thomas supposes that 
‘such a decentralisation, if it ever took place, quickly proved unworkable (though this does not prove 
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Within the nome a complex network of additional delegates existed. The 
nome administration was divided into three branches. Firstly, the bureau of the 
nomarch, along with his locally commissioned subordinates, the toparchs and 
komarchs, supervised the nome’s agricultural production. Secondly, the bureau of 
the oikonomos, together with his checking clerks (ἀντιγράφεις), was given charge of 
the nome’s finances. Finally, the bureau of the βασιλικὸς γραμματεύς, with his 
subordinates, the τοpiογραμματεῖς and κωμογραμματεῖς, maintained the necessary 
official records, especially regarding the land. The head of each of these bureaus 
reported to the διοικητής in Alexandria.11 Precisely how far the oversight of these 
officials extended is complex and well beyond the scope of this survey, since various 
documents hint that jurisdiction could overlap. What concerns us at the present is 
the office of the oikonomos and his subordination to the διοικητής and the king. 
An important document that highlights the hierarchical structure of the 
financial branch of the kingdom is P.Tebt. 703 (Bagnall/Derow §103; Austin §319), a 
late third-century (after January 208 BCE) memorandum (ὑpiομνήμα) generally 
agreed to have been an appointment charter from a διοικητής to an οἰκονόμος.12 
Dubbed ‘the jewel of Greek administrative papyri’,13 P.Tebt. 703 shows the 
superordinate rank of the author throughout as he repeatedly instructs the 
addressee with verbs in the imperative mood. But this hierarchy is especially 
apparent at the end of the document when the author orders the recipient ‘to keep 
the instructions in hand, and to report on everything as has been ordered’ (piερὶ 
ἑκάστων ἐpiιστέλλε[ιν] καθὰ συντέτακται). More than any other feature in the 
document, the need to give an account to the commissioning party attests to the 
subordinate rank of the oikonomos. 
The subordinate role of oikonomoi is further underscored on occasions when 
civilians file complaints against them and request their superiors to overturn their 
decisions. Such was the case when in 254/253 BCE a certain Neoptolemos wrote to 
                                                                                                                                                               
that it was not tried) and the government rapidly reverted to the old situation’ (191). On the other 
hand, P.Ord.Ptol. 21-22 (Bagnall/Derow §64), dated to 260 BCE, suggests that Syria had its own 
διοικητής, who was supervised by the διοικητής stationed in Alexandria. 
11 Bagnall, Administration, 3-4; cf. Manning, Land and Power, 137. 
12 Although the document does not specify the rank of the two officials, Rostovtzeff, '§703', 
66-67, argues that ‘the subjects of the memorandum coincide with matters dealt with by the 
oeconomus in the third century B.C.’. For a fine defence of Rostovtzeff’s position, see Alan E. Samuel, 
'P. Tebt 703', in Studi in Onore di Edoardo Volterra, ed. Edoardo Volterra (Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di 
giurisprudenza dell'Università di Roma 40-45; Milano: Giuffrè, 1971), 451-60. 
13 Turner, 'Ptolemaic Egypt', 147. 
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Diotimos (the διοικητής) to appeal a ruling concerning taxation on vineyards made 
by Theokies (the oikonomos of the Aphroditopolite Nome) and Petosiris (the 
βασιλικὸς γραμματεύς), which cost Neoptolemos’ father, Stratippos, an unusually 
large sum (P.Cair.Zen. 59236). Neoptolemos, therefore, wrote to the διοικητής 
requesting that the local and regional officials, including the oikonomos, reimburse 
Stratippos for the expenses he incurred. A similar request was also made in 248 BCE 
by Theopropos, a Kalyndian landholder, whose tenant farmer had supplied wine for 
a city festival, but had not been repaid by the city administration for those goods. 
Theopropos, therefore, wrote to Apollonios (the διοικητής), requesting that he 
contact the oikonomos overseeing Kalynda and instruct the official to reimburse 
Theopropos for the 250 drachmas plus interest he was owed for the wine 
(P.Cair.Zen. 59341a). In these instances, appeals by certain individuals over the 
heads of oikonomoi demonstrate that the decisions even of these regional officials 
ultimately rested on the approval of higher authorities—in these cases the 
διοικητής—and any executive decisions made by διοικηταί were binding for 
oikonomoi. 
Authority over oikonomoi did not cease, however, with the διοικητής. 
Apparently the king himself was regarded as their superior and possessed the 
authority to appoint oikonomoi to office. An inscription from Labraunda in Caria 
dating to 267 BCE, for instance, records that a certain Apollonius, son of Diodotos, 
was appointed oikonomos directly by King Ptolemy (κατασταθεὶς οἰκο[νό]μος ὑpiὸ 
βασιλέως Πτολε[μαίου] [ILabraundaMcCabe 2/ILabraunda 43]). Another inscription 
from Limyra in Lycia dating to 288/287 BCE and honouring two Caunian oikonomoi, 
Amyntas Eythonos and Sosigenes of Zopyros, follows a similar honourific formula 
when it indicates that King Ptolemy had appointed the two officials as ‘oikonomoi of 
the land’ (κατασταθέντες ὑpiὸ βασιλ[έως] [Π]τολεμαίου οἰκονόμοι τῆς χώρας [SEG 
27.929]).14 Admittedly, officials who did not report directly to the king were 
normally assigned to their positions by his representatives, in the case of the 
financial bureau, by the διοικητής. It is uncertain in these two instances, therefore, 
whether the king assigned the oikonomoi personally or was merely credited with 
their commission. Even so, it is clear from these documents that oikonomoi were 
                                                        
14 For discussion of this text, especially the difficulty in determining the jurisidiction implied 
by τῆς χώρας, see Michael Wörrle, 'Epigraphische Forschungen zur Geschichte Lykiens I', Chiron 7 
(1977): 43-66. 
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subordinate officials in the Ptolemaic kingdom and they envisaged the διοικητής as 
well as the king as their administrative superiors. 
Despite their rank beneath the διοικητής and king, oikonomoi occupied an 
impressive, regional supervisory position. ‘The Ptolemaic state functioned’, remarks 
Joseph Manning, ‘by stressing the vertical ties to the ruler through a bureaucratic 
hierarchy that connected the villages to the nome capitals, and these in turn to the 
capital at Alexandria’.15 The middle-management role of oikonomoi, then, afforded 
them great structural authority in the nome. Within these regional territories 
oikonomoi supervised numerous officials who managed the nome subdivisions called 
toparchies, which were then further divided into villages. Moreover, the oikonomoi 
employed a series of subordinate collectors (λογευταί), auditors (λογισταί, 
ἐκλογισταί), and checking clerks (ἀντιγράφεις) who functioned as their personal 
agents. 
The structural authority of oikonomoi is also apparent in those papyri which 
describe their many responsibilities. The mid-third century (259 BCE) Revenue 
Laws, for instance, details the regulations governing tax farming, vineyard 
supervision, wine production, and oil distribution while frequently mentioning the 
responsibilities of oikonomoi in these commercial and economic divisions. Column 20 
of the papyrus explains with particular clarity the authority derived 
representatively from the king and entrusted to his oikonomoi. The column reads: 
‘Any tax-farmers who fail to balance their accounts with the oikonomos, when he 
desires them to do so and summons them, shall pay 30 minas to the Crown and the 
oikonomos shall at the same time compel them’ (P.Rev. 20; Bagnall/Derow §114; cf. 
Austin §297). Two parts of the passage are of interest here. Firstly, the relationship 
between tax farmers and the oikonomos was clearly asymmetrical. The tax farmers, 
for example, were required to report to the oikonomos and balance accounts with 
him ‘when he desires’ (β[ο]υ[λο]μέν[ου] τοῦ οἰκονόμου), clearly demonstrating the 
structural superiority of the oikonomos over his delegates. His administrative 
authority is also underscored when the law states that the oikonomos is able to 
compel (συναναγκάζω) the delinquent tax farmer to balance accounts. Such 
compulsion suggests that the oikonomos possessed the structural leverage and legal 
authority to force his subordinates into action when encountering delay or 
                                                        
15 Manning, Land and Power, 131. 
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resistance. But the source of his authority is also worthy of clarification. The regal 
oikonomos derived his authority from his association with the king. As stated later in 
the column, the oikonomos, the ἀντιγράφεις, and their agents (οἱ pi[αρ’ αὐτῶν]) were 
‘officials of the Crown’ (οἱ τὰ βασι[λ]ικὰ piραγματευόμενοι), who were apparently 
appointed in order to carry out the king’s plan to completion.16 Indeed, it was the 
king’s vision, after descending down through the chain of command, which was 
enacted in the nomes. Consequently, in tax collection, just as much as in his other 
supervisory duties, the oikonomos represented Ptolemy in the nome as one 
authorised to command on his behalf. 
P.Tebt. 703 also portrays oikonomoi as possessing authority in their day to day 
responsibilities. Early in the document the διοικητής instructed the oikonomos to 
encourage and to inspire (piαρακαλεῖν καὶ εὐθαρσεστέρους piαρασκευάζειν [42-43]) 
the local farmers. But the oikonomos was required to carry out these instructions not 
only verbally (τοῦτο μὴ μόνον λόγωι γίνεσθαι [43-44]) and interpersonally, but also 
by intervening on behalf of the farmers when they were unfairly harassed by local 
officials. As the charter states, ‘[I]f any of them complain of the komogrammateus or 
the komarchs about any matter touching agricultural work, you should make inquiry 
[ἐpiισκοpiεῖν] and put a stop [ἐκpiοῆι εἰς ἐpiίστασ{ε}ιν] to such doings’ (44-49; 
Bagnall/Derow §103; cf. Austin §319). Numerous papyri show that it was in fact 
commonplace for farmers to write to their regional oikonomos to appeal for 
assistance with these kinds of disturbances. According to Alan Samuel, ‘Such 
appeals are by no means exceptional, and they show that the resolution of disputes 
in agricultural matters was a normal administrative task for the oikonomos in the 
third century B.C.’.17 By instructing oikonomoi to intervene in village affairs on behalf 
of farmers, this document underscores the administrative authority that oikonomoi 
exercised over village officials, particularly the komogrammateus and komarchs. As 
Samuel affirms, ‘A number of third century appeals [from villagers] to the 
oikonomos illustrate that his administrative authority was recognized’.18 
The administrative authority of oikonomoi is especially illumined by the 
abovementioned P.Cair.Zen. III 59341a. This papyrus indicates that the oikonomos 
                                                        
16 For more on the agent of the oikonomos (ὁ piαρὰ τοῦ οἰκονόμου), see W. Clarysse, 
'Harmachis, Agent of the Oikonomos: An Archive from the Time of Philopator', Ancient Society 7 
(1976): 185-207. 
17 Samuel, 'P. Tebt 703', 452. 
18 Samuel, 'P. Tebt 703', 452. 
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wielded great, yet restricted authority at the nome level, sometimes to the 
dissatisfaction of the people. As discussed earlier, in 248 BCE a certain Theopropos 
from Kalynda, in Caria, wrote to the διοικητής concerning money which the city 
administration owed him. The document reads as follows: 
To Apollonios the dioiketes, greeting from Theopropos, theoros from Kalynda. In year 38 my tenant 
farmer Theron purchased from the city a concession to supply wine for the festival which is held 
yearly in Kypranda, and I supplied the wine on his behalf, amounting to 84 metretai, at 10 drachmas 
the metretes, which makes 850 drachmas (borrowing at the legal rate of interest, as Theron had no 
private means and had made the purchase through me). And as the treasurers [ταμιῶν] Diophantos 
and Akrisios had only given me 600 drachmas in payment of this sum and were withholding the 
balance of 250 drachmas because all the subscriptions had not been paid up, I brought the treasurers 
before the strategos Motes and the oikonomos Diodotos, claiming my 250 drachmas. The treasurers 
Diophantos and Akrisios demanded that a decree should be issued for them to act on, saying that 
without a decree it was beyond their authority to repay the money. But the prytaneis and the clerk 
procrastinated and had not written the decree up to the time when, having been appointed a theoros 
by the city, along with Diophantos one of the treasurers, I came here to the king. If therefore it 
seems good to you, kindly write to our city and to the strategos and the oikonomos that the 250 
drachmas are to be paid to me (together with the interest whatever it may amount to from the time 
when I paid out money to buy the wine for the city, as I had myself to borrow from other people and 
am still incurring interest) . . . in order that I may not suffer wrong but be one of the many that have 
experienced your benevolence. Farewell. (Bagnall/Derow §68) 
In this scenario several interesting events occur which reveal the power dynamics 
involved in the central and peripheral administrative sectors of the kingdom.19 As 
stated in the greeting, Theopropos wrote to the διοικητής requesting that he 
intervene in his suit for reimbursement since he possessed the authority to exact 
power over regional and city officials. However, because Theopropos had originally 
summoned the two treasurers to appear before the στρατηγός and οἰκονόμος, these 
two regional officials must have also possessed some authority over city 
administrators. The στρατηγός and οἰκονόμος were apparently reluctant to get 
involved in matters of city finance, though, and the piρυτάνεις and γραμματεύς as 
city officials were asked instead to issue the decree mandating the release of funds 
for Theopropos, probably at the request of the στρατηγός and οἰκονόμος. But the 
piρυτάνεις and γραμματεύς failed to follow through before Theopropos’ relocation to 
Alexandria, thus requiring his direct appeal to the διοικητής. 
This letter reveals the great authority of the oikonomos in two ways. Firstly, 
the jurisdiction of the oikonomos, at least in Caria, appears to have overlapped 
considerably with that of the στρατηγός. Not only is he paired with the στρατηγός 
here as his associate during the dispute, but as a later portion of this letter reveals, 
his responsibilities extended well beyond matters of finance and into military 
                                                        
19 For further discussion, see Bagnall, Administration, 99-101. 
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administration (P.Cair.Zen. III 59341b-c).20 Secondly, the oikonomos possessed the 
authority to arbitrate between Theopropos and the entire city of Kalynda in matters 
of finance. Although he refused to involve himself directly in the repayment of the 
debt, he and the στρατηγός were nevertheless perceived by Theopropos, the two 
treasurers, and the piρυτάνεις and γραμματεύς as having the authority to resolve the 
dispute.21 
 
2. Responsibilities 
The responsibilities of the oikonomos were mostly financial in nature, being 
charged primarily with administering the revenue and expenditures of the nome. 
But the oikonomos was not confined to accounting and the disbursing of public 
funds; such were the responsibilities of the βασιλικὸς γραμματεύς and ἀντιγραφεύς. 
Instead, the oikonomos developed and implemented the plan for the nome’s 
economy. He was responsible for the nome’s agricultural production, for ensuring 
seed was issued to farmers, and even for encouraging them when the harvest was 
poor. He was responsible for oil production and linen manufacturing. He also 
oversaw the entire commercial sector, including the scheduling of deliveries from 
farms to the market and for regulating its prices. But perhaps the chief financial 
responsibility of the oikonomos in Ptolemaic administration was organising tax 
collection. Tax farming in antiquity was a complex system of state revenue 
acquisition involving the auctioning off of collection responsibilities to tax farmers, 
who after each monthly collection would balance accounts with the oikonomos and 
checking clerk to make certain that the proper sum was accumulated. The oikonomos 
then balanced his accounts with the διοικητής to ensure the same.22 The 
responsibilities of the oikonomos in tax farming are nowhere better preserved than 
in the Revenue Laws. The document is much too long and detailed to cite or explain 
here at length. It is sufficient to say here, though, that the kingdom’s economy was 
                                                        
20 Bagnall, Administration, 245: ‘The oikonomos was evidently the colleague of the strategos, not 
his subordinate. . . . And the oikonomos was at least the equal if not somewhat higher in rank than the 
commandant’. 
21 Alan E. Samuel, 'The Judicial Competence of the Oikonomos in the Third Century B.C.', in 
Atti dell'XI Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia. Milano, 2-8 Settembre 1965 (Milan: Istituto Lombardo di 
Scienze e Lettere, 1966), 444-50, at 446: ‘A review of the evidence shows that the oikonomos had no 
real judicial role, but as any administrator could and would do, he decided matters which affected 
the satisfactory accomplishment of his tasks’. 
22 Turner, 'Ptolemaic Egypt', 152; cf. NewDocs 8:49-57. 
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buttressed by tax revenue, and therefore the involvement of the oikonomos in the 
collection of taxes ensured the financial viability of the kingdom. 
Many of the other duties of the oikonomos have been preserved in P.Tebt. 
703.23 According to the papyrus the oikonomos was responsible for maintaining the 
depth, strength, and cleanliness of the canals which ran through and hydrated the 
fields (29-40). He was expected to encourage and inspire the local farmers (42-43) 
and to prevent the village officials from harassing them (44-49). The oikonomos was 
required to inspect the landscape carefully to ensure that the fields were sown well 
(49-54), with the correct kinds of crops according to the sowing schedule (κατὰ τὴν 
διαγραφὴν τοῦ σpiόρου [57-58]), and that upon the harvest the grain was punctually 
transported to Alexandria (70-87). He was to maintain a list of the uses of cattle in 
agriculture (63-70; 163-174) and to make sure that the calves were fed adequately 
(183-191), especially the offspring of royal cattle (ἡ ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν [67-68]). All of 
the specifics concerning the operation of weaving houses (τὰ ὑφαντεῖα [87-117]) 
and of the oil factories (τὰ ἐλαιουργῖα [134-163]) fell within the jurisdiction of the 
oikonomos. He was responsible for auditing the revenue accounts, village by village if 
possible, otherwise by toparchy (117-134). Moreover, he regulated the prices of items 
sold in the market (174-182), ensured that trees were planted on schedule (191-211), 
and organised the maintenance for the royal houses and gardens (211-214). He 
oversaw the custody of deserting soldiers and sailors prior to their journey to the 
capital (215-222). Finally, he was responsible for providing the nome with a sense of 
civil as well as financial security, since the former would bring about the latter (222-
234). 
Beyond itemising the main responsibilities of the oikonomos, the papyrus also 
lists the official’s idealised character traits and work ethic. These attributes, 
according to the author, were absolutely necessary (δεῖν [261]) for performing the 
job well. According to the author, the oikonomos was to be characterised by honesty 
(καθαρῶς [262-263]), goodness (βέλτιστος [263]), justice (δίκαιος [266]), and 
blamelessness (ἀνέγκλητος [276]). Moreover, the papyrus includes numerous 
admonitions about the manner in which the official should complete his tasks. He 
was expected, for instance, to inspect the various agricultural, industrial, and 
commercial sectors of the nome carefully (ἐpiιμελῶς [passim]) and zealously 
                                                        
23 Many of the concerns in P.Tebt. 703 are also addressed in P.Rev. 
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(piροθύμως [120]). The ideal character profile of the oikonomos, then, was a central 
concern in P.Tebt. 703, just as it was in many documents outlining the duties of state 
officials in Egypt.  
In P.Tebt. 27, for instance, the late second-century (111 BCE) διοικητής 
Eirenaios reprimanded Hermias, the superintendent of revenues, for appointing a 
poorly qualified oikonomos, along with certain other officials. Eirenaios accused 
Hermias of appointing men who were ‘without exception evil and worthless persons 
[piᾶσι δὲ κακοῖς καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίοις]’ (Bagnall/Derow §110), instructing him rather to 
nominate ‘persons of repute’ (ἀξιόλογοι). Dorothy Crawford, in fact, drew heavily 
from P.Tebt. 27 and 703 when she compiled a list of traits commonly associated with 
royal officials over the three centuries of Ptolemaic rule. Her profile of the 
archetypical ‘good official’ resembles the oikonomoi portrayed in both Tebtunis 
papyri: 
The duty of the official was universal care, ἡ τῶν ὅλων φροντίς, he should be piασίφιλος [friendly to 
all], and exhibit qualities of care, ἐpiιμέλεια, goodwill, εὔνοια, foresight, piρόνοια, keenness and 
alacrity, σpiουδή, piροθυμία, or ἐκτενία, and acumen in decision, ἀκρίβεια. He must always show 
attention, ἐpiιστορφή or piροσοχή, vigilance, τήρησις or ἀγρυpiνία, and care, ἀντίληψις, for those with 
whom he had contact; the aim of his actions should be justice for all men, ὅpiως τὰ δίκαια γίνηται 
τοῖς ἀνθρώpiοις.24 
Although these documents only prescribe the make-up of the oikonomos from the 
vantage point of the top of the hierarchy, they nevertheless supply an idealised 
portrayal of the official, indeed one of the perspectives we are seeking here. 
 
3. Accountability 
Despite the clearly defined responsibilities entrusted to the oikonomos, he 
may have struggled to meet the demands of his superiors while also maintaining a 
healthy relationship with the inhabitants of the nome. As Crawford explains, 
‘Officials were those used by the king to look after his interests, whilst protecting 
those of the peasants; it was necessary that they collected as much profit in the 
form of rents and taxes as was compatible with the continuing co-operation of the 
peasants. If they were over-zealous on the king’s behalf the peasants would refuse 
to co-operate; if they were over-kind to the peasants the king would be displeased’.25 
                                                        
24 Dorothy J. Crawford, 'The Good Official of Ptolemaic Egypt', in Das Ptolemäische Ägypten, ed. 
Herwig Maehler and Volker Michael Strocka (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 1978), 195-202, at 
195-96. 
25 Crawford, 'Good Official', 195. 
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In order, therefore, to maintain the dependability of oikonomoi, the chief Ptolemaic 
administrators offered incentives to their subordinates for their achievements, 
while also penalising them for poor performance. In either case, accountability was 
implemented by the διοικητής and king to motivate their regional supervisors to 
serve as instructed. 
In the conclusion of P.Tebt. 703, for instance, the author of the papyrus 
remarks, ‘If you act thus, you will fulfil your official duty and your own safety will be 
assured [ὑμῖν ἡ piᾶς ἀσφάλεια ὑpiάρξει]’ (255-258). The statement implies that the 
office carried with it the potential for removal, or demotion, upon a poor 
performance. But the author also promises professional advancement to the 
oikonomos if he manages well.26 As the author affirmed, ‘[I]f you are without 
reproach in this, you will be held deserving of higher functions [γένησθε μειζόνων 
ἀξιωθήσεσθαι]’ (276-278). These kinds of positive and negative incentives kept the 
oikonomos highly aligned with the interests of his superiors.27 Thus, even though it 
may be, as E. G. Turner maintains, that in Ptolemaic administration ‘no regular 
system of promotion, no cursus honorum or specially quick promotion to reward 
initiative has been traced’,28 Crawford is probably correct to affirm the existence of 
an informal system of promotion, whereby professional advancement could be 
attained through ‘acceptable performance and not antagonizing one’s superior’.29 
 
B. In the Seleucid Kingdom 
The administration of the Seleucid kingdom (ca. 305-63 BCE) was 
differentiated from the Ptolemaic system primarily by means of its Achaemenid 
origin. Whereas historians generally agree that the Ptolemies inherited and 
immediately adapted the Pharaonic form of financial administration, creating the 
modified Macedonian system outlined above, the Seleucids similarly laid a 
                                                        
26 Nothing is known precisely about the compensation of οἰκονόμοι. But according to the 
Zenon archive διοικηταί were provided δωρεαί, temporary grants of land given by the king in 
substitution for a salary; cf. Michael I. Rostovtzeff, A Large Estate in Egypt in the Third Century B.C.: A 
Study in Economic History (University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History 6; 
Madison: 1922), 42-55. 
27 It is perhaps for this reason that ‘good officials’, that is, those who were acceptable both to 
the king and to his subjects, were rather scarce in the Ptolemaic administration. As the abundance of 
written complaints and royal decrees suggest, ‘many officials were both wicked and corrupt’ 
(Crawford, 'Good Official', 199). 
28 Turner, 'Ptolemaic Egypt', 147. 
29 Crawford, 'Good Official', 199. 
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Macedonian-style economy atop the existing Achaemenid administration which 
they inherited from the Persians.30 Thus, even though the basic structure of the 
Seleucids and their utilisation of oikonomoi deserve independent comment, there are 
few major differences between the administrative approaches of the Seleucids and 
Ptolemies. 
The source that best illumines the framework of the Seleucid financial 
administration is Pseudo-Aristotle’s Oeconomica. In the second book of the treatise 
the author outlines the administrative structure used by the Seleucids, 
distinguishing between its four spheres (οἰκονομίαι): ‘the administration of a king 
[βασιλική]; of the governors under him [σατραpiική]; of a free state [piολιτική]; and 
of a private citizen [ἰδιωτική]’ (Oec. 1345b). The governing of satrapies (provinces) 
and free states (cities) are of primary concern here. The satrapies, which at the 
kingdom’s height spanned from Anatolia to central Asia,31 further divided into 
hyparchies,32 and thus required a vast network of subordinate officials through 
whom the king regulated the economy, collected taxes, and sold and leased 
privately and publicly owned land. 
 
1. Hierarchy 
The greatest difference between Seleucid and Ptolemaic administration lies 
in the offices at the top of the chain of command. As with the Ptolemies, the 
Seleucid διοικηταί were directly subordinate to the king as his chief financial 
officers. But whereas in the Ptolemaic structure a single διοικητής was appointed to 
represent the king in financial matters at Alexandria, the Seleucid king appointed 
numerous διοικηταί both centrally and regionally, placing the majority of them in 
the satrapies and various other subdivisions (e.g. Coele-Syria). There they 
supervised finances, serving alongside the στρατηγός, who oversaw civil matters.33 
                                                        
30 G. G. Aperghis, The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the 
Seleukid Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 264-69; Susan Sherwin-White and 
Amélie Kuhrt, From Samarkhand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire (Hellenistic Culture and 
Society 13; London: Duckworth, 1993), 42; Rostovtzeff, Hellenistic World, 440. 
31 For the known satrapies of the third-century BCE Seleucid kingdom, see Sherwin-White 
and Kuhrt, From Samarkhand, 45. 
32 Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, From Samarkhand, 46. 
33 Scholars have been unable to agree on the title given to the royal official who functioned 
as the most senior financial officer of the Seleucid kingdom, if even there was one. Earlier scholars 
suggested that the officer bearing the title ὁ ἐpiὶ τῶν piροσόδων functioned in this capacity. More 
recent scholarship, however, has proposed that ὁ ἐpiὶ τῶν piροσόδων was equivalent to and came to 
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The titles given to administrative officials beneath the διοικηταί also diverge from 
those of the Ptolemaic kingdom. According to G. G. Aperghis, the ἐκλογισταί were 
the officials responsible for establishing the level of taxation and for supervising the 
λογευταί who carried out the collection. Οἱ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἱερῶν managed the temples and 
their revenue. The oikonomoi, on the other hand, supervised the royal land and 
revenue, while controlling the expenditures in their financial districts, the 
subdivisions within the satrapy sometimes referred to as οἰκονομίαι (SEG 
39.1289/OGI 179).34 They also cooperated with the hyparchs, who oversaw all civil 
and military matters.35  
Much of what is known about the role and responsibilities of Seleucid regal 
oikonomoi derives from a single administrative document known as the Ptolemaios 
Dossier, an early second-century (ca. 190 BCE) compilation of inscriptions from 
Scythopolis in Palestine (SEG 29.1613). In Text 4 of the set of inscriptions Ptolemaios, 
the στρατηγός and high priest, petitioned the king, Antiochos III, to allow certain 
regional misdemeanours to be handled by local leaders, while those matters of some 
severity to be dealt with by leaders of the satrapy. Antiochus then forwarded the 
request to two διοικηταί, Kleon and Heliodoros, before it was formalised on stele. 
The document reads as follows: 
To King Antiochus III, memorandum from Ptolemy the strategos and high priest; concerning any 
disputes that may arise: I request that written instructions be sent so that disputes arising in my 
villages [ἐν ταῖς κώμαις] and involving peasants with each other should be settled by my agents [ἐpiὶ 
τῶν piαρ’ ἐμοῦ], but those arising with peasants from the other villages should be investigated 
[ἐpiισκοpiῶσιν] by the oikonomos and the official in charge of the district, and if they concern murder 
or appear to be of greater significance they should be referred to the strategos in Syria and Phoenicia; 
the garrison commanders and those in charge of the districts [τῶν τόpiων] should not ignore in any 
way those who call for their intervention. The same letter to Heliodorus. (Trans. adapted from 
Austin §193) 
Even though some of the specifics about the administrative and juridical divisions in 
the satrapy remain uncertain, this inscription reveals several interesting insights 
about the role and responsibilities of oikonomoi in those regions.36 The stele clearly 
distinguishes between villages (κῶμαι) and collections of villages, districts (τόpiοι). 
Districts were governed by an oikonomos and ‘the official in charge of the district’ ([ὁ 
                                                                                                                                                               
replace the oikonomos in the later stages of the kingdom. See further the discussion by Aperghis, 
Economy, 276-77. 
34 For discussion of οἰκονομίαι and SEG 39.1289, see John Ma, Antiochos III and the Cities of 
Western Asia Minor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 136; Philippe Gauthier, Nouvelles 
inscriptions de Sardes II (Hautes études du monde gréco-romain 15; Geneva: Droz, 1989), 129-34. 
35 Aperghis, Economy, 295. 
36 For discussion, see Aperghis, Economy, 269-73. 
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τοῦ τόpi]ου piρ[ο]εστηκώς), who was probably a toparch, or hyparch. These two 
officials probably were also those identified as Ptolemaios’ agents (τῶν piαρ’ ἐμοῦ). 
But while both officials were in some sense subordinate to the στρατηγός (e.g. 
Ptolemaios)—the general appointed over the satrapy and all of its respective 
districts and villages—the διοικητής, as the financial counterpart to the στρατηγός, 
was the immediate supervisor of the oikonomos. The Seleucid regal oikonomoi, 
therefore, while remaining at least two or three positions removed from the top of 
the administrative hierarchy, still occupied high-ranking offices as the chief 
financial administrators at the district level. 
 
2. Responsibilities 
In addition to possessing great administrative authority in their respective 
regions, the Seleucid oikonomoi shared the same area of administrative responsibility 
as the Ptolemaic oikonomoi. As the chief financial official in the district, the 
oikonomos supervised the region’s royal land and revenue. Their oversight of 
Seleucid territory, for instance, is apparent in the Laodike Dossier, a mid third-
century (ca. 254 BCE) inscription from Didyma in Ionia, which reports a real-estate 
transaction that took place between the king’s officials and Laodike, the king’s ex-
wife (SEG 16.710/19.676/OGI 225/IDidymaMcCabe 128). The relevant portion has been 
restored to read: 
The copy of the survey: — Pannoukome and the manor-house and the land belonging to it and the 
peasants who live there, and there has been conveyed to Arrhidaios the manager of Laodike’s 
property [τῶι οἰκονομοῦντι τὰ Λαοδίκης] by -krates the hyparch, the village and the manor-house 
and the land belonging to it, according to the written order of Nikomachos the oikonomos [κατὰ τὸ 
piαρὰ Νικομάχου τοῦ οἰκονόμου piρόσταγμα] to which were subjoined that from Metrophanes and 
that from the king which had been written to him, according to which it was necessary to make the 
survey. (Trans. adapted from Bagnall/Derow §25; cf. Austin §173)37 
This document is of immediate interest because it underscores how oikonomoi 
managed the king’s real estate. In this case, though the hyparch credited the village, 
mansion, property, and peasants to Laodike through Arrhidaios, the oikonomos 
Nikomachos was responsible for authorising the transaction on behalf of the king.38  
                                                        
37 For text, translation, and discussion, see also C. Bradford Welles, Royal Correspondence in the 
Hellenistic Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 102-104 (§20); Aperghis, Economy, 315-18 
(§3); Landvogt, 'Οἰκονόμος', 29. 
38 Secondarily, it is significant that the author draws a distinction between ὁ οἰκονόμος and 
ὁ οἰκονόμων τά Λαοδίκης. Here ὁ οἰκονόμος is a regal official under whose jurisdiction the real-
estate transaction took place. The other manager, Arrhidaios, was the private administrator who 
supervised Laodike’s personal affairs. Private oikonomoi of wealthy persons could possess some 
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The Seleucid oikonomoi, just as their Ptolemaic counterparts, also possessed a 
certain judicial authority, as the earlier Scythopolis text indicates. Although 
oversight of the royal land and revenue in the districts were their primary concern, 
apparently the responsibilities of the oikonomos extended beyond financial matters 
and, together with the toparch (ὁ τοῦ τόpiου piροεστηκώς), included legal rule of any 
number of disputes (ἐγκλήματα) between the peasants (οἱ λαοί) and all minor 
criminal offenses up to homicide (φόνος). The pair of officials probably maintained 
their own areas of competency when possible. But as many civil matters also 
concerned private and public finances, it was probably fitting that the two officials 
settle certain disputes jointly. 
 
C. In the Attalid Kingdom 
The Attalid (or Pergamene) kingdom was the undersized state that remained 
following the death of Lysimachus in 281 BCE. With Pergamon as its capital the 
dynasty controlled but a small sector of the northwest corner of Asia Minor until 
the land was bequeathed to the Romans in 133 BCE. In comparison with the 
Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms, evidence for the inner workings of Attalid 
administration is rather meagre. Without question the city of Pergamon was the 
administrative centre throughout the dynasty, and the remainder of the kingdom 
continually struggled to develop around it. But the city was governed quite 
differently than the other Hellenistic capitals in the early years following its 
inception.39 The king’s control over the city was quite limited before the Treaty of 
Apameia in 188 BCE. Technically, he stood apart from the βουλή and its 
management of civic finances, although the council στρατηγοί and ταμίαι were 
appointed by him and provided him opportunities to direct civic policy.40 Following 
the treaty, however, the king developed a hierarchy featuring more empowered 
civic offices (i.e. στρατηγοί, ὁ ἐpiὶ τῆς piόλεως, ὁ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἱερῶν piροσόδων [cf. the 
                                                                                                                                                               
means. Cf. ILaodikeiaLykos 1/SEG 47.1739/Austin §168; for discussion, see Michael Wörrle, 'Antiochos 
I., Achaios der Ältere und die Galater: Eine neue Inschrift in Denizli', Chiron 5 (1975): 59-78. 
Nevertheless, they possessed far less authority and responsibility, while operating on a quite 
different socio-economic plane. As Ma, Antiochos III, 149, observes, ‘It comes as no surprise that 
Antiochos II and his subordinates should have distinguished between a Seleukid officer, ὁ οἰκονόμος, 
and the private manager of Laodike I, ὁ οἰκονομῶν τά Λαοδίκης. . . . [Even the] peasants could 
differentiate between institutions of the central state . . . and their landlord’s managers’. 
39 R. E. Allen, The Attalid Kingdom: A Constitutional History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 159. 
40 Allen, Attalid Kingdom, 167-68. 
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Astynomic Law, OGI 483]), which increased his control over Pergamon considerably. 
The hierarchical evolution probably occurred in the outer Attalid territories as well, 
although these smaller regions required far less developed administrative 
structures than did those of their Near Eastern neighbours. Whereas the Ptolemies 
divided their land into nomes, and the Seleucids into satrapies, the Attalids 
partitioned their main territories into τόpiοι.41 Each of these regions was governed 
politically by a στρατηγός and financially by an οἰκονόμος, both of whom were 
personally appointed by the king. 
But the use of oikonomoi in the financial administration of the Attalid 
kingdom was not confirmed textually until rather recently. The 1996 discovery of a 
mid-second-century (150 BCE) inscription at a shrine in Pleura, near Sardis, 
provides for the first time material evidence for the appointment of oikonomoi in 
Attalid regal administration.42 The document contains a list of initiates (μύσται) and 
reports the decision to erect the stele in the shrine at the request of the priest. The 
relevant portion of the text reads: 
When Euthydemus was chief-priest and Kadoas, son of Pleri, was priest. Memorandum to the chief-
priest Euthydemus from Kadoas, priest of Apollo in Pleura, who has held the priesthood for a long 
time. Earlier, when Antiochus was king, I asked the chief-priest Nikanor to give permission that I set 
up a stele in the sanctuary, on which I record his name, my own and those of the mystai, and now I 
ask you, if it seems right to you, to give order [συντάξαι] to write to Asclepiades, the oikonomos, to 
assign me a place [ἵνα piαραδείξῃ μοι τόpiον] where I may set up the stele on which I record your 
name, my own, and those of the mystai.43  
(From) Diophantos to Attinas: I submit to you the copy of the letter written to me by Euthydemos 
the chief-priest. 
(From) Euthydemos to Asklepiades: Because of the petition made to me by Kadoas the priest of 
Apollon at Pleura, let it be just as he requested. 
The inscription does not reveal much about the profile of the oikonomos or the other 
mentioned officials, and disagreement therefore remains about their rank, duties, 
and the extent of their jurisdiction.44 It is clear, however, that the oikonomos 
Asclepiades was a financial official responsible for allocating space for sanctuary 
                                                        
41 H. Malay, 'New Evidence Concerning the Administrative System of the Attalids', Arkeoloji 
Dergisi 4 (1996): 83-86, at 84. Due to the variety of communities which were included in the τόpiοι, 
Esther V. Hansen, The Attalids of Pergamon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1947), 172, suggests 
that the ‘places’ were not strict, administrative subdivisions, but ill-defined demarcations of land. 
42 Even so, historians have for some time been importing Seleucid models into their 
reconstructions of Attalid administration, and thus assumed all along that the Attalids utilised 
οἰκονόμοι in provincial management; cf. Hansen, Attalids, 169-70. 
43 For text, translation, and discussion, see H. Malay and C. Nalbantoğlu, 'The Cult of Apollon 
Pleurenos in Lydia', Arkeoloji Dergisi 4 (1996): 75-81. 
44 See, e.g., Aperghis, Economy, 277-78; Beate Dignas, Economy of the Sacred in Hellenistic and 
Roman Asia Minor (Oxford Classical Monographs.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 50-56; Ma, 
Antiochos III, 146-47. 
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inscriptions. The chief priest (ἀρχιερεύς) Euthydemos was responsible for 
authorising the decision and for instructing (συντάσσω) the oikonomos to allocate 
(piαραδέχομαι) space for the stele. This does not necessarily indicate, however, that 
the chief priest was directly superior to the oikonomos. Euthydemos apparently 
forwarded the request to Diophantos, who then forwarded the letter to Attinas. The 
two latter-named officials are of unknown rank, but probably served in the royal 
administration and were ‘in charge of a large territory or of a wide range of matters’ 
in the region of the shrine.45 The last named official, Attinas, apparently informed 
the oikonomos Asclepiades about Euthydemos’ authorisation. Thus, the oikonomos was 
probably subordinate to Attinas and perhaps also to Diophantos.46  
Since Attalid oikonomoi were apparently responsible for the erection of stelae 
at local shrines, they probably occupied a less significant administrative position 
than did the Ptolemaic and Seleucid oikonomoi. Clearly they were involved in the 
payment of various civic and sacred expenses,47 but even so, the competencies of 
Attalid oikonomoi were similar to their Seleucid counterparts, being responsible for 
at least some of the region’s finances.48 Thus, they were officials with much 
administrative authority. 
 
D. In the Macedonian Kingdom 
The financial administration of the Macedonian (or Antigonid) kingdom 
remains in relative obscurity in comparison with its Asian and Near Eastern 
counterparts. At various times during their rule (ca. 294-168 BCE) the Antigonids 
controlled all of Macedonia, parts of Achaea and southern Thrace, certain Aegean 
Islands, and Caria. Credible evidence is lacking about how these regions were 
governed, however, due in part to the focus of the Antigonid kings on warfare 
rather than administrative development.49 Local economic structures are attested, 
                                                        
45 Dignas, Economy, 54 n. 84. 
46 Aperghis, Economy, 278. Contra Malay and Nalbantoğlu, 'Cult of Apollon': 78, who suggest 
that Diophantos and Attinas were ‘royal functioners serving under the chief-priest or the oikonomos’. 
47 Dignas, Economy, 55, probably overstates her case when she suggests that the oikonomos 
was ‘involved in matters that did not concern land at all, not even sacred territory. The post must 
have had a very down to earth profile, if Asclepiades was really going to assign a place for a single 
stele in a small sanctuary’. 
48 Ma, Antiochos III, 136. In fact, Malay and Nalbantoğlu, 'Cult of Apollon': 78, suggest that the 
oikonomos was ‘a royal official responsible for the royal land (βασιλικὴ γῆ) as well as for the 
sanctuaries’, and was ‘adopted by the Attalids from the Seleucid administration’. 
49 It is of further significance that Macedonia has so far been inadequately excavated. 
 46 
 
 
but the relationships between the cities and districts, and districts and king, remain 
somewhat unclear and highly disputed, creating difficulty for those who attempt to 
reconstruct the administrative framework of the Macedonian kingdom. This is 
especially disappointing because the balance of power between the king and his 
people made Macedonia the most distinct of the major Hellenistic powers.50 
Although certain kings instituted structures that resembled those of neighbouring 
kingdoms,51 because these systems changed regularly, simply importing a 
bureaucratic model from a contemporary state to provide a skeleton on which to 
build will not do. Neither will it suffice to rely too much on evidence dating from 
before the Antigonid dynasty. While it has been suggested that the kingdom’s 
structure changed little following the death of Alexander,52 recent studies have 
noted significant changes in city and state organisation not only immediately 
following the division of the Alexandrian empire, but even between the reigns of 
various Antigonid kings.53 For our purposes, then, we will focus all of our attention 
on reconstructing part of only one administrative policy, that of Philip V. 
Of the Macedonian kings the reign of Philip V has preserved the most 
illuminating data with which to work in the Hellenistic period and it is from his rule 
that we possess the only extant documents attesting to the appointment of 
oikonomoi in Macedonian regal administration. During the forty-three years of his 
reign (222-179 BCE), Philip spent no more than eight at peace.54 For this reason it is 
not at all strange that the two inscriptions noting regal oikonomoi in Macedonia were 
discovered in army garrisons (IG XII Suppl. 644; SEG 51.640bis).55 In these two nearly-
                                                        
50 M. B. Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions under the Kings: A Historical and Epigraphic Study 
(Meletemata 22.1; Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity/National Hellenic 
Research Foundation, 1996), 420, remarks that ‘the whole structure of the Macedonian state is less 
elaborate, less hierarchical, and bears less the imprint of an all-pervasive and strictly structured 
bureaucracy than that of the Ptolemies. . . . Macedonia emerges as more “democratic”, if not 
egalitarian, and relying more on local initiative and autonomy than on a centralised civil service’; 
contra R. M. Errington, A History of Macedonia (Hellenistic Culture and Society; Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 218-29. For a balanced view, see F. W. Walbank, 'Macedonia and Greece', in 
The Cambridge Ancient History: The Hellenistic World (Vol. 7.1), ed. F. W. Walbank et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 221-56, at 225-29. 
51 Richard A. Billows, Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State (Hellenistic 
Culture and Society; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 268, suggests that something akin 
to the Achaemenid administration was instituted during the reign of Antigonos Monophthalmos. 
52 Rostovtzeff, Hellenistic World, 250. 
53 Walbank, 'Macedonia and Greece', 225-27. 
54 F. W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 259. 
55 IG XII Suppl. 644, found in Chalcis, was preserved in its entirety. For discussion, see C. 
Bradford Welles, 'New Texts from the Chancery of Philip V of Macedonia and the Problem of the 
'Diagramma'', AJA 42 (1938): 245-60, at 252-54; M. B. Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions under the 
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identical texts, oikonomoi emerge as financial administrators, just as they were in the 
more abundantly documented kingdoms. But some of their responsibilities included 
tasks somewhat unfamiliar to those expounded in the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and 
Attalid texts examined above. The late third-century BCE inscription found in 
Chalcis (IG XII Suppl. 644), for instance, portrays oikonomoi as responsible for the 
inspection and replacement of basic supplies in Philip’s military fortresses 
(φρούρια).56 The lengthy inscription comes in the form of a διάγραμμα and reads as 
follows: 
The oikonomoi shall take care that the orders by the king [τὰ διαταχθέντα ὑpiὸ τοῦ βασιλέως] 
concerning the stores be kept without alteration. And while in the presence of the phrourarchoi, the 
things which are already stored, they shall measure those of which there is a measure, [5] and they 
shall raise those of which there is weight, so that the phrourarchoi might also attend to whatever 
there is. And the agents of the oikonomoi [οἱ διὰ τῶν οἰκονόμων χειρισταί] shall have the keys to the 
warehouses. [10] And the phrourarchoi shall seal the bins and they shall be careful that nothing is 
taken out of the stores, unless something, after having become old, seems useless, in which case 
these shall be removed whenever the equal amount has been substituted. [15] And they shall bring 
in the dry grain from the new revenue and immediately arrange to sow [the old grain] on the 
Chalcidian land. And they shall replace the wine and wood every five years and shall be careful [20] 
that the sweet one-year-old wine is brought in after having been tested. And they shall also inspect 
[ἐpiισκοpiείτωσαν] the granaries during the six months of summer whenever there is rain, and during 
the winter every ten days, and if there is a leak [25] that reaches the grain, they shall repair it 
immediately. And if any oikonomoi or agents of the oikonomoi either removes the seals without 
permission from the phrourarchoi, or takes out something before other things have been brought in, 
[30] or allows something to become useless because he did not inspect it [διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐpiισκοpiεῖν] 
according to the times which have been indicated, then after having been examined they shall suffer 
whatever sentence the king issues in judgment against them [ἐλεγχθέντες piαθέτωσαν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν 
ὁ βασιλεὺς καταγνῶι]. And the phrourarchoi, if they should neglect care [35] of those things which 
are being stored, if they willingly give them away to others, or if they themselves should take [from 
them], then they will be liable to whatever sentence the king issues in judgment against them 
[ἔνοχοι ἔσονται ὧν ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν καταγνῶι]. And whatever the oikonomoi do not do of those 
things written in this diagramma, [40] the phrourarchos appointed in whatever place the negligence 
occurs shall write to the king immediately, so that the king may decide of what punishment he is 
worthy concerning the one neglecting [ὃpiως ὁ βασιλεὺς διαγνῶι piερὶ τοῦ ὀλιωρήσαντος τίνος ἄξιός 
ἐστιν ἐpiιτιμήσεως]. And if he does not write, [45] but the king first learns by another person, he will 
be exacted a fine of six thousand drachmas. And each of the oikonomoi, after having recorded this 
diagramma on a stele, shall set it in the most visible place of the fortress and he, [50] whenever 
transferred over to another place, or relieved of his duty [ὅταν ἢ μετάγηται ἐφ’ ἕτερον τόpiον ἤ 
ἀφιῆται ἀpiὸ τῆς χρείας], shall hand it over to his successor with the rest of the concerns of the office 
in accordance with this diagramma [piαραδιδότω τῶι ἐpiικαθισταμένωι μετὰ τῶν λοιpiῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς 
οἰκονομίας κατὰ τὸ διάγραμμα τοῦτο].57 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Kings: Epigraphic Appendix (Meletemata 22.2; Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman 
Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1996), 36-38. SEG 51.640bis, found in Kynos, 
contains lines 36-53 of the previous text. For both, see M. B. Hatzopoulos, L'organisation de l'armée 
macedonienne sous les Antigonides. Problèmes anciennes et documents nouveaux (Meletemata 30; Athens: 
Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2001), 151-
53 (§1). 
56 The φρούριον in Chalcis was among the ‘fetters of Greece’, the three most strategically 
located Macedonian fortresses located in Demetrias, Corinth, and Chalcis. 
57 I am grateful to Dr. Paola Ceccarelli and Professor John Barclay for their assistance in the 
translation of this text. 
 48 
 
 
1. Hierarchy 
The oikonomoi in view were clearly royal administrators who were 
subordinate to the king, since the orders they received were issued directly by him 
(τὰ διαταχθέντα ὑpiὸ τοῦ βασιλέως). Since the document also contains instructions 
to the φρούραρχοι and χειρισταί τῶν οἰκονόμων, we can reconstruct a basic chain of 
command: the king served as head of the monarchy and delegated oversight to his 
military and financial subordinates, the φρούραρχοι and οἰκονόμοι; the οἰκονόμοι 
then further delegated tasks to their agents (χειρισταί). While the φρούραρχοι were 
required to grant permission to the oikonomoi for the opening of storage bins and to 
notify the king of any mismanagement on the part of the oikonomoi or their agents, 
the oikonomoi were not subordinate to the φρούραρχοι. Rather, they were officers of 
equal rank in complementary departments.58 This is most apparent when the text 
indicates that the king himself, rather than the φρούραρχοι, gave the directives (τὰ 
διαταχθέντα ὑpiὸ τοῦ βασιλέως [1]) and would issue punishment (καταγινώσκω [33, 
36]) for any case of negligence. Thus, the oikonomoi were subordinate officials 
located, according to this inscription, directly beneath the king. 
The document also shows that the oikonomoi possessed some degree of 
authority. Although the text does not state explicitly which official was in view for 
most of the instructions, the supervisory nature of the duties and the opening 
address together suggest that all of the instructions were intended for the oikonomoi 
unless otherwise indicated. But the presence of the χειρισταί (9, 27) indicates that 
oikonomoi did not handle all of the storage matters in each φρούριον personally. 
Final responsibility for the replenishment of the fortresses’ supplies belonged to the 
oikonomoi, but since the χειρισταί maintained possession of the keys to the storage 
bins (τὰς μὲν κλεῖδας τῶν ἀpiοθηκῶν [8]) these tasks were probably carried out by 
the agents. Hence, oikonomoi, though subordinate to the king, possessed supervisory 
authority in the fortresses, and probably over the provinces of the kingdom. 
 
2. Responsibilities 
The responsibilities and desired traits of the oikonomoi are made clear in the 
inscription. Once they took inventory of the stored goods (ὧν μέτρον ἐστὶν 
ἀναμετρησάτωσαν . . . ὧν δὲ σταθμὸς ἀναστησάτωσαν [3-6]), they were responsible 
                                                        
58 Walbank, Philip V, 294. 
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for bringing in the new grain (τὸμ μὲν σῖτον ἀναγέτωσαν ἀpiὸ τῆς νέας piροσόδου 
ἄβροχον [15-16]) and for arranging the old grain to be sown in the local fields 
(συνατασσέτωσαν διαpiάσσειν τῆι γῆι τῆι Χαλκιδικῆι [17-18]). Furthermore, they 
were responsible for replacing the wine and wood every five years (τὸν δὲ οἶνον καὶ 
τὰ ξύλα ἐγνεούτωσαν διὰ piέντε ἐτῶν [18-19]) and for inspecting (ἐpiισκοpiείτωσαν 
[21; cf. 30]) and repairing (ἐpiισκευαζέτωσαν [25-26]) the granaries. The purpose for 
the surplus is not entirely clear. Bradford Welles suggests that the ordinance was 
given ‘to maintain in a state of constant readiness the “first class” military supplies, 
grain, wine, and wood’ in case of an enemy siege.59 On the other hand, the supplies 
may have been intended for emergency civilian use, since the peasants would have 
likely found protection in the fortress during an attack.  
But even though the inscription only lists responsibilities associated with 
the maintenance of army surplus, it is reasonable to surmise that the Macedonian 
oikonomoi were entrusted with responsibilities beyond those listed on this stele, and 
perhaps outside of military matters. Clearly the φρούραρχος was appointed to a 
particular fortress (ὁ φρούραρχος ὁ τεταγμένος ἐν ὧι ἂν τόpiωι [40-41]), but this may 
not have been the case for the oikonomos. When the text states that an oikonomos 
might be ‘transferred over to another place’ (μετάγηται ἐφ’ ἕτερον τόpiον [49-50]), 
the location in view may not be a fortress, but an administrative region, similar to 
the τόpiοι managed by the Seleucid and Attalid oikonomoi. Moreover, it is plausible, 
as Welles suggests, that the oikonomoi performed duties in addition to those 
mentioned in the document.60 When the text refers to ‘the rest of the concerns of 
the office’ (τῶν λοιpiῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομίας [52-53]), it indicates that oikonomoi 
performed tasks not mentioned in this διάγραμμα, tasks which may have required 
supervision beyond the fortress. Indeed, the appointment of χειρισταί might suggest 
that the responsibilities of oikonomoi were so numerous and geographically 
extensive that personal agents were required to fulfil them. The regularly scheduled 
instructions mentioned in the text, in fact, required attention only once every ten 
days at most during the winter, undoubtedly the most demanding season of the year 
[23-24]. Therefore, it is likely that the oikonomoi had more tasks entrusted to them 
than those listed here. If so, they would have been regarded as persons of great 
authority in the regal administration of the Macedonian kingdom. 
                                                        
59 Welles, 'New Texts': 253. Significantly, nothing is stated about weaponry. 
60 Welles, 'New Texts': 253. 
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3. Accountability 
The διάγραμμα also makes clear that the office of the oikonomos required 
thoughtfulness (φροντιζέτωσαν [19-20]), punctuality (εὐθέως [16-17]; piαραχρῆμα 
[26]), and above all precision (ἐpiιμελείσθωσαν ὅpiως τὰ διαταχθέντα . . . διατηρῆται 
ἄφθαρτα, [1-2]). According to the inscription, negligence was simply unacceptable 
to the king, and in any such cases the offenders would suffer whatever sentence the 
king issued (ἐλεγχθέντες piαθέτωσαν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς καταγνῶι [32-33]), 
which might have consisted of one’s termination (ἀφιῆται ἀpiὸ τῆς χρείας [50-51]), 
or perhaps worse. Regardless, the oikonomoi were warned by way of this inscription 
not to disregard the king’s orders, or else suffer the penalty for mismanagement. 
 
E. Summary 
In the preceding investigation we carefully examined the use of the title 
οἰκονόμος in the regal administrations of the Hellenistic kingdoms.61 It is notable 
that during this period the title was used in each of the main four Hellenistic 
political powers, the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, Attalid (Pergamene), and Macedonian 
(Antigonid) kingdoms. Due to the minor structural differences that existed between 
the monarchies, we examined them individually, so as not to confuse the use of the 
title in one administrative system with that in another. Despite this discriminating 
approach to the source material, however, several consistent features surfaced in 
our analysis.  
Oikonomoi were always shown to be subordinate financial officials at least 
one step removed from the top of the administrative hierarchy, and in most cases 
they were at least two or three steps away. At the same time, oikonomoi were 
without exception regional managers entrusted with the oversight of large 
territories. As a result, they normally had several delegates at their immediate 
disposal and supervised numerous other local officials. With such a high 
administrative rank, oikonomoi would have possessed significant social status and 
                                                        
61 In the Roman period, the oikonomoi of Caesar, though clearly belonging to the emperor and 
forming a somewhat distinct category of administration beyond the private, public, and regal 
domains, more closely resembled private than regal administrators as they belong to the familia 
Caesaris; cf. Anna Swiderek, 'Les Καίσαρος οἰκονόμοι de l'Égypte romaine', Chronique d'Égypte 89 
(1970): 157-60; P. R. C. Weaver, Familia Caesaris: A Social Study of the Emperor's Freedman and Slaves 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). We will therefore integrate our discussion of the 
administrators of Caesar in Chapter 4. 
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structural authority. But the administrative competencies of oikonomoi were usually 
limited to financial matters, so that their responsibilities typically involved various 
kinds of revenue acquisition as well as the provisions and payments of needs and 
supplies of the regional economic sectors. They served in certain judicial capacities 
on occasion, but this seems to have been necessary only when the offenses involved 
were of some financial relevance. In either case, oikonomoi would have been held 
accountable for their administrative oversight by their superiors. Several 
documents indicate that professional advancement was a real possibility for those 
who carried out the king’s wishes. Alternatively, termination and eventual 
sentencing by the king or an immediate supervisor awaited those who were guilty 
of mismanagement. 
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Chapter 3. Oikonomoi as Civic Administrators 
 
The epigraphic remains from both the Hellenistic and Roman periods also attest to 
the appointment of oikonomoi as administrators of Greek and Roman cities. Just like 
the evidence pertaining to regal oikonomoi, texts featuring oikonomoi in civic 
contexts have been found throughout the Mediterranean basin and range in date 
from just before the death of Alexander the Great to the mid-third century CE. But 
before an analysis of these municipal officials can be undertaken, several 
methodological difficulties must be addressed. 
Firstly, despite the widespread geographical attestation of the title, the 
inscriptions mentioning municipal oikonomoi are not evenly distributed. Many of 
these inscriptions surface in clusters and in specific geographical regions, most 
notably western Asia Minor, the Aegean Islands, the coastal cities of the Black Sea, 
and southern Greece, creating a lack of uniformity across the Mediterranean. It is 
possible that this clustering is due to modern archaeology’s patchy excavating of 
Greek societies, but it should be noted that there are even very few attestations of 
oikonomoi in some cities that have been heavily excavated.1 
In spite of the scattered usage of oikonomoi, though, it is significant for our 
purposes that the best attested regions are those located at the edges of the 
Hellenistic kingdoms where an abundance of self-governing cities developed.2 It is 
not surprising, then, that cities in these peripheral regions were administered 
differently than those managed more closely by the Hellenistic kings and employed 
titles not normally utilised in cities falling within the direct jurisdiction of the 
monarchies. In fact, many of the titles used for magistrates in these ‘independent’ 
cities were the same as those used for regional administrators in the Hellenistic 
                                                        
1 Take for example Athens, from which there have been tens of thousands of inscriptions 
published and just one known instance of <o>ikonomos (IG II2 11492/CIG 963/CIL 3.555), which, 
incidently, attests to a private slave administrator, not a civic official. 
2 Although much of western Asia Minor and the Black Sea region fell within the boarders of 
the monarchies, quite often the cities located within those distant territories were given the 
opportunity to govern themselves, so long as tributes were regularly paid to the kings. For the 
‘independence’ of Greek cities, see, e.g., Ma, Antiochos III, 150-74; Mogens Herman Hansen, 'The 
"Autonomous City-State", Ancient Fact or Modern Fiction?', in Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis, ed. 
Mogens Herman Hansen and Kurt A. Raaflaub (Historia Einzelschriften 95; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 
1995), 21-43. 
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kingdoms. After all, in the peripheral independent cities there would have been 
little concern for titular overlap with regal administrators.3 
It is also significant that there are genetic links between many of the cities 
that appointed oikonomoi. It has been well documented that the Greek civilisations 
of western Asia Minor, for instance, were colonised by the cities of southern Greece. 
Moreover, the Greek civilisations found in the Black Sea region were largely 
colonised by the cities of western Asia Minor, particularly Miletus.4 Because these 
regions have hereditary ties, it should come as no surprise that the titles used for 
city officials in these regions quite frequently overlapped. 
A second difficulty with examining the profile of municipal oikonomoi is that 
the inscriptions which mention them rarely reveal anything of real significance. As 
David Magie laments, ‘Unfortunately, the extant documents—principally decrees 
passed by the Assemblies—yield little information concerning the details of 
government and the actual administration of public affairs in the Asianic city-states 
during the Hellenistic period’.5 This does not imply that nothing can be ascertained 
about their civic responsibilities and administrative power. Inscriptions featuring 
oikonomoi indicate much about their involvement in civic purchases and certain 
public events. But beyond this not much is known directly from these texts. If it can 
be assumed that every oikonomos serving in municipal contexts was entrusted with 
the same responsibilities, then more can be deduced. But as previously stated, most 
cities where the title was used were autonomous, constructed their own 
constitutions, and so were governed differently. It is not entirely clear, therefore, 
why certain cities appointed entire boards of oikonomoi, why some elected only one, 
and why some appear to have had none. To complicate things further, the titles 
given to the individuals who fulfilled the duties normally performed by oikonomoi 
were not always the same. It is quite unclear why some cities used the title 
οἰκονόμος, others ταμίας, and still others ὁ ἐpiὶ τῆς διοικήσεως. Were these titles 
                                                        
3 For an introduction to the economy of these free states, see Léopold Migeotte, The Economy 
of the Greek Cities: From the Archaic Period to the Early Roman Empire (trans. Janet Lloyd; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2009). 
4 Gocha R. Tsetskhladze, 'Greek Penetration of the Black Sea', in The Archaeology of Greek 
Colonisation: Essays Dedicated to Sir John Boardman, ed. Gocha R. Tsetskhladze and Franco De Angelis 
(Oxford University School of Archaeology Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University School of 
Archaeology, 2004), 111-135, at 124: ‘Virtually all the colonies in the Black Sea region were founded 
by Miletus’. 
5 David Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor: To the End of the Third Century after Christ (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1950), 59. 
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synonymous? If so, why do they occasionally appear in the same city6 and even side 
by side?7 Moreover, why do certain titles surface in some periods, disappear for well 
over a century, only to reappear again in the same city in a later era?8 Such 
questions create difficulties in the reconstruction of city administrations and must 
be taken into consideration when investigating the responsibilities and power 
dynamics of civic oikonomoi. 
We must, nevertheless, attempt to synthesise what the evidence does 
suggest. In an effort to do so, we will divide the data into three historical and 
municipal contexts. We will first analyse the responsibilities and administrative 
power possessed by those oikonomoi serving in Greek cities during the Hellenistic 
period, then proceed to those characteristics of oikonomoi in Greek cities from the 
Roman period, and finally examine the same features pertaining to oikonomoi 
serving in Roman colonies and municipia. While minor differences existed in each of 
these civic contexts, several consistent features of oikonomoi will become apparent 
over the course our analysis. In each case, oikonomoi normally functioned as 
financial magistrates and possessed considerable socio-economic status within their 
respective communities (it is noteworthy, however, that a number of municipal 
oikonomoi serving in Greek cities during the Roman period appear to have been 
public slaves [e.g. SEG 24.496; 47.1662; 38.710; see Appendix 1]).9 But despite their 
                                                        
6 In Priene, οἰκονόμος, νεωpiοίης, and ὁ ἐpiὶ τῆς διοικήσεως were all used for financial 
magistrates. But νεωpiοίαι clearly managed sacred funds, suggesting that οἰκονόμοι served in the 
central treasury. The jurisdiction of οἱ ἐpiὶ τῆς διοικήσεως is more complicated, since they made the 
same payments as οἰκονόμοι. Anton Asboeck, 'Das Staatswesen von Priene in hellenistischer Zeit' 
(PhD Diss., Univ. of Munich, 1913), 112, concluded that ὁ οἰκονόμος and ὁ ἐpiὶ τῆς διοικήσεως refered 
to the same public office: ‘Die Befugnisse beider sind, soweit wir sie kennen, identisch’. This may 
have been the case, but not necessarily, as ὁ ἐpiὶ τῆς διοικήσεως only surfaces four times in Priene, 
the last attestation being in the second century BCE, while οἰκονόμος appears more than ten times 
through the first century BCE. Léopold Migeotte, 'La haute administration des finances publiques et 
sacrées dans les cités hellénistiques', Chiron 36 (2006): 379-94, at 388, therefore, suggests that a 
reform took place during the second century BCE that eliminated ὁ ἐpiὶ τῆς διοικήσεως and retained 
only the οἰκονόμος, entrusting all public funds to him. 
7 See, e.g., IMylasa 301: τὴν αὐτὴν ἐpiιγραφὴν piοιείσθω ἐφ’ ἑκάστου καὶ piαραδιδότω αὐτὰ τοῖς 
ταμίαις ἢ οἰκονόμοις τῆς φυλῆς (cf. IMylasa 201). It could be that in Mylasa the various city tribes 
(φυλαί) used ταμίας and οἰκονόμος interchangeably. Cf. SEG 39.1243; 52.659; ISmyrna 771; 772. 
8 See, e.g., the titular variety of the Athenian treasury. Cf. Alan S. Henry, 'Polis/Acropolis, 
Paymasters and the Ten Talent Fund', Chiron 12 (1982): 91-118; Alan S. Henry, 'Athenian Financial 
Officials after 303 B.C.', Chiron 14 (1984): 49-91; R. Develin, Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 7-12; G. J. Oliver, War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 223-27. 
9 Still, many other municipal οἰκονόμοι in Greek cities during the Roman period were 
citizens and magistrates (e.g. CIG 2811; SEG 26.1044; TAM 5.743; Ismyrna 761; 771; 772; IStratonikeia 1). 
Cf. Alexander Weiß, Sklave der Stadt: Untersuchungen zur öffentlichen Sklaverei in den Städten des 
Römischen Reiches (Historia Einzelschriften 173; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), 50-59. 
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prominence, these officials never possessed any significant political and decision-
making authority. Furthermore, the measures taken to ensure their dependability 
differed between historical and municipal contexts. In fact, it is quite significant 
that oikonomoi serving in these civic roles were neither offered any tangible 
incentives for administering well, nor held accountable directly to a superior 
official. Instead, municipal oikonomoi were answerable either to the entire 
community or to a representative body. 
 
A. In Greek Cities of the Hellenistic Period  
1. Responsibilities 
The oikonomoi who served in Greek cities during the Hellenistic period were 
treasurers, elected magistrates, and citizens. This much is clear from the 
interchangeable usage of οἰκονόμος with ταμίας (treasury magistrate) in civic 
publications.10 According to the epigraphic record, the most commonly repeated 
statement mentioning municipal οἰκονόμοι reads as follows: τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς 
τὴν στήλην δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον (‘And let the oikonomos pay the expense for the 
stele’ [OGI 50]). While regularly varying in word-order and word-choice, this formula 
is mentioned in at least twenty-five inscriptions dated between the fourth and first 
centuries BCE, as well as in an additional eight inscriptions whose dates are 
unknown, but whose provenances suggest that they too belonged to the Hellenistic 
period (see Appendix 2). Significantly, the formula resembles that which was used 
to authorise the purchases made by ταμίαι and other financial magistrates in many 
other Greek cities during this timeframe.11 
Oikonomoi were also responsible for the payments and provision of numerous 
gifts and crowns for ambassadors, athletes, and benefactors. A third-century BCE 
inscription from Ephesus, for instance, has been restored to report how an 
oikonomos was charged with the responsibility of awarding a certain man with a gift 
in return for his benefactions: ‘And the oikonomos should send to him the gift of 
                                                        
10 Although Weiß, Sklave der Stadt, 56, deduces that in some instances οἰκονόμοι and ταμίαι 
held entirely different offices, he concedes that ‘der οἰκονόμος τῆς piόλεως in einigen Städten den 
ταμίας ersetzte’. Cf. Reumann, 'Oikonomia', 234-35. While Landvogt, 'Οἰκονόμος', 19-21, ultimately 
rejected a formal equivalence between οἰκονόμοι and ταμίαι, he observed that their responsibilities 
overlapped considerably. 
11 Cf. Alan S. Henry, 'Provisions for the Payment of Athenian Decrees: A Study in Formulaic 
Language', ZPE 78 (1989): 247-93, esp. 259-60. 
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hospitality [ξένια] so that all might know that the people highly honour the favours 
being offered for the benefits of the city’ (IEphMcCabe 88/IBM 469). Although the 
recipient is not specified in what remains of the inscription, it is clear from another 
Ephesian publication dating to the same period that such ξενίαι were offered to 
wealthy visitors whose favours the city aimed to secure (IEphMcCabe 60/OGI 10/IBM 
453). Such gifts were apparently sanctioned by law, as suggested by a third-century 
BCE inscription from Colophon: ‘And the oikonomos, Koronos, should give the gifts of 
hospitality [ξένια] to the ambassador [τῶι piρεσβευτῆι] which are in accordance with 
the law [τὰ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου]’ (SEG 49.1502/REG 1999:2.1). Oikonomoi were also 
responsible for purchasing and distributing crowns to accomplished athletes and 
politicians. In one inscription (IEphesos 1448; see below) an Ephesian oikonomos was 
commissioned to pay for the crowns presented to Antigonus and Demetrius, 
whereas in another particularly interesting case the oikonomos in Ephesus was 
instructed to distribute money to the victor of a contest so the athlete could 
purchase the crown himself: 
The boule and people decreed: Neumos son of Andronikos proposed: whereas Athenodoros son of 
Semon being of equal rights and dwelling in Ephesos has won the Nemean games in boys’ boxing and 
being proclaimed as Ephesian has crowned the city [ἐστεφάνωκε τὴν piόλιν], the city and people 
decree: Athenodoros is to be an Ephesian, as he was proclaimed in the contest, and there are to be 
for Athenodoros the honours that are authorized by law for the victor in boys’ corporeal events in 
the Nemea (games); and to proclaim him in the agora as the other victors are proclaimed; the 
oikonomos is to give Athenodoros the money [ἀργύριον] that is authorised by law [τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου] 
for the crown; and to allot him a tribe and chiliastus. (IEphesos 1415/IEphMcCabe 69/IBM 415)12 
According to the text Athenodoros was to be awarded the prize in cash from the 
Ephesian oikonomos. Presumably the victor would then use the money to purchase 
his own crown.13 Finally, a second-century BCE inscription from Colophon shows 
that an oikonomos was responsible annually for financing a celebration in honour of 
a certain deceased citizen: 
These things were decided by the council and the people: Let the gymnasiarch of the ephebes each 
year, on the day when Athenaios passed away, perform a sacrifice and the race of the neioi and 
ephebes in honor of Athenaios. On this day, let also the paidonomos put on a sporting competition of 
the paides. Let them be given by the oikonomos for the sacrifice and the race and the sporting 
competition [ὑpiὸ τοῦ οἰκονόμου εἴς τε τὴν θυσίαν καὶ τὴν διαδρομὴν καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα].14 
                                                        
12 Trans. adapted from William J. Slater and Daniela Summa, 'Crowns at Magnesia', GRBS 46 
(2006): 275-99, at 297-98. 
13 The interesting feature of this award is that it was delivered by Ephesus, even though the 
athletic contest was held in Nemea. It is probably the case that the policy in Ephesus, and perhaps in 
other cities as well, was to award gifts to any champion who named the city as their residence; cf. 
Slater and Summa, 'Crowns at Magnesia': 298. 
14 T. Macridy, 'Altertümer von Notion', JÖAI 8 (1905): 155-73, at 163; trans. adapted from 
Sviatoslav Dmitriev, City Government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 36. 
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It is significant to observe that, while other city officials were integrally involved in 
the planning of this municipal event, which included cultic as well as athletic 
oversight, the only responsibility of the oikonomos in this instance and in many 
others was the dispensing of the required funds. 
Oikonomoi, however, did on occasion perform duties beyond making public 
payments. Two lengthy inscriptions reveal their participation in religious festivals 
and processions. A second-century BCE inscription from Magnesia on the Maeander, 
for example, mentions a board of oikonomoi who were delegated certain cultic duties 
on behalf of the city (IMagnMai 98/IMagMcCabe 2). It was resolved that in the last 
month of the year they should buy a bull and at the beginning of the new year, 
when seed was to be sown, they were to offer it as a sacrifice at a public festival. 
Their participation in the sacrifice as well as in the on-going prayer for peace and 
prosperity highlights their representative role even in the religious activities of the 
community. The relevant portion of the inscription reads: 
[10] It was decided by the council and people, on the proposal of the people: that the oikonomoi in 
office shall buy the best possible bull and that those who succeed them shall ever after buy the best 
possible bull in the month of Heraion at the annual festival, and shall dedicate it to Zeus at the start 
of the sowing in the month of Kronion at the new moon together with the male priest and the 
female priest of Artemis Leukophryene and the chief magistrate and the Sacred Herald and the one 
serving as sacrificer for the city. 
[18] that the paidonomoi send nine boys, with both parents alive, and the gunaikonomoi likewise send 
nine girls, with both parents alive. At the designation of the bull, the Sacred Herald shall pray with 
the male priest and the female priest and the stephanephoros and the boys and the girls and the army 
commanders and the cavalry commanders and the oikonomoi and the Secretary of the council and 
the notary and the general for the wellbeing of the city and the territory and the citizens and 
women and children and the other inhabitants of the city and territory for peace and prosperity and 
the yield of grain and of all other crops and livestock. [. . . ] 
[46] that also the oikonomoi shall provide in the month of Artemision on the twelfth day an additional 
three sacrificial victims, which they shall sacrifice to Zeus Sosipolis, to Artemis Leukophryene and to 
Apollo Pythios, to Zeus the finest ram, to Artemis a nanny-goat and to Apollo a billy-goat, sacrificing 
to Zeus on the altar of Zeus Sosipolis, to Artemis and Apollo on the altar of Artemis. The priests of 
these gods shall take their customary privileged portions. 
[54] that when they sacrifice the bull, they shall divide up the meat among the participants in the 
procession; they shall divide up the meat of the ram, the nanny-goat and the billy-goat among the 
stephanephoros, the female priest, the army commanders, the presidents, the Temple Clerks of Work, 
the judges and those who have assisted in the rituals; the oikonomoi shall divide up the meat. 
[59] that once a bull has been dedicated, the oikonomoi shall make a contract so that the bull is 
maintained by the contractor; that the contractor bring the bull into the agora, and take a collection 
from the grain-dealers and from the other stall-holders for what he spends on the maintenance of 
the bull, and it is recommended that they make a donation. 
[64] that the oikonomoi inscribe this decree in the sanctuary of Zeus on the doorway; that the 
oikonomoi pay for the writing of all these things from the income which they have for the 
administration of the city [ἐκ τῶν piόρων ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς piόλεως διοίκησιν]. 
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[67] that this decree is for the protection [φυλακήν] of the city.15 
That oikonomoi should have a leadership role in the observance of this festival is to 
be expected given the purpose of the ceremony as indicated in the final line of the 
inscription. According to the text, the ritual solicited citywide protection (φυλακή) 
from Zeus.16 It is fitting, therefore, that oikonomoi and other magistrates should 
participate by offering public prayers and sacrifices, since as public officials they 
represented the community not only in political matters, but also to the gods. As 
John Reumann observes, the duties of the oikonomos ‘go beyond check-signing, for 
he takes part in the sacrificial rites, if not as a cult official, at least as an 
intermediary of the municipal government’.17 But this and other inscriptions show 
that, even when oikonomoi were assigned cultic duties, they were not in these 
contexts only, or even primarily, acting as ‘religious’ officials, since these texts 
normally indicate that administrative responsibilities also accompanied their 
religious tasks.18 It is significant, for instance, that in this inscription the oikonomoi 
were responsible for offering and dividing sacrifices—seemingly religious tasks—as 
well as for purchasing the animals, drawing up a contract, and having the decree 
engraved on a stele, placed in the sanctuary, and paid for by the central treasury—
seemingly administrative tasks.19 
                                                        
15 Trans. adapted from S. R. F. Price, Religions of the Ancient Greeks (Key Themes in Ancient 
History; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 174 (§3); cf. Reumann, 'Stewards of God': 343. 
16 Even so, Dmitriev, City Government, 25, insists that the event represented in this inscription 
was not a ‘religious’ activity as such, but involved sacrifices and priests because ‘almost everything in 
Greek cities did’. 
17 Reumann, 'Stewards of God': 342. 
18 Of course the sharp distinction between sacred and secular did not exist in the Graeco-
Roman world, so that one should not categorise oikonomoi or any city official as serving in a purely 
secular context. As P. J. Rhodes, 'State and Religion in Athenian Inscriptions', Greece & Rome 56 (2009): 
1-13, at 1, remarks, ‘In Athens, and in the Greek world generally, the notion of a separation between 
church and state was unthinkable’. Moreover, Ramsay MacMullen, Paganism in the Roman Empire (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 43, explains, ‘it must be remembered how far from purely 
secular were most elected officials in cities of Greek or Roman derivation. This year to the gods, the 
next to the city – such was the pattern of service rendered by the local aristocracy’. Nevertheless, 
some delineation between public and sacred was recognised in Graeco-Roman cities. Dignas, 
Economy, 272, for instance, maintains that ‘a clear destinction between sacred and public finances, as 
well as between sacred and public land, existed in the communities of both Hellenistic and Roman 
Asia Minor’. 
19 Dmitriev, City Government, 29-30, further explains that Greek city officials occasionally 
supervised affairs in different administrative contexts because ‘city offices in Hellenistic Asia were 
not grouped into any a priori defined fields of city administration. One city official could have 
different kinds of responsibilities and was classified in more than one category, while officials with 
different ranges of responsibility could participate in the same kind of activity. The Greeks 
conceptualized city administration not as a sum of administrative fields but as individual offices 
which they grouped as the situation required’. 
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Other inscriptions also present oikonomoi as simultaneously fulfilling 
religious and administrative duties. A late-fourth-century BCE inscription from 
Ephesus, for example, charges the city oikonomos with performing sacrifices as well 
as making public payments (IEphesos 1448/IBM 448/IEphMcCabe 108/SIG 352). The 
relevant portion of the text was restored to read: 
It was decreed [by the council and the people]: Since Demetrios, the king, being responsible for 
obtaining many great good-things for the Greeks and our city, for good fortune it should be resolved 
by the people to delight together over the good things which have been announced about the king 
and the army, and for the Ephesians and all those dwelling within to bear crowns [στεφανηφορεῖν] 
on the good fortunes which were being announced, and for the priestess and oikonomos to offer 
sacrifice also to Artemis for the good news [εὐαγγέλια] brought, and to pray also for the rest of time, 
for abundant well-being to come to Demetrios the king and the people of Ephesus. And also to give 
to Antigonus and Demetrios the crowns which are of the laws. And for the oikonomos to pay the 
expenses which are for the sacrifice. . . . And the oikonomos to pay for the crown. 
In this text the pairing of the oikonomos with the priestess as officiants of the 
sacrifice and festival demonstrates once more that municipal oikonomoi were 
occasionally delegated religious responsibilities. But, as noted before, the 
participation of public administrators in public rituals was quite normal in Graeco-
Roman antiquity, since city magistrates served as community representatives not 
only in political matters, but also in religious observance. The oikonomos in this text, 
therefore, should not be confused with a purely cultic official, since the payment 
announcements in the latter part of the inscription indicate that the oikonomos was 
primarily a public administrator. As Reumann remarks, ‘[A]ll state officials in 
antiquity had religious duties to perform, and the fact that an ἄρχων took part in a 
sacrifice did not make him a cult official. Likewise with the political oikonomos’.20 
In summary, while a handful of inscriptions mention the cultic duties 
occasionally delegated to municipal oikonomoi, it is apparent in each case that 
religious oversight only accompanied the administrative responsibilities normally 
entrusted to them.21 Cumulatively, then, the texts mentioning municipal oikonomoi 
reveal that during the Hellenistic period they were always treasurers and often the 
chief financial magistrates of the Greek cities where they were appointed, having 
been commissioned to disburse public funds for various civic expenses. As Peter 
Landvogt explains, ‘Die Hauptkompetenzen des οἰκονόμος in diesen Freistaaten 
bestehen in der Sorge für Aufschrift und Aufstellung von Psephismen und Statuen, 
in Bestreitung der Kosten für jene Besorgungen sowie für Kränze und 
                                                        
20 Reumann, 'Stewards of God': 344 (original emphasis). 
21 Reumann, 'Stewards of God': 344: ‘At best we can say that these governmental oikonomoi at 
times had cultic duties along with financial ones’.  
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Gastgeschenke. . . . Kurz, das Charakteristische für die ganze Amtstätigkeit des 
οἰκονόμος . . . in dieser Periode ist, daß er lediglich als Kassen- oder Finanzbeamter 
fungiert’.22 
 
2. Hierarchy 
As municipal magistrates oikonomoi were, in one sense, considered civic 
leaders. But their elevated social status and political rank did not translate into 
great administrative authority like the oikonomoi who served in the hierarchies of 
the Hellenistic kingdoms. Hellenistic cities simply—and quite intentionally—lacked 
the deep political structure which characterised the monarchies. Instead, political 
power was designed to be shared by the members of the community. Certain kinds 
of socio-economic power could be obtained and were exploited effectively in these 
municipalities. But oikonomoi and other local politicians possessed very limited 
structural leverage with which they could control the community. 
The typical independent Greek city of the Hellenistic period was democratic 
by constitution and instituted three main political bodies to ensure that it was ruled 
by the people (δῆμος).23 The first institution, the assembly (ἐκκλησία), consisted of 
all the male citizens of the city at least twenty-one years of age. Just as in Athens,24 
most city assemblies convened for standard meetings about thirty times per year 
and for the ‘chief meeting’ (ἐκκλησία κηρία) ten additional times per year.25 At 
assembly meetings, which were always summoned by the president (e.g. piρύτανις, 
ἡγεμών), the people made collective decisions, normally by vote, concerning 
matters proposed by the council. Such matters included the passing of decrees 
(ψηφίσματα) and legal revisions, although the latter were also required to be 
confirmed by legislative jurors (νομοθέται).26 
                                                        
22 Landvogt, 'Οἰκονόμος', 17.  
23 A. H. M. Jones, The Greek City: From Alexander to Justinian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 
157: ‘Democracy was . . . in the hellenistic age universally recognized as the proper constitution of 
the Greek city, and as the institutions of the Greek city spread over barbarian lands it was the 
democratic type of constitution which was accepted as the norm’. 
24 M. I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World (The Wiles Lectures; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 70-71, considers it methodologically acceptable to draw general comparisons 
between Athens and other large city-states. 
25 Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, 
Principles, and Ideology (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1999), 133. 
26 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 167-69. 
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The second institution, the council (βουλή), consisted of annually elected 
magistrates (ἄρχοντες), such as oikonomoi, who carried out the executive duties of 
the city.27 Normally, magistrates in the piόλις were required to be male citizens at 
least thirty years of age—although exceptions have been noted28—free of any 
criminal charges, and not to be seeking re-election to an office held the previous 
year (Aristotle, Ath. pol. 55.3). Further, in keeping with the democratic principle, 
they were to have gained their positions either by vote or by lot.29 While certain 
cities required a single official for a given magistracy, other cities further reduced 
the control of elected officials by electing entire boards to a particular office, such 
as the city treasury.30 But whereas the right to pass public decisions was reserved for 
the assembly, magistrates were entrusted with the responsibility of preparing 
decisions for the assembly and implementing those policies passed collectively by 
the people. Resolutions normally originated with the magistrates and, after the 
formal motion had been passed by the council, it became a preliminary resolution 
(piροβούλευμα). It was then presented before the assembly for vote where, if passed, 
the resolution became a decree.31 Thus, both the people—by virtue of the assembly—
and the council were integral to the decision-making process, as announced in the 
enactment formulas of many civic publications: ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι.32 
These statements are suggestive of the great administrative authority and 
responsibility entrusted to both the assembly and the council. The two bodies 
functioned complementarily, so that the council was always charged with the 
important task of proposing and carrying out the decisions made by the assembly.33 
                                                        
27 Dmitriev, City Government, 56; Jones, Greek City, 165. 
28 Dmitriev, City Government, 46-56, discusses instances when women and children (and even 
kings and deities) were elected to public office. 
29 In the east magistrates were normally elected in order to protect the sovereignty of the 
people. As Jones, Greek City, 162, remarks, ‘It was an essential principle of Greek democracy to curb as 
far as possible the power of the executive, the magistrates, and to ensure that the magistracies were 
equally accessible to all citizens’. 
30 Jones, Greek City, 163; Migeotte, 'La haute administration': 393-94, argues that ‘beaucoup de 
cités ont concentré en peu de mains la haute administration des finances publiques et souvent celle 
des finances sacrées’. 
31 P. J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 104; B. H. McLean, An 
Introduction to Greek Epigraphy of the Hellenistic and Roman Periods from Alexander the Great down to the 
Reign of Constantine (323 B.C.-A.D. 337) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 218. 
32 P. J. Rhodes and David M. Lewis, The Decrees of the Greek States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), 4. 
33 Jones, Greek City, 164: ‘All Greek cities, however democratic, recognized that the primary 
assembly was a dangerously irresponsible body, and therefore, while leaving to it the ultimate 
decision on every point of importance, took care that no ill-considered proposal could be suddenly 
sprung upon it and passed in a snap division. One precaution, which seems to have been universal, 
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Nevertheless, the entire procedure underscores the sovereignty of the people and 
the supportive roles of the council and its magistrates. 
The third institution of the Greek city was the people’s court (δικαστήριον), 
which further highlights the restricted power of magistrates. If the council was the 
executive branch of the δῆμος, then the court functioned as its judicial embodiment 
and was the political establishment with which the final word and source of power 
rested.34 Although every city had a single δικαστήριον, several courts might convene 
everyday in a given city, each comprising upward to several hundred male jurors 
(δικασταί) at least thirty years of age who were selected daily by lot from a large 
panel of eligible citizens. These courts tried both public and private cases, but those 
that most often came before the people’s court were political hearings. 
The distribution of power between each of these three civic bodies has 
significant implications for how we regard the authority entrusted to the oikonomoi 
appointed in Hellenistic cities. Since Greek cities sought to restrict the power of its 
politicians by placing the bulk of the decision-making authority in the hands of the 
citizens, the structural authority of the typical elected official was limited. Beyond 
this, treasurers such as oikonomoi do not appear to have possessed much of any 
structural authority, as their role was largely to dispense public funds at the 
instruction of the council. Still further, this responsibility was occasionally 
distributed among a treasury board, affording the individual oikonomos a rather 
inconsequential role in the development of public policy. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
was that no measure might be brought before the assembly which had not been considered and 
approved by the council’. 
34 The precise relationship between the δῆμος and δικαστήριον is disputed. Mogens Herman 
Hansen, The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action 
Against Unconstitutional Proposals (Odense University Classical Studies 4; Odense: Odense 
universitetsforlag, 1974), 18, argues that, ‘The authority of the courts is greater than that of the 
Assembly, and it is the jurors who are the protectors of democracy’. Cf. Mogens Herman Hansen, 
Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of 
Generals and Politicians (Odense University Classical Studies 6; Odense: Odense universitetsforlag, 
1975); Mogens Herman Hansen, 'The Political Powers of the People's Court in Fourth-Century 
Athens', in The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander, ed. Oswyn Murray and Simon Price (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1990), 215-43. Peter Rhodes, on the other hand, has maintained that both the assembly 
and people’s court were mere embodiments of the δῆμος; cf. P. J. Rhodes, 'Εισαγγελια in Athens', JHS 
99 (1979): 103-14; P. J. Rhodes, 'Athenian Democracy after 403 B.C.', CJ 75 (1980): 305-23; P. J. Rhodes, A 
Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 314, 489, 525, 545. 
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3. Accountability 
According to the Athenian court system, political hearings generally took 
four forms.35 Before any elected person could take office, he had to undergo (i) a 
scrutiny of his legal qualifications (δοκιμασία).36 While in office he could then be 
removed during any ἐκκλησία κηρία (ii) by vote (ἀpiοχειροτονία) due simply to the 
dissatisfaction of the people,37 or (iii) by impeachment (εἰσαγγελία) for criminal 
behaviour.38 Lastly, at the end of his term he had to undergo (iv) a final review of his 
conduct and a financial audit (εὔθυναι).39 Only when this final scrutiny was 
                                                        
35 The majority of the evidence for the accountability of Greek city officials is from fourth-
century BCE Athens. Fortunately, recent studies have confirmed that much continuity existed 
between Athenian political trials and those of other Hellenistic cities; cf. Pierre Fröhlich, Les cités 
grecques et le contrôle des magistrats (IVe-Ier siècle avant J.-C.) (Hautes études du monde gréco-romain 33; 
Geneva: Droz, 2004), 361-62. For attestations of similar judicial scenarios in other Greek cities, see 
Rhodes and Lewis, Decrees, 528-29. 
36 The δοκιμασία was not an examination of the candidate’s competence, but of his ‘formal 
qualifications, conduct and political convictions’ (Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 218). In theory the 
court maintained the power to overturn an election if it believed the candidate was legally unfit for 
office, although eventually this procedure became something of a formality. During the procedure 
the candidate was required to reply to a series of standard questions (Aristotle, Ath. pol. 55.3). After 
the candidate successfully answered the questions and provided witnesses to testify on his behalf, all 
citizens were given the opportunity to bring accusations against the candidate’s qualifications, to 
which he was forced to reply. A vote was then held by the jurors and the candidate was either 
admitted to or excused from office. Cf. Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Accountability in Athenian Government 
(Wisconsin Studies in Classics; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 14; Gabriel Adeleye, 
'The Purpose of the 'Dokimasia'', GRBS 24 (1983): 295-306. 
37 The first formal opportunity afforded citizens to criticise magistrates took the form of a 
vote of no confidence. During every ἐκκλησία κηρία citizens could propose a ‘vote on the 
magistrates’ (ἐpiιχειροτονία τὰς ἀρχάς), whereby the assembly voted by a show of hands on the 
approval of a named official. If the vote went against the magistrate (ἀpiοχειροτονία), then he would 
be immediately suspended. An impeachment trial (εἰσαγγελία) would follow in order to remove the 
magistrate from office permanently. The trial itself was presided over by the θεσμοθέται, who 
carried out the preliminary investigation (ἀνάκρισις) and summoned a court. It included speeches by 
the prosecution and defence and a vote by the jury. If the jury found the magistrate guilty, then he 
would be permanently dismissed and punished according to the sentence which was proposed by the 
prosecution and decided upon by a second vote of the jury. But if he was acquitted, then the 
magistrate would be immediately restored to his office. Cf. Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 221. 
38 Impeachment could take different forms and call for varying degrees of punishment. 
Εἰσαγγελία εἰς τὸν δῆμον could be charged against any citizen for a political crime, but was primarily 
brought against generals (στρατηγοί) for major crimes committed against the city, such as treason, 
corruption, or even an unlucky defeat on the battlefield. These offences often resulted in the death 
penalty, exile, or such a heavy fine that the convicted man became a state debtor and ἄτιμος for life. 
For a number of examples of impeached magistrates, see Roberts, Accountability, 28. Εἰσαγγελία εἰς 
τὴν βουλήν, on the other hand, could only be brought on magistrates for the lesser charge of 
maladministration, but could encompass any number of offences and might result in a large fine. Cf. 
Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 212-18. 
39 These trial procedures were held in two phases. First, εὔθυναι involved an active 
investigation into an official’s conduct. At the end of every magisterial term each official submitted 
his accounts to a board of ten inspectors (λογισταί) who would then preside over a court hearing 
while their assistants (συνεργοί) brought forth against the official accusations concerning the audit. 
After the intial scrutiny, citizens could come forward and make further accusations of 
embezzlement, bribery, or a lesser financial offence. After the official testified in his own defence, 
the jury then voted. If the official was found guilty of either embezzlement or bribery, then he was 
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completed could the magistrate honourably return to civilian life.40 These kinds of 
political elections and trials were essential for the survival of democracy in 
Hellenistic cities. According to Peter Rhodes and David Lewis, ‘If a Greek state was to 
be considered in any sense democratic, it was essential that, even if the offices were 
not open to all citizens, the citizens should have the right to appoint the office-
holders and call them to account’.41 
The construction of the assembly and court, then, created a balance of power 
in the Hellenistic cities, so that civic magistrates, such as oikonomoi, could occupy 
elected office and possess administrative responsibility without being afforded 
great structural power like the oikonomoi of the Hellenistic monarchies.42 Certain 
offices utilised titular prefixes which imply subordination (ὑpiο-), but as Sviatoslav 
Dmitriev explains, ‘The development of subordinate relations took place only inside 
administrative colleges and social organizations and therefore did not create any 
hierarchical structure in Asian city administration’.43 Again, since magistrates 
during this period—who do not appear normally to have been paid44—were often 
wealthy enough to finance their own administration or promise some sort of 
                                                                                                                                                               
penalised a tenfold fine; if he was convicted of a lesser offence, then he was fined a lesser amount. 
The second phase was much more passive. It required that the magistrates reply to any other 
offences for which they were accused. But these later accusations were brought by citizens first to 
another panel of inspectors consisting of one corrector (εὔθυνος) and two assessors (piάρεδροι) from 
each tribe. For only three days following the first phase of the εὔθυναι these inspectors were made 
available to their respective tribes to receive accusations from citizens. During this time any 
accusation could be brought forward, but the correctors and assessors were given the opportunity to 
decide for themselves whether or not the charges were worthy of investigation. If in fact an 
accusation seemed worthy of further consideration, it was then passed on to court authorities so the 
magistrate could stand trial once again. If no charges were passed by the inspectors, then the 
εὔθυναι came to a close and the man returned to civilian life.  
40 Magistrates also had to be prepared for inspections while in office. The council, for 
instance, regularly audited the accounts of the treasurers and any other such magistrates entrusted 
with public funds. A board of ten inspectors (λογισταί) from among the councillors was chosen 
annually by lot to examine these magistrates during each prytanny. Accused councillors were forced 
to stand trial and face punishment if found guilty. Additionally, at any point during a magistrate’s 
administration a citizen could bring charges against him and recommend impeachment. Such 
measures were so fundamental to democratic practice in the Hellenistic city that opportunities to 
voice grievances were built into the assembly’s regularly scheduled meetings. 
41 Rhodes and Lewis, Decrees, 528. 
42 That junior magistrates, and not just στρατηγοί, could be prosecuted for misconduct is 
best represented by the trial of the acclaimed Athenian general Timotheus, whose sentence fell upon 
his ταμίας Antimachus, (Demosthenes, [Tim.] 49). Cf. Roberts, Accountability, 27, 42-43, 201 n. 54. 
43 Dmitriev, City Government, 61. 
44 G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'Political Pay outside Athens', CQ 25 (1975): 48-52, presents evidence 
that members of the assembly in Iasus, as well as judges, assembly members, and councilors in 
Rhodes, received pay. But the practice of paying magistrates was probably not widespread; cf. 
Dmitriev, City Government, 34-35. 
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benefaction upon election,45 public officials normally held a large amount of social 
clout in the community.46 But even though the population was apparently content 
with the political initiative of the elite, the δῆμος maintained the bulk of political 
power as they possessed the final vote on all matters which entered the assembly 
and, perhaps more importantly, the opportunity to prosecute political crimes in the 
people’s court. Thus, civic oikonomoi would not have possessed any decision-making 
authority or structural power stemming from a superior bureaucratic rank. Rather, 
as Mogen Hansen explains regarding the central treasury, ‘[T]he job of the Council 
and the Board of Receivers in relation to the public finances was purely 
administrative: they had only very limited power to take decisions about the use of 
the moneys they administered’.47 David Magie concurs, saying, ‘As a rule . . . 
treasurers had no authority of their own, their duties being to receive the income of 
the city and to make payments ordered by the Council or by a decree of the 
Assembly’.48 
 
B. In Greek Cities of the Roman Period 
With the spread of Rome came the inevitable deterioration of democracy 
and the introduction of top-heavy power structures in the cities of the eastern 
                                                        
45 Pierre Fröhlich, 'Dépenses publiques et évergétisme des citoyens dans l'exercice des 
charges publiques a Priène a la basse époque hellénistique', in Citoyenneté et participation a la basse 
époque hellénistique, ed. Pierre Fröhlich and Christel Müller (Hautes études du monde gréco-romain 
35; Geneva: Droz, 2005), 225-56. 
46 By the Hellenistic period the typical Greek city was in enough financial disarray that the 
population was generally willing to succumb to the ambitious political careers of the economic elite 
so long as the city was compensated in the return. Public benefactions and liturgies—often expressed 
through generous donations to city building projects and the funding of magistracies—eventually 
provided wealthy citizens avenues to secure long-term control of public offices; cf. Dmitriev, City 
Government, 38-45. As Jones, Greek City, 168, explains, ‘Democracy was . . . in the Hellenistic age 
tempered by a convention that the rich should have a virtual monopoly of office, provided that they 
paid for it liberally. And on the whole the compromise seems to have worked very well. The 
sanguinary class war which was the curse of Greek politics in the fifth century died down, and the 
upper classes fulfilled their part of the bargain in no grudging spirit. A very strong sense of civic 
obligation grew up among them, and they served their cities loyally both with their persons and 
their purses, as countless inscriptions testify’. Greek cities during the Hellenistic period, therefore, 
were ideologically democratic, but functionally aristocractic. 
47 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 263. The inscriptions mentioning the payments of oikonomoi 
never specify which account was to be deducted when paying for stelae, gifts of hospitality, or 
crowns. It is reasonable to assume, though, that they were paid for by the council, who set aside an 
account to cover such expenses. For city budgets, see Dmitriev, City Government, 36; Christof Schuler, 
'Die διοίκησις τῆς piόλεως im öffentlichen Finanzwesen der hellenistischen Poleis', Chiron 35 (2005): 
385-403; P. J. Rhodes, 'διοίκησις', Chiron 37 (2007): 349-62; Léopold Migeotte, 'La planification des 
dépenses publiques dans les cités hellénistiques', in Studi Ellenistici 19, ed. Biagio Virgilio (Pisa: 
Giardini editori e stampatori, 2006), 77-97. 
48 Magie, Roman Rule, 61. 
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Mediterranean. Although not all democratic principles and practices were discarded 
outright during the Roman period, most Greek city governments came to function 
as aristocracies, rather than as the democracies so prevalent in the Classical and 
Hellenistic periods. Of course democracy’s decline was neither instantaneous nor 
universal. The changes introduced in the Roman period were already present in 
infancy as early as the beginning of the Hellenistic era.49 Moreover, not all cities 
adopted Rome’s policies, so that there remained features of the democratic model in 
a number of Asian cities which continued to function just as they had centuries 
earlier. But while neither the labels ‘oligarchy’ nor ‘aristocracy’ ever appear in city 
constitutions, in both form and function most Greek cities under Rome came to 
resemble miniature versions of the Roman republic. 
According to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, three factors led to the gradual 
‘destruction of Greek democracy’. The first cause was the growth of magisterial and 
conciliar control of the assembly.50 In many Greek cities during this period the 
people maintained some involvement in the creation of public policy. Indeed, the 
councils of certain cities continued to require the approval of the assembly in the 
policy-making process. But the assembly’s power to reject proposals was largely 
theoretical and rarely utilised. The epigraphic evidence from the Roman empire 
demonstrates that the ἐκκλησία convened mainly for the purpose of ratifying 
honorary decrees and the proposals that the magistrates chose to present to the 
people. The assembly, then, had become little more than a confirmatory body and 
its power largely nominal.51 
A second factor that led to the demise of democracy and the rise of oligarchy 
in the Greek city was the attachment of liturgies to civic magistracies.52 Like the 
magistracies of the Hellenistic period, city officials under Rome were elected 
annually by the assembly of adult male citizens. During the Roman period, however, 
the annual lists of magisterial candidates were produced by the council and the 
assembly’s only responsibility in elections was the selection of the candidates from 
                                                        
49 As F. F. Abbott and A. C. Johnson, Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1926), 69: ‘When Rome entered Greece, the era of the independent city-
state had already passed’.  
50 G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the 
Arab Conquests (London: Duckworth, 1981), 300; Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration, 75.  
51 Magie, Roman Rule, 641. 
52 de Ste. Croix, Class Struggle, 300. 
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the pre-approved list of nominees.53 During this period magistracies also came 
attached with property qualifications, often because magistrates were expected to 
finance their administrations personally.54 A third-century CE inscription from 
Thessalonica demonstrates this reciprocal exchange as it recognises the generosity 
of a certain Zosimos, the city’s oikonomos and benefactor (τὸν εὐεργέτην [IG X 
2.1.150]). But the property qualification was not an entirely new observance during 
the Roman period. As Jones remarks, it simply ‘gave legal sanction to what was 
already the general practice, making illegal for the future what had in the past been 
theoretically possible—that the people might elect to office radically minded 
politicians of humble station’.55 The use of elections was a small concession to 
democracy, but in some cities even voting rights were restricted to a few, which is 
implied by the differentiation between ‘ecclesiasts’ and ‘citizens’ in certain 
inscriptions.56 
With council nominations out of the reach of the poor, magisterial posts 
became almost hereditary and perpetually controlled by the elite. This is even 
demonstrated in several oikonomoi inscriptions from the Roman period. One 
oikonomos from Cos, for instance, is said to have served his post for well over two 
decades: ‘Philetos, oikonomos of the city of Cos, managing [οἰκονομήσαντος] 
blamelessly for 23 years’ (IKosPH 310).57 A funerary column of a well-respected 
citizen from Crete, moreover, mentions the man’s three sons, all of whom 
apparently served  as oikonomos in their lifetime: ‘[Kletonymos] certainly did not 
extinguish his life in old age glowing like some star, through the imprudence of his 
daimon, while protecting his country with his counsels. Rather the oikonomoi, pillars 
of his reputation [δοξῆς κίονες], prevailed in good foresight. For he left three sons of 
                                                        
53 Magie, Roman Rule, 640-41. 
54 Dmitriev, City Government, 140-57. 
55 Jones, Greek City, 171. 
56 Magie, Roman Rule, 640; cf. Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration, 75-76. 
57 The date of this inscription is still uncertain, but is estimated to be from no earlier than 
the first century BCE. Dmitriev, City Government, 223, considers the oikonomos to be a magistrate. But 
P. M. Fraser, 'Notes on Two Rhodian Institutions', ABSA 67 (1972): 113-24, at 115, suggests that the 
individual was a public slave, arguing that ‘the words τῆς piόλεως seem normally to be used of state-
employment of a humble sort . . . and would not be appropriate to a regularly elected official or 
magistrate’. Cf. Susan Sherwin-White, Ancient Cos: An Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the 
Imperial Period (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 222. But Fraser’s generalisation cannot be 
applied to numerous οἰκονόμοι bearing the qualifier τῆς piόλεως (e.g. IPriene 83; 109; 99; 117; TAM 
5.743; IAphrodMcCabe 275). 
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his own’.58 These examples demonstrate that magistracies, including the office of 
the oikonomos, were important roles in city administration and were controlled by 
certain socio-economic groups, and even individual families. By the Roman period 
the elite clearly had a tight monopoly on political office. 
The third factor contributing to democracy’s demise while under Rome was 
the elimination of the popular law courts.59 In the democratic city the δικαστήριον 
held the magistrates accountable for political crimes, ensuring that the council 
operated in the best interest of the people. But in the Roman period, the juries were 
largely non-functioning bodies, so that the council was left without accountability 
or any built-in restrictions.60 Some ancients still regarded these courts as operative 
during this period (e.g. Plutarch, Mor. 805a; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 49.15).61 But the 
involvement of the courts in the prosecution of the ruling class is almost completely 
absent from the epigraphic record.62 Without the people’s court the council became 
sovereign.63 As Jones explains, ‘When [the council] came to be no longer a mere 
committee of the assembly, renewed at frequent intervals and responsible to the 
popular courts for its acts, but a permanent and therefore irresponsible body, it 
inevitably became the governing body of the city’.64 
                                                        
58 For text, translation, and discussion, see Martha W. Baldwin Bowsky, 'Epigrams to an Elder 
Statesman and a Young Noble from Lato Pros Kamara (Crete)', Hesperia 58 (1989): 115-29. The date of 
this inscription is probably the late-second century BCE. 
59 de Ste. Croix, Class Struggle, 301. 
60 Some supervision was applied by the provincial governor and his imperial agents; cf. 
Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration, 78; Alan K. Bowman, 'Provincial Administration and 
Taxation', in The Cambridge Ancient History: The Augustan Empire, 43 B.C.-A.D 69 (Vol. 10), ed. Alan K. 
Bowman, Edward Champlin, and Andrew Lintott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 344-
70, esp. 366. But not much is known about the involvement of these imperial officials in the 
accountability of local magistrates; cf. François Jacques, Le Privilège de Liberté: Politique Impériale et 
Autonomie Municipale dans les cités de L'occident romain (161-244) (Collection de L'école Française de 
Rome Rome: École française de Rome, 1984), 379-425. 
61 Dmitriev, City Government, 157: ‘The evidence for the dokimasia of city officials in 
preprovincial Asia and in various Roman provinces suggests that at least some city officials in the 
province of Asia also had to pass a dokimasia before being admitted to office’; cf. C. P. Jones, The Roman 
World of Dio Chrysostom (Loeb Classical Monographs; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 
98; I. Makarov, 'Les données épigraphiques sur l’histoire de Chersonèse Taurique du Ier s.a.C. au Ier 
s.p.C.', in Provinciae Imperii Romani inscriptionibus descriptae. Barcelona, 3-8 Septembris 2002 (Barcelona: 
Barcelona, 2007), 877–83.  
62 Joyce Reynolds, 'Cities', in The Administration of the Roman Empire, 241 BC - AD 193, ed. David 
Braund (Exeter Studies in History; Exeter: University of Exeter, 1988), 15-51, at 31, maintains that ‘in 
most cities the more important cases went to a Roman court’. 
63 Although Rome tried not to interfere in the legislation of cities in the east, the absence of 
official accountability in these cities might stem from the policies of magisterial immunity in the 
west; cf. E. J. Weinrib, 'The Prosecution of Roman Magistrates', Phoenix 2 (1968): 32-56, at 36-37; 
Joseph Plescia, 'Judicial Accountability and Immunity in Roman Law', American Journal of Legal History 
45 (2001): 51-70, at 51-56. 
64 Jones, Greek City, 171. 
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Rome’s aristocratic and timocratic policies clearly dominated the majority of 
the cities of the eastern Mediterranean. Even though each of these features was 
already present during the Hellenistic period, the power enacted over oikonomoi in 
the Greek cities under the Roman empire changed markedly in this period. No 
longer were they mere administrative functionaries serving as representatives of 
the δῆμος. During the Roman period the oikonomoi serving as treasury magistrates—
though they largely remained unpaid65—belonged to the socio-economic elite, were 
patrons of the city, and remained unaccountable to the general population. Still, the 
magistracy was not considered a position of great structural power. Just as before, 
their administrative powers were restricted to making payments as decided by the 
council. While they were able to utilise their wealth and social stature to obtain 
office, once they were elected to the magistracy the administrative power of the 
oikonomos was quite limited.  
 
C. In Roman Colonies and Municipia 
The appointment of oikonomoi in the coloniae and municipia of the eastern 
Roman empire requires that we also analyse the political structures of these cities 
since coloniae and municipia were governed quite differently than their Greek 
counterparts.66 Unfortunately, the administrative rank and responsibilities of 
oikonomoi in these Roman cities remains tentative due to the absence of a bilingual 
text from antiquity containing the Greek title and a Latin correlative. Much debate 
has therefore ensued in an effort to identify, for instance, the rank and status of 
Erastus, the acquaintance of Paul and oikonomos of Corinth (Rom 16.23). NT 
specialists as well as ancient historians have proposed a number of possible Latin 
renderings for Erastus’s title, including arcarius (servile accountant),67 quaestor 
                                                        
65 Dmitriev, City Government, 141. 
66 During the Roman Republic and early empire coloniae were newly established cities 
comprised largely of army veterans and freedmen settlers commissioned from Rome, while municipia 
were previously inhabited, conquered towns incorporated into the Roman state. Cf. Abbott and 
Johnson, Municipal Administration, 3-9. For the similarities between Rome and its colonies, see Aulus 
Gellius (Noct. att. 16.13.8-9a), who described them as ‘miniatures’ and ‘copies’ of the capital, and A. W. 
Lintott, Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration (London: Routledge, 1993), 130, who likens them 
to ‘Roman islands in a more or less foreign sea’. 
67 Vulg.; A. G. Roos, 'De titulo quodam latino Corinthi nuper reperto', Mnemosyne 58 (1930): 
160-65; Henry J. Cadbury, 'Erastus of Corinth', JBL 50 (1931): 42-58; P. N. Harrison, Paulines and 
Pastorals (London: Villiers, 1964), 100-105; Justin J. Meggitt, 'The Social Status of Erastus (Rom. 16:23)', 
NovT 38 (1996): 218-23; Steven J. Friesen, 'Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New 
Consensus', JSNT 26 (2004): 323-61, at 354-55.  
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(treasury magistrate),68 and aedilis (public works magistrate),69 but to date no 
consensus has emerged. 
The identification of the Latin equivalent for oikonomos in Roman coloniae and 
municipia has received some clarification in recent years, however, by the discovery 
of an inscription from the Achaean colony of Patras (SEG 45.418). Paying tribute to 
the oikonomos Neikostratos, the inscription displays the man’s cursus honorum and 
therefore provides the opportunity to compare his current rank with that of his 
previously held municipal positions. The inscription was restored to read: 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
12 
[τὸ]ν̣ Οἰκονόμον τ̣[ῆς] 
κολωνείας Νεικό[στρα]- 
τον τὸν δὶς Ἀγων[οθέ]- 
την Ἀγορανομήσα[ντα] 
φιλοτείμως δὶς Γρ[αμμ]- 
ατεύσαντ[α] φιλοδόξω̣ς 
κατασκευάσαντα ἀpi[ὸ θε]- 
μελίων τὸ τρέκλειν[ον] 
ψηφοθετήσαντα .[- 2–3 -] 
[- - 4–5 - -] εὐφρασίας Π[- 2–3 -] 
[- - 6–7 - -] – 3-4 - ΕΝ[- 3–4 -] 
[- - - 11–12 - - -]piρ[- 3–4 -] 
(Reproduced from SEG 45.418)70 
‘Neikostratos, oikonomos of the 
colony, twice the president of the 
games, having generously served as 
agoranomos, having twice lavishly 
served as secretary, having built 
the triclinium from its foundation, 
having laid the mosaic . . . of good 
cheer . . .’ 
 
 
Several details in this inscription are relevant for our enquiry. Firstly, it is 
significant that Neikostratos, perhaps a freedman, was honoured here as the 
oikonomos of the colony after having held several prestigious posts earlier in his 
                                                        
68 Gerd Theissen, 'Soziale Schichtung in der Korinthische Gemeinde: Ein Beitrag zur 
Soziologie des hellenistischen Urchristentums', ZNW 65 (1974): 232-72, at 245; Wayne A. Meeks, The 
First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 59; 
Victor P. Furnish, 'Corinth in Paul’s Time: What Can Archaeology Tell Us?', BAR 14 (1988): 15-27, at 20; 
Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, Paul: A Critical Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 268-70. 
69 IKorinthKent 232; David W. J. Gill, 'Erastus the Aedile', TynBul 40 (1989): 293-301; Andrew D. 
Clarke, 'Another Corinthian Erastus Inscription', TynBul 42 (1991): 146-51; Clarke, Secular, 46-56; 
Bruce W. Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens (First-Century 
Christians in the Graeco-Roman World; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 179-97. 
70 Nikolitsa Kokkotake, 'ΣΤ' ΕΦΟΡΕΙΑ ΠΡΟ· Ι· ΣΤΟΡΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΛΑΣΙΚΩΝ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΤΗΤΩΝ: Οδός 
Ηφαίστου 13 και Ηλία Μηνιάτη', ArchDelt 47, no. B’1 (1992): 129-57, at 130. While the editors of SEG 
45.418 have dated the inscription to the Roman period generally, through personal email 
correspondence Joyce Reynolds has suggested to me that the lettering indicates a date perhaps no 
earlier than the late-second century CE. 
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career. Of particular importance in Neikostratos’ cursus was his tenure as 
ἀγωνοθέτης (cf. Achaïe II 136 and 266).71 The president of the games, as Athanasios 
Rizakis indicates, was an office that only the wealthiest individuals of the city could 
afford to occupy: ‘agonothètes et munerarii font partie de la tranche la plus riche de 
la société locale car ils sont appelés à faire des dépenses très élevées pour les jeux et 
les concours de la cité’.72 The adverbs φιλοτείμως and φιλοδόξως also vividly 
describe the liberality of Neikostratos’ previous administrations. They testify to the 
man’s high social status while highlighting how he generously gave of his own 
wealth, probably in the form of benefactions—like the triclinium and mosaic 
(κατασκευάσαντα ἀpiὸ θεμελίων τὸ τρέκλεινον ψηφοθετήσαντα)—in exchange for 
his offices and public admiration. As Jon Lendon explains, ‘In Greek, one of the usual 
terms for public benefaction was philo-timia, an act of “glory-love”. It was in honour 
terms that the rich man’s motivation, involving so much trouble and expense, was 
chiefly understood: he devoted to the city his money and effort and got honour in 
return—cheering in the assembly and the voting of honorific decrees and 
monuments’.73 In view of this description, it is clear that no mere slave (arcarius) or 
aspiring citizen could have fitted Neikostratos’ profile. Rather, as the text intimates, 
the office of oikonomos in an Achaean colony, such as Patras, was reserved for 
accomplished and highly visible aristocrats, and was indicative of social, economic, 
and political achievement. 
Secondly, it should be observed how Neikostratos’ cursus undermines the 
interpretation which equates the offices of οἰκονόμος and ἀγορανόμος in Achaean 
colonies. Bruce Winter, for example, seeking to identify Erastus the oikonomos from 
Rom 16.23 with Erastus the aedilis from IKorinthKent 232, has proposed that Corinth’s 
unusual political structure permitted οἰκονόμος (i.e. Rom 16.23) to be used 
                                                        
71 A. D. Rizakis, 'La Colonie romaine de Petras En Achaie: le Temoignage Épigraphique', in 
Renaissance (1989), 180-86, at 184: ‘Grâce à l’épigraphie nous connaissons, aujourd’hui, l’existence des 
concours patréens; des textes, provenant des cités voisines de Corinthe et de Delphes mais aussi de 
Laodicée de Syrie, mentionnent des concours à Patras, sans toutefois préciser leur nom exacte; il en 
est de même d’une longue liste agonistique en latin, trouvée à Patras et qui présente un intérèt 
particulier en ce qui concerne l’origine ethnique des concurrents et les noms des différentes 
épreuves’. 
72 A. D. Rizakis, Achaïe II. La cité de Patras: épigraphie et histoire (Meletemata 25; Athens: 
Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1998), 30. 
73 J. E. Lendon, Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), 86. 
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interchangeably with ἀγορανόμος and ἀστυνόμος, two textually confirmed 
equivalents for aedilis.74 Winter explains: 
The term ἀγορανόμος usually involved the organisation of the games in cities in the East as well as 
administrative and financial duties. However, the job description of the aedile was determined by a 
situation peculiar to Corinth. The holder of that office would be responsible for sponsoring the 
games, which returned to Corinth c. 40 B.C., soon after it was founded as a colony. Precisely when the 
duties of running the Games were separated from the aedileship is not unclear [sic?] but the office of 
‘President of the Games’ (ἀγωνοθέτης) in Corinth was created as a separate liturgy no later than the 
beginning of the first century A.D. Such was their fame and the burden of private sponsorship borne 
by the president that the office was given precedence over any other liturgy in Corinth, including 
that of magistrates who normally held the most senior position. This change in the duties of the 
aedile in Roman Corinth meant that his function was that of chief administrative officer and city 
treasurer. Such duties could best be rendered descriptively by the term οἰκονόμος, a natural and 
entirely appropriate term.75 
While Winter’s argument for a ‘descriptive’ use of οἰκονόμος in Rom 16.23 is 
ingenious, the likelihood that οἰκονόμος might have actually been used this way in 
Corinth is highly improbable, since Neikostratos’ cursus in SEG 45.418 demonstrates 
that, even in an Achaean colony where ἀγωνοθέτης and ἀγορανόμος were two 
distinct offices, οἰκονόμος likewise referred to a magistracy altogether separate 
from the ἀγορανόμος.  
Still, the question remains: In Patras, to which magistracy did οἰκονόμος 
correspond? In Neikostratos’ cursus in SEG 45.418, ἀγορανόμος (ἀγορανομέω) 
unquestionably corresponded to aedilis.76 Moreover, since in Patras the Greek 
equivalents for duovir were στρατηγός (Achaïe II 110) and ἀρχὸς piενταέτηρος (Achaïe 
II 37),77 the use of οἰκονόμος in Neikostratos’ inscription indicates that he served as 
quaestor.78 But where in the administrative hierarchy were quaestores located, and 
what kinds of administrative power and responsibilities did municipal quaestores 
possess? 
 
1. Hierarchy 
The reconstruction of the administrative structures of Roman colonies and 
municipia is made possible mainly through the remains of a number of Latin 
                                                        
74 Winter, Welfare, 185-87: ἀγορανόμος (IGRR 1.769); ἀστυνόμος (Epictetus, Diatr. 3.1.34). Cf. 
Hugh J. Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions: A Lexicon and Analysis (American Studies in 
Papyrology 13; Toronto: Hakkert, 1974), 175. 
75 Winter, Welfare, 189; cf. 191. 
76 Mason, Greek Terms, 19, equates ἀγορανομέω with aedilis esse in a municipal context. 
77 Rizakis, Achaïe II, 29. 
78 For a fuller defence of this position, see John K. Goodrich, 'Erastus, Quaestor of Corinth: The 
Administrative Rank of ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς piόλεως (Rom 16.23) in an Achaean Colony', NTS 56 (2010): 
90-115. 
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statutes. These texts were legislated by the central Roman government in an effort 
to unify the civic administrations of their provincial settlements in the period when 
many of them were founded.79 The Lex Iulia Municipalis, or Tabula Heracleensis (ILS 
6085; FIRA I2 13), for instance, is a collection of regulations instituted in 45/44 BCE to 
standardise local administration in the settlements both ‘within the city of Rome or 
nearer the city of Rome than one mile’ and ‘in municipia or colonies or prefectures 
or fora or conciliabula of Roman citizens’ (passim; Crawford 24).80 Equally significant 
are the remains of the four city charters discovered in Spain.81 The Lex Coloniae 
Genetivae Iuliae (seu Ursonensis), or Lex Ursonensis (ILS 6087/FIRA I2 21), for instance, 
comprises four bronze tablets from the colony of Urso dating to 45/44 BCE and 
contains many of the same stipulations concerning the responsibilities of the 
senate, duoviri, and aediles included in the Lex Iulia Municipalis.82 Both of these leges 
reveal much about how colonies were founded and governed in the late Republic 
and early empire. Moreover, they have special relevance for this study because 
Corinth, as a Roman colony founded in early 44 BCE, was probably commissioned 
with a nearly-identical charter.83 Regrettably, neither the Lex Iulia Municipalis nor 
the Lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae mention the office of the quaestor or contain 
significant information concerning magisterial accountability. Fortunately, much of 
the missing information from these two documents is supplemented by the well-
preserved remains of three Spanish municipium charters dating to the Flavian 
period. The Lex Salpensa, Lex Malacitana, and Lex Irnitana are near-verbatim copies of 
what must have been a charter template and together provide close to a 
comprehensive account of city administration and magisterial responsibility in a 
typical Flavian city. Using this assortment of laws and charters to inform our study, 
we can reconstruct the typical municipal government under the late Republic and 
early empire in order to discover how administrative power was issued to and held 
over the municipal quaestor. 
                                                        
79 Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration, 57; Barbara Levick, Roman Colonies in Southern 
Asia Minor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 80. 
80 For full text, translation, and discussion, see Michael H. Crawford, Roman Statutes (2 vols.; 
BICS 64; London: Institute of Classical Studies; University of London, 1996), 355-91. 
81 For the relevance of Spanish charters in the reconstruction of city constitutions across the 
empire, see, e.g., Leonard A. Curchin, The Local Magistrates of Roman Spain (Phoenix Supplementary 
Series 28; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 12. For their relevance to Greek cities, see 
Clarke, Serve the Community of the Church, 40. 
82 For full text, translation, and discussusion, see Crawford, Roman Statutes, 393-454. 
83 Curchin, Magistrates, 14. 
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Political power in the ancient Roman city was unevenly shared between 
three civic institutions: the assembly of citizens (comitia), local senate (ordo 
decurionum), and magistrates (magistratia). Unlike the Hellenistic Greek city, power 
did not rest with the people or even the assembly. Rather, as in the lesser-privileged 
Greek cities under Rome, the only notable responsibility of the assembly was to 
elect civic magistrates nominated by the senate. Administrative power in the 
Roman colony and municipium, then, was entrusted to a few, the aristocrats, who 
controlled the primary decision making bodies, the senate and the magistracies. 
The ordo consisted of the local senators (decuriones), whose number differed 
from city to city—being as low as thirty, as high as six hundred, but often hovering 
around one hundred—and would have been specified in the city’s constitution (e.g. 
Lex Irnitana 31).84 Candidates for admission to the ordo were elected annually and 
were required to meet basic legal, financial, and age qualifications before being 
elected by the existing decurions. These qualifications ensured that the empowered 
elite maintained political authority and that any undesirable members were 
excluded.85 
The magistrates were nominated annually from among the existing senators 
by the ordo and elected by the assembly. Candidates for office could not have held 
office within the five years leading up to their candidacy (Lex Malacitana 54) and 
were expected to fund large portions of their administration personally, including 
certain expensive public services which were stipulated in the city constitution. The 
officials to be elected each year included two duoviri, two aediles, and, in some cities, 
two quaestores. Aspiring aristocrats often, but not always, progressed up through the 
magisterial ranks according to the cursus honorum, whereby they would take office 
sequentially from quaestor to aedilis to duovir.86 
The duoviri (duumviri) were the chief local dignitaries and presided over the 
senate. They also served as the judicial magistrates of the city. They might 
personally hear a number of smaller civil and criminal cases, although these cases 
could also be decided by juries made up of senators. The more costly and important 
cases were sent before the provincial governor, who became more and more 
involved in local affairs through the centuries. Regarding the relationship of the 
                                                        
84 Curchin, Magistrates, 22.  
85 Curchin, Magistrates, 27. 
86 Curchin, Magistrates, 29, doubts the validity of any fixed sequence. 
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duoviri to the lower magistracies, they possessed greater potestas than the aediles and 
quaestores and could apply intercession against the acts of those lesser officials, 
provided this took place within three days of a complaint being received (Lex 
Salpensa 27; Lex Malacitana 58). The lesser officials, however, were not directly 
accountable to the duoviri. They were subject to the discretion of the duoviri in some 
administrative decision-making and could be prosecuted by them following their 
term, but the duoviri did not possess any direct political authority over the junior 
magistrates. 
The aediles functioned as deputies to the duoviri. They might at times 
function in a judicial capacity, but were primarily entrusted with the management 
of public works and city maintenance, which involved overseeing the restoration of 
public roads and buildings as well as supervising the marketplace. Moreover, they 
were expected to sponsor annual athletic contests and religious festivals. Although 
little is said in the extant charters about the oversight of city finances by the aediles, 
there is little room to doubt that they handled public funds, especially in towns 
which had no quaestor.  
The quaestores are completely absent in the earliest Spanish colony charters 
and may not have existed in all cities.87 Therefore, not as much is known about their 
responsibilities and governing authority as the duoviri and aediles. What is known 
about the municipal quaestores in the provinces comes largely from the Lex Irnitana. 
Once in office quaestores were responsible solely for the administration of public 
finances. As chapter 20 of the charter indicates, ‘The quaestors . . . are to have the 
right and power [ius potestasque] of collecting, spending, keeping, administering and 
looking after the common funds . . . at the discretion of the duumviri [pecuniam 
commune . . . exigendi erogandi custodiendi atministrandi dispensandi arbitratu{m} 
IIuirorum]’ (Gonzalez/Crawford).88 Even so, the quaestorship comprised of 
considerably less political and judicial power than the senior magistracies. Although 
they were given command of their share of public slaves (servi communes), nowhere 
do the charters suggest that quaestores possessed any decision-making authority 
                                                        
87 Curchin, Magistrates, 29-30: ‘Clearly the quaestorship did not exist in all towns, and the 
quaestors’ financial duties must have been undertaken by the other magistrates’. Still, as Curchin 
notes, it is perhaps significant that certain Caesarian colonies elected quaestores (e.g. Tarraco, 
Valentia, Emerita/Norba), even though the office was not not mentioned in the Caesarian colony 
charters. 
88 W. D. Lebek, 'Domitians Lex Lati und die Duumvirn, Aedilen und Quaestoren in Tab. Irn. 
Paragraph 18-20', ZPE 103 (1994): 253-92, at 264-69. 
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regarding public expenditures. Budget revisions were made by the senate in 
consultation with the duoviri, and instructions regarding public payments 
apparently came through the duoviri and at their discretion (arbitratum).89 
Quaestores, on the other hand, were simply entrusted with the unenviable task of 
making and receiving payments on behalf of the central treasury.90 
Regardless of the tedious nature of their work, quaestores were always 
assumed to possess high social and economic status. According to chapter 54 in the 
Lex Malacitana, for instance, quaestores were required to be Roman citizens and 
decuriones, who were generally among the one-hundred wealthiest members of the 
city, possessing at least 100,000 sesterces.91Chapter 60 in the Lex Irnitana 
furthermore mandated all candidates for the quaestorship to deposit sizable 
‘securities’ (praedes) for the office prior to the casting of votes on election 
day.Together these stipulations indicate that quaestores were prominent individuals 
in Roman communities, even if they lacked administrative power. After all, 
magistracies were indicative of social, rather than political hierarchy, often 
requiring more personal munificence than professional competence.92 
Political power in the Roman city, then, truly rested with the senate. This 
centralisation of administrative authority is underscored in chapter 129 of the Lex 
Coloniae Genetivae: 
Whoever shall be IIviri [duoviri], aediles, or prefect of the colonia Genetiva Iulia, and whoever shall 
be decurions of the colonia Genetiva Iulia, they are all diligently to obey and observe the decrees of 
the decurions without wrong deceit, and they are to see that whatever it shall be appropriate for any 
of them to undertake or do according to a decree of the decurions, they undertake or do all those 
things, as they shall deem it proper, without wrongful deceit. If anyone shall not have acted in this 
way or shall have done anything contrary to these rules knowingly with wrongful deceit, he is to be 
condemned to pay 10,000 sesterces <to the colonists> of the colonia Genetiva Iulia for each occasion, 
and there is to be action, suit and claim for that sum according to this statue by whoever of them 
shall wish in a recuperatorial trial before the IIvir or prefect and there is to be right and power. 
(Crawford 25) 
                                                        
89 Rizakis, Achaïe II, 29. 
90 For more on the powers of municipal quaestores during the empire, see W. Liebenam, 
Städteverwaltung im römischen Kaiserreiche (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1967), 265-66; for quaestores in 
Republican Rome, A. W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 
136-37. 
91 Clarke, Secular, 27. In most Roman cities magistrates were also required to be freeborn (cf. 
Lex Malacitana 54). Exceptions were made, however, in certain colonies; cf. A. J. S. Spawforth, 'Roman 
Corinth: The Formation of a Colonial Elite', in Roman Onomastics in the Greek East: Social and Political 
Aspects, ed. A. D. Rizakis (Meletemata 21; Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman 
Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1996), 167-82, at 169. 
92 Lendon, Honour, 21. 
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That all of the magistrates would be subject to the decrees and decisions of the ordo 
suggests that the senate had final say in all matters relating to public policy.93 
Even though the magistrates were entrusted with the oversight of particular fields 
of administration, they—especially quaestores—were largely functionaries appointed 
to carry out the decisions of the ordo. It was the senate, then, that was the ultimate 
decision making body: the senate decided what buildings were to be erected, what 
expenses were to be paid, how taxes were to be collected, and what laws were to be 
passed.94 They even functioned as the jury for many of the larger cases too 
important for the duoviri to decide themselves. But perhaps most significantly, the 
senate was the political body that called the magistrates to account. 
 
2. Accountability 
What is known from the remains of charters and leges about the 
accountability of magistrates in Roman colonies and municipia of the early empire 
suggests that cities feared very little that magistrates might abuse their political 
power. It was the senate, after all, that possessed the bulk of the city’s decision-
making authority while functioning without any form of accountability toward the 
plebs. Thus, impeachment or political prosecution of magistrates for administrative 
corruption or negligence was not as much of a concern as in the Greek cities. 
According to the charters, the primary administrative concern of the senate 
was embezzlement of public funds by those magistrates who had access to them. 
Throughout the charters and leges instructions were provided mandating the 
provision of praedes by magisterial candidates prior to election. These securities, 
which could be paid for by the candidates directly or by bondsmen if the expense 
was too great, functioned as collateral on behalf of the candidates ensuring that 
those magistrates who handled the public funds would not steal from the city 
                                                        
93 Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration, 68: ‘It is rather surprising that Caesar, in 
founding the colonia Genetiva Iulia after his hard struggle with the Roman senate, did not magnify 
the power of the magistrates or the popular assembly at the expense of the ordo, but he adopted the 
pure Roman tradition for the three branches of the government’. 
94 Curchin, Magistrates, 59: ‘In the financial sphere, the decurions received accounts of public 
business and decided upon the expenditure, loan, and investigation of public funds. They could pass 
decrees on the sale of property under a lex praediatoria (law concerning auctions) and on the annual 
inspection of sources of revenue in the town’s territory. More importantly (although not mentioned 
in the surviving charter fragments), the decurions were responsible for ensuring the collection of 
taxes, although (to prevent any conflict of interest) they could not act as tax-farmers themselves’.  
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treasury or flee from their responsibilities.95 Chapter 60 of the Lex Irnitana and Lex 
Malacitana provides a helpful summary of the procedure: 
Those who in that municipium seek the duumvirate or the quaestorship . . . each of them, on the day 
on which the election is held, before the votes are cast, is to provide at the discretion of the person 
who holds that election praedes to the common account of the municipes, that their common funds 
which he handles in the course of his office will be kept safe for them. If it appears that too little has 
been secured for that purpose with those praedes, he is to register praedia at the discretion of the 
same person. And that person is to accept praedes and praedia from them without wrongful intent, 
until everything has been properly secured, as he may think proper. Anyone of those for whom it is 
necessary for votes to be cast at the election for duumviri or quaestors, whose fault it is that 
everything has not been properly secured, is not to be regarded as eligible by the person who holds 
the election. (Gonzalez/Crawford) 
The mere threat of losing the praedes normally prevented magistrates from 
embezzling public funds. But how did the senate keep record of what was spent and 
whether or not elected officials in fact stole from the community? 
The primary means by which the senate secured its treasury was through 
the rendering of accounts at the close of each magisterial term. As several 
important leges indicate, each official was required to produce upon the completion 
of their administration evidence for the purchases they made with community 
monies while in office. This procedure is most clearly explained in chapter 67 of the 
Lex Irnitana: 
Whoever has received common funds of the municipes of that municipium, he or his heir or 
whoever has an interest in the case is to deliver them to the public account of the municipes of that 
municipium within the next 30 days after he has received those funds. And whoever runs and 
handles the common accounts or any common business of the municipes of that municipium, he or 
his heir or whoever has an interest in the case, within the next 30 days after he has ceased to run 
and handle that business or those accounts, provided that there is a meeting of the decuriones or 
conscripti, is to produce his accounts and render them to the decuriones or conscripti or to the 
person to whom the commission has been given of accepting and checking them, according to a 
decree of the decuriones and conscripti which has been passed when not less than two thirds of 
them are present. (Gonzalez/Crawford)96  
If the accounts were not rendered by the magistrate, then according to chapters 68 
and 69 of the statute the senate was able to appoint prosecutors, summon the 
alleged criminal before the senatorial court, and sue him for the money he owed. 
But apparently the threat of losing the praedes was not severe enough to prevent all 
defection, since some additional forms of punishment also had to be enforced. If, for 
instance, a candidate refused to fulfil the duties of his office, he himself was liable 
for his obligations, but so were his bondsmen and his nominators. One can, 
therefore, imagine the pressure applied to an elected magistrate by his supporters 
to complete his term. Moreover, if a magistrate refused to fulfil his duties, the 
                                                        
95 Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration, 86. 
96 See also the Lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae 80; Lex Tarentina (7-25). 
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governor was entitled to intervene and compel him to complete his responsibilities 
(Dig. 50.4.9). Precautions were also instituted in order to prevent the official from 
fleeing the city. If, for example, a magistrate attempted to flee, then the city would 
seize his property and surrender all his possessions to his successor. If, on the other 
hand, he was caught, according to the early fourth-century CE Theodosian Code 
(12.1.16), the fugitive was forced to serve two terms rather than just one.97 
 
D. Summary 
In the preceding survey we encountered oikonomoi in three different kinds of 
Graeco-Roman cities and observed that the title would have carried slightly 
different connotations in each municipal context. After examining the role of 
oikonomoi in the political hierarchies of the Hellenistic Greek city, the Roman Greek 
city, and the Roman colony and municipia, we noted that the office was normally 
considered a civic magistracy, or perhaps a liturgy (except in the few instances in 
the Roman period when the title referred to a public slave), and the responsibilities 
which were entrusted to these officials primarily and consistently included the 
administration of public finances, particularly the payment of community expenses. 
The persons who occupied these prominent offices, therefore, were always citizens. 
Beyond this, as political magistracies became more and more monopolised by the 
socio-economic elite, the oikonomos became closely associated with public 
benefaction. 
But the social standing of these magistrates did not have a direct bearing on 
the authority entrusted to them. Despite their social and legal privilege, oikonomoi 
possessed very little structural power. In certain circumstances they would have 
had delegates at their disposal, but normally the officials who occupied this position 
were administrative functionaries, merely serving as the bursar for the ruling body. 
The personal incentives for occupying this public office were also quite limited. 
Although serving as an oikonomos/quaestor functioned as one of several possible 
means of advancing one’s social status, such honours were not accompanied by any 
immediate tangible or monetary benefits. Rather, as a public office, the position was 
normally quite costly, often requiring promises of munificence in order to receive 
                                                        
97 Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration, 86. 
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election. But as long as one’s administrative duties were fulfilled to the community’s 
satisfaction, the annual term ended peaceably with a mere balancing of accounts.
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Chapter 4. Oikonomoi as Private Administrators 
 
The private administrative sphere is the context in which oikonomoi are most 
commonly attested in antiquity. Scores of ancient literature, inscriptions, and 
papyri from across the Mediterranean basin and throughout the Graeco-Roman era 
refer to the oikonomoi who served as managers of privately-owned businesses and 
estates. The most voluminous evidence for the service of oikonomoi in this area is 
ancient literature, especially the economic handbooks from the Hellenistic 
philosophical tradition. Many recent studies on ancient slavery, however, have 
distanced themselves from these kinds of literary sources, largely because they 
present estate administration from the vantage point of the proprietor. While 
recognising this bias, the present investigation makes no attempt to distance itself 
from these literary texts, since this chapter aims to produce a portrait of private 
administrators as they were popularly conceived. We are therefore just as 
interested in an ideological portrait of private administration as an actual one. For 
this reason, the use of caricatures and stereotypes—even occasional depictions of 
the ‘perfect administrator’ (ἀpiοτετελεσμένος ἐpiίτροpiος [Xenophon, Oec. 13.3]; 
perfectus villicus [Columella, Rust. 11.1.12])—will be useful for illuminating Paul’s 
metaphor, especially when literary portrayals can be substantiated by real-life 
testimonies from inscriptions and papyri. These kinds of documentary evidence are 
very useful for supplementing the literary sources, as they are able to confirm 
through scenarios taken from ‘normal life’ the ideas and practices described and 
prescribed by the literary authors. 
Further, since much of the most illuminating data derives from texts that 
refer to private administrators as something other than οἰκονόμοι, in the following 
study we will also use as supporting evidence (i) Greek sources which prefer the 
titles ἐpiίτροpiος, piραγματευτής, and δούλος,1 as well as (ii) Roman sources which 
                                                        
1 Admittedly, the relationship between οἰκονόμος and other Greek and Latin administrative 
titles is disputed. Jean-Jacques Aubert, Business Managers in Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of 
Institores, 200 B.C. - A.D. 250 (CSCT 21; Leiden: Brill, 1994), 33-34, suggests that οἰκονόμος corresponded 
with vilicus, and ἐpiίτροpiος with procurator. The epigraphic record, however, demonstrates that 
οἰκονόμος had the lexical range to be translated: vilicus (CIL 3.447/ILS 1862; CIL 3.555/ILS 1867); actor 
(CIL 9.425/ILS 3197/IG 14.688, with IGRR 1.464/CIG 5875), and dispensator (CIL 3.333/ILS 1539/IGRR 3.25; 
SB 6.9248). Moreover, that ἐpiίτροpiος can be translated vilicus is apparent in Columella, Rust. 11.1.5, 
where he quotes from Cicero’s translation of Xenophon, Oec. 12.3-4. Many other Greek terms were 
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employ Latin equivalents, such as vilicus, actor, dispensator, institor, and servus.2 By 
supplementing our study with evidence that uses these correlative terms, we will 
benefit from a more comprehensive analysis of the concept of administration 
without the liabilities that accompany surveys unnecessarily restricted to a single 
word. Moreover, the use of such (near) synonyms is especially important in this 
study since, while numerous and significant descriptions of oikonomoi appear in 
literary sources from the periods of Classical and Hellenistic Greece, the Latin vilicus 
and other synonyms are used far more abundantly and in more illuminating ways in 
the sources from the early empire. 
In this chapter, then, we will provide an overview of the private 
administrative sphere in order to show that business administrators were popularly 
conceived of as subordinate and servile managers subject to the total (structural 
and legal) dominance of the master and proprietor. They were responsible for the 
profitability of the enterprise, which afforded them considerable representative 
authority over the workforce and in trade negotiations with third contracting 
parties. Finally, their loyalty to the owner’s interests—demonstrated through 
obedience and the moderate success of the business—determined whether the 
administrator would reap reward or punishment, which could be manifested 
through varying degrees of generosity or vengeance. 
                                                                                                                                                               
also used for private estate administrators (e.g. χειριστής, φροντιστής, μιζοτέρα). It is probable, then, 
that the Greek terms for private managers were roughly interchangeable and could indicate a range 
of administrative roles; cf. Jesper Carlsen, 'Estate Managers in Ancient Greek Agriculture', in Ancient 
History Matters: Studies Presented to Jens Erik Skydsgaard on His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Karen Ascani et al. 
(ARIDSup 30; Roma: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 2002), 117-26, at 117-18; Jesper Carlsen, Vilici and Roman 
Estate Managers until AD 284 (ARIDSup 24; Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 1995), 15-16; Dominic 
Rathbone, Economic Rationalism and Rural Society in Third-Century A.D. Egypt: The Heroninos Archive and 
the Appianus Estate (Cambridge Classical Studies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 62. 
2 The Latin administrative titles normally referred to specific administrative positions, 
though they evolved over time. Harrill, 'Subordinate', 103-104, explains that in the Latin tradition 
the ordo mancipiorum had a threefold chain of command: (i) procurator (steward-attorney, or full 
representative), followed by (ii) vilicus (bailiff) and (iii) praefectus, monitor, or magister (overseer, 
foreman). Other designations were also utilised (actor, atriensis, dispensator, institor), but their specific 
functions varied according to literary and historical context. For some of the regional complexities 
involving the use of both Greek and Latin terms, see Dorothy J. Crawford, 'Imperial Estates', in Studies 
in Roman Property, ed. M. I. Finley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 35-70, at 51-52. 
Despite the minor differences that may have existed between these administrators, their close 
conceptual overlap permits us to draw insights from a range of titles. As H. C. Tietler, 'Free-Born 
Estate Managers in the Graeco-Roman World', in De Agricultura (1993), 206-213, at 210, explains: 
‘Although the mutual relationships between these vilici, actores, oikonomoi, pragmateutai et ceteri, the 
hierarchy among some of them and the precise content of their tasks are not as sufficiently known as 
one might wish, one thing at least seems clear: in one way or another they could be put in charge of 
the management, the supervision or the administration of an estate. In that respect it seems justified 
to place them together under a common denominator, regardless of subtle distinctions’. 
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A. Hierarchy 
While the employment of delegate estate managers was considered 
beneficial from very early in most ancient Mediterranean societies, the title 
οἰκονόμος originally applied to the heads of households who personally supervised 
their own estates (cf. Xenophon, Oec., 1.1-4). But as estates grew larger, military and 
political obligations weightier, and the migration of rural settlers to urban centres 
more popular, the burden of running estates and directing labourers became 
heavier as well.3 Landowners, then, who desired to cultivate their estates while 
participating in non-agrarian interests, were forced to make a functional 
compromise, that is, by developing various systems of absentee landownership 
involving the appointment of estate administrators.4 Not every estate owner could 
afford to entrust their livelihood to another, but this was often the solution for the 
elite. As Aristotle explains, ‘[A]ll people rich enough to be able to avoid personal 
trouble have a steward who takes this office [ἐpiίτροpiος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμήν], 
while they themselves engage in politics and philosophy’ (Pol. 1255b35-37).5 But 
though absentee landownership during the fourth century BCE was perhaps a rare 
privilege even among the rich, by about the second century BCE it had become 
commonplace among the landed elite to entrust the responsibilities of business 
administration to various kinds of delegates.6 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Aubert, Business Managers, 120. 
4 Paul Erdkamp, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic Study 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12, estimates that in antiquity roughly 80% of the 
population was engaged in agriculture, a statistic which he claims is a ‘commonplace’ in historical 
scholarship. While it is beyond the scope of this study to offer any sort of adjustment to this figure, 
we can concede that agriculture functioned as the economic base for the vast majority of ancient 
persons. As Aristotle observed, ‘[T]he largest class of men live from the land and the fruits of 
cultivation’ (Pol., 1256a38-40). 
5 Michael H.  Jameson, 'Agriculture and Slavery in Classical Athens', CJ 73 (1978): 122-45, at 
138: ‘The richer might be able to leave the farm to a manager, or to oversee the work without 
dirtying their hands. But the bulk of the landowners would have been autourgoi and if possible would 
have purchased oiketai in order to have men work with them, synergous’. For business affairs as a 
distraction and an annoyance to elite estate owners, see, e.g., Pliny, Ep. 2.15; 4.6; 5.14; 7.30; 9.15; 9.20; 
9.36. 
6 Aubert, Business Managers, 121; Michael I. Rostovtzeff, The Social & Economic History of the 
Roman Empire (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 18. M. I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and 
Modern Ideology (London: Chatto and Windus, 1980), 83-84, argues that Rome had become a slave 
society no later than the third century BCE and implies that vilici would have been appointed 
regularly by then. 
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1. Subordination 
Absentee landownership generally took one of two forms, tenancy or 
agency, the difference generally lying in who made the payments and who kept the 
proceeds. Tenancy required that an estate be leased to an occupant farmer, who 
could further sublet the estate or cultivate the land personally with his own staff. 
The benefit for tenants was that, after the base amount was paid to the landlord (in 
either cash or kind), they were then able to keep the remainder of the yields for 
themselves. Agency, on the other hand, required that estates be entrusted to the 
care of managers, who then might lease (parts of) the property to tenants, farm the 
land personally, or supervise a team of their own labourers. In the agency model 
landowners, or masters (κύριοι/domini), were entitled to the proceeds, but were also 
responsible for all of the estate’s operating expenses and for maintaining the 
manager’s loyalty by offering certain kinds of incentives, normally family privileges 
and monetary grants.7 
Despite its popularity during the early to mid Republic, by the Principate 
tenancy became the expert’s preferred method of estate management.8 In the first 
century CE, for example, Columella insisted that ‘it is better for every kind of land to 
be under free farmers [liberis colonis] than under slave overseers [vilicis servis]’ (Rust. 
1.7.6), especially for distant estates out of easy reach of the owner. This warning, 
however, did not deter every estate owner from appointing agents. The model was 
used enough throughout the early empire that even Columella included a job 
description for vilici and advised those property owners employing agents to 
purchase estates within easy reach of the city, in order to sustain the loyalty of the 
manager through the ever-present possibility of a surprise inspection (Rust. 1.1.18-
1.2.1). 
                                                        
7 Even though additional options existed that adopted features from both models, the simple 
distinction between tenancy and agency will suffice for this study. For more on tenancy, see, e.g., 
Bruce W. Frier, Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); P. 
W. de Neeve, Colonus: Private Farm-Tenancy in Roman Italy during the Republic and the Early Principate 
(Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1984); Lin Foxhall, 'The Dependent Tenant: Land Leasing and Labour in 
Italy and Greece', JRS 80 (1990): 97-114, at 104-111. 
8 Peter Garnsey and Richard P. Saller, The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 72. Still, Aubert, Business Managers, 133, admits the 
difficulty in discerning whether absentee landowners preferred one system over the other, 
demonstrating that ‘in many cases agency existed side-by-side with tenancy and independent 
smallholdings, and that the various systems of management supplemented each other’. 
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Whereas the relationship between the landowner and tenant could have 
entailed a number of reciprocal obligations and involved different kinds of power 
dynamics,9 the relationship between the principal and agent was decidedly 
asymmetrical. Administrators were always subordinate to the principal, being 
ranked directly beneath either the master or a procurator (e.g. Pliny, Ep. 3.19).10 This 
hierarchy is apparent in a host of Greek inscriptions (see Appendix 3). Because these 
texts are often quite brief, normally being religious tributes or funerary epitaphs, 
they usually fail to mention much more than the administrator’s name, title, and 
relationship to the principal. The name appears often—although not exclusively—as 
a nominative absolute, and the title in apposition to the name. Both then commonly 
stand in close proximity to—sometimes even bracketing—the name of the principal, 
which normally appears as a possessive genitive, creating a formula bearing close 
resemblance to the slave-master construction found in many other Greek and Latin 
inscriptions (e.g. Φίλων Κλαυδίας Γαλλίτης οἰκονόμος [SEG 28.1034/INikaia 196]). 
 
2. Legal Status 
While it is impossible to ascertain the legal status of every private 
administrator, it is generally safe to assume that most were slaves (δοῦλοι/servi; e.g. 
RECAM 2.34; ILS 4199) and freedmen (ἀpiελεύθεροι/liberti; e.g. TAM 3.258; ILS 7372). 
Even eminent ancient historian Moses Finley in his celebrated volume on The 
Ancient Economy generalised that ‘management throughout the classical period, 
Greek as well as Roman, urban as well as rural, was the preserve of slaves and 
freedmen’.11 There are a few exceptions to this rule,12 yet there remain two 
                                                        
9 Foxhall, 'Dependent Tenant': 100-104. 
10 The procurator (ἐpiίτροpiος) appears increasingly after the first century CE; cf. Christoph 
Schäfer, 'Procuratores, actores und vilici: Zur Leitung landwirtschaflicher Betriebe im Imperium 
Romanum', in Landwirtschaft im Imperium Romanum, ed. Peter Herz and Gerhard Waldherr (Pharos 14; 
St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae, 2001), 273-84. Thomas Corsten, 'Estates in Roman Asia Minor: The 
Case of Kibyratis', in Patterns in the Economy of Roman Asia Minor, ed. Stephen Mitchell and Constantina 
Katsari (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2005), 1-51, at 11-13, observes how an ἐpiίτροpiος 
supervising the entire Ummidii estate delegated its three divisions to piραγματευταί. Corsten 
observes that a similar hierarchy may have also been present on the nearby estate of M. Calpurnius 
Longus, which attests to an ἐpiίτροpiος and οἰκονόμοι (18); cf. Stephen Mitchell, Anatolia: Land, Men, 
and Gods in Asia Minor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 164. 
11 M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 75-76. Also 
W. W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery: The Condition of the Slave in Private Law from Augustus to 
Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 131: ‘It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, 
in the age of the classical lawyers, Roman commerce was mainly in the hands of slaves’. For the 
servile status of oikonomoi in the Roman period, see Landvogt, 'Οἰκονόμος', 8, 13. 
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significant reasons for regarding estate managers and other private business 
administrators from the Roman period as normally—though not exclusively—slaves 
or freedmen. 
Firstly, the nomenclature of private administrative texts suggests that most 
managers had servile origins. Typically, Roman freedmen are demarcated in the 
documentary evidence by the adoption of the praenomen and/or nomen 
(gentilicium) of their former master,13 as were a number of private administrators, 
such as (i) the vilicus Gnaeus Vergilius Nyrius, freedman of Gnaeus (Cn. Vergilio Cn. l. 
Nyrio . . . vilico [CIL III 7147]), and (ii) Claudius Thallos, oikonomos of Gaius Claudius 
Calpornianus (Κλaύδιος Θάλλος Γ. Κλαυδίου Καλpiορνιανοῦ οἰκονόμος [SEG 
29.1306/INikaia 205]).14 Slaves, on the other hand, were identified simply by a 
personal name, as were (i) Eutychos, slave pragmateutes of Julia Tabille (Εὔτυχος 
Ἰουλίας Ταβίλλης δοῦλος piραγματευτὴς [TAM 5.442]), and (ii) Artemon, slave 
oikonomos of Marcus Calpurnius Longus (Ἀρτέμων Μ. Καλpiουρνίου Λόνγου δοῦλος 
οἰκονόμος [SEG 48.1606/IGRR 4.895]).15 Additionally, seven of the ten oikonomoi 
identified by Thomas Corsten in his study of the Bithynian population have only one 
name,16 while Jean-Jacques Aubert observes—mostly on the basis of nomenclature—
that less than ten percent of the vilici in Italy and Sicily were freedmen and none 
were freeborn.17 Thus, even though the majority of inscriptions mentioning private 
                                                                                                                                                               
12 Philodemus indicates that some estate managers were free-born: ‘And how can he 
[Pseudo-Aristotle/Theophrastus] say that there are two kinds of slaves, the overseer and the worker, 
while both of them can also be free men’ (Oec. 9.16-20). Xenophon, moreover, recorded that the free 
and once rich Eutherus enquired of Socrates how he might make a living. Socrates suggested that 
Eutherus hire himself out as a bailiff to an estate owner, but Eutherus objected to the idea because he 
did not want to make himself a slave (δουλείαν ὑpiομείναιμι [Mem. 2.8.1-4]). But these exceptions 
prove the rule. See further Rhona Beare, 'Were Bailiffs Ever Free Born?', CQ 28 (1978): 398-401; Walter 
Scheidel, 'Free-Born and Manumitted Bailiffs in the Graeco-Roman World', CQ 40 (1990): 591-93. The 
suggestion of Tietler, 'Estate Managers', 213, is to be preferred, who recommends that historians 
‘consider those who occupied functions as vilicus, oikonomos, actor and the like as slaves unless the 
contrary is proved’. Cf. Egon Maróti, 'The Vilicus and the Villa System in Ancient Italy', Oikumene 1 
(1976): 109-24, at 115. 
13 A. M. Duff, Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), 52-
53; Susan Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 250-51. 
14 For vilici as freedmen, see Duff, Freedmen, 93; Treggiari, Freedmen, 106-110. 
15 Sandra R. Joshel, Work, Identity, and Legal Status at Rome: A Study of the Occupational 
Inscriptions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 39, while conceding that ‘a single name is 
not as secure an indication of servile status as a nomen is of free status’, cautiously maintains that 
individuals with single personal names were normally slaves. For more on how to determine legal 
status, see McLean, Greek Epigraphy, 112-48, esp. 129-131; Weaver, Familia Caesaris, 42-86. 
16 Thomas Corsten, 'The Role and Status of the Indigenous Population in Bithynia', in Rome 
and the Black Sea Region: Domination, Romanisation, Resistance, ed. Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (Black Sea 
Studies 5; Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006), 85-92, at 89. 
17 Aubert, Business Managers, 149-57. 
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administrators fail to identify their legal status explicitly, it is generally safe—based 
on convention—to assume the servility of private administrators with a single 
name, unless otherwise indicated.  
Secondly, the limitations of the Roman law of commercial agency made the 
employment of dependent intermediaries, such as slaves and freedmen, the safest 
and most convenient means for transacting business.18 This was the case in the 
western and eastern parts of the empire, even Roman Palestine.19 Aaron 
Kirschenbaum offers four reasons why slaves were those ‘psychologically best 
suited’ to occupy these roles: (i) ‘self-respecting free men were unwilling to accept 
positions in which they had to obey the orders of an employer’;20 (ii) ‘employers 
preferred to utilize the services of men whose character they knew and on whose 
obedience they could rely’; ‘slaves could be chastised if they disobeyed instructions’; 
and (iv) ‘slaves had formed the habit of executing their masters’ orders’.21 But 
beyond these ‘psychological’ bases, Kirschenbaum explains that in Rome the 
employment of slave and freed agents was additionally beneficial on legal and 
pragmatic grounds. 
To begin with, transacting business in the Roman world was complicated by 
the fact that there existed no law of direct agency. While free agents (e.g. clients, 
friends) could act as intermediaries in the negotiation of contracts and the 
                                                        
18 Jean Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World (Key Themes in Ancient History; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 64-70; Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 90-114. Slave agency was more significant in Roman than in Greek 
law, largely because slaves were members of the Roman familia, and thus fell within the potestas of 
the paterfamilias. Slaves in the Greek oikos, however, were only considered property; cf. Sarah B. 
Pomeroy, Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), 21. 
19 Catherine Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 275-84; 
cf. Udoh, 'Unrighteous Slave': 315-24. 
20 For elite attitudes and involvement in Roman commerce, see John H. D'Arms, Commerce 
and Social Standing in Ancient Rome (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); H. W. Pleket, 
'Urban Elites and Business in the Greek Part of the Roman Empire', in Trade in the Ancient Economy, ed. 
Peter Garnsey, C. R. Whittaker, and Keith Hopkins (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 
131-44; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, 'Elites and Trade in the Roman Town', in City and Country in the 
Ancient World, ed. John Rich and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient 
Society 2; London: Routledge, 1991), 241-72; Andreau, Banking and Business, 9-29. 
21 Aaron Kirschenbaum, Sons, Slaves and Freedmen in Roman Commerce (Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 1987), 32. Kirschenbaum also notes that ‘the superior savoir-faire as well as the unscrupulous 
character of many hellenized Orientals that had been brought as slaves to Rome were the 
concomitant personal and psychological qualities that account for their generally uninhibited 
dynamic activity in the field of commerce and for their specific usefulness as agents’ (149). It is also 
worth noting that slaves who were old enough to serve in administration had normally acquired 
significant education and experience growing up in the household and on the estates of their 
masters (Columella, Rust. 11.1.7); cf. Aubert, Business Managers, 151. 
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transferral of property on behalf of a business owner (Gaius, Inst. 2.90-92),22 third 
contracting parties were reluctant to make payments to free agents since there was 
no universal, extemporaneous legal device established to ensure the money would 
be subsequently transferred to the intended party. Certain legal arrangements 
(locationes conductio; mandata; negotiora gestio) and legal remedies (actiones) were 
introduced to commercial law that made the principal responsible for specific 
liabilities incurred by an agent,23 but generally the principal himself remained 
unprotected if the agent was free. 
Roman law, however, possessed a built-in system of non-contractual 
obligations which permitted the heads of households (paterfamiliae) to make various 
kinds of commercial transactions—provisions and acquisitions—through certain 
household members. As the second-century CE jurist Gaius states, ‘Acquisitions 
come to us not only by our own acts, but also through those whom we hold in 
potestas’ (Inst. 2.86; trans. Zulueta). The potestas, or power of the head of the family, 
extended over not only one’s wife and children, but also one’s slaves. Because 
everything these dependents practically (de facto) possessed belonged legally (de 
iure) to the head of the household, whatever they acquired through their monetary 
grant (peculium) likewise became the property of the paterfamilias/dominus (Gaius, 
Inst. 2.87, 89).24 This was also the case in ancient Jewish legal practice. As the Tosefta 
states, ‘The son who does business with what belongs to the father, and likewise the 
slave who does business with what belongs to his master, behold, they [the 
proceeds] belong to the father, they [the proceeds] belong to the master’ (t. B. Qam. 
11.2).25 But despite the representative privileges slaves retained, in their commercial 
capacity they could not bring injury upon the master. As Kirschenbaum explains, 
‘[A] person in potestas could not worsen the condition of the head of family 
economically or legally. Thus, a subordinate in power could neither create 
                                                        
22 It was, however, illegal for unqualified free men to act as intermediaries: ‘From what we 
have said it is evident that through free men who are neither subject to our power nor bona fide 
possessed by us, and through the slaves of others of whom we have neither a usufruct nor a lawful 
possession, acquisition is impossible on any account’ (Gaius, Instit. 2.95; trans. Zulueta). 
23 Aubert, Business Managers, 40-116. 
24 For more on the peculium, see Buckland, Slavery, 187-238; Ireneusz Zeber, A Study of the 
Peculium of a Slave in Pre-Classical and Classical Roman Law (Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis 491; 
Wroclaw: Wydawn, 1981); Kirschenbaum, Sons, 31-88; Watson, Slave Law, 90-101; Jean Andreau, 'Les 
esclaves "hommes d’affaires" et la gestion des ateliers et commerces', in Mentalités et choix 
économiques des romains, ed. J. Andreau, J. France, and S. Pittia (Scripta Antiqua 7; Bordeaux: Ausonius, 
2004), 111-26. 
25 For more on Jewish laws of commercial agency, see Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 276-82. 
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obligations for his master nor render him liable to suit. Moreover, since a slave 
could not be hailed into court . . . it was useless to bring an action against [him]’;26 
the liability of the slave was always limited to the extent of his peculium. Thus, while 
the use of slaves in commerce was often very advantageous, certain limitations 
remained. 
Freedmen, on the other hand, whose ties of potestas were severed by 
manumission, also frequently functioned as agents for their former masters. The 
freedman’s competence in business administration was often derived from his prior 
education and experience as a commercial slave. But while many of the freedman’s 
commercial dealings following manumission aimed to generate profit for himself, a 
significant portion of his efforts continued to be rendered on behalf of his patron, as 
was both compulsory and customary. The jurist Ulpian, for instance, states, ‘A 
freedman and a son should always consider the person of a father and a patron 
honourable and inviolable’ (Dig. 37.15.9; trans. Watson; cf. Lex Irnitana 97). The filial 
reverence which the freedman owed to his former master was commonly described 
as deference (obsequium) and duty (officium), and was routinely expressed in the 
freedman’s fulfilment of certain services (operae) for his patron. These services, 
being semi-contractual by virtue of ‘the oath of the freedman’ (iusiurandum liberti 
[Gaius, Inst. 3.96]), were legally binding and customarily rendered as payment for 
manumission.27 But besides the formal, legal dimension of these obligations, the 
principle of loyalty (fides) served as an additional basis for the freedman’s continued 
labour. Collectively, these factors contributed to the regular employment of 
freedmen as commercial agents. Thus, even without explicit mention of legal status 
in most of the documentary evidence, it can be deduced, with W. V. Harris, that 
‘[a]mong the Romans it was largely freedmen and slaves . . . who managed the 
commercial enterprises’.28 
Once it is realised that private administrators were normally slaves and 
freedmen, their subordinate rank and compulsory obedience to their masters or 
patrons becomes more apparent. In antiquity it was simply accepted that ‘the free 
                                                        
26 Kirschenbaum, Sons, 38. 
27 Duff, Freedmen, 36-49; Treggiari, Freedmen, 68-81. 
28 W. V. Harris, 'Trade', in The Cambridge Ancient History: The High Empire, A.D. 70-192 (Vol. 11), 
ed. Alan K. Bowman, Peter Garnsey, and Dominic Rathbone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 710-40, at 732-33. 
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rules [ἄρχει] the slave’ (Aristotle, Pol. 1260a10).29 As Peter Garnsey explains, ‘The 
slaveowner’s rights over his slave-property were total, covering the person as well 
as the labour of the slave’.30 Keith Bradley clarifies the asymmetry and exploitative 
nature of slavery in Roman society: 
In the master-slave relationship . . . there were no restricting factors: the slave was at the complete 
and permanent disposal of the master and except by an act of resistance could never find relief from 
the necessity of obeying because there were no countervailing rights or powers in the condition of 
slavery itself to which the slave had recourse. From the slave it was complete submission that the 
master expected.31 
Bradley’s portrayal is also the perception of slavery represented in much ancient 
popular literature. In Chariton’s mid-first-century CE novel, for instance, the 
administrator (διοικητής) Leonas, speaking to his master Dionysius about the newly 
acquired slave Callirhoe, remarked, ‘You are her master, with full power over her, so 
she must do your will whether she likes it or not [κύριος γὰρ εἶ καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν 
ἔχεις αὐτῆς, ὥστε καὶ ἑκοῦσα καὶ ἄκουσα piοιήσει τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν]’ (Chaer. 2.6.2). As 
slaves, then, administrators were considered forced labour, mere chattel, and 
basically powerless with respect to their masters. 
The outlook of most freedmen was not markedly different than that of a 
slave, as noted above. Caught somewhere between the status of slavery (servitus) 
and that of the freeborn person (ingenuitas), freedmen often enjoyed certain 
privileges of citizenship even while maintaining other stigmata of servility and 
continuing to labour under the subjugation of the propertied class.32 More on the 
low social status of slave administrators will be addressed in Chapter 6. For now, 
however, we can conclude that private administrators gazing up the chain of 
command would have perceived themselves, even in the physical absence of their 
                                                        
29 The Digest defines the slave as one who is ‘subjected to an alien dominion’ (Dig. 1.5.4.1). For 
a survey of ancient ideologies of slavery, see Peter Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a modern sociological analysis of the institution, 
see Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), 13, who famously defines slavery as ‘the permanent, violent domination of 
natally alienated and generally dishonored persons’. 
30 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 1; cf. Finley, Ancient Slavery, 77. 
31 K. R. Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome (Key Themes in Ancient History; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5. 
32 Jean Andreau, 'The Freedman', in The Romans, ed. Andrea Giardina (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 175-98, at 179: ‘The freedman ceaselessly swung back and forth in pendular 
fashion between the past and the future, citizenship and slavery, assimilation and rejection, and he 
was a channel for the greater party of the heterogeneities and contradictions of the society that 
surrounded him’. Henrik Mouritsen, 'Freedmen and Decurions: Epitaphs and Social History in 
Imperial Italy', JRS 95 (2005): 38-63, at 62, suggests, ‘The freedmen’s continued use of epitaphs, with 
little regard for the prevailing norms and customs, would suggest a certain degree of non-integration 
in Roman society’. For the assimilation of freedmen, see Lauren Hackworth Petersen, The Freedman in 
Roman Art and Art History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 228. 
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masters or patrons, as delegates and would have constantly been aware of their 
vulnerability to the power of their superiors. 
 
3. Authority 
Despite being subordinate to a principal and often of marginal socio-legal 
status, estate managers and business administrators normally occupied elevated 
positions within the households or managerial units to which they were assigned. 
Due to their aptitude for business, for instance, freedmen administrators during the 
Roman period were commonly appointed as legal guardians (tutores) of free minors 
and their patrimonies (Dio Chrysostom, Or. 73.3; Philo, Prob. 35). These assignments 
attributed to the administrator authority (auctoritas) to make investment decisions 
regarding the ward’s property, especially while the heir was an infant (Dig. 26.1.1.pr; 
41.2.32.2). Paul himself, in fact, once drew upon this custom in an illustration about 
the provisional constraint of the Mosaic Law (Gal 4.1-2).33 
Beyond guardianship appointments, private administrators also would 
normally have supervised a team of subordinate labourers (subiecti [Columella, Rust. 
1.8.10]). This workforce, which consisted largely—though not only—of fellow slaves, 
provided the administrator with extensive structural leverage with which to issue 
commands. Indeed, just as the master was known ‘to rule [imperare] his slaves’ 
(Cicero, Resp. 3.37), so the administrator was placed over an enterprise ‘to rule 
[ἄρχειν] the labourers’ (Xenophon, Oec. 12.3), to be as it were their master 
(magistrum esse operariorum [Columella, Rust. 11.1.4]). But the administrator’s 
authority to command (auctoritatem ad imperium [Columella, Rust. 1.8.3]) did not 
originate with him personally. As the owner’s representative, the administrator 
‘had provisionally been entrusted with some of the powers of the pater familias’.34 K. 
D. White reiterates this point: ‘Where the owner was normally non-resident, the 
steward (vilicus) was given virtually complete authority over the entire staff, 
                                                        
33 For the ἐpiίτροpiοι and οἰκονόμοι in Gal 4.1-2 as private administrators, see John K. 
Goodrich, 'Guardians, not Taskmasters: The Cultural Resonances of Paul's Metaphor in Galatians 4.1-
2', JSNT 32 (2010): 251-84; Peter Garnsey, 'Sons, Slaves - and Christians', in The Roman Family in Italy: 
Status, Sentiment, Space, ed. Beryl Rawson and Paul Weaver (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 101-21, at 106; 
cf. Richard P. Saller, Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family (Cambridge Studies in 
Population, Economy and Society in Past Time; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 181-
203. 
34 Carlsen, Vilici, 75.  
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whether of free or of servile status’.35 In fact, one first-century BCE literary fragment 
from L. Pomponius reads, ‘To be a bailiff far from the city [longe ad urbe vilicari], 
where the master seldom comes, is, in my opinion, not to be a bailiff, but to be the 
master [non vilicari, sed dominari]’ (CRF 45-46).36 
The same derivative authority was also afforded to the dispensator. As 
urbanised accounting clerks of exceptionally large familiae, dispensatores did not 
normally oversee large workforces like vilici, but could still acquire numerous 
personal slaves (vicarii/οὐικάριοι [P.Oxy. 735.6-7]) attached to their peculium and 
handle considerable sums of money in their master’s name.37 This is especially the 
case for the dispensatores and other intermediate clerical aids belonging to the 
household of Caesar (cf. ILS 1514/GRS §127).38 Such administrators in the familia 
Caesaris—though technically neither regal officials in the Hellenistic sense nor 
public servants in the municipal sense, and yet also somewhat distinct from 
privately-owned administrators in the scale of their operations—managed the 
accounts of various departments and enterprises attached to the imperial 
administration and thus possessed unique opportunities to exploit their master’s 
purses and power for their own socio-economic benefit. 
More on the administrator’s supervisory responsibilities, especially those of 
the vilicus, will be discussed below. It will suffice for now, however, simply to re-
emphasise that his managerial functions, as Jean-Jacques Aubert notes, ‘were the 
source of considerable power for the vilicus, and the basis of patronage in the 
countryside’.39 
 
 
 
                                                        
35 K. D. White, Roman Farming (Aspects of Greek and Roman Life; London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1970), 350. 
36 Cited at Carlsen, Vilici, 77; Maróti, 'Vilicus': 117. Carlsen supposes that the power of the 
manager increased in direct proportion to the owner’s ability to control him. Thus, the greater the 
distance from the master to the estate, the greater the opportunity for the manager to do what he 
wished (78). 
37 Carlsen, Vilici, 151; Jesper Carlsen, 'Dispensatores in Roman North Africa', in L'Africa romana: 
Atti del IX convegno di studio, ed. Attilio Mastino (Pubblicazioni del Dipartimento di storia 
dell'Università di Sassari 20; Nuoro: Gallizzi, 1992), 97-104. 
38 Weaver, Familia Caesaris, esp. 200-206. For imperial oikonomoi, see Strabo, Geogr. 17.1.12; 
Swiderek, 'Καίσαρος οἰκονόμοι': 159-60; P. A. Brunt, 'The Administrators of Roman Egypt', JRS 65 
(1975): 124-47, at 140. 
39 Aubert, Business Managers, 171. For managerial slaves and patronage, see Martin, Slavery, 
22-49. 
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B. Responsibilities 
Administrators were normally responsible for supervising a branch of a 
particular business, whether appointed to a rural estate (villa rustica), a factory 
(officina), or an urban shop (taberna). Vilici and actores, for instance, have been 
attested in a number of private contexts, including mines (CIL X 1913), aqueducts 
(CIL X 3967), baths (CIL VI 8676), libraries (CIL VI 8744), gardens (CIL VI 623/ILS 3521), 
apartments (CIL VI 9483) amphitheatres (CIL VI 10163/ILS 5155), and granaries (CIL 
VI 36786).40 Dispensatores, moreover, managed military funds (CIL VI 8516, 8517, 
33737), schools (CIL VI 10166), crops (CIL VI 544, 634, 8472), and gardens (CIL VI 8667, 
8675), among other things.41 Naturally, the commercial context and social location 
determined the scope of the administrator’s tasks. But aside from minute 
differences, the general responsibilities of private administrators were normally 
very similar,42 usually involving ‘the supervision of real estate and possibly other 
slaves’.43 Given these basic areas of oversight, it should be noted that the chief 
objective of estate and business administration in antiquity was to yield some 
margin of financial return (κέρδος/fructus).44 For this reason, it is important to begin 
                                                        
40 Carlsen, Vilici, 31-43. For the administrative staff of imperial mines, see Alfred Michael 
Hirt, Imperial Mines and Quarries in the Roman World: Organizational Aspects 27 BC-AD 235 (Oxford Classical 
Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 251-58. 
41 Carlsen, Vilici, 151; Carlsen, 'Dispensatores', 97. 
42 According to the jurist Pomponius, ‘The man in charge of a block of flats is not very 
different from a bailiff, but he lives among urban slaves’ (Dig. 50.16.166pr). Even Aubert, Business 
Managers, 38, who observes with respect to institores few strict commonalities between them, 
suggests that they at least shared similar administrative skills and duties. There was, however, a 
great divide between urban and rural life which extended even to slaves. Ramsay MacMullen, Roman 
Social Relations: 50 B.C. to A.D. 284 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 31, explains that ‘away 
from the city each mile marked a further deviation from correctness’. The rural estate manager 
could, therefore, sense some inadequacy when in the territory of his urban counterpart, as 
demonstrated by Chalinus’ taunting of Olympio in Plautus’ play Casina: ‘[W]hat are you slinking 
around in the city for, you trumpery bailiff? Why aren’t you at the farm, in your own dominion? Why 
don’t you choose to tend to the business you’re in charge of and leave city concerns alone? . . . Back 
to the farm, back to your own province, and be damned to you!’ (Cas. 97-103). The absence of urban 
luxuries on country estates also affected the attractiveness of being assigned a rural post. Columella 
warned not to appoint a city slave as a rural vilicus, for want of the city’s excitement (Rust. 1.8.1-2). 
Horace, for instance, once relocated an urban slave longing for the country to his Sabine farm, only 
to have the new vilicus later grumble about what he missed in the city (Ep. 1.14.14-15). Indeed, for 
some slaveowners relocation to the country was a form of punishment. Trimalchio, for instance, 
confessed that after being suspected of beating his mistress, his master banished him to a country 
stewardship (vilicatio [Petronius, Saty. 69]). 
43 Carlsen, Vilici, 31. Chrysippus (ca. 280-207 BCE) defines administration (oikonomia) in 
similar terms: ‘as an arrangement concerned with expenditures and tasks [ἀναλωμάτων καὶ ἔργων] 
and has to do with the care of possessions and of those who work on the land [κτήσεως ἐpiιμέλειαν 
καὶ τῶν κατ’ ἀγρὸν ἐργαζομένων]’ (Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.95.12-14). 
44 It is beyond the scope of this study to engage the perennial debate about the ‘primitivist’ 
(Moses Finley) or ‘modernist’ (Michael Rostovtzeff) nature of the ancient economy. For a selection of 
leading contributions in this respect, see the essays (re-)published by Walter Scheidel and Sitta Von 
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our survey of the responsibilities of private administrators with a brief overview of 
the financial goals of business owners themselves, that is, those whose enterprises 
were large enough to require managers. 
 
1. Financial Productivity 
It is commonly acknowledged that in Graeco-Roman antiquity the vast 
majority of people from the free population who were not tenants were small-
landholding peasants who lived at or near subsistence level.45 Because survival was 
routinely at stake, it is implausible that these peasant landowners would have taken 
great risks in their land development strategies or have sought to produce much 
beyond that which was needed to meet their immediate needs.46 More to the point, 
because this large portion of the landowning population was actively involved in 
the cultivation of their own properties, they did not appoint managers to run their 
estates.47 
The financial security of absentee landowners, on the other hand, afforded 
them other investment options. Living well above subsistence, owners of large 
estates who could afford to appoint managers established a variety of economic 
goals and implemented a range of administrative strategies, normally utilising their 
estates as a means for long-term investment. According to some ancient theorists, 
estate owners and managers alike should seek to maximise profits.48 The Greek 
philosophers, for instance, generally maintained that the very objective of private 
administration (‘economics’/‘economy’ [οἰκονομικός/οἰκονομία]) was to generate 
                                                                                                                                                               
Reden, eds., The Ancient Economy (Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World; Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2002). More recently, see Neville Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity (Key Themes in 
Ancient History; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and 
Richard P. Saller, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
45 Finley, Ancient Economy, 105; Garnsey and Saller, Roman Empire, 43. 
46 Erdkamp, Grain Market, 95-105, suggests that, while enough surplus would have been 
sought to fulfil community obligations (98), for smaller-scale peasant farmers ‘long-term subsistence 
was prized higher than short-term profit’ (96). He observes further that small landholders generally 
adopted a ‘constrained profit maximisation’ approach, whereby ‘peasants pursue profit only within 
the limits that are set by their primary goal of long-term security’ (100). 
47 Maróti, 'Vilicus': 109, notes that the employment of an estate manager is ‘[t]he 
fundamental difference between the small-peasant farming based on autarchy, and the organization 
of the Villa-farmstead aimed at production for the market’. 
48 Jean-Jacques Aubert, 'The Fourth Factor: Managing Non-Agricultural Production in the 
Roman World', in Economies Beyond Agriculture in the Classical World, ed. D. J. Mattingly and John 
Salmon (Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society 9; London: Routledge, 2000), 90-111, at 93-
94, differentiates between the ‘strategic’ (global, long-term) decisions made by entrepreneurs and 
the ‘tactical’ (narrower, short-term) decisions made by business managers. 
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income.49 The fourth-century BCE philosopher Xenophon, for example, reported 
how a certain Critobulus informed Socrates that ‘the business of a good estate 
manager [οἰκονόμου ἀγαθοῦ] is to manage his own estate well [εὖ]’ (Oec. 1.2). While 
the appropriateness of the adverb εὖ would be contested outright three centuries 
later by Philodemus of Gadara (ca. 110-35 BCE), it is clear from elsewhere in 
Xenophon’s discourses that the ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος—who for Xenophon is a free 
gentleman farmer—should seek to increase one’s assets, since as an expert investor 
he knew the right times to make purchases (Mem. 2.10.3-4) and the best ways for 
generating profit (Mem. 3.4.11). For Xenophon, then, oikonomia—as the discipline of 
the oikonomos—was ‘the knowledge by which men can increase [αὔξειν] estates’ (Oec. 
4.4), and making large profits was its chief objective.50 
Aristotle later downplayed the profit-generating responsibility of the 
oikonomos by drawing a distinction between money-making (χρηματιστική) and 
administration (οἰκονομική). According to Aristotle, ‘the function of the former [i.e. 
χρηματιστική] is to provide [piορίσασθαι] and that of the latter [i.e. οἰκονομική] to 
use [χρήσασθαι]’ (Pol. 1256a11-13). Thus, riches (piλοῦτος), for Aristotle, were simply 
tools (ὄργανα) which administrators use to manage the household (Pol. 1256b37-38). 
Pseudo-Aristotle, however, returned to Xenophon’s perspective by emphasising the 
need for administrators both to obtain and employ wealth. According to Pseudo-
Aristotle, oἰκονομική ‘tells us first how to acquire a household [κτήσασθαι οἶκον] 
and then how to conduct its affairs [χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ]’ (Aristotle, [Oec.] 1.1.1). His 
profile of the ideal oikonomos reflected both of these dimensions: 
There are four qualities which the [οἰκονόμος] must possess in dealing with his property [τὰ 
χρήματα]. Firstly, he must have the faculty of acquiring, and secondly that of preserving what he has 
acquired [τὸ κτᾶσθαι δυνατὸν χρὴ εἶναι καὶ φυλάττειν]; otherwise there is no more benefit in 
acquiring than in baling with a colander, or in the proverbial wine-jar with a hole in the bottom. 
Thirdly and fourthly, he must know how to improve his property, and how to make use of it [εἶναι 
κοσμητικὸν τῶν ὑpiαρχόντων καὶ χρηστικόν]; since these are the ends for which the powers of 
acquisition and of preservation are sought ([Oec.] 1.4.1).  
                                                        
49 Peter Spahn, 'Die Anfänge der antiken Ökonomik', Chiron 14 (1984): 301-23. While many of 
these writings became quite dated by the first century CE, the ideas they presented were very 
popular in the eastern parts of the empire, apparently even among the non-elite—some of the 
tradition was at least familiar to the authors of the NT (see the Haustafeln [Eph 5.21-6.9; Col 3.18-4.1; 
Titus 2.1-10; 1 Pet 2.18-3.7]; David L. Balch, Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter (SBLDS 
26; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1981), esp. 29 and 109)—and were probably implemented into the 
curriculum of estate managers. While some of the economic treatises appear to have been produced 
primarily for academic objectives, certain others (Xenophon, Oec.) seem to have had practical 
intentions, some of which were shared by the Roman agronomists (Cato, Varro, Columella, Palladius). 
50 Sarah B. Pomeroy, Xenophon Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 52; cf. Pomeroy, Families, 22. 
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According to the later Aristotelian tradition, money-making (χρηματιστική) was an 
important component of the larger discipline of administration (οἰκονομική). The 
ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, then, was required to acquire, retain, multiply, and utilise property 
for the benefit of the household.51 
While the Greek philosophers debated the relationship between financial 
productivity and administration, the great emphasis on profit-making was 
perpetuated also in the Latin tradition. Varro, for instance, advised the estate owner 
to seek from his investments both ‘profit and pleasure’ (utilitatem et voluptatem), that 
is, both a material return (fructum) and enjoyment (delectationem). And quite 
significantly, Varro immediately clarified that ‘[t]he profitable [utile] plays a more 
important role than the pleasurable’ (Varro, Rust. 1.4.1; cf. 1.2.8; 1.16.2-3; 3.2.15-17).52 
Echoing Varro’s concerns, Cicero underscored the importance of deriving profit 
from estate management when he asked, ‘Which of us may not survey his estate or 
go to see his rural concerns, whether in quest of profit or of amusement [vel fructus 
causa, vel delectationis]?’ (De or. 1.58.249). 
The emphasis in Columella’s treatise is even stronger. For one, Columella 
describes his target audience as the ‘attentive head of a household [diligens pater 
                                                        
51 The first-century BCE philosopher Philodemus of Gadara later disputed these definitions 
due to their implicit promotion of material greed. As an Epicurean, Philodemus rejected both 
poverty and wealth, and combated any ideology that led to either of those two conditions. As 
Reumann, 'Oikonomia', 193, explains, ‘The basic problem for an Epicurean discussing oikonomia in the 
first century B.C.—when his philosophy still stood for an absence of pain and a neutral state of 
feeling as the goal, not sensual self-indulgence, as in its later perversion—was the fact that household 
management was popularly interpreted to mean money-making; but to an Epicurean the goal of this 
science was only to provide a comfortable living according to a mean of expediency’. Philodemus’ 
major opponents with respect to household management were Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle 
(Theophrastus). Philodemus’ primary critique was directed at Xenophon’s use of εὖ in Oec. 1.2. For 
the Epicurean to live and manage ‘well’ implied that he should live and manage comfortably, but also 
simply, rather than lavishly, as Philodemus interpreted Xenophon to mean. In his treatise, then, 
Philodemus sought to explain ‘not how to live nobly in a household [οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἴκωι καλῶς ἔστιν], 
but how one must take a stand regarding the acquisition and preservation of property [ἀλλ’ ὡς 
ἵστασθαι δεῖ piερὶ χρημάτων κτήσεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς], with which oikonomia and oikonomikos, it is 
agreed, are strictly concerned’ (Oec. 12.6-12). Cf. David L. Balch, 'Philodemus, "On Wealth" and "On 
Household Management:" Naturally Wealthy Epicureans Against Poor Cynics', in Philodemus and the 
New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 
177-96. Philodemus, therefore, distinguished himself from his predecessors by his emphasis on the 
preservation (φυλακή), rather than the use and increase, of property, and by explaining that a 
philosopher has a ‘moderate mean of wealth [piλόυτου μέτρον]’ (Oec. 12.17-19), insisting neither on 
prosperity nor poverty, but happiness and expediency. Philodemus therefore argued, ‘We would say 
that the good household manager [τὸν ἀγαθὸν οἰκονόμον] is the provider of possessions and goods 
[τὸν κτημάτων καὶ χρημάτων piοριστήν]. . . which he sets in order [ἃ διοικονομεῖ], and his function is 
to manage a household happily [τὸ μακαρίως οἶκον οἰκεῖν]’ (Oec. 3a.6-14]). 
52 J. Love, 'The Character of Roman Agricultural Estates in the Light of Max Weber's 
Economic Sociology', Chiron 16 (1986): 99-146, at 117-24, considers it ‘undeniable’ that the estates 
about which Varro writes ‘are implicated to varying degrees in profit making’ (123). 
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familiae], whose heart is set on pursuing a sure method of increasing his fortune [rei 
familiaris augendae] from the tillage of his land’ (Rust. 1.1.3).53 His detailed discussion 
on the operation of a vineyard has been considered ‘[p]ossibly the single most 
important piece of evidence . . . suggestive of the existence of capitalism in Roman 
agriculture’ (cf. Rust. 3.3).54 Not only do Columella’s remarks on viticulture present 
‘valuable insights as regards the general attitude towards business and money 
making in Roman times’, but ‘[h]is work is most illuminating as to the precise extent 
estateowners oriented their activities towards the generation of monetary profits’.55 
Reiterating these observations about estate ownership, K. D. White applied the point 
to estate management: ‘In the appointment of a vilicus . . . the sole consideration is 
the economic one of obtaining a maximum return for the heavy expenditure by 
placing the responsibility on the shoulders of one whose tact and firmness in 
handling the staff were matched by dependability and integrity’.56 
It is significant to note, however, that even as numerous ancient economic 
theorists emphasised the pursuit of large, indeed optimised profits, it is also 
apparent that in antiquity certain—perhaps many—wealthy landowners preferred 
to minimise risk by implementing sensible, long-term production strategies on their 
landed investments at the expense of a considerable, immediate return.57 Despite 
having the profit-seeking agenda just mentioned, Columella, for instance, 
prescribed a rather conservative approach in his instructions on viticulture. He 
affirms—contrary to his contemporaries—that ‘the return from vineyards is a very 
rich one [uberrimum esse reditum vinearium]’ (Rust. 3.3.2), and that it is ‘consistent 
with good business to plant them’ (3.3.15).58 But even still, Columella proceeds to 
favour—again, relative to other farmers—a steady and enduring production 
                                                        
53 Grundy Steiner, 'Columella and Martial on Living in the Country', CJ 50 (1954): 85-90, at 88: 
‘The whole point of Columella’s handbook of course is to provide the special knowhow to guarantee 
that the hardships and the toil of farming will not be in vain but result in profit for the owner and in 
useful products to benefit society in general’. 
54 Love, 'Character': 124. 
55 Love, 'Character': 127. 
56 White, Roman Farming, 350-51 (emphasis added). 
57 This would seem to challenge the view of Erdkamp, Grain Market, 103, who states, ‘In 
general, risk aversion declines as wealth rises’. Nevertheless, relative to their lower-class 
counterparts, wealthy landowners still received sizable returns from their estates, as apparent 
through their lavish life-styles and expensive civic benefactions; cf. Finley, Ancient Economy, 103. 
58 Columella insists that those who take care in their viticulture ‘will easily outdo in the 
increase of their ancestral estates all those who hold fast to their hay and pot-herbs. And he is not 
mistaken in this; for, like a careful accountant, he sees, when his calculations are made, that this kind 
of husbandry is of the greatest advantage to his estate [maxime rei familiari conducere]’ (Rust. 3.3.7). 
 98 
 
 
strategy, assured that his methods will reap greater dividends over time than those 
who are less risk-averse. Columella’s conservatism is especially apparent in his 
criticisms of those maximalists who ‘strive for the richest possible yield at the 
earliest moment [fructum vero plerique quam uberrimum praesentem consectantur]; they 
make no provision for the time to come, but, as if living merely from day to day, 
they put such demands upon their vines and load them so heavily with young 
shoots as to show no regard for succeeding generations’ (3.3.6). 
Furthermore, Dennis Kehoe, in his studies on the letters of Pliny (esp. Ep. 
3.19; 9.37) and several large estates in early Roman Egypt, has observed that some 
real-life, wealthy Roman senators purchased and cultivated large tracts of land, not 
as the means to generate great profits and social advancement, but to secure a 
comparatively modest, yet dependable return.59 While he acknowledges that some 
landowners profited enormously from risky land-based investments (cf. Pliny the 
Elder, Nat. 14.49-51), Kehoe has shown that others—perhaps due to the 
unpredictability of droughts in the Mediterranean region, or the uncertainty of the 
Nile’s flooding—implemented rather conservative approaches to agricultural 
production with the intention of obtaining steady and lasting revenue.60 Admittedly, 
Kehoe has been criticised in some cases for forcing the documentary evidence from 
Egypt to fit the model he abstracts from the investment strategies of Pliny.61 But 
even still, the data he gathers which do fit his model require us to adjust our 
suppositions about the investment goals of absentee landowners. 
                                                        
59 Dennis P. Kehoe, Management and Investment on Estates in Roman Egypt during the Early Empire 
(Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 40; Bonn: R. Habelt, 1992), 168: ‘This income depended 
primarily on the landowner’s ability to achieve a sufficient level of productivity from his property, 
while his security required him to keep as low as possible the investment necessary to achieve this 
level of productivity’. See also Dennis P. Kehoe, 'Allocation of Risk and Investment on the Estates of 
Pliny the Younger', Chiron 18 (1988): 15-42; Dennis P. Kehoe, 'Approaches to Economic Problems in 
the "Letters" of Pliny the Younger: The Question of Risk in Agriculture', ANRW II 33.1 (1989): 555-90; 
Dennis P. Kehoe, 'Investment in Estates by Upper-Class Landowners in Early Imperial Italy: The Case 
of Pliny the Younger', in De Agricultura (1993), 214-37. Cf. P. W. de Neeve, 'A Roman Landowner and 
His Estates: Pliny the Younger', Athenaeum 68 (1990): 363-403. 
60 Garnsey and Saller, Roman Empire, 74: ‘Landowners had a strictly limited notion of profit 
and how to seek it, and a gravely defective method of calculating it. . . Attitudes to profit-seeking in 
agriculture differed, even among the aristocracy. Yet profit-seeking is not the same as profit 
maximization, and a value system that put a premium on wealth-consumption could not at the same 
time promote productive investment’. Even nearly a century ago, W. E. Heitland, Agricola: A Study of 
Agriculture and Rustic Life in the Greco-Roman World from the Point of View of Labour (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1921), 206, noted that, during the early Principate, ‘the true imperial 
interest was, not to squeeze the most possible out of [provincial subjects] at a given moment, but to 
promote their continuous well-being as producers of a moderate but sure revenue’. 
61 Cf. Roger S. Bagnall, 'Managing Estates in Roman Egypt: A Review Article', BASP 30 (1993): 
127-35. 
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If, then, the primary goal of estate and business administration was social 
and economic security through slow and steady profits—at least for those wealthy 
enough to appoint an administrator—then it is reasonable to surmise that the aims 
and methods of estate and commercial managers would have been somewhat 
modest as well. This, in fact, is what is perceived from some popular Graeco-Roman 
literature, particularly biblical parables. Commercial agents in the Synoptic gospels 
are responsible, on the one hand, solely for increasing their employer’s property. In 
the Lucan Parable of the Unjust Steward (Luke 16.1-8), for instance, the oikonomos 
initially is threatened with termination and abandonment for squandering his 
master’s wealth (διασκορpiίζων τὰ ὑpiάρχοντα αὐτοῦ [Luke 16.1]). But by the end of 
the narrative, the oikonomos is praised (ἐpiαινέω), not for demanding the debts owed 
his master in their entirety, but in his cunningness (φρονίμως) for reducing them 
enough to coax the debtors to make payment while satisfying his master’s financial 
expectations (Luke 16.8).62 Since such a tactic elicits commendation and perhaps 
exoneration,63 it seems reasonable to conclude that the administrator was 
responsible only for producing a moderate return.64 
This is also the caricature of the good (and faithful) slave in the Parable of 
the Talents and the Parable of the Ten Mina (Matt 25.14-30//Luke 19.11-27).65 In 
both of these accounts, commercial agents were responsible not simply for 
maintaining the master’s investment, but for increasing his possessions (κερδαίνω 
                                                        
62 This interpretation underscores the economic, rather than sociological, benefits of the 
administrator’s actions; contra David Landry and Ben May, 'Honor Restored: New Light on the Parable 
of the Prudent Steward (Luke 16:1-8a)', JBL 119 (2000): 287-309; John S. Kloppenborg, 'The 
Dishonoured Master (Luke 16,1-8a)', Biblica 70 (1989): 474-94. Our reading finds a significant parallel 
in Pliny, Ep. 9.37, where the senator reduces debts and adjusts his letting policy to secure the 
financial cooperation of his otherwise hopeless and delinquent tenants. For a summary of the 
parable’s wide range of interpretations, see Dennis J. Ireland, Stewardship and the Kingdom of God: An 
Historical, Exegetical, and Contextual Study of the Parable of the Unjust Steward in Luke 16:1-13 (NovTSup 70; 
Leiden: Brill, 1992), 5-47. 
63 Darrell L. Bock, Luke (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994), 2:1332. 
64 It could be that the master’s praise is also directed at the ability of the oikonomos to make 
‘friends’ with the debtors (v. 9). Regardless, his cunningness is at least in part represented by his 
ability to profit his master. 
65 On the relationship between the two parables, see Ivor H. Jones, The Matthean Parables: A 
Literary and Historical Commentary (NovTSup 80; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 463;  Snodgrass, Stories, 523-25. 
Neither version employs strictly administrative titles, but it should be noted that Matthean parables 
often use δοῦλος to denote slave administrators (e.g. δοῦλος in Matt 24.45 = οἰκονόμος in Luke 12.42). 
In fact, Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus (Rev. ed.; New Testament Library; London: SCM, 1963), 
56 n. 25, explains, ‘The reason for the change from δοῦλος to οἰκονόμος was that Luke, as is shown by 
12.41, limited the application of the parable to the apostles’. Furthermore, piραγματεύομαι in Luke 
19.13 suggests a managerial position similar to that of an oikonomos. For managerial slavery in 
Matthew, see Jennifer A. Glancy, Slavery in Early Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
112-22. 
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[Matt 25.16, 17, 20, 22]; piραγματεύομαι [Luke 19.13]; διαpiραγματεύομαι [Luke 
19.15]).66 The greater each agent earned, the greater they were entrusted at their 
master’s return. The need to generate a profit is further underscored in each 
narrative through the case of the wicked (and lazy) slave. The failure of the slave to 
invest his allowance resulted in his dismissal and violent death (Matt 25.26-
30//Luke 19.24-27). The gruesome finale, even if somewhat hyperbolic, illustrates 
the urgency laid upon the slave to generate profit, while also showing the 
uselessness of the one who fails to do so. But it is perhaps equally surprising to 
notice that the master’s expectations of the final slave were not, it would seem, 
beyond reason. While a profit was required, the master’s investment goals seem 
rather modest since the minimal bank interest which such a small deposit would 
have generated would have been sufficient to meet the master’s expectations (Matt 
25.27//Luke 19.23).  
Finally, Jesus’ remarks following the Parable of the Faithful and Wise 
Steward (Luke 12.42-48) likewise indicate that an agent who was appointed 
specifically to an estate was also expected to multiply what had been entrusted to 
him.67 As Jesus is reported to have explained, ‘From everyone to whom much [piολύ] 
has been given, much [piολύ] will be required; and from the one to whom much 
[piολύ] has been entrusted, even more [piερισσότερον] will be demanded’ (Luke 
12.48).68 But while Jesus’ remark implies that a profit had to be earned, he does not 
suggest that an enormous return was expected. Generating especially large profits, in 
fact, could have been problematic for the estate manager. As Jesper Carlsen 
explains, ‘The bailiff did not have any incentive to boost the farm’s production or 
increase its profits year after year, as that could create expectations from the owner 
of a constantly rising yield; expectations which would be still more difficult to meet 
if the means of production remained unchanged; therefore the easiest and safest 
                                                        
66 For the requirement of the slaves to produce a profit, see Snodgrass, Stories, 532; Aubert, 
Business Managers, 4 n. 18; Ben Chenoweth, 'Identifying the Talents: Contextual Clues for the 
Interpretation of the Parable of the Talents (Matthew 25:14-30)', TynBul 56 (2005): 61-72, at 70-71. 
67 Joel B. Green, The Gospel of Luke (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 504. 
68 Even though the term οἰκονόμος is replaced with δοῦλος following verse 42, it should be 
understood that a managerial slave is in view throughout the parable; cf. Kyoung-Jin Kim, 
Stewardship and Almsgiving in Luke's Theology (JSNTSup 155; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 
137. 
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thing for the vilicus was to keep production ticking over at a level which could be 
reached without problems year after year’.69 
Since a satisfactory return from a landed investment was relative to the kind 
and size of the enterprise in view as well as the aims of the individual entrepreneur, 
it is impossible to be precise about how productive administrators were expected to 
be in every circumstance. We can generalise, however, that it was always 
advantageous for estate and business owners to find an ambitious administrator, 
one who, as Xenophon’s Ischomachus described, was ‘covetous of gain 
[φιλοκέρδεια] in a moderate degree’ (Xenophon, Oec. 12.16). 
 
2. Personnel Supervision 
As a means to agricultural and industrial production, private administrators 
were required to oversee a team of subordinates.70 It would be misleading, in fact, to 
make any sharp distinction between revenue acquisition and labour supervision in 
the ancient economy, for the outcome of the former objective was heavily reliant on 
the success of the latter. Greek and Latin authors alike observed that the manner in 
which an administrator commanded his labourers greatly influenced the 
productivity of the enterprise. For instance, while many of his contemporaries 
insisted that bareness in agriculture was due to poor climate and the disposition of 
the elemental beings (Natura and Tellura), Columella maintained that most estate 
failures were caused by poor management: ‘I do not believe that such misfortunes 
come upon us as a result of the fury of the elements, but rather because of our own 
fault; for the matter of husbandry, which all the best of our ancestors had treated 
with the best of care, we have delivered over to all the worst of our slaves [pessimo 
cuique servorum], as if to a hangman for punishment’ (Rust. 1.praef.3). Since slaves 
were often thought to contribute to poor production, it was critical for an 
administrator who wished to run a profitable business, therefore, to be able to 
direct his team of subordinates efficiently. 
The group of slaves (familia) that an administrator supervised could have 
been quite large. Although the size of a given workforce depended generally on the 
nature of the enterprise, the depth of its managerial structure, and the 
                                                        
69 Carlsen, Vilici, 74. 
70 Carlsen, Vilici, 54, maintains that managing his staff was in many ways the estate 
administrator’s ‘most important task’. 
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entrepreneurial strategy of the business owner, it is probable that many estate 
managers were responsible for several dozen slaves. Seneca, in fact, intimates that 
some estates were so large that the administrator could be compared to a consul (Ira 
1.21.2) or king (Ep. 89.20). Apuleius, in his second-century CE novel the 
Metamorphoses, may have even alluded to such a manager, ‘whose master had 
entrusted [permiserat] him with the stewardship of his entire household [cunctam 
familiae tutelam] and who acted as overseer of that extensive holding [possessionem 
maximam . . . villicabat]’ (Met. 8.22). Zenon, the mid-third-century BCE oikonomos of 
Apollonius71—though clearly an exceptional case—also possessed extensive 
supervisory responsibilities as the manager of two very large estates (δωρεαί) in the 
Arsinoe and Memphis nomes.72 From his papyri collection one is afforded an 
excellent insight into the range of supervisory responsibilities with which a private 
administrator could have been entrusted, as well as the problems which he could 
have had to resolve. As C. C. Edgar explains, 
It was [Zenon] who gives orders about paying the salaries of the domestic staff and to whom their 
complaints are addressed. He has sufficient control over the λόγος Ἀpiολλωνίου to arrange for the 
gradual repayment of a debt out of the wages of the debtor. The foremen of Apollonios’s estates 
write to him about crops and cattle. The dispatch of provisions from Alexandria, the feeding of the 
horses, the making of mattresses are among the things that occupy his attention. He is in constant 
communication with the members of the household left in Alexandria, especially with the chief of 
them, a certain Amyntas, who gives him all the news, how the cook has run away with eighty 
drachmas, and how the carpenter, Καλλιάναξ ὁ κίναιδος, detected in some knavery, has gone up the 
river to put a plausible case before Apollonios.73 
These and many other administrative matters were charged to Zenon’s oversight 
during his tenure under Apollonius. But of particular significance is the large 
number of subordinates whom he supervised.74 While most managers of large 
estates and businesses were not able to rival the breadth and depth of Zenon’s 
administrative staff, many, nevertheless, were responsible for supervising 
                                                        
71 For Zenon’s title as oikonomos, see P.Lond. VII.2133 (Ζήνωνι τῶι piαρ’ Ἀpiολλωνίου 
οἰκονόμωι λόγος ἀργυρικός) and P.Edg. 16 (ὑpiόμνημα Ἀράτωι piαρὰ Ἀριστέως μνησθῆναι Ζήνωνι τῶι 
οἰκονόμωι καὶ Κρίτωνι). Apollonius was the finance minister to Ptolemy Philadelphos. Rostovtzeff, 
Large Estate, 39, explains the implied hierarchy from Zenon to Ptolemy: ‘Zenon . . . was the chief 
manager of all the private affairs of Apollonius, both commercial and agricultural. He stood in the 
same relation to Apollonius as Apollonius to the King. Thence his title οἰκονόμος the manager of 
Apollonius’ οἶκος (estate), of all the economic affairs of Apollonius’. 
72 ∆ωρεαί were temporary grants of land given by the king to privileged individuals 
normally in substitution for a salary; Rostovtzeff, Large Estate, 42-55. 
73 C. C. Edgar, ed., Zenon Papyri in the University of Michigan Collection (University of Michigan 
Studies. Humanistic Series; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1931), 22-23. 
74 Rostovtzeff, Large Estate, 87. 
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numerous kinds of delegates (e.g. vilica, subvilici, praefecti, monitores, magisteri) and 
even more menial labourers.75 
Given the number of subordinates administrators oversaw, labour efficiency 
often demanded some degree of job specialisation among the slave staff. Columella 
maintained that specialisation not only created a sense of healthy competitiveness 
among the slaves and even generated pride in their work, but also enabled the 
manager to identify which slaves were performing inadequately, since any given 
task was the responsibility of a single labourer (Rust. 1.9.5-8). Given, then, this 
advisable approach to job allocation, most administrators of large familiae divided 
their staff into subsidiary teams and then allocated to the slaves individual jobs.76 
The administrators themselves also probably participated in some of the 
enterprises’ manual labour to set an example for and to win the respect of their 
subordinates, as the agronomists repeatedly advised (Cato, Agr. 5.5; Varro, Rust. 
1.17.5; Columella, Rust. 11.1.4, 7-9, 14-18, 26-27; 11.3.65; 12.1.3). But given their need 
to keep track of all the agricultural yields (Cato, Agr. 2.1) and to record all the tasks 
performed on and off the estate by members of the staff (Agr. 2.2), the manager’s 
time was probably in large part monopolised by their supervisory and 
administrative duties.77 
Not as much is known about the size and infrastructure of non-agricultural 
businesses, such as factories and workshops (officinae). Studies on the Roman brick 
and tile industry as well as the manufacturing of various ceramics (amphorae, terra 
sigillata, terracotta lamps) have shown that owners often delegated production 
responsibilities to business managers. Although the legal status of these overseers 
has been the subject of some debate (particularly the identity of the officinatores),78 
                                                        
75 For the administrator’s associates and subordinates, see Aubert, Business Managers, 175-99; 
White, Roman Farming, 355-56; Jesper Carlsen, 'Subvilicus: Subagent or Assistant Bailiff?', ZPE 132 
(2000): 312-16; Jesper Carlsen, 'The Vilica and Roman Estate Management', in De Agricultura (1993), 
197-205. 
76 Bradley, Slavery and Society, 73. 
77 Aubert, Business Managers, 172, observes, ‘If we look at the occupations of vilici in the 
literary sources, we notice that we rarely find them out in the fields’. Because they were so busy 
‘[s]earching for contractors, negotiating the contracts, overseeing their execution, calculating the 
laborers’ remuneration’, we should conclude that estate managers had little time to share in the 
actual farmwork. 
78 In the brick industry, for example, Tapio Helen, Organization of Roman Brick Production in the 
First and Second Centuries A.D.: An Interpretation of Roman Brick Stamps (Annales Academiae Scientiarum 
Fennicae, Dissertationes Humanarum Litterarum 5; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1975), 108-
109, has argued that officinatores were normally (nearly 80%) freeborn contractors, rather than slave 
or freedman agents, as previously thought (e.g. Duff, Freedmen, 92). John P. Bodel, Roman Brick Stamps 
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several studies have shown that not a few of these enterprises would have been 
managed by slave or freed vilici and actores.79 In fact, as Aubert argues, the methods 
of administration commonly employed in these factories and workshops probably 
originated from the managerial approaches utilised on the villa rustica: 
The managerial system used in the clay industry seems to have been borrowed from agricultural 
concerns (fundi), and was adapted to both rural and urban contexts. The manufacture of containers 
for the export of staples produced in agricultural estates and the exploitation of clay districts 
located in the vicinity of farmsteads for the production of building material must have directly 
benefited from the existence of the vilicus system.80 
Thus, despite the shortage of data regarding the size and structure of these non-
agricultural businesses, it is reasonable that the administrators of factories and 
workshops would have shared many of the same responsibilities and attributes as 
those on rural estates. But how did these administrators motivate their 
subordinates and what kinds of skills were required to manage them?  
In order to run a business well, it was preferred that managers possess a 
number of specific attributes. Beyond a desire for money-making, managers were 
expected to have general leadership skills, a strong work ethic, and significant 
experience in their area of production.81 As a leader, for instance, the administrator 
was expected to motivate his subordinates to work productively. This could be 
accomplished in several ways. According to Ischomachus, the truly great leader is 
able to motivate his staff ‘by his will [γνώμῃ] rather than his strength [ῥώμῃ]’ 
(Xenophon, Oec. 21.8). As Ischomachus explained:  
[I]n private industries, the man in authority [ὁ ἐφεστηκὼς]—bailiff [ἐpiίτροpiος] or manager 
[ἐpiιστάτης]—who can make the workers keen, industrious and persevering—he is the man who gives 
a lift to the business and swells the surplus [piολλὴν τὴν piεριουσίαν piοιοῦντες]. . . . [I]f at sight of 
him they bestir themselves, and a spirit of determination and rivalry and eagerness to excel falls on 
                                                                                                                                                               
in the Kelsey Museum (Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, Studies 6; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1983), 4, contests this point, suggesting that the title officinator could have been born by a 
variety of persons, including ‘anything from a slave foreman in his master’s service to a powerful 
industrialist of equestrian rank’ (4). Cf. Aubert, Business Managers, 222-36; P. R. C. Weaver, 'Imperial 
Slaves and Freedmen in the Brick Industry', ZPE 122 (1998): 238-46.  
79 Jean-Jacques Aubert, 'Workshop Managers', in The Inscribed Economy: Production and 
Distribution in the Roman Empire in the Light of instrumentum domesticum, ed. W. V. Harris (JRASup 6; Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 171-81, at 174; cf. Aubert, Business Managers, 201-321 
(passim). For other industries, see Carlsen, Vilici, 31-55. 
80 Aubert, Business Managers, 319. 
81 The general nature of the administrator’s leadership ability is represented well in 
Socrates’ explanation to Nicomachides about the similiarities between the ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος and the 
ἀγαθὸς στρατηγός. Listing their overlapping responsibilities, Socrates noted how both were required 
to make their subordinates willing and obedient (κατηκόους τε καὶ εὐpiειθεῖς), to appoint men to 
appropriate posts, to punish the bad (τοὺς κακοὺς καλάζειν) and to reward the good (τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς 
τιμᾶν . . . piροσήκειν), to win the goodwill of those under them (τοὺς ὑpiηκόους εὐμενεῖς), to attract 
allies and helpers, to keep their possessions, and to be strenuous and industrious (ἐpiιμελεῖς καὶ 
φιλοpiόνους) in their own work (Xenophon, Mem. 3.4.7-9).  
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every workman, then I should say: this man has a touch of the kingly nature in him [τι ἤθους 
βασιλικοῦ]. And this, in my judgment, is the greatest thing in every operation that makes any 
demand on the labour of men, and therefore in agriculture. (Xenophon, Oec. 21.9-11)82 
But managing a successful estate purely by will was hardly realistic. Eventually, 
administrators had to utilise force. Cato even prescribed a chain of such disciplinary 
measures: ‘If anyone commits an offence [deliquerit] he must punish him [vindicet] 
properly in proportion to the fault. . . . If the overseer sets his face against 
wrongdoing [nolet male facere], they will not do it [non faciet]; if he allows it [passus 
erit], the master must not let him go unpunished [dominus inpune ne sinat esse]’ (Agr. 
5.1-2). Administrators would have punished fellow-slaves primarily through 
beatings and incarceration (Columella, Rust. 1.8.16).83 In Plautus’ Casina, for instance, 
the vilicus Olympio explained emphatically to his master Lysidamus how given the 
opportunity he would penalise the urban slave Chalinus: ‘Only let him come to the 
farm! I’ll send the fine fellow back to town to you, under a yoke like a charcoal 
peddler’ (Cas. 2.8.437; cf. Pseud. 38-61). 
Administrators who were overly reliant upon the whip, however, also ran 
the risk of developing enmity between themselves and their labourers. As Columella 
cautioned, the vilicus who wished to manage a productive estate was required to 
strike a balance between ruling with laxness (remisse imperet) and leniency (lenius) 
on the one hand, and ruling with cruelty (crudeliter imperet) and severity 
(dominorum) on the other. It was preferred that labourers ‘fear his sternness than 
detest his cruelty [timeant eius severitatem, quam crudelitatem detestentur]’ (Columella, 
Rust. 1.8.10; 11.1.6, 25; cf. Aristotle., [Oec.] 1344a29). Failure to find a balance between 
the two could be met with grave personal consequences, as illustrated in the Parable 
of the Faithful (and Wise) Steward. In both the Lucan and Matthean accounts, Jesus 
explains that the manager set over the master’s slaves and entrusted with the 
responsibility of issuing to them their allowance of food and drink would eventually 
be punished once his master discovered that the manager was hoarding the rations 
and beating (τύpiτω) the slaves without cause (Matt 24.45-51// Luke 12.42-46). 
Alternatively, Hippocrates, the real-life vilicus of a certain Plautus, apparently 
                                                        
82 Although by line 10 of the discourse the δεσpiότης is the kind of leader in view, it is clear 
from line 9 that the generic concept under consideration is ‘the man in authority’ (ὁ ἐφεστηκώς), of 
which the ἐpiίτροpiος, ἐpiιστάτης, and δεσpiότης each serve as examples. 
83 Conversely, managers were urged by the philosophers and agronomists to encourage hard 
working slaves with food, clothing, praise, and leisure (Aristotle, [Oec.] 1344a29-1344b12; Cato, Agr. 
5.2). 
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exercised his command so judiciously that his subordinates paid tribute to him 
through a funerary inscription, signing it: ‘the rural slaves, over whom he exercised 
authority with moderation [quibus imperavit modeste]’ (ILS 7367/GRS §152). 
In addition to being strict with his subordinates, the manager of an estate 
was required also to be learned in farming and very robust (robustissimus), so he 
could both ‘teach those under his orders and himself adequately carry out the 
instructions which he gives’ (Columella, Rust. 11.1.3). The manager was required to 
be neither too young nor too old, but of middle age, preferably around 35 years old, 
so as to be strong and experienced enough to earn the respect of his subordinates 
while setting an example for them in work ethic (Rust. 1.8.3; 11.1.3-4). As Pseudo-
Aristotle summarises, ‘Right administration of a household [οἰκονομεῖν] demands in 
the first place familiarity with the sphere of one’s action; in the second place, good 
natural endowments; and in the third, an upright and industrious way of life. For 
the lack of any of these qualifications will involve many a failure in the task one 
takes in hand’ (Aristotle, [Oec.] 1345b6-12).84 
 
3. Trade 
In addition to supervising the enterprise’s workforce, business 
administrators were charged with participating in many kinds of monetary 
transactions. Estate managers, for instance, were responsible for buying farm tools, 
slaves, animals, seed, fodder, and various other kinds of agricultural equipment 
(Columella, Rust. 11.1.23). They might hire additional paid-labourers according to 
specific tasks (Cato, Agr. 2.6; 5.3; Petronius, Satyr. 53.10; Matt 20.8) and let contracts 
for leases, labourers, and certain other farm supplies. They also handled credits and 
deposits (Cato, Agr. 2.6), and registered all transactions involving cash, grain, wine, 
oil, and fodder in the estate’s records (Cato, Agr. 2.5; Luke 16.2).85 Finally, they were 
responsible for selling the surpluses of produce and other commodities, including 
everything that was considered superfluous and marketable, such as sick slaves, 
weak animals, and old tools (Varro, Rust. 1.16.4; 1.22.1; 1.27.4; Cato, Agr. 2.1).86  
                                                        
84 White, Roman Farming, 353-54. 
85 For the literacy and arithmetical competency of the administrator, see Jean-Jacques 
Aubert, 'De l'usage de l'écriture dans la gestion d'entreprise a l'époque romaine', in Mentalités et choix 
économiques des romains, ed. J. Andreau, J. France, and S. Pittia (Scripta Antiqua 7; Bordeaux: Ausonius, 
2004), 127-47. 
86 Aubert, Business Managers, 170-71; cf. Carlsen, Vilici, 70-80. 
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Managers whose business transactions involved writing contracts, however, 
were normally required to receive official authorisation from their principal to do 
so. This stipulation was not always mandatory by law, but was frequently observed 
by business owners due to the risks involved in using middlemen. Principals, for 
instance, could not sue third contracting parties as a result of the contracts 
negotiated by their extraneous agents. Even more significantly, third contracting 
parties could not sue principals directly as a result of those very same mediated 
contracts, as liability was restricted to the extent of the slave’s peculium.87 Over time, 
however, several legal remedies were introduced to Roman commercial law which 
aimed to enforce the contracts established by an agent. The most significant remedy 
for our purposes is the second-century BCE actio institoria (Dig. 14.3). As Aubert 
explains, 
The actio institoria was based on the idea that principals who benefited from the transactions of their 
dependent business managers should also incur liabilities arising from them. According to the terms 
of the praetorian Edit, the principal who had appointed an agent (institor) to run his business 
expected him to negotiate contracts with customers, suppliers, and contractors, in a specifically 
designated place (estate, workshop, store, or any other facility) or elsewhere, and accepted full 
liability for the transactions performed by his agent on the basis, and within the scope, of his 
appointment (praepositio). Consequently, third contracting parties were given a legal remedy against 
either the agent or the principal.88 
Institores were generally slaves, although by the Principate free persons could also 
receive such authorisation. But this concession was probably introduced only to 
permit slave institores who had been freed to continue working for their former 
master without interruption. In such cases, however, the principal no longer 
appears to have been able to sue a third contracting party, even if he himself could 
be sued.89 
The use of institores had several immediate commercial benefits. One 
advantage for principals was the opportunity to offer legal assurance to third 
contracting parties through low-risk, mediated business transactions. Still, the third 
party had to be sure about the authorisation of the agent with whom they were 
entering into business negotiations. As Aubert explains, ‘Circumspection was 
required on the part of a third contracting party entering into a business 
transaction with an agent, so that the transaction did not fall outside the scope of 
the [agent’s] appointment. For instance, a moneylender had to make sure that the 
                                                        
87 Aubert, Business Managers, 196-98. 
88 Aubert, Business Managers, 52-53. Cf. Andreau, Banking and Business, 66. 
89 Andrew Lintott, 'Freedmen and Slaves in the Light of Legal Documents from First-Century 
A.D. Campania', CQ 52 (2002): 555-65, at 558. 
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money borrowed by the institor would likely be used in fulfilment of the task 
entrusted to him’.90 Such assurance could be supplied through the agent’s 
authorising documentation. Thus, another benefit of the institor arrangement was 
the ability of the principal to restrict the kinds of transactions his manager could 
conduct by documenting the precise scope of the commission through a charter (lex 
praepositionis). The charter could then be disclosed to prospective clients to ensure 
the precise nature of the agent’s authorisation. These advantages are apparent in 
the following third-century CE contract: 
I have empowered you [συνέστησά σοι] by this document to administer [φροντιοῦντα] my estate in 
Arsinoe, and to collect the rents and, if need be, to arrange new leases or to cultivate some land 
yourself, and to give receipts in my name, and to transact any business connected with stewardship 
[piάντα τῇ ἐpiιτροpiῇ ἀνήκοντα ἐpiιτελέσαντα], just as I can transact it when I am present [καθὰ κἀμοὶ 
piαρόντι ἔξεστιν], and to distribute the plots in Karamis, restoring to me what remains over, as to 
which matter I rely on your good faith [piίστι], and I confirm whatever you decide about them 
[εὐδοκῶ οἷς ἐὰν piρὸς ταῦτα ἐpiιτελέσῃ]. (BGU 1.300)91 
This document shows with significant clarity the representative nature of an agency 
appointment. In this sort of arrangement, the administrator was able to manage the 
principal’s many financial responsibilities just as if the owner was present (καθὰ 
κἀμοὶ piαρόντι ἔξεστιν), since the principal’s confirmation accompanied the 
decisions made by the administrator (εὐδοκῶ οἷς ἐὰν piρὸς ταῦτα ἐpiιτελέσῃ). For 
this very reason it was important when appointing an agent to specify the scope of 
the commission by listing each of their constituent tasks. By doing so, the principal 
not only made himself liable for those actions performed by the agent within the 
scope of the appointment, but the principal formalised and publicised his 
authorisation. The principal’s liability would then be sufficiently disclosed to 
prospective third contracting parties. 
In the light of the first two benefits of the institor arrangement, an additional 
advantage was that principals could maximise their production by authorising and 
then stationing various business managers in strategic locations all across the 
empire. And just such use of multi-branch enterprises has been detected in various 
kinds of ancient commerce, such as the ceramics industry. Through the study of 
production signatures, for example, W. V. Harris has proposed that certain 
                                                        
90 Aubert, Business Managers, 14. 
91 Trans. David Daube, 'Neglected Nuances of Exposition in Luke–Acts', ANRW II 25.3 (1985): 
2329-56, at 2335. The document technically is not a lex praepositionis, but a temporary agreement 
(ὁμολογία) between a principal and agent. It nonetheless contains many of the features expected in a 
lex praepositionis. Cf. Aubert, Business Managers, 11; Gábor Hamza, 'Einige Fragen der Zulässigkeit der 
direkten Stellvertreteng in den Papyri (Das Verhältnis zwischen Vollmacht und Auftrag im Recht der 
Papyri Ägyptens als romischer Provinz)', AUB (iur) 19 (1977): 57-68, esp. 61-62. 
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entrepreneurs commissioned numerous agents to various locations to widen the 
base of their production and sale of terracotta lamps. Harris suggests that one 
manufacturer (‘Fortis’), for instance, may have had between twenty and thirty 
workshops—although not necessarily all active at once—including branches in 
northern and central Italy, Gaul, Germany, Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Dacia. A second 
firm (‘C. Oppi Res.’), on the other hand, had branches in Gaul, Sardinia, Spain, Rome, 
and several in North Africa.92 Thus, the use of institores in Roman commerce became 
a common means by which business owners could expand their commercial 
interests while simultaneously offering third contracting parties confidence and 
security with the principal’s backing. 
But business administrators such as οἰκονόμοι, ἐpiίτροpiοι, vilici, and actores 
were not institores by default. The Digest indicates that the vilicus, for instance, had 
to be specially assigned to sell goods in order to qualify as an institor.93 Moreover, 
while the agronomists each indicate that administrators routinely conducted 
financial transactions, they were reluctant to allow their managers to become 
overly involved in trade (Cato, Agr. 5.3-4; 142; Varro, Rust. 1.16.5; 2.5-7; Columella, 
Rust. 1.8.13; 3.21.6).94 Columella particularly warns against spending too much time 
trading: ‘He [the administrator] should not employ his master’s money [pecuniam 
domini] in purchasing cattle or anything else which is bought or sold; for doing this 
diverts him from his duties as a bailiff and makes him a trader [negotiatorem] rather 
than a farmer [agricolam] and makes it impossible to balance accounts with his 
master’ (Rust. 11.1.24). These remarks emphasise the supplementary nature of trade 
in certain business arrangements. Of course other kinds of commercial and 
                                                        
92 W. V. Harris, 'Roman Terracotta Lamps: The Organization of an Industry', JRS 70 (1980): 
126-45, at 141-42. 
93 ‘Since a bailiff [vilicus] is appointed to farm rather than to trade, a person who deals with 
the bailiff of another has no action against the owner; but if I authorize my bailiff to sell goods as 
well, it is fair that I should be liable to an action based on the action for the manager’s conduct [actio 
institoria] (Dig. 14.3.16)’. Another ruling seems to indicate they might actually be institores by default: 
‘Labeo also wrote that full liability attaches to the person who appoints another to lend money or to 
run a farm [agris colendis] or to be trader or a public contractor’ (Dig. 14.3.5.2). But the stipulation 
probably assumes the commission of the agent. 
94 Aubert, Business Managers, 8 n. 30, remarks about vilici: ‘There is no doubt that farm 
managers were often involved in moneylending, trading, and contracting’. In fact, Aubert, 'De l'usage 
de l'écriture', 137, states, ‘Le caractère périssable des fruits et légumes, des produits laitiers et des 
œufs, voire de la viande et des céréales, rend ce type de développement de la fonction du régisseur 
absolument incontournable’; cf. Erdkamp, Grain Market, 109-110; Hamish Forbes and Lin Foxhall, 
'Ethnoarchaeology and Storage in the Ancient Mediterranean: Beyond Risk and Survival', in Food in 
Antiquity, ed. John Wilkins, David Harvey, and Mike Dobson (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995), 
69-86, at 78-81; Tiziana J. Chiusi, 'Landwirtschaftliche Tätigkeit und actio institoria', Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stifung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 108 (1991): 155-86. 
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administrative slaves were expected to handle and exchange funds regularly. A 
dispensator, for example, whose service as an accountant required the grant of a 
sizable allowance (peculium), would have continually been responsible for making 
and receiving payments.95 Despite the relative frequency of these transactions, trade 
was an inevitable part of private administration. It was, therefore, generally 
important for administrators to have conceived, like Petronius’ Trimalchio, ‘a 
passion for business [concupivi negotiari]’ (Satyr. 76). 
 
C. Accountability 
The desired ethical make up of private administrators consisted chiefly of 
loyalty (piίστις/fides), which was tangibly expressed through deference (obsequium) 
to the master.96 Xenophon, for instance, recorded how Ischomachus prescribed 
fidelity, or goodwill, as the primary character trait to teach a new estate manager: 
‘[T]he first requirement will be that he should be loyal [εὔνοιαν] to you and yours, if 
he is to represent you in your absence’ (Oec. 12.5).97 Columella similarly warned that 
a new vilicus should always be tested early by his master in order to ensure the 
bailiff’s competence in farming and his ‘fidelity and attachment to his master 
[domino fidem ac benevolentiam]’; ‘without these qualities, the most perfect 
knowledge possessed by a bailiff is of no use’ (Rust. 11.1.7). 
Numerous fictitious tales and real-life testimonials affirm that loyalty was 
also the primary idealised trait of administrators in popular culture. In his novel 
Callirhoe, for instance, Chariton used piίστος and piίστις several times to characterise 
private administrators. On one occasion the master Dionysius commended his 
oikonomos Phocas, saying, ‘You are my benefactor [εὐεργέτης]; you are my true 
                                                        
95 Carlsen, Vilici, 149: ‘Dispensatores fundamentally differed from vilici and actors by not being 
institores: the legal foundation for their work was the consent of the master, permissu domini, which 
was considered as the precondition for the slaves’ peculium’. Aubert, Business Managers, 196, notes, 
‘The position of dispensatores was comparable in many ways to that of vilici or actores’. However, ‘each 
time a dispensator entered a contract on behalf of his master, he did so upon request (iussum) from 
the master himself or from his procurator’ (198). 
96 K. R. Bradley, Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 21-45. Fidelity was the hallmark of all kinds of relationships. As Cicero 
explains, ‘[M]en commonly do not entrust [mandate] anything except to a friend [amico], and do not 
trust [credit] any one except one whom they think faithful [fidelem putat]’ (Verr. 29.1). For this reason 
fidelity also became the idealised attribute of many menial slaves and private administrators. 
Valerius Maximus explains that a slave’s fidelity to his master is more praiseworthy (laudabilis) than 
a wife’s to her husband, since the former is less expected (Lib. 6.8.praef.). 
97 Carlsen, Vilici, 57; Aubert, Business Managers, 159-62; Joshel, Work, 33. 
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guardian [κηδεμὼν ἀληθής] and my most loyal supporter [piιστότατος] in 
confidential affairs’ (Chaer. 3.9.11-12; cf. 2.4.6; 5.1). The same oikonomos was 
elsewhere similarly described as a φιλοδέσpiοτος for his eagerness to ensure his 
master’s security (Chaer. 3.7.2).98 Loyalty also typified the archetypal administrators 
in the biblical tradition. In their repeated casting of trusted slaves in the parables, 
the authors of the Synoptic gospels portray faithfulness (piίστος) as the principal 
virtue of good administration (e.g. Matt 24.25//Luke 12.42; Matt 25.21-23//Luke 
19.17). For this reason Jennifer Glancy explains that, in the gospels, ‘a faithful slave 
is one who occupies a managerial position and has moreover internalized the 
master’s interests to the extent that he will work unsupervised when his master is 
away’.99 Fabian Udoh similarly remarks, ‘The faithful manager (ὁ piιστὸς οἰκονόμος 
[Luke 12.42]) is defined by the symbiosis between him and the master, such that he 
knows, anticipates, and does the master’s will, that is, what promotes the master’s 
best interest’.100 
The testimony of funerary epitaphs—while probably containing a certain 
degree of embellishment—still further suggest that some real-life administrators 
aspired to, and perhaps even achieved fidelity.101 The first-century CE oikonomos 
Italos, for instance, apparently exhibited such faithful service that his master 
personally erected a memorial for the bailiff and even mourned his death: ‘In this 
place Chrestos buried aged Italos; he wept for his faithful steward [οἰκονόμον 
piιστὸν] when he died. In return for a good life and industrious servitude 
[δουλοσύνης φιλοεργοῦ], he fulfilled these sacred rites for him as a favour’ (SEG 
28.1033/NewDocs 3.10). Another monument was raised for ‘the most faithful 
[fidelissimo] Gallicanus’, the vilicus of Afinianus (ILS 7371). Still another tribute was 
dedicated to a certain Sabinianus, who is described as ‘a vilicus and a good and most 
faithful man [vilico et homini bono et fidelissimo]’ (ILS 7370; GRS §153). Similar honours 
were also paid to Cerdontus and Junius, who were both remembered as most faithful 
                                                        
98 Φιλοδέσpiοτος was also the name of a second-century CE oikonomos from Sparta (CIG 1276) 
and an actor (Philodespotus) in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses (2.26), just as the name Pistus was given to 
one of Plautus’ fictional vilici (Mer. 2.2.1). 
99 Glancy, Slavery, 114. 
100 Udoh, 'Unrighteous Slave': 330. 
101 Despite the ubiquity of the rebellious slave, Joseph Vogt, Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of 
Man (trans. Thomas Wiedemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 130, maintains 
that there were many actual slaves, especially those serving in close proximity to the master, ‘who 
reciprocated their master’s good will and concern for them by industrious and dedicated work; there 
were always slaves who were dependable . . . slaves to whom one could readily entrust one’s 
property’. 
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actores (ILS 7376/CIL XIV 469; CIL VI 9119/CIL XIV 2301). Collectively, these texts 
plainly show that the quintessential administrator was characterised by loyalty. 
And so long as this virtue was apparent, the satisfaction of the master and the 
longevity of the administrator were secure. 
But while administrators were keenly aware of their need to manage 
responsibly, their fidelity was constantly reinforced through the structural 
hierarchy of the managerial unit. Over the course of his tenure an administrator 
would be called to account by his master, or immediate superior, through sporadic 
and unannounced inspections. In Callirhoe, for instance, Dionysius waited until just 
before the harvest to inspect the herds and crops at his seaside estate, presumably 
to ensure the profitability of the harvest (Callirhoe, 2.3.1). But beyond seasonal 
assessments, masters also made random and unannounced visits in order to observe 
the work ethic of their labourers (Aristotle, [Oec.] 1345a).102 In the gospel parables, 
for example, the uncertainty of the master’s return was the method by which he 
maintained the administrator’s diligence while left unsupervised (Luke 12.46//Matt 
24.51). Surprise inspections, therefore, served two purposes: (i) they enabled the 
master to examine the various areas of production and the unveiled loyalty of the 
administrator and his staff; this then (ii) kept the administrator managing the 
enterprise industriously for fear of the master’s wrath. 
 
1. Reward 
The outcome of the inspection normally resulted in either the reward or 
penalisation of the administrator. If the agent managed reliably, he could receive a 
number of various kinds of rewards.103 To begin with, slave administrators—along 
with menial slaves—would receive certain basic necessities, such as food and 
clothing. As Pseudo-Aristotle cautioned, ‘Unless we pay men, we cannot control 
them [ἀμίσθων γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄρχειν]; and food is a slave’s pay [δούλῳ δὲ μισθὸς 
τροφή]’ (Aristotle. [Oec.] 1344b3). Ischomachus, in fact, instructs estate owners to 
                                                        
102 Inspections involved, among other things, the examination of the condition of the 
estate’s produce, equipment, labourers, and accounting records (Cato, Agr. 1.2; 2.5; Columella, Rust. 
1.8.20; Matt 25.19; Luke 16.2). 
103 Immediately following Ischomachus’ prioritisation of fidelity among administrators, 
Socrates inquired of him, ‘And how, in heaven’s name, do you teach your man to be loyal to you and 
yours?’ Ischomachus’ response is telling: ‘By rewarding him [εὐεργετῶν], of course, whenever the 
gods bestow some good thing on us in abundance’ (Oec. 12.6). 
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provide their administrators the best of the food and clothes, since the better 
servants deserve the superior provisions (Xenophon, Oec. 13.10). Other 
administrators might also receive verbal commendation. Ischomachus, for instance, 
states that slaves with ‘an ambitious disposition [φιλότιμοι τῶν φύσεων] are also 
spurred on by praise [τῷ ἐpiαίνῳ piαροξύνονται], some natures being hungry for 
praise as others for meat and drink’ (Xenophon, Oec. 13.9; cf. 13.12; Luke 16.8). Still 
other administrators might receive a promotion with increased responsibility (Matt 
25.20-23//Luke 19.16-19), including additional financial and personnel oversight 
(Matt 24.46-47//Luke 12.43-44).104 Finally, certain administrators might receive 
some kind of monetary compensation.105 If one was a freeman or freedman, the 
administrator would receive a wage (μισθός), in either cash or kind.106 If one was a 
slave, however, the master might award the administrator a salary (ὀψώνιον; 
σύνταξις [cf. P.Oxy. 42.3048]).107 
Administrators who did not receive an ὀψώνιον, however, may have 
benefited from an alternative financial arrangement, the grant of a peculium.108 The 
peculium of a slave could include money, provisions, and even other slaves. Though 
it legally belonged to the master, it functioned as a sort of allowance through which 
                                                        
104 Some NT scholars doubt if real-life administrators would have been motivated by the 
rewards presented to Jesus’ parabolic slaves, since they would have prized manumission over 
occupational promotion and material gain; cf. Mary Ann Beavis, 'Ancient Slavery as an Interpretive 
Context for the New Testament Servant Parables with Special Reference to the Unjust Steward (Luke 
16:1-8)', JBL 111 (1992): 37-54, at 43. But while this evaluation is true, these critics downplay the 
reality that promotions up the slave hierarchy were desirable. Columella, for example, suggests that 
the vilicus himself should be promoted to his post from among the hardened, experienced, and 
hardworking slaves (Rust. 1.8.2). These managerial positions not only had the bonus of appearing as 
freemen’s work (Aristotle, [Oec]. 1344a), but provided the slaves with increased contact with the 
master, which in turn afforded them more privileges and better prospects for future manumission. 
105 Aubert, Business Managers, 161: ‘Vilici formed a select group of privileged slaves and were 
therefore more likely to be induced by social or economic incentives to side with landowners’. 
106 Eusebius, quoting a letter of Dionysios, bishop of Alexandria, for instance, recalls the 
martyrdom of Ischyrion, ‘the hired steward of one of the rulers [ἐpiετρόpiευέν τινι τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐpiὶ 
μισθῷ]’ (Hist. eccl. 6.42.1). It is not clear, however, if Ischyrion was a slave, freed, or free. Similarly, in 
the mid-fourth century BCE  Xenophon (Oec. 1.3-4), reporting a conversation between Socrates and 
Critobulus, explains how the gentleman farmer (οἰκονομικός) who is able to manage his own estate 
well would also be competent to manage the estate of another in exchange for a μισθός. Xenophon 
almost certainly does not have a slave administrator in view, although Pomeroy, Oeconomicus, 218, 
suggests the possibility of a freedman. For the salary of free or freed agents in mandatum, see Alfons 
Bürge, 'Salarium und ähnliche Leistungsentgelte beim mandatum', in Mandatum und Verwandtes: 
Beiträge zum römischen und modernen Recht, ed. Dieter Nörr and Shigeo Nishimura (Berlin: Heidelberg, 
1993), 319-38. 
107 Jane Rowlandson, Landowners and Tenants in Roman Egypt: The Social Relations of Agriculture 
in the Oxyrhynchite Nome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 205; Rathbone, Economic Rationalism, 91-92. 
108 As Varro explains, ‘The foremen are to be made more zealous by rewards, and care must 
be taken that they have a bit of property of their own’ (Rust. 1.17.5). He continues to explain that 
administrators might be rewarded with a family and exemption from work (Rust. 1.17.5-7). 
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the slave could conduct business and thus increase on his master’s behalf (Matt 
25.14-30//Luke 19.11-27). But before returning the peculium to their masters, slaves 
lived off what they earned, which supplied their needs and motivated them to 
manage responsibly. In fact, Jean Andreau has recently argued that the entire 
peculium arrangement was intended to enable the slave to make a fortune and then 
return part or all of the sum to the master in exchange for manumission.109 An 
anonymous freedman friend of Petronius’ Trimalchio, for instance, admits to having 
purchased his freedom for a thousand denarii, which could have only been supplied 
by just this sort of peculium arrangement (Satyr. 57).110 All of these kinds of awards 
were quite commonplace and were thought—by the agronomists anyway—to 
benefit the farm. As Columella summarises, ‘Such justice and consideration [iustitia 
et cura] on the part of the master contributes easily to the increase of his estate 
[multum confert augendo patrimonio]’ (Rust. 1.8.19). 
 
2. Punishment 
Much literature has been written about the punishment of slaves in the 
ancient world that applies directly to administrators as well. Normally, if an 
administrator were found to be unfaithful and disobedient to his master he would 
have been liable to great professional and physical maltreatment. But in some 
instances of administrative carelessness, it appears that they were punished rather 
lightly. After all, administrators were specially skilled and educated labourers who 
possessed great money-making potential for their masters. Severely injuring or 
killing one’s administrator, therefore, was not always in the best interest of the 
proprietor. Ischomachus, for instance, remarked that he punished his estate 
managers, not vindictively, but for pedagogical purposes, to train them how to 
superintend the estate better. As Ischomachus explained, 
                                                        
109 Andreau, 'Les esclaves', 116-17: ‘Au moment où l’esclave allait être affranchi, le maître 
pouvait lui redemander le pécule tout entier tel qu’il était au moment de l’affranchissement, ou bien 
lui en reprendre seulement une partie. Quelle partie? Assez souvent, semble-t-il, le maître demandait 
une somme équivalant au prix d’achat de l’esclave, afin qu’elle lui permît de racheter un esclave de 
valeur analogue’. Andreau points as evidence to Pliny the Elder, Nat. 7.39.128-129. 
110 Although the LCL translation suggests that the freedman’s purchase was for his own 
manumission, Petronius’ Latin text is ambiguous and may indicate that the freedom of the 
freedman’s wife (contubernalis) is in view. In either case, the story depicts the great monetary 
possessions of a slave. The boast of the fictitious bailiff Olympio, ‘I can get freed for a farthing [una 
libella liber possum fieri]’ (Plautus, Cas. 316), is of course hyperbole, but nevertheless demonstrates that 
slave stewards possessed adequate funds to purchase manumission. 
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Whenever I notice that they are careful [ἐpiιμελομένους], I commend them and try to show them 
honour [ἐpiαινῶ καὶ τιμᾶν piειρῶμαι αὐτούς]; but when they appear careless, I try to say and do the 
sort of things that will sting [δήξεται] them. . . . If you want to make men fit to take charge, you must 
supervise their work and examine it, and be ready to reward work well carried through, and not 
shrink from punishing carelessness as it deserves. (Xenophon, Oec. 12.16, 19) 
These kinds of gentle punishments—those which merely ‘sting’—were suitable for 
generally-obedient administrators, those who, even when deserving of punishment, 
were still of great value to their masters. 
But some administrators were punished quite violently, especially when 
they had caused their masters great misfortune. Rural estate managers and business 
agents were especially liable to the master’s aggression,111 for as Ramsay MacMullen 
observes, ‘It was easy for [the master] to hurt people he never saw’.112 While some 
administrators were banished to a distant country estate (Petronius, Satyr. 69), 
others were heavily beaten and whipped (Columella, Claud. 38.2; Chariton, Chaer. 
3.9.5-7).113 In his novel, Chariton tells that during an inspection a master’s anger 
toward his administrator might be expressed in a subtle complaint (μέμψις) or in 
such fury (βαρύθυμος) as to require a lover’s intercession and rescue from death 
(Chaer. 2.7.2-6; cf. Cicero, Resp. 1.59). Moreover, the masters in the gospel parables 
are quite famous for viciously penalising disobedient managers. In certain cases 
they desert or demote their managers to menial servitude (Luke 16.2-3),114 and in 
others they have their administrators cut into pieces (διχοτομέω [Luke 12.46//Matt 
24.51]).115 These horrific examples were not exceptional. As Saller maintains, 
‘Romans regularly and legitimately inflicted on their fellow men corporal 
punishments that maimed and even killed’.116  
 
D. Summary 
In the preceding analysis of private administrators we sought through the 
use of the title οἰκονόμος and several other Greek and Latin correlatives to identify 
                                                        
111 Cicero remarked, ‘If a man, as a guardian, or as a partner, or as a person in a place of trust, 
or as any one’s agent, has cheated any one, the greater his offence is, the slower is his punishment’ 
(Caecin. 2.7). 
112 MacMullen, Social Relations, 6. Seneca’s vilicus appealed to the intimacy and longevity of 
their relationship in an attempt to appease his master’s anger (Ep. 12.1-3). 
113 Fitzgerald, Slavery, 32-50. 
114 Beavis, 'Ancient Slavery': 49, who argues that demotion and desertion were suitable forms 
of punishment for slaves, because the inflicted slaves would either be left to fend for themselves and 
probably to die, or be demoted to digging as a drudge. 
115 Ulrich Luz, Matthew 21-28: A Commentary (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), 224-25; 
cf. Beavis, 'Ancient Slavery': 43. 
116 Saller, Patriarchy, 134 (original emphasis). 
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their main characteristics and chief attributes. Several features of the position were 
consistently observed. Although οἰκονόμος originally referred to a free proprietor 
of an estate, over time the title and the responsibilities of estate and business 
management came to be identified almost exclusively with slaves and freedmen. 
Administrators, therefore, were typically the subordinates of wealthy 
masters/patrons, although administrators themselves were normally located in 
positions of authority as well. Granted the responsibility of running an enterprise, 
private administrators were charged with making steady—though not excessive—
profits for the proprietor and with directing a group of subordinate labourers to 
achieve that end.117 Administrators were often authorised to enter into contract 
negotiations with potential third contracting parties. Both to their slave staffs as 
well as to third parties, then, administrators acted as representatives of their 
principals and were entrusted with the right to act for them as such. 
Administrators, however, were generally not liable for their contracts. Rather, when 
formally authorised, the principal was normally held responsible for all commercial 
dealings, as long as the agent acted within the scope of his commission. But even 
though third parties could not charge the administrator with fault, business 
managers were always held accountable to their principals for the work they 
performed. Depending on their fidelity to their principal, they either received 
rewards (e.g. promotion, commendation, allowance) or punishment (e.g. demotion, 
chastisement, death). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
117 In his treatise on estate management, Xenophon records how Ischomachus summarises 
the make-up of the good administrator: ‘[A]fter you have implanted in him a desire for your 
prosperity and have made him also careful to see that you achieve it, and have obtained for him, 
besides, the knowledge needful to ensure that every piece of work done shall add to the profits 
[ὠφελιμώτερα], and, further, have made him capable of ruling [ἄρχειν], and when, besides all this, he 
takes as much delight in producing heavy crops for you in due season as you would take if you did 
the work yourself. For it seems to me that a man like that would make a very valuable bailiff [piολλοῦ 
ἂν ἄξιος εἶναι ἐpiίτροpiος]’ (Xenophon, Oec. 15.1). 
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Summary of Part 1 
 
In Chapters 2-4 we surveyed the three main administrative contexts from Graeco-
Roman antiquity in which oikonomoi served (regal, municipal, private) in order to 
highlight their key similarities and significant differences. Therein we made several 
important observations relevant for our enquiry concerning Paul’s metaphorical 
use of oikonomos. Firstly, we noticed that the social and legal status of oikonomoi 
varied according to the kind, period, and location of the administration in view. The 
civic oikonomoi from the Hellenistic period, for instance, were freemen, while those 
in municipal positions during the Roman period could have been free, freed, or 
slaves. Moreover, although regal oikonomoi from the Hellenistic period were always 
freemen, during both the Hellenistic and Roman periods private oikonomoi were 
almost always freedmen or slaves. Secondly, we observed that the administrative 
structures in which oikonomoi served varied according to context. Although regal 
and private oikonomoi operated in hierarchical structures, civic oikonomoi served in 
democratic and republican forms of government, which dramatically affected the 
power they possessed and the manner—and even possibility—of their calling to 
account. These observations will enable us now to identify the source domain of 
Paul’s oikonomos metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9. 
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PART II. PAUL’S OIKONOMOS METAPHOR IN 1 CORINTHIANS 4 AND 9 
 
Interpreting the Apostle Paul’s portrayal of himself as an oikonomos in 1 Corinthians 
4 and 9 has long troubled NT interpreters. This difficulty is not due, however, to the 
infrequency with which the term was used in antiquity. As was made apparent in 
Part 1, the title was used so commonly in the ancient Greek-speaking world that 
modern scholarship remains conflicted regarding the precise source domain of 
Paul’s metaphor. Just as troubling is that only a handful of studies of Paul’s use of 
the term have been conducted in any detail, and even fewer have paid much 
attention to the differences between its regal, municipal, and private contexts. This 
is especially surprising given that the metaphor occupies an important rhetorical 
and theological role in the two passages where it appears in 1 Corinthians. 
But when Paul’s portrayal of his administration is analysed in light of the 
various models surveyed in Part 1, it becomes clear that Paul adopted the term from 
just one of those contexts and employed it strategically in an effort to elucidate the 
nature of his apostleship and to elicit a very specific response from his readers. In 
Chapter 5 we will apply a basic method for identifying metaphors and thereby make 
a case for the source domain of Paul’s analogy. Then in Chapters 6 and 7 we will turn 
to Paul’s employment of the metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 respectively seeking 
to illumine how Paul deployed the image in two distinct epistolary contexts to meet 
his particular rhetorical and theological objectives.
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Chapter 5. Idenitifying Paul’s Oikonomos Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 
 
Having surveyed in Part 1 the three distinct administrative contexts in which 
oikonomoi are most attested in Graeco-Roman antiquity, in this chapter we will seek 
to identify which of those contexts is responsible for Paul’s metaphor in 1 
Corinthians. But in seeking to identify the image’s source domain, we will greatly 
increase the plausibility of our results if we examine Paul’s letter, including its 
epistolary and social contexts, employing strict hemerneutical criteria that can 
direct and clarify our analysis. Our investigation of Paul’s metaphor will benefit 
significantly from the principles recommended by Nijay Gupta. 
In a recent article, Nijay Gupta has introduced a series of seven principles 
and related questions which aid in the identification and interpretation of Pauline 
metaphors. Three of those principles are of particular relevance here. The first 
principle, cotextual coherence, asks the question: ‘Is the source domain made 
prominent elsewhere in the discourse?’ The second principle, analogy, asks the 
question: ‘Is the metaphorical term or phrase used in similar ways elsewhere?’ 
Finally, the third principle, exposure, asks the question: ‘To what extent were the 
author and reader exposed to, or in contact with, the source domain?’1 Significantly, 
when these questions are posed to Paul’s metaphor in 1 Corinthians, it only 
resonates with one source domain examined in Part 1: private commercial 
administration. In what follows we will demonstrate how these principles illumine 
Paul’s adoption of this particular source domain. 
 
A. Cotextual Coherence 
Evidence that commercial agency, or the private administrative sphere, is 
the appropriate source domain of Paul’s oikonomos metaphor is, in the first place, 
supplied in 1 Cor 4.1-5 and the larger discourse in which this passage is located. The 
first indication lies in the hierarchy Paul constructs involving apostles and 
God/Christ. In 4.1-5 Paul portrays apostles to be serving in a subordinate role 
closely resembling those occupied by oikonomoi in private structures from Graeco-
                                                        
1 Nijay K. Gupta, 'Towards a Set of Principles for Identifying and Interpreting Metaphors in 
Paul: Romans 5:2 (piροσαγωγή) as a Test Case', Restoration Quarterly 51 (2009): 169-81, at 174. The 
sequence of these principles has been reversed here. 
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Roman antiquity. This is most apparent when Paul declares that apostles serve a 
κύριος, namely Christ (4.4-5). Paul indicates that it is Christ who will return to 
examine and acquit him. At that time the Lord will expose the secret things of 
darkness (τὰ κρυpiτὰ τοῦ σκότους) and the desires of the heart (τὰς βουλὰς τῶν 
καρδιῶν), and issue either rewards or penalty to his apostles (4.5; cf. 3.8, 14-15). 
This hierarchy is reinforced in 4.1-3. Firstly, the genitive constructions 
ὑpiηρέτας Χριστοῦ and οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ (4.1) bear close resemblance to 
the administrator-master relationship exhibited in both Greek and Latin 
inscriptions. The use of the genitive in the phrase ὑpiηρέτας Χριστοῦ is possessive. 
Since οἰκονόμος, on the other hand, is a cognate of the verb οἰκονομεῶ (LSJ I.1-2), 
the construction οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ probably constitutes an objective 
genitive, so that apostles are those who manage, or dispense, God’s mysteries.2 
Nevertheless, because the mysteries belong to God,3 the οἰκονόμοι are by 
implication his subordinates. Secondly, a hierarchical model is apparent when Paul 
states that it is required of oikonomoi that they be found faithful (4.2). But to whom 
must the apostles prove faithful? Verses 3-4a reveal the wrong persons, namely 
other believers, human judiciaries, and even the apostle himself. While Paul 
considers it the mission of the apostolate to serve the church (3.21-22), their 
subordination and accountability are to none other than Christ (4.4b-5). Finally, the 
fact that apostles were entrusted with oversight of a particular commodity, the 
μυστήρια θεοῦ (4.1), implies the metaphor’s commercial derivation, since oikonomoi 
who managed a specific product normally served in private commercial contexts, as 
did Genealis, the commercial slave of Caesar: Γενεάλ[ιος] Καίσαρος δούλου 
οἰκονόμου ἐpiὶ τοῦ σείτου [sic, σίτου] (IKios 46/IGRR 3.25).4 
Collectively, then, these textual features suggest that Paul served in an 
administrative configuration that was markedly different from the democratic and 
republican structures of both Greek and Roman cities. Furthermore, since by the 
time of Paul’s ministry the regal oikonomos (in the Hellenistic sense) was a thing of 
                                                        
2 This goes slightly against Gladd, Mysterion, 168 n. 9, who suggests a genitive of 
subordination (e.g. ‘stewards over the mysteries of God’), although in the light of IKios 46/IGRR 3.25 
(cited immediately above), Gladd could be correct. 
3 Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, 1:320: ‘ὑpiηρέται Χριστοῦ und οἰκονόμοι der 
Geheimnisse Gottes, nicht Besitzer eigener Mysterien’. For additional indicators in 4.1-5 of the 
subordination of apostles to God/Christ, see Chapter 5. 
4 The original Greek text of this bilingual inscription probably presented Genealis’ name in 
the genitive case (Γενεάλ[ιος]), although the Latin renders it in the nominative: [Ge]nealis, Caesaris 
Aug(usti) [se]rvos {servus} verna, dispens(ator) [ad] frumentum. 
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the distant past, the source domain of Paul’s metaphor must be the private 
administrative sphere. This is then further confirmed by Paul’s frequent use of 
other private domestic metaphors in 1 Corinthians, especially in the letter’s opening 
four chapters: ἀδελφοί (passim); διάκονοι (3.5); τέκνα (4.14, 17); piαιδαγωγοί (4.15); 
piατήρ (4.15).5 
 
B. Analogy 
The commercial use of the oikonomos metaphor in 1 Cor 4.1-5 finds additional 
support in 9.17. In the earlier passage, Paul uses the noun οἰκονόμος in an effort to 
portray the role apostles occupy in God’s administration. It is then significant that 
Paul employs the abstract noun οἰκονομία in 9.17 for a similar purpose. In the latter 
instance, however, Paul uses the metaphor in order to explain how as God’s slave he 
can be entitled to a μισθός (9.18), and why his primary ministerial objective is ‘to 
gain’ (κερδαίνειν) converts. The intricacies of this difficult passage will be addressed 
at length in Chapter 7. For now it is sufficient simply to observe that Paul’s concerns 
with slavery, remuneration, and making evangelistic profits suggest that the source 
domain of his οἰκονομία metaphor in 9.17 is the realm of private commercial 
administration, especially since municipal oikonomoi were often wealthy citizens, 
normally did not receive a wage, and were responsible for making payments, not 
profits. Therefore, because Paul figuratively utilises the οἰκονομ- lexical stem in two 
passages in the same letter to refer to his apostleship, we can with great certainty 
conclude that Paul drew both metaphors from the same private administrative 
context. 
 
C. Exposure 
Paul was familiar with many of the features of the urban sector of the 
ancient world. As Wayne Meeks remarks, ‘Paul was a city person. The city breathes 
                                                        
5 Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First 
Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911), 75: ‘God is the master (iii. 23) of 
the Christian household (1 Tim. iii. 15), and the stores entrusted to His stewards are the “mysteries of 
God”’. Cf. Fee, First Corinthians, 159; Joubert, 'Managing', 216; Ben Witherington III, Conflict and 
Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1995), 138; Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians (Interpretation; Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997), 65; 
Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 336. 
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through his language’.6 For this reason, it is not surprising that on several occasions 
in 1 Corinthians Paul borrowed images from everyday Corinthian life in order to 
illustrate various theological insights (e.g. 1 Cor 9.24-27). The metaphor under 
investigation in our study would have functioned similarly. Paul’s portrayal of 
apostles as oikonomoi would have resonated richly within the colony’s flourishing 
commercial context. Even as early as the fifth century BCE, Thucydides could affirm 
that ‘Corinth had from time out of mind been a commercial emporium [ἐμpiόριον]’ 
(War 1.13.5).7 This was also true of the city which Paul knew in the first century CE.8 
But Corinth’s success as a trade centre was not accidental; the city’s wealth was due 
largely to geography. 
 
1. Corinth’s Strategic Location 
Because of its location, Corinth served to unite the eastern and western parts 
of the Mediterranean, resting as it were ‘at the cross-roads [ἐν τριόδῳ] of Greece’ 
(Dio Chrysostom, Or. 8.5). Writing during the period of Corinth’s desolation—Corinth 
remained in ruins from 146-44 BCE after being sacked by the Roman general Lucius 
Mummius—Cicero considered Corinth’s location to be a navigational centrepiece: 
‘[I]ts position was such on the straits and the entrance to Greece, that by land it held 
                                                        
6 Meeks, Urban, 9. Paul’s acquaintance with the city began in his youth. Luke reports that 
Paul was born in Tarsus (Acts 22.3; cf. 9.11; 21.39), a philosophical and commercial centre as well as 
the capital of the Roman province of Cilicia. Paul then spent an unspecified number of years in 
Jerusalem, where he received his Pharisaic education (Acts 22.3; 26.4; cf. Gal 1.14, 22; Phil 3.5-6); cf. 
Martin Hengel, The Pre-Christian Paul (London: SCM Press, 1991), 18-39; Willem Cornelis van Unnik, 
Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul's Youth (London: Epworth Press, 1962); James D. G. Dunn, Beginning 
from Jerusalem: Christianity in the Making (vol. 2; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 330-33. Finally, he 
devoted over three decades to missionary activity, during which time he established numerous 
churches in some of the leading cities in the northeast Mediterranean basin. By the end of the 60s CE, 
Paul could even boast, ‘[F]rom Jerusalem and as far around as Illyricum I have fully proclaimed the 
good news of Christ’ (Rom 15.19). We can, then, without hesitancy assert with Meeks that ‘the 
mission of the Pauline circle was conceived from start to finish as an urban movement’ (10). 
7 Translation from Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (trans. Richard Crawley; 
London: J. M. Dent, 1910), 7. Joan M. Frayn, Markets and Fairs in Roman Italy: Their Social and Economic 
Importance from the Second Century BC to the Third Century AD (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 10, explains, 
‘The Greek term ἐμpiόριον denotes a market centre, mainly on the coast, importing and exporting 
goods to and from distant places, either in the same country or in foreign parts’. For the city up to 
the mid-fourth century BCE, see J. B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984); for 228-44 BCE, see James Wiseman, 'Corinth and Rome I: 228 B.C.-A.D. 267', 
ANRW II 7.1 (1979): 438-548, at 450-96. 
8 See, e.g., Furnish, 'Corinth in Paul’s Time: What Can Archaeology Tell Us?': ; Jerome 
Murphy-O'Connor, 'The Corinth that Saint Paul Saw', Biblical Archaeologist 47 (1984): 147-59; Jerome 
Murphy-O'Connor, St. Paul's Corinth: Texts and Archaeology (3rd ed.; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 
2002); Meeks, Urban, 47-49; Peter Oakes, 'Contours of the Urban Environment', in Urban Christians 
(2009), 21-35, at 32-34. 
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the keys of various places and almost united two seas, set over against each other 
especially for purposes of navigation, separated by a very small intervening space’ 
(Agr. 2.87). The narrow isthmus on which Corinth was built was an advantageous 
site on all accounts, even serving to join numerous people groups. As Aristides 
lauded, 
[Corinth] is, as it were, a kind of market place [ἀγορά], and at that common to all Greeks, and a 
national festival [piανήγυρις], not like this present one which the Greek race celebrates here every 
two years, but one which is celebrated every year and daily. If just as men enjoy the official status of 
being public friends with foreign cities, so too did cities enter into this relationship with one 
another, the city [Corinth] would have this title and honor everywhere. For it receives all cities and 
sends them off again and is a common refuge for all, like a kind of route [ὁδός] and passage 
[διέξοδος] for all mankind, no matter where one would travel, and it is a common city for all Greeks, 
indeed, as it were, a kind of metropolis [μητρόpiολις] and mother [μήτηρ] in this respect. For among 
other reasons, there is no place where one would rest as on a mother’s lap with more pleasure or 
enjoyment. Such is the relaxation, refuge, and safety for all who come to it. (Or. 46.23-24)9 
Corinth, then, was a city of repute throughout antiquity, and many of its accolades 
were owed to its auspicious placement. 
Corinth’s location was also its primary reason for being refounded. Strabo 
credits Julius Caesar’s decision to recolonise Corinth to the city’s ‘favourable 
position’ (εὐφυΐαν [Geogr. 8.6.23]),10 the payoff being the city’s potential to serve as a 
centre for all kinds of trade.11 For this reason, in June 44 BCE, after lying nearly 
uninhabited for over a century, Caesar’s plan to resettle the site was implemented 
by Antony (Appian, Hist. rom. 8.136; Strabo, Geogr. 8.6.23; Plutarch, Caes. 57.8; 
Diodorus Siculus, Libr. 32.27.1).12 It is especially noteworthy that the colonists 
dispatched from Rome included a large contingent of freedmen, many of whom had 
become entrepreneurs or were serving their patrons as business agents.13 So 
                                                        
9 For all translations of Aristides, see P. Aelius Aristides, The Complete Works (2 vols.; trans. 
Charles A. Behr; Leiden: Brill, 1981). For the Greek text, see Aelii Aristidis, 'Quae Supersunt Omnia', 
ed. Bruno Keil (Berlin: Weidmann, 1958). 
10 Edward T. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic (Aspects of Greek and Roman Life; 
London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), 135: ‘Another Caesarian colony founded for economic or social 
reasons was the most celebrated of them all, Corinth. . . . It was manifestly intended to revive the 
mercantile glories of the city that Mummius had destroyed’. Cf. Mary E. Hoskins Walbank, 'The 
Foundation and Planning of Early Roman Corinth', JRA 10 (1997): 95-130, at 99: ‘The refounding of 
Corinth, a great commercial centre of the past, was in keeping with Julius Caesar’s economic and 
colonial policies of relieving economic distress at home, particularly at Rome, and of developing the 
provinces’. 
11 Cicero’s appreciation for the ease of access to every city of the Peloponnese was especially 
true of Corinth: ‘[A]ll the products of the world can be brought by water to the city in which you live, 
and your people in turn can convey or send whatever their own fields produce to any country they 
like’ (Cicero, Resp. 2.9). 
12 For the circumstance and date of the foundation, see Walbank, 'Foundation': 97-99. 
13 For the limited number of army veterans in Corinth, compared to freedmen and 
businessmen, see Spawforth, 'Colonial Elite', 168-73. For an overview of the colony from its 
foundation in 44 BCE to 267 CE, see Wiseman, 'Corinth': 497-533.  
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strategic was Corinth’s location that by the late first century CE the colony had 
already become a ‘flourishing centre of commerce, administration, the imperial 
cult, and entertainment’.14 As Strabo explained, 
Corinth is called “wealthy” [ἀφνειός] because of its commerce [τὸ ἐμpiόριον], since it is situated on 
the Isthmus and is master of two harbors, of which the one leads straight to Asia, and the other to 
Italy; and it makes easy the exchange of merchandise [ἀμοιβὰς τῶν φορτίων] from both countries 
that are so far distant from each other. And just as in early times the Strait of Sicily was not easy to 
navigate, so also the high seas, and particularly the sea beyond Maleae, were not, on account of the 
contrary winds; and hence the proverb, “But when you double Maleae, forget your home.” At any 
rate, it was a welcome alternative, for the merchants both from Italy and from Asia, to avoid the 
voyage to Maleae and to land their cargoes here. And also the duties on what by land was exported 
from the Peloponnesus and what was imported to it fell to those who held the keys. And to later 
times this remained ever so. (Strabo, Geogr. 8.6.20; cf. Cicero, Resp. 2.9)15 
The Maleae was the infamous cape of the southeastern Peloponnese which had for 
centuries posed a terrible risk for seafarers.16 Crossing at the isthmus, therefore, 
provided a welcome relief for those who wished to avoid the dangerous trek around 
Greece’s southern tip. 
The isthmus benefitted transport in two ways. Firstly, smaller ships that 
were required to continue their voyage from one sea to the next could, for a price, 
be carried by trolleys along the six kilometre-long δίολκος strip stretching across 
the narrowest part of the isthmus (Strabo, Geogr. 8.6.22; Pliny the Elder, Nat. 4.10). 
Secondly, either of the two major harbours at opposing sides of the isthmus could 
have served as a final destination.17 At the harbours goods were imported, stored, 
traded, and exported at either end of the isthmus. The Lechaion Harbour, which was 
located directly north of the colony on the Corinthian Gulf, was used for shipping to 
and from Italy and was easily reached from the city’s ἀγορά/forum by the 3,150 
                                                        
14 A. J. S. Spawforth, 'Corinth: Roman', in OCD (2003), 391. Walbank, 'Foundation': 107, agrees: 
‘These new Corinthians were entrepreneurs, eager to seize onto a good thing, and ready to exploit 
their resources and connections as far as possible; just the sort of people to make a commercial 
success of their city’. Cf. Mary E. Hoskins Walbank, 'What's in a Name? Corinth under the Flavians', 
ZPE 139 (2002): 251-64, at 261. 
15 G. D. R Sanders, 'Urban Corinth: An Introduction', in Urban Religion (2005), 11-24, at 15: 
‘Well-watered, overlooked by an imposing acropolis, flanked by a large fertile plain to the north and 
northwest, and located between two seas, Corinth commanded the principal nodal point in the land 
and sea communications of southern Greece. Its strategic and commercial position was 
supplemented by valuable natural resources for export, including building materials, excellent clays 
for ceramic and mortars, wood, and agricultural produce. It was not so much Corinth’s own riches 
that were being moved, however. The importance of Corinth was as an entrepôt through which the 
produce of other regions was shipped’. 
16 Murphy-O'Connor, St. Paul's Corinth, 54. 
17 Corinth also had two simpler docking facilities at Schoenus and Poseidona which served 
either end of the δίολκος. 
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metre-long Lechaion Road (Strabo, Geogr. 8.6.22; Pausanias, Descr. 2.2.3).18 The 
Cenchreae Habour (see image 1 below), on the other hand, being the lesser of the 
two, was located to the east of Corinth on the Saronic Gulf and served to facilitate 
trade with Asia (Dio Chyrsostom Or. 37.8; Apuleius, Metam. 10.35; Aristides, Or. 
46.23).19 Both Cenchreae and Lechaion grew quite famous in antiquity for their 
shipping and attest to the sheer volume of Corinth’s commercial interests during 
the early empire.20 
 
                         
 (1)   (2) 
Coins featuring: (1) the Cenchreae Habour with a statue of an unidentified deity shown in mid-
harbour (though it probably stood on the north mole) and three ships in the foreground (Antoninus 
Pius, 138-161 CE; © The Trustees of the British Museum [1899,0401.26; CGR3668]); (2) the Corinthian 
ἀγορά with the north and south stoas (Caracalla 198-211 CE; © The American Numismatic Society).21 
 
2. Corinth’s Prosperous Ἀγορά 
Many of the goods transported to the vicinity of Corinth, either by land or 
sea, whether for the Pan-Hellenic festivities22 or everyday use, eventually made 
their way to be sold in the Corinthian ἀγορά (see image 2 above). It was in the 
marketplace where the local and international tradesmen exchanged their goods.23 
                                                        
18 For the products and destinations of the Lechaion Harbour, see Donald Engels, Roman 
Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 12.  
19 Murphy-O'Connor, St. Paul's Corinth, 16-19. 
20 Sanders, 'Urban Corinth', 14-15; C. K. Williams, 'Roman Corinth as a Commercial Center', 
in The Corinthia in the Roman Period, ed. Timothy E. Gregory (JRASup 8; Ann Arbor: JRA, 1993), 31-46, at 
38-39, explains how Corinth’s commercial sphere benefitted from all the transportation, since ‘many 
of the market buildings at Corinth probably served as distribution centers for the various products 
that were to be shipped abroad and for other products that were to be sold in the city and nearby, as 
well as for products destined for the eastern part of the Peloponnese and inland Arcadia’. 
21 Images from M. J. Price and B. L. Trell, Coins and Their Cities (London: Vecchi, 1977), 83 
(Figure 146) and 84 (Figure 148). 
22 Corinth’s bustling economy also owed much to the Isthmian Games, the second largest of 
the Pan-Hellenic festivals (Strabo, Geogr. 8.6.20). 
23 Pausanias provides a detailed description of the layout of the marketplace during the 
second century CE (Descr. 2.2.6-3.1). It is unfortunate, however, that in 77 CE an earthquake destroyed 
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Kathleen Slane remarks, ‘It is noteworthy . . . that the ports of Corinth were located 
not at the diolkos but at the locations on their respective coasts closest to Corinth. 
This suggests that cargoes arriving from either direction were normally off-loaded 
and broken up, that Corinth acted as a middleman, and perhaps also as a market in 
the trade between east and west’.24 Mary Haskins Walbank agrees when she writes, 
‘Although Corinth’s agricultural resources provided a valuable underpinning, the 
city’s prosperity rested primarily on trade and on its function as an entrepôt 
between east and west, in addition to an invisible trade in usury and bottomry’.25 
Thus, Aristides described—albeit a century after Paul’s letter—the busyness of 
Corinth’s marketplace and the profusion of its merchandise: ‘Indeed, you would see 
it everywhere full of wealth [piλούτου] and an abundance of goods [piλήθους 
ἀγαθῶν], as much as is likely, since the earth on every side and the sea on every side 
flood it with these, as if it dwelled in the midst of its goods and was washed all 
around by them, like a merchant ship [ὁλκάδα]’ (Or. 46.27). 
Donald Engels’ study on the economy of Roman Corinth has attempted to 
demonstrate the basis of Corinth’s economy. While most cities in the Graeco-Roman 
period survived on agriculture and consumerism, Engels has (controversially) 
proposed that Corinth should be categorised as neither an agro- nor a consumer-
town. Rather, Engels contends that Corinth’s economy was supported by services 
(e.g. religion, education, cultural and judicial activities).26 It is beyond the scope of 
this study to attempt either to confirm or deny Engels’ thesis, but it is safe to affirm 
that Corinth had an unusually robust economy and relied to a large extent on trade. 
This owes much to the poor agricultural conditions of the territorium surrounding 
the city. Although some farming was possible, and in fact some scholars now 
contend that there was more arable land than Strabo supposed (Geogr. 8.6.23),27 
                                                                                                                                                               
much of the city that Paul knew. The marketplace then went under extensive reconstruction, so that 
much of what is discussed in ancient literature about the city’s appearance post-dates the first 
century CE and is irrelevant for our study. Nevertheless, archaeology and a few ancient sources are 
able to provide reliable evidence for the nature of Corinthian commerce in the mid-first century CE. 
24 Kathleen Warner Slane, 'Corinthian Ceramic Imports: The Changing Pattern of Provincial 
Trade in the First and Second Centuries AD', in Renaissance (1989), 219-25, at 219. 
25 Walbank, 'Name': 259. 
26 For criticisms of Engels treatment, see, e.g., Richard P. Saller, 'Review: Donald Engels, 
Roman Corinth', Classical Philology 86 (1991): 351-57; A. J. S. Spawforth, 'Roman Corinth and Ancient 
Roman Economy', The Classical Review 42 (1991): 119-20. 
27 Oakes, 'Contours', 35: ‘So much space seems to have been centuriated [in Corinth] that 
even if, as Strabo asserts, farming was difficult, it must have been a major component of the city's 
economic activity’. Cf. David Gilman Romano, 'City Planning, Centuriation, and Land Division in 
Roman Corinth: Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis & Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis', in Corinth 
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neither the size nor the soil of the hinterland was suitable to sustain the Corinthian 
population or the local economy.28 The colony, then, was forced to take advantage of 
its easy access to trade routes and the services it could offer guests. 
Roman Corinth was well-known for distributing a wide range of products. C. 
K. Williams suggests that the items known to have been in surplus there were wool, 
dyed woven goods, olive oil, honey, and possibly wine.29 Corinth also developed 
quite a reputation for its artisans. As Strabo reports, ‘The city . . . was always great 
and wealthy [ἡ μεγάλη τε καὶ piλουσία], and it was well equipped with men skilled 
both in the affairs of state and in the craftsman’s arts; for both here and in Sicyon 
the arts of painting and modelling and all such arts of the craftsman flourished 
most’ (Geogr. 8.6.23). Of its manufactured goods, Roman Corinth was best known for 
producing bronze, marble, and various kinds of pottery (e.g. terracotta lamps, terra 
sigillata, bowls, roof tiles).30 Moreover, the high quantity of imports made Corinth 
an ideal location for those industries whose products required a combination of 
goods.31 These locally manufactured items were probably produced in small 
factories outside the city, or even workshops in the marketplace.32 In either case, 
business owners living in distant cities would have appointed various kinds of 
business administrators to supervise their local operations,33 some of whom 
probably bore the titles οἰκονόμος, ἐpiίτροpiος, vilicus, actor, or dispensator.34 
                                                                                                                                                               
(2003), 279-301, at 289-90; David Gilman Romano, 'Urban and Rural Planning in Roman Corinth', in 
Urban Religion (2005), 25-59, at 43. 
28 Engels, Roman Corinth, 25: ‘Corinth provided a huge market for agricultural surplus whose 
size had far outstripped the ability of its hinterland (territorium) to supply’. Williams, 'Commercial 
Center', 38: ‘The Corinthia was not suited to raise a large crop of grain, at least not enough for export 
after the Augustan period. In fact, with the population that the Corinthia had after the initial colony 
took root — let us say in the Flavian-Hadrianic period — grain surely was imported on a regular basis 
to supply the needs of the area. Foodstuffs that were not able to be produced locally would have been 
much in demand in a provincial capital’. Cf. Walbank, 'Name': 258-59. 
29 Williams, 'Commercial Center', 38; cf. Slane, 'Ceramic Imports', 220. 
30 Engels, Roman Corinth, 33-39. See further: Oscar Broneer, Terracotta Lamps (Corinth 4.2; 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); Doreen Canaday Spitzer, 'Roman Relief Bowls from 
Corinth', Hesperia 11 (1942): 162-92; K. S. Wright, 'Early Roman Sigillata and Its Local Imitations from 
the Post-War Excavations at Corinth' (PhD, Bryn Mawr College, 1977), esp. 453-73; Carol C. Mattusch, 
'Corinthian Bronze: Famous, but Elusive', in Corinth (2003), 219-32; Mary Lou Zimmerman, 
'Corinthian Trade with the Punic West in the Classical Period', in Corinth (2003), 195-217. For the high 
volume of imported pottery during the first century CE, see Slane, 'Ceramic Imports', 221-23. 
31 Engels, Roman Corinth, 33. 
32 For the excavations of workshops in the Corinthian marketplace, see Williams, 
'Commercial Center', 37-38. See also David W. J. Gill, 'The Meat Market at Corinth (1 Corinthians 
10:25)', TynBul 43 (1992): 389-93; Winter, Corinth, 293-95; Murphy-O'Connor, St. Paul's Corinth, 24-28. 
33 Spawforth, 'Colonial Elite', 171, argues that ‘the new colony drew off eastern negotiatores 
from less well-located communities in Greece and the Aegean’. But a number of these wealthy 
entrepreneurs sent their freedmen commercial agents to the city to set up shop in their place. 
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Plutarch alludes to the prominence of these commercial middlemen when he 
uses piραγματευτής—another widely recognised synonym for οἰκονόμος—to 
describe the aggression of Achaean business agents and the threat they posed to 
habitual debtors: ‘And so “one after another takes over”35 the borrower, first a 
usurer or broker of Corinth [τοκιστὴς ἢ piραγματευτὴς Κορίνθιος], then one of 
Patrae, then an Athenian, until, attacked on all sides by all of them, he is dissolved 
and chopped up into the small change of interest payments’ (Mor. 831a).36 The early 
colony had a large contingent of just these kinds of business agents. As Williams 
remarks, ‘The freedmen-agents were an important part of the population sent to 
Corinth, serving the wealthy families who foresaw the colony as a potentially strong 
commercial center. These freedmen were sent out to ensure Roman control of the 
markets at this point on the east-west trade route and to secure positions for 
interested Roman families in this new distribution center in the eastern 
Peloponnesos’.37 
In summary, Corinth’s commercial prosperity developed a reputation that 
was widely recognised both inside and outside of the city, that is, among its 
residents as well as among itinerant philosophers and visiting apostles. The 
constant influx of potential converts was probably even a major reason why Paul 
devoted to this church so much time, energy, and letter-writing. For at Corinth Paul 
had an ideal base for his Gentile mission; to secure viable churches there would be 
to guarantee the proliferation of the gospel all across the Mediterranean world.38 
                                                                                                                                                               
Spawforth suggests that the C. Heius family may serve as an example. Although these colonists were 
wealthy enough to hold public office shortly after the colony’s founding (cf. IKorinthKent 151), it may 
be that this family of freedmen was commissioned to Corinth by the prominent Delian negotiator C. 
Heius Libo. If so, then ‘we have here a case of a leading family of Roman businessmen which sent 
freedmen to represent its interests in the new colony’ (172). But the stream of servile agents did not 
end at the city’s inception. Spawforth surmises that ‘colonial Corinth’s reputation for being 
“freedman-friendly” continued to attract freedmen in the years after the foundation’ (170). 
34 The only extant epigraphic occurrence of οἰκονόμος in Corinth attests to the later-Roman 
purchase (ἀγοράζω) of a sepulcher by a certain Loukas from the οἰκονόμος Andreas (SEG 11.171b). 
IKorinthKent 558 suggests that the two individuals were imperial employees. 
35 Here Plutarch quotes the Greek philosopher Empedocles (ca. 490–430 BCE). The LCL 
edition of Plutarch cites Friedrich W. A. Mullach, Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum (vol. 1; Paris: 
Editore Ambrosio Firmin Didot, 1860), 2, at v. 35; cf. M. R. Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 137, at 107(115) v. 12. 
36 Based on this text, Williams, 'Commercial Center', 31 n. 3, reasons that ‘Corinth especially 
was known for its business representatives’. But apparently the ethos of Corinth’s commercial scene 
had a reputation as well. Commenting on the wretchedness and desperation of Corinthian retailers, 
Dio Chrysostom remarks how one can observe in Corinth ‘peddlers [καpiήλων] not a few peddling 
[διακαpiηλευόντων] whatever they happened to have’ (Or. 8.9). 
37 Williams, 'Commercial Center', 33. 
38 Sanders, 'Urban Corinth', 15. 
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Most importantly for our purposes, however, Corinth’s commercial fame provided 
Paul with a familiar metaphorical field from which to draw an illustrative portrait of 
his apostolic position. Paul’s oikonomos metaphor would have resonated deeply in 
Corinth’s commercial context, carrying with it not a few implications about who 
Paul was, what he was sent to do, and what kind of authority he possessed. 
 
3. Paul and Ancient Commerce 
Paul spent a considerable amount of time in the commercial world. 
According to Luke, Paul preached in the ἀγορά everyday while in Athens (Acts 
17.17), and he probably did likewise in other cities as well. Paul was especially well 
acquainted with the Corinthian ἀγορά. It was there where Paul stood trial before 
Gallio (Acts 18.12-16) and it was the ἀγορά he had in view when he urged the 
Corinthians not to dispute over the consumption of polluted foods purchased from 
the local meat market (1 Cor 10.25). In fact, Paul and his co-workers themselves 
would probably have been familiar faces in the marketplace of Corinth—as well as in 
Thessalonica, Ephesus, and elsewhere39—where they laboured as artisans (Acts 18.3; 
cf. 20.34) from dawn to dusk for eighteen months (1 Cor 4.12; cf. 1 Thess 2.9). 
Paul’s particular trade as a tentmaker (σκηνοpiοιός)40 also situated the 
apostle in various urban workshops (ἐργαστήρια/officinae/tabernae).41 Ronald Hock 
suggests that Paul laboured in workshops ‘wherever and whenever he was doing 
missionary preaching and teaching’.42 Hock explains that the size of these 
workshops depended on their location, but that the average shop accommodated 
between about a half-dozen and a dozen artisans. Paul’s workshop in Corinth was at 
least large enough to accommodate him, Aquila, and Priscilla and functioned also as 
their residence (Acts 18.3).43 Furthermore, though the NT does not indicate whether 
or not Paul himself laboured in an administrative hierarchy significant enough to 
require a manager, Aeschines explains that in the fourth-century BCE a certain 
                                                        
39 Ronald F. Hock, 'The Workshop as a Social Setting for Paul's Missionary Preaching', CBQ 41 
(1979): 438-50, at 440, notes that ‘Paul’s reference to Barnabas’ working to support himself (1 Cor 9:6) 
would thus cover the so-called first missionary journey and the stays in Antioch (Acts 13:1-14:25 and 
14:26-28; 15:30-35), the periods when Luke has Barnabas as Paul's travel and missionary companion’. 
40 For the scope of Paul’s trade, see Ronald F. Hock, The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: 
Tentmaking and Apostleship (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 20-21. 
41 Hock, Social Context, 32, notes that ‘most workshops would be located in or near the agora’ 
and in close proximity to businesses specialising in the same trade. 
42 Hock, 'Workshop': 440. 
43 Hock, Social Context, 33; Murphy-O'Connor, St. Paul's Corinth, 194 
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Athenian workshop which employed nine or ten slave leatherworkers also 
employed a superintendent (ἡγεμών [Tim. 97]). Thus, it is highly plausible that the 
apostle was personally familiar with how local businesses and commercial 
enterprises were managed, making private administration the likely source domain 
of his oikonomos metaphor. 
 
D. Summary 
Through just a cursory analysis of Paul’s metaphorical use of οἰκονόμος and 
οἰκονομία in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, we have noticed that the managerial structure in 
which Paul functioned as an apostle far more closely resembled the systems 
implemented in ancient private administration than in Hellenistic kingdoms or 
Graeco-Roman cities. Moreover, this source domain would have resonated richly 
with the church in Roman Corinth, since the colony was renowned throughout the 
ancient world as a centre for international trade and the home to many servile 
business agents. Beyond this, Paul’s gospel preaching and leatherworking profession 
routinely situated him among all sorts of merchants and craftsmen for many hours 
at a time, exposing him to the social, legal, and administrative intricacies of the 
Roman commercial world, as occassionaly reflected in his discourses (e.g. ἀγοράζω 
[1 Cor 6.20; 7.23]; ἐξαγοράζω [Gal 3.13; 4.5]; piιpiράσκω [Rom 7.14]; κερδαίνω/κέρδος, 
ζημιόω/ζημία [1 Cor 3.15; 9.19-22; Phil 1.21; 3.7-8]; μισθός/ὀψώνιον [Rom 4.4; 6.23; 1 
Cor 3.14-15; 9.17-18]).44 With this first-hand experience in the realm of the ἀγορά 
and ἐργαστήριον, it seems to be well within the capability of Paul to draw on his 
understanding of the commercial world for the purpose of illustrating to a church 
all too familiar with trade and business his role and responsibilities within God’s 
administration. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
44 A. C. Zenos, 'St. Paul as a Business-Man', Old and New Testament Student 12 (1891): 71-78, at 
75-76. 
 131 
 
 
Chapter 6. Interpreting Paul’s Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4.1-5 
 
Having established the private commercial world of Roman Corinth as the most 
plausible context in which to read Paul’s oikonomos metaphor, we will now seek to 
demonstrate the significance of the image in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians. 
Over the next two chapters we will investigate Paul’s metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 
and 9, specifically for the purpose of elucidating Paul’s theology of apostolic 
authority. The concept of authority in Paul is, however, quite complex and 
admittedly a number of avenues could have yielded results. But this particular 
metaphor has been selected partly because of its relative neglect in Pauline 
scholarship and its repeated use in key Pauline discourses.1 Even more importantly, 
however, this image provides unique insight into our larger theological concerns, 
the construction and assertion of authority. Over the course of the next two 
chapters we will seek to demonstrate the fruitful way that Paul employs the 
oikonomos metaphor in both 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 to negotiate his identity as a 
person of privilege and authority on the one hand, and one of relative insignificance 
and obligatory service on the other. Moreover, in both passages Paul applies the 
metaphor in an effort to respond to perceived or anticipated critics.2 These texts, 
then, provide ample opportunity to analyse Paul’s portrayal and exercise of 
authority within contexts where the issue is expressly in view and indeed a matter 
of some dispute. 
In the present chapter we will seek (i) to identify what Paul’s metaphor in 1 
Cor 4.1-5 indicates about his understanding of apostolic ministry (especially 
                                                        
1 The lack of attention Paul’s oikonomos metaphor has received in modern scholarship 
remains quite disproportionate to the rhetorical and theological significance it carries in 1 
Corinthians. As Gladd, Mysterion, 165, explains, ‘During the past few decades, many have explored the 
notions of apocalypticism, revelation, and mystery in the Pauline corpus. In these expeditions, 
however, one stone appears to be left unturned: Paul’s enigmatic phrase “stewards of the mysteries 
of God”’. This lacuna is surprising given that Paul’s metaphor concludes one of the most instructive 
passages in the early part of Paul’s letter (4.1-5), and is central to one of the most disputed passages 
in the middle portion of the letter (9.16-23). 
2 Our two texts, 1 Cor 4.1-5 and 9.16-23, have much in common. In the larger contexts where 
they appear (1.18-4.21; 9.1-23), Paul is on the defensive; he even introduces 1 Corinthians 9 as ἡ ἐμὴ 
ἀpiολογία (non-apologetic readings will also be engaged below). Additionally, in both sections Paul 
indicates that there exist persons—presumably in the church—who are scrutinizing him (ἀνακρίνω 
[4.3-4; 9.3; cf. 2.15-16]). Finally, one of the primary matters in dispute within the church is Paul’s 
refusal of financial support. This issue is perhaps implicit in 4.12, but becomes explicit in 9.12, 15, 18-
19. It is therefore highly plausible that Paul chose to portray himself as an οἰκονόμος in 4.1-2, though 
especially in 9.17, because the image itself connotes monetary concerns (see chapter seven). 
 132 
 
 
concerning hierarchy, responsibility, and accountability), and (ii) to trace how Paul 
employs the image there to bring about ecclesial and ethical change in the 
community. To attain these two goals it will also be important to identify the 
problems that Paul was facing in Corinth, including the kinds of resistance, or 
power plays, the apostle perceived himself to be up against. It will be argued that 1 
Corinthians 1-4 reveals not only the existence of fractures in the church at Corinth, 
but that the divisions themselves materialised as a result of a fundamental 
theological misunderstanding about who, or what, apostles are, and a 
corresponding misapphrension about how the church should relate to them. 
Moreover, based on the content, style, and tone of Paul’s discourse, it will be argued 
that Paul perceived his authority to be the subject of criticism in Corinth. 
Unfortunately, the validity of some of these social and rhetorical assumptions has 
been challenged in recent scholarship. We must, therefore, begin our investigation 
by addressing the social and rhetorical context of 1 Corinthians 1-4. Once a plausible 
case is made for reading the letter this way, we will then turn our attention to Paul’s 
discourse in 4.1-5. 
 
A. The Social and Rhetorical Context of 1 Corinthians 1-4 
Our investigation of 1 Cor 4.1-5 must begin with an analysis of the rhetoric of 
the first four chapters of the letter, so as to establish as best we can something of 
the social context in which Paul was situated when he wrote the letter. The central 
questions to ask at this stage are: What is Paul’s primary rhetorical objective in 1 
Corinthians? What are his subsidiary rhetorical objectives in 1.18-4.21? What does 
he perceive to be the current status of his relationship with the Corinthian church? 
What has Paul attempted to accomplish by the time he reaches 4.1-5? 
 
1. The Rhetorical Objective of 1 Corinthians 
The appearance of Margaret Mitchell’s book-length treatment of the 
rhetoric of 1 Corinthians marked a significant watershed in the analysis of Paul’s 
letter. In her seminal study, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation (1991), Mitchell 
argued that 1 Corinthians is a unified composition with a single rhetorical objective, 
and as a case of deliberative rhetoric, the letter has reconciliation as its primary 
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goal.3 Her argument rests both on the letter’s form and on its thematic 
congruencies, which closely resemble those modeled in ancient rhetorical 
handbooks and exhibited in both ancient speeches and letters. 
Mitchell’s conclusions are largely convincing since, when 1 Corinthians is 
taken as a compositional unit, Paul’s reconciliatory objectives are apparent from 
beginning to end.4 Most telling of the letter’s deliberative intentions are: (i) its 
prospective outlook, or future orientation, most evident in Paul’s use of piαρακαλῶ 
ὑμᾶς in 1.10, 4.16, and 16.15, the first and last instances forming an inclusio around 
the entire epistle; (ii) the repeated appeals to ‘advantage’, explicit in the use of 
συμφέρω/σύμφορος (6.12; 7.5, 35; 10.23, 33; 12.7); (iii) the use of a variety of 
examples, in this case from the Hebrew Scriptures, Hellenistic culture, and Paul 
himself (4.16; 11.1); and (iv) the presence of factions in the community (σχίσματα 
[1.10; 11.28]; αἱρέσεις [11.19]; ἔριδες [1.11; 3.3]), which Paul repeatedly sought to 
resolve.5 Furthermore, if the inclusio formed by piαρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς in 1.10 and 16.15 
marks the compositional and rhetorical unity of the entire letter, then the inclusio 
formed by the phrase in 1.10 and 4.16 indicates that 1.18-4.21 forms a subsection 
within it.6 The separateness of this unit is also indicated by the inclusio formed by 
Paul’s statements about his evangelistic work in the community: οὐ γὰρ ἀpiέστειλέν 
με Χριστὸς βαpiτίζειν ἀλλὰ εὐαγγελίζεσθαι (1.17); ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ διὰ τοῦ 
εὐαγγελίου ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα (4.15). 
                                                        
3 Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the 
Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: WJK, 1991), 24: ‘Deliberative rhetoric is 
argumentation which urges an audience, either public or private, to pursue a particular course of 
action in the future’.  For 1 Corinthians as deliberative rhetoric, see also, e.g., George A. Kennedy, New 
Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Studies in Religion; Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1984), 87; Welborn, 'Discord': 89; L. L. Welborn, 'A Conciliatory Principle in 1 
Cor. 4:6', NovT 29 (1987): 320-46, at 326; Stephen M. Pogoloff, Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation 
of 1 Corinthians (SBLDS 134; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 25; Witherington III, Conflict, 75. For 
critiques of Mitchell and Witherington, see R. Dean Anderson, Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul (Rev. 
ed.; CBET 18; Leuven: Peeters, 1999), 254-65; Stanley E. Porter, 'Paul of Tarsus and His Letters', in 
Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C.-A.D. 400, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 
1997), 533-85, at 551-54. 
4 Cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 20. Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, 'The Structure and 
Argument of 1 Corinthians: A Biblical/Jewish Approach', NTS 52 (2006): 205-18, have recently argued 
that Paul’s primary objective in 1 Corinthians is to establish the purity of the church for the glory of 
God. 
5 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 65-183. For the church as embroiled in bickering, but not divided, 
see Johannes Munck, 'The Church without Factions: Studies in 1 Corinthians 1-4', in Paul and the 
Salvation of Mankind (London: SCM, 1959), 135-67. 
6 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 207. Ciampa and Rosner, 'Structure': 210-12, may be correct to 
argue that the first major section ends at 4.17, while 4.18 begins the new section concerning sexual 
immorality and greed and extending to 7.40. 
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In Mitchell’s framework, 1.10 serves as the letter’s thesis statement 
(piρόθεσις/propositio) and 1.11-17 functions as the statement of facts 
(διήγησις/narratio). The proof sections (piίστεις/probationes) are (a) 1.18-4.21, (b) 5.1-
11.1, (c) 11.2-14.40, and (d) 15.1-57,7 with 15.58 functioning as the conclusion 
(ἐpiίλογος) and 16.1-24 as the epistolary closing.8 But while many scholars now agree 
with Mitchell about the general deliberative character of 1 Corinthians, there 
remains some uncertainty concerning the rhetorical function of the first proof 
(1.18-4.21).9 If the entire letter is deliberative, then how does this unit contribute to 
Paul’s argument? 
 
2. The Rhetorical Objectives of 1 Cor 1.18-4.21 
Prior to Mitchell’s influential volume, a significant contingent of Pauline 
interpreters considered 1.18-4.21 to be a defense of Paul’s apostolic authority, due to 
the seemingly apologetic function of many of his self-referential statements (e.g. 
2.1-5; 3.1-4; 4.1-5, 8-16).10 More recently, however, Mitchell and others have 
contended that Paul had no opponents during the writing of the epistle, his 
apostleship was not being challenged by anybody in the church, and those passages 
                                                        
7 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 207. For an alternative approach to framing the proofs, see 
Witherington III, Conflict, vi-viii. 
8 Some of Mitchell’s advocates regard 16.1-12 to be an additional proof, 16.13-18 the 
recapitulation (peroratio), and 16.18-24 the letter closing; cf. Witherington III, Conflict, 313-24. 
9 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 207, admits, ‘While scholars are virtually unanimous in regarding 
1:18 (or 1:10) – 4:21 as a discrete section of the letter, a section which treats the problem of 
Corinthian factions, there is debate about the function and purpose of this section within the whole 
composition’. 
10 A chief proponent of this position was Nils A. Dahl, 'Paul and the Church at Corinth 
according to 1 Corinthians 1:10-4:21', in Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John 
Knox, ed. William R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, and Richard R. Niebuhr (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), 313-35. The final footnote in the essay’s republication, however, reveals some 
of Dahl’s later reservations; Nils A. Dahl, 'Paul and the Church at Corinth', in Studies in Paul: Theology 
for the Early Christian Mission (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977), 40-61, at 61 n. 50: ‘To call the section 
“apologetic” is to downplay the degree to which Paul is critical of his own adherents as well as of his 
opponents. Nevertheless, the section lays a foundation for the subsequent parts of the letter, it 
serves to reestablish Paul’s true authority, and it does contain apologetic elements, see esp. 1 Cor. 
4:2-5 and 18-21’. See also, e.g., F. C. Baur, 'The Two Epistles to the Corinthians', in Paul: The Apostle of 
Jesus Christ, His Life and Work, His Epistles and His Doctrine, vol 1 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1873), 
267-320; Johannes Weiß, Der erste Korintherbrief (KEK 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910), 
92; Barrett, First Corinthians, 101; Schütz, Authority, 190; Gerd Theissen, 'Legitimation und 
Lebensunterhalt: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie Urchristlicher Missionare', NTS 21 (1975): 192-221; J. 
Bradley Chance, 'Paul's Apology to the Corinthians', PRSt 9 (1982): 144-55; Michael Bünker, 
Briefformular und rhetorische Disposition im 1. Korintherbrief (Göttinger theologische Arbeiten 28; 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), 52-59; Peter Marshall, Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions 
in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians (WUNT 2/23; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987), 217; 
Karl A. Plank, Paul and the Irony of Affliction (Semeia Studies; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 11-24; Fee, 
First Corinthians, 48-49. 
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which appear to be polemical only do so on the basis of illegitimate mirror-
reading.11 Furthermore, some of these scholars insist that Paul’s letter must conform 
to one rhetorical genre,12 and because 1 Corinthians is a case of deliberative 
rhetoric, all self-referential and seemingly apologetic elements are dismissed as 
exempla.13 These interpreters even find textual support for their readings in Paul’s 
use of μιμητής (4.16) and the verb μετασχηματίζω (4.6), the latter implying through 
‘covert allusion’ that the disputes between the parties which attached themselves to 
Paul, Apollos, and Cephas (1.12; 3.4, 22) were purely figurative and represented by 
way of analogy altogether different quarrels centring around unnamed leaders in 
the church.14 Paul’s apostleship was, therefore, not in question. 
 
a. Paul’s Apologetic Objective 
In spite of these arguments there remain good reasons for regarding 1.18-
4.21 as having a defensive function. Firstly, although some interpreters reject the 
possibility that a deliberative letter might simultaneously have an apologetic 
dimension, the rhetorical flexibility of the epistolary genre suggests that certain 
passages could have a defensive posture.15 Several sub-units of 1 Corinthians, in fact, 
feature characteristics of non-deliberative rhetoric. Mitchell herself concedes that 
1.18-4.21 includes epideictic elements and ‘has as its purpose the censuring of the 
                                                        
11 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 54-55; Pogoloff, Logos, 102; Witherington III, Conflict, 74. 
12 Anderson, Rhetorical Theory, 255. 
13 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 54-55, 209; John T. Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An 
Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1988), 120-22; Raymond Pickett, The Cross in Corinth: The Social Significance of the Death of Jesus 
(JSNTSup 143; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 74-84; Brian J. Dodd, Paul's Paradigmatic "I": 
Personal Example as Literary Strategy (JSNTSup 177; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 45. 
14 The literary device was typically used to admonish an audience by way of analogy. 
Benjamin Fiore, '"Covert Allusion" in 1 Corinthians 1-4', CBQ 47 (1985): 85-102, at 95, for instance, 
recognizes that Paul’s use of covert allusion refers to the metaphors in 3.5-4.5 which aim to instruct 
the church how to regard their leaders. David R. Hall, 'A Disguise for the Wise: μετασχηματισμός in 1 
Corinthians 4.6', NTS 40 (1994): 143-49, on the other hand, dismisses the criticisms of Paul and other 
apostles as representative of entirely different quarrels. In other words, the parties Paul attaches to 
the apostles did not actually concern them. 
15 The mixing of rhetorical genres has been defended. See, e.g., Raymond F. Collins, '1 
Corinthians as a Hellenistic Letter', in The Corinthian Correspondence, ed. Riemund Bieringer (BETL; 
Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 39-61, at 60-61: ‘[T]he modes of rhetorical argumentation 
were sometimes so intermingled in a single sustained argument that one could speak of a mixed type 
of rhetoric’. Also, David E. Aune, The New Testament in its Literary Environment (Library of Early 
Christianity; Louisville: WJK, 1987), 23: ‘Greco-Roman literary composition often departed from the 
prescriptions of ancient literary and rhetorical theory’. Cf. Fredrick J. Long, Ancient Rhetoric and Paul's 
Apology: The Compositional Unity of 2 Corinthians (SNTSMS 131; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 24-28. 
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Corinthians for their factionalism’.16 George Kennedy also observes that, though 1 
Corinthians is ‘largely deliberative’, ‘it contains some judicial passages, for example 
1:13-17 claiming that [Paul] had not created faction in Corinth and chapter 9 
defending his rights as an apostle’.17 Such rhetorical licence even within a 
deliberative letter opens the door for the possibility of also attributing to 1.18-4.21 
an apologetic function. 
Secondly, there are clues that the apostles mentioned by Paul in the party 
slogans (1.12; 3.4, 21-23) are the actual leaders who were the objects of 
inappropriate partisanship. Despite the objection of interpreters who, on account of 
Paul’s use of ‘covert allusion’ in 4.6, fictionalise the disclosed apostolic parties (Paul, 
Apollos, Cephas) and assume the existence of parties attached to undisclosed local 
leaders, it seems quite excessive to allow Paul’s use of μετασχηματίζω in 4.6 to mask 
which leaders are in view. In fact, there is no indication that unnamed leaders were 
ever the objects of boasting in 1 Corinthians. And if Paul was not included among 
the revered leaders, then why did he remove himself from the disputes by denying 
his participation in baptism (1.13-16) when local leaders almost certainly could not 
have denied the same? Rather, as Morna Hooker has argued, the ταῦτα in 4.6, as the 
direct object of μετασχηματίζω, refers only to the three metaphors employed in 3.5-
4.5 (gardeners, builders, servants/administrators). These were ‘figuratively applied’ 
to Paul, Apollos, and perhaps Cephas not to hide the identities of the actual party 
leaders, but simply to demonstrate that apostles are merely intermediaries and 
should not be the objects of adulation.18 Thus, a minimalist reading of this rhetorical 
device is preferred, as it simply highlights the use of analogy, not an undisclosed 
                                                        
16 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 209-10, cf. 213-25; cf. Joop F.M. Smit, 'Epideictic Rhetoric in Paul's 
First Letter to the Corinthians 1-4', Biblica 84 (2003): 184-201. For the use of epideictic rhetoric in 
deliberative or forensic speeches, see the comment ascribed to Cicero: ‘And if epideictic is only 
seldom employed by itself independently, still in judicial and deliberative causes extensive sections 
are often devoted to praise or censure’ (Rhet. her. 3.8.15). 
17 Kennedy, Interpretation, 87; cf. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, 'Rhetorical Situation and 
Historical Reconstruction in 1 Corinthians', NTS 33 (1987): 386-403, at 393, who cites Kennedy. For 
recent defenses of the apologetic function of 1 Corinthians 1-4, or parts of it, see, e.g., Duane Litfin, 
St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric (SNTSMS 79; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 171; J. S. Vos, 'Die Argumentation  des  Paulus  in  1  Kor  1,10-3,4', 
in The Corinthian Correspondence, ed. R. Bieringer (BETL 125; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 
87-119, esp. at 87, 90, and 119; Donald P. Ker, 'Paul and Apollos—Colleagues or Rivals?', JSNT 77 (2000): 
75-97, at 90-91; Joop F. M. Smit, '"What is Apollos? What is Paul?": In Search for the Coherence of 
First Corinthians 1:10-4:21', NovT 44 (2002): 231-51, at 250; Wanamaker, 'Power', 136; Long, Ancient 
Rhetoric, 120. 
18 Morna D. Hooker, '"Beyond the Things which are Written": An Examination of 1 Cor. IV.6', 
NTS 10 (1963): 127-32, at 131; cf. Ker, 'Paul and Apollos': 92. 
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agenda. Accordingly, while the slogans which Paul quotes to the Corinthians in 1.12 
may not be ‘actual party-cries from the Corinthians themselves’, we can reasonably 
conclude that ‘underlying Paul’s statements in 1:12 is an historical truth that people 
at Corinth are lining up behind the various missionaries’ (i.e. Paul, Apollos and 
Cephas).19 
Thirdly, there is significant evidence to support the case that Paul at least 
perceived his authority to be in jeopardy. While at the time of this letter there 
probably was neither any intrusion of false teachers in Corinth nor the outright 
rejection of the apostle by the Corinthians, there are indications that Paul 
considered his apostolic authority, or primacy, to be a matter of real dispute. 
Admittedly, Nils Dahl probably goes too far when he deduces, ‘The other slogans are 
all to be understood as declarations of independence from Paul’.20 Nevertheless, 
since Paul himself indicates that the parties in the church included a group loyal to 
him, it is reasonable to suppose that there were also persons in Corinth who were 
critical of him. This is also apparent in light of the fact that Paul presents his role 
and manner of preaching as in need of explanation (1.17; 2.1-5; 3.1-4; 4.1-5). 
Not every scholar will be pleased with this understanding since a degree of 
mirror-reading is required. Mirror-reading as a hermeneutical method has, after all, 
been heavily criticised by a number of modern NT interpreters. Mitchell, for 
instance, prudently challenges the assumption that whenever Paul speaks about 
himself, he seeks ‘always to ward off charges’.21 Nevertheless, one should be wary of 
any methodological protest which calls for a radical reversal of the hermeneutical 
pendulum. Mitchell’s suspicions about mirror-reading, while valid, need not result 
in the absolute abandonment of the technique.22 After all, the decision to interpret 
every Pauline self-reference merely as an exemplum requires just as much 
                                                        
19 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 83 (original emphasis). 
20 Dahl, 'Corinth', 322. 
21 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 55 n. 156. She does recognize 2 Corinthians 10-13 as a defense. 
22 Contra George Lyons, Pauline Autobiography: Toward a New Understanding (SBLDS 73; Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1985), who suggests that mirror-reading ‘is an inappropriate, if not entirely fallacious, 
method for identifying either Paul’s opponents or the function of his autobiographical remarks: (1) It 
does not give sufficient weight to the argumentative origins of Paul’s denials and antithetical 
formulations, while (2) it gives too much weight to extra-textual assumptions’ (96); ‘[s]ince we have 
only Paul’s presumed defense and not the accusation, it is necessary to exercise restraint in asserting 
too confidently that a specific charge existed, and if so, what it may have been’ (97). Cf. William 
Baird, '"One Against the Other": Intra-Church Conflict in 1 Corinthians', in The Conversation Continues: 
Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn, ed. Beverly R. Gaventa and Robert T. Fortna 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 116-36, at 119 
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presumption as the judgments made in mirror-reading. To obtain carefully 
formulated exegesis, then, one needs only to apply a cautious and consistent 
methodology.23 Our study, then, will benefit further from the mirror-reading 
principles proposed by John Barclay and Jerry Sumney.24 
 
b. Mirror-Reading 1 Corinthians 
In his influential article on mirror-reading, John Barclay offers seven criteria 
useful in the evaluation of a polemical letter. (1) The type of utterance requires that 
the reader consider the significance and limitations of certain kinds of statements 
(assertions, commands, etc.). Barclay explains, among other things, the implications 
of Pauline denials: ‘If Paul makes a denial, we may assume that, at least, those whom 
he addresses may be prone to regard what he denies as true, and at most, someone 
has explicitly asserted it’.25 (2) Tone demands due attention to be given to those 
statements made with emphasis and urgency. (3) Frequency suggests that statements 
made in repetition are probably central themes. (4) Clarity insists that the 
interpreter consider if the text contains any significant ambiguities that might 
prevent the reader from giving it priority. (5) Unfamiliarity asks if a theological motif 
is so uncommon that it stands out as something to which Paul might be reacting. (6) 
Consistency considers if the previously mentioned criteria taken collectively point to 
a single opponent. (7) Historical plausibility allows what other evidence is available to 
be considered in order to demonstrate the likelihood of the hypothesis. 
                                                        
23 It was Dahl, 'Corinth', 317-18, in fact, who first issued ‘a strict method’ in the study of 1 
Corinthians 1-4. In his essay, Dahl urged interpreters to respect the onesidedness of the letter, to give 
priority to this letter and this section over the remainder of the epistle and the Pauline corpus, to 
assume the letter’s integrity, and to account for the total argument in chapters 1-4 when 
reconstructing the historical context. Dahl also advised the reader to give priority to the ‘relatively 
clear and objective statements’ over ‘evaluations, polemical and ironic allusions, and warnings and 
exhorations’. Cf. Jerry L. Sumney, 'Studying Paul's Opponents: Advances and Challenges', in Paul and 
His Opponents, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Pauline Studies 2; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 7-58, at 44. 
24 John M. G. Barclay, 'Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case', JSNT 31 
(1987): 73-93, at 84, considers mirror-reading to be ‘a good deal more difficult than is usually 
acknowledged, but not wholly impossible. What is needed is a carefully controlled method of 
working which uses logical criteria and proceeds with suitable caution’. In some ways, mirror-
reading 1 Corinthians is on surer ground than many other Pauline letters, since certain difficulties 
present elsewhere do not apply to this discourse. In 1 Corinthians, for example, Paul directly 
addresses his so-called critics, rather than responding to one party about the remarks made by 
another, as in 2 Corinthians. Similarly, while Paul utilizes some hyperbole and sarcasm in 1 
Corinthians (e.g. the quarrels probably did not involve ‘each’ believer [1.12]; Paul was not completely 
indifferent about being scrutinized [4.3; cf. 4.14-16]; see also 4.8-10), the ‘distorting effects of polemic’ 
apparent perhaps in Galatians is probably less of a concern in 1 Corithians. 
25 Barclay, 'Mirror-Reading': 84 (original emphasis). 
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These criteria when applied collectively suggest that in 1 Corinthians Paul 
was reacting polemically to an urgent matter in the church. Since, according to 
Barclay’s method, the very presence of a denial permits the reader to assume that 
the audience was at least inclined to believe the contrary, then Paul’s clear, emphatic, 
and repeated denials about the role of eloquent speech in his preaching (1.17; 2.1-5; 
cf. 2 Cor 10.10) suggest that these issues—which are relatively unfamiliar outside of 
the Corinthian correspondence (cf. 1 Thess 2.1-12)—were probably misunderstood 
by, and of particular importance to, the church in Corinth. Moreover, Bruce Winter 
and others have convincingly demonstrated the historical plausibility of this reading 
in their reconstructions of the Corinthian disputes against the backdrop of Graeco-
Roman oratory and the budding Second Sophistic.26 
Jerry Sumney’s basic methodology for identifying Pauline opponents also 
confirms our suspicions. In order to prioritise certain kinds of epistolary texts above 
others, Sumney differentiates between explicit statements (‘those in which the author 
speaks directly about the opponents’, allusions (‘statements which seem to address 
opponents, but are indirect, and so more or less oblique references to them’), and 
affirmations (‘statements which neither explicitly refer to opponents nor obviously 
allude to them’).27 When seeking to identify which texts make reference to 
opponents, Sumney naturally grants more weight, or ‘certainty’, to explicit rather 
than to allusive statements—even though he is suspicious of the ‘reliability’ of data 
arising from polemical and apologetic contexts, over against didactic, 
thanksgivings, and similar kinds of discourse.28 But since the reliability of a 
particular report need not prevent us from concluding that during this early period 
Paul at least perceived himself to have had critics in Corinth (even if not 
‘opponents’/false teachers), it is notable that Sumney’s methodology enabled him to 
identify no less than eleven verses in 1 Corinthians 1-4 explicitly referring to critics 
(1.10-12; 3.3-4, 21-22; 4.3, 6-7, 18-19) and another thirty alluding to them (1.13-17, 
18-25; 2.1-5, 13-16; 3.5-9; 4.8-13). As Sumney remarks, ‘Our search for opponents has 
                                                        
26 Winter, Sophists, esp. 180-202; cf. Winter, Corinth, 31-43; Litfin, Proclamation, 137-209; 
Clarke, Secular, 36-39, 101-105; Wenhua Shi, Paul’s Message of the Cross as Body Language (WUNT 2/254; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 112-86; Corin Mihaila, The Paul-Apollos Relationship and Paul's Stance 
toward Greco-Roman Rhetoric: An Exegetical and Socio-Historical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-4 (LNTS 399; 
London: T&T Clark, 2009). 
27 Jerry L. Sumney, "Servants of Satan", "False Brothers" and Other Opponents of Paul (JSNTSup 
188; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 23. 
28 Sumney, Servants, 25-32. 
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yielded no evidence that the problems in Corinth are the result of intruders who are 
attempting to take Paul’s place. Rather, the questions raised about Paul come from 
the Corinthians themselves. There are clearly challenges to his authority as he is 
compared to other leaders, specifically at least Cephas and Apollos’.29 With Sumney, 
then, we can conclude that Paul’s apostolic authority was being scrutinised when he 
wrote 1 Corinthians. 
The reconstruction of 1 Corinthians made possible through the principles 
presented by Barclay and Sumney is even more plausible given that Paul’s 
preaching, presence, and apostleship came under heavier attack, provoking an even 
more comprehensive defense, in 2 Corinthians. One must ask how plausible it is that 
the very themes included in Paul’s self-references in 1 Corinthians (esp. 1.17; 2.1-5) 
could have become the basis of the accusations in subsequent correspondence (2 
Cor 10.10) without having already been the objects of dispute—even in an embryonic 
form—during the earlier letter. Such a scenario is highly improbable. 
But if 1.18-4.21 does contain apologetic undertones, then it must also be 
explained briefly how Paul’s autobiographical remarks and reflections about his 
preaching serve the reconciliatory (deliberative) intentions of 1 Corinthians while 
also functioning as more than paradigms to be imitated (exempla).30 After all, how 
can Paul instruct the Corinthians to imitate him if they are against him? But as we 
established earlier, when Paul wrote the letter his apostolic authority was neither 
under full attack nor even the primary problem in Corinth. And because the 
Corinthians had not been introduced to formal opponents during this period, there 
was no need for him to deliver a full apologetic just yet. After all, nobody in 
antiquity wanted to hear others praise themselves, for ‘to speak to others of one’s 
own importance or power is offensive’ (Plutarch, Mor. 539a).31 Rather, Paul sought 
only briefly to censure the church and to justify his modus operandi in order to 
eliminate the party mentality while also regaining their confidence so he could 
                                                        
29 Sumney, Servants, 79. 
30 Long, Ancient Rhetoric, 55, observes that, although examples (piαραδείγματα; exempla) were 
important in deliberative rhetoric, they were also commonly used in forensic rhetoric. 
31 See, e.g., Favorinus (Dio Chrysostom, Or. 37), who defended his former statue, rather than 
himself, in order not to deter his audience; cf. Maud W. Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-
Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 9; L. Michael White, 
'Favorinus's "Corinthian Oration": A Piqued Panorama of the Hadrianic Forum', in Urban Religion 
(2005), 61-110, at 67-73. 
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instruct them further about unity and Christian maturity.32 As Duane Litfin explains, 
‘The fact is that in raising the subject of his preaching Paul has not left the 
Corinthian quarrels at all. On the contrary, he has moved to the heart of them’.33  
Thus, we can with confidence agree with Peter Marshall when he asserts, ‘It 
is clear through 1:10-4:21 Paul is defending himself in an endeavour to re-restablish 
his apostolic authority in Corinth and that the divisions in Corinth were related to 
criticisms that some had made against Paul’s conduct as an apostle’.34 Furthermore, 
while the reader need not conclude that Paul was facing formal opponents, Paul’s 
censuring of the Corinthians for their apparent criticisms of his preaching (2.1-5; 
3.1-4; 4.3-5) suggests that Paul was facing more hostility from the church than many 
recent interpreters have realised.35 
 
3. The Structure of 1 Cor 1.18-4.21 
Interpreters of 1 Corinthians have not infrequently attempted to subdivide 
1.18-4.21 into even smaller units. Among these approaches, Joop Smit’s analysis is to 
be preferred. Smit contends that ‘this passage consists of four general reflections, 
each in a different, highly rhetorical style and followed by a practical conclusion 
formulated with much less rhetorical flourish’.36 Based on textual syntax, Smit 
argues that the stylised reflections and corresponding conclusions are divided as 
follows: (a) 1.18-31 followed by 2.1-5; (b) 2.6-16 followed by 3.1-4; (c) 3.5-23 followed 
                                                        
32 For the close association between forensic and epideictic rhetoric, see Winter, Sophists, 
182: ‘His apologia must be seen as his critique of the Corinthians and not simply a justification of his 
modus operandi. Like Aristides, who concluded his apologetic oration to a friend with “Call these 
remarks a defence (ἀpiολογία), or if you wish, a well intentioned censure (ἐpiιτίμησις), or even a 
combination of the two”, Paul in 1 Corinthians 1-4 clearly combines both’. See also Lyons, 
Autobiography, 28: ‘Although the goals may differ, the topics of an author’s own “life,” encomium, or 
apology are hardly distinguishable’. 
33 Litfin, Proclamation, 188. 
34 Marshall, Enmity, 217. 
35 I am in general agreement with the rhetorical analysis of Smit, 'Epideictic': 200: ‘In 1 Cor 
1,10–4,21 Paul builds up an argument to justify his rather unimpressive performance. To that end, 
from the four encomia [1.18-31; 2.6-16; 3.5-23; 4.6-13], evaluations of a more general character, he 
draws four specific conclusions regarding his former preaching at Corinth: this is in accordance with 
the highest, divine norms (2,1-5); this has been consciously adapted to the starting-position of the 
Corinthians (3,1-4); the Corinthians do not have the right to judge Paul, because he is in the service of 
God (4,1-5); as founder of the community Paul is entitled to the respect of the Corinthians (4,14-21)’. 
36 Smit, 'Epideictic': 185. It could be that in this discourse, despite his verbal dismissal of 
rhetoric, Paul was attempting to demonstrate his rhetorical skill; cf. Smit, 'Apollos': 247; Wire, The 
Corinthian Women Prophets, 47. 
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by 4.1-5; and (d) 4.6-13 followed by 4.14-21.37 What is striking about Smit’s pattern is 
that the four conclusions clearly stand apart from their corresponding reflections, 
not simply in their lack of rhetorical flourish, but also in the directness with which 
Paul communicates with the Corinthians. In each conclusion, for example, Paul 
turns from a primarily third-person mode of discourse to address the church in the 
first and second person.38 Also, the transitions in 2.1 and 3.1 are marked by the 
expression κἀγὼ ἀδελφοί, demonstrating that 2.1-5 and 3.1-4 share the same 
function in the units in which they appear. 
Smit’s analysis has significant implications for how one reads 1 Corinthians 
1-4. Based on placement, directness, and tone, the conclusion passages should be 
given far more weight when interpreting Paul’s rhetorical objectives than they have 
received in much recent scholarship. By concentrating on these smaller units, the 
reader will no doubt detect Paul’s stern tone of blame and defense. In the following 
survey, then, we will summarise Paul’s argument in each individual unit in order to 
prepare for a more comprehensive analysis of 4.1-5. 
 
a. 1 Cor 1.18-2.5 
Paul’s primary concern in 1.18-2.5 is to demonstrate the centrality of the 
power of God, and alternatively the powerlessness of persuasion, in gospel 
proclamation. This emphasis is apparent through the way 1.17 and 2.4-5 bracket the 
unit, as both texts (i) deny Paul’s use of words of wisdom (οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου [1.17]; 
οὐκ ἐν piειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις [2.4]), and (ii) convey the rationale (purpose) for Paul’s 
modus operandi (ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστου [1.17]; ἵνα ἡ piίστις ὑμῶν μὴ ᾖ 
                                                        
37 For these divisions, consider the terminological associations observed by Smit, 'Apollos': 
236-39: (a) the relationship between ὁ λόγος and δύναμις θεοῦ from 1.18 resurfaces in 2.1-5; Χριστὸς 
ἐσταυρωμένος from 1.23 reappears in 2.2; τὰ ἀσθενῆ from 1.25-27 becomes ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ in 2.3; the 
rejection of σοφία ἀνθρώpiων at the end of the first unit (2.5) announces the theme of the second 
(2.6-3.4); (b) λαλέω (2.6, 7, 13) and piνευματικός (2.13[2x], 15) reappear in 3.1; λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς 
τελείοις in 2.6 is in opposition to λαλῆσαι . . . ὡς νηpiίοις in 3.1; the formula οὐ . . . ἀλλά from 2.6-7, 8-
9, 12-13 repeats twice in 3.1-2; Paul and Apollos, who are mentioned in the slogans at the end of the 
second unit (3.4), announce the theme of the third (3.5-4.5); (c) Paul’s explicit use of metaphor in 3.5-
17 resurfaces in 4.1-5, the ὑpiηρέται and οἰκονόμοι from 4.1 corresponding with the διάκονοι and 
συνεργοί from 3.5 and 9 respectively; the judgement theme in 3.12-17 is repeated  in 4.3-5; the 
synecdochic use of ἡμέρα for judgement in 3.13 reoccurs at 4.3; the hierarchy exhibited in 3:18-23 is 
qualified in 4.1-5; (d) the verb φυσιόω stated at 4.6 is repeated as the main theme in 4.18-19. 
38 Paul occasionally addresses the church in the second person outside of these conclusions, 
but the tone of these segments is noticeably different; cf. Smit, 'Apollos': 232; Smit, 'Epideictic': 185, 
200; Fiore, 'Covert': 87-88. 
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ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώpiων ἀλλ᾽ ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ [2.5]).39 For the remainder of the unit 
(1.18-31), then, Paul responds to those in the church who desired that persuasion 
play a central role in his preaching by demonstrating that any other approach to 
Paul’s ministry would have obstructed the recipient from receiving the wisdom and 
power intrinsic to the message itself (1.18, 24, 30). But while Paul surely seeks to 
illustrate the power of the word of the cross, he emphasises to an even greater 
extent the utter weakness of conventional wisdom by demonstrating the inability of 
the σάρξ to grasp such a foolish gospel (1.26, 29). Indeed, the rejection of the gospel 
by professional academics (σοφός, γραμματεύς, συζητητής [1.20]), the dismissal of 
the message by sign-demanding Jews and wisdom-seeking Greeks (1.22-23), and yet 
the inclusion of the unimpressive Corinthian believers, most of whom lacked all 
such fleshly wisdom, power, and nobility (1.26), indicates that conventional wisdom 
and power is at odds with the wisdom and power of God.40 Instead, God saves those 
whose minds have been transformed to regard real wisdom and power as exhibited 
in the cross (1.30), so that no one can boast before God (1.29), but only in him (1.31).41 
As Litfin explains, ‘[I]n his wisdom God chooses to work through means which the 
world finds weak, foolish, and unimpressive so that there can be no question in the 
end as to who has accomplished the result’.42 
Thus, in 1.18-2.5 Paul explains that he could not have utilised ‘words of 
wisdom’ (i.e. persuasive speech) in his articulation of the gospel because the gospel 
                                                        
39 Litfin, Proclamation, 190: ‘The close parallelism of these two statements is no accident. The 
first looks forward, the second looks back; the first states the theme to be developed in 1.18-2.5, the 
second restates the same theme, this time as a conclusion of what has just been developed’. 
40 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 212, maintains that Paul intended here to show that ‘God’s wisdom 
has the power to unite all those who are called, both Jew and Greek (1:24; cf. 12:13), thus ending 
ethnic separation in the common acceptance of the scandal of the cross (1:23-24)’. This 
interpretation would support her reconciliatory reading of the letter. But Paul’s reference to the 
crucifixion of Christ in 1.23 does not demonstrate God’s unifying intentions for Jews and Greeks, but 
the paradoxical power and wisdom of his seemingly unimpressive gospel. As becomes clear in 1.24, 
Paul sought to demonstrate that Christ’s humiliating death (1.23) was counter-intuitively δύναμις 
(rather than σκάνδαλον) for believing Jews and σοφία (rather than μωρία) for believing Greeks. As 
Hays, First Corinthians, 30, explains, ‘The fundamental theological point is that if the cross itself is 
God’s saving event, all human standards of evaluation are overturned. This outlandish message 
confounds Jews and Greeks alike, who quite understandably seek evidence of a more credible sort, 
either empirical demonstrations of power (“signs”) or rationally persuasive argumentation 
(“wisdom”). But the apostle offers neither. Instead, “we proclaim Christ crucified” (v. 23)’. 
41 Richard B. Hays, 'Wisdom according to Paul', in Where Shall Wisdom Be Found?: Wisdom in the 
Bible, the Church and the Contemporary World, ed. Stephen C. Barton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 111-
23, at 113, maintains, ‘Paul has taken the central event at the heart of the Christian story – the death 
of Jesus – and used it as the lens through which all human experience must be projected and thereby 
seen afresh. The cross becomes the starting point for an epistemological revolution, a conversion of the 
imagination’. 
42 Litfin, Proclamation, 193-94. 
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is utter foolishness from the perspective of conventional wisdom. Only divine 
wisdom transmitted through God’s mystery (2.1) and divine power applied through 
God’s spirit (2.4) are able to produce faith in the unbeliever (2.5). In this unit, then, 
Paul aims to reestablish the validity of his seemingly unimpressive mode of gospel 
proclamation and to censure the church for preferring an alternative approach. As 
Litfin explains, ‘Paul’s goal is nothing less than to defend his modus operandi as a 
preacher. To do so he must demonstrate that it is theologically inspired. Hence he 
argues that he could not have operated otherwise; he was locked into simple 
proclamation — in contrast to the impressive εὐγλωττία of the rhetor — by the 
demands of the Gospel itself’.43 
 
b. 1 Cor 2.6-3.4 
After establishing in 1.18-2.5 the rationale for his unimpressive manner of 
preaching, Paul in 2.6-3.4 explains why it was that he brought the Corinthians an 
equally unimpressive message. Paul’s primary concern in 2.6-3.4 is to demonstrate 
why the Corinthians were not ready for more substance in the preaching they 
received during his earlier visit, and thus to defend the content of his preaching at 
that time.44 Throughout this unit Paul explains that divine wisdom is intended for 
mature believers, the τελείοι and piνευματικοί, while wisdom is incomprehensible 
for immature believers and unbelievers, the νηpiίοι, ψυχικοί, and σαρκίνοι. As Corin 
Mihaila summarises, ‘[T]he wisdom of God identified with the message of the cross 
is perceived only by the “mature” and “spiritual” as a result of the revelation of 
God’s Spirit and not as the a result of human wisdom, and much less of the teachers’ 
eloquence’.45 But in the conclusion of this section (3.1-4), Paul explains that, while 
his preaching to the Corinthians contained the basic ingredients of wisdom, he did 
not provide them with the real substance of his divine insights as if they were 
mature enough to digest them. Due to their immaturity, Paul was not even able to 
speak to the Corinthians this way (οὐκ ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν ὡς piνευματικοῖς 
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς σαρκίνοις [3.1]). They were simply unprepared for the depths of God’s 
                                                        
43 Litfin, Proclamation, 201. Cf. Mihaila, Paul-Apollos, 17-24. 
44 Jouette M. Bassler, '1 Corinthians 4:1-5', Interpretation 44 (1990): 179-83, at 180, ‘It was the 
inept way he preached the gospel (2:3-4) and the way he seemed to hold back from the Corinthians 
the “meat” of the message (3:1-3) that the Corinthians objected to’. 
45 Mihaila, Paul-Apollos, 26. 
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wisdom and at that time could only consume milk, not solid food (3.3). And just in 
case the Corinthians take exception to Paul’s accusation, he conveniently points to 
their factions—the topic of the next unit—as symptomatic of their very condition. 
 
c. 1 Cor 3.5-4.5 
First Corinthians 3.5-4.5 has been labeled the ‘centerpiece in the rhetorical 
structure of 1 Cor 1:10-4:21’, since it is here where ‘Paul deals explicitly and at 
length with the problem of social disunity in the Corinthian church’.46 In order to 
eliminate inappropriate partisanship and criticism of individual apostles, it is in this 
pericope that Paul, through the employment of three elaborate metaphors (3.6-9a; 
3.9b-17; 4.1-5), elucidates what (τί [3.5])47 the apostles are and how (οὕτως; ὡς [4.1]) 
the early believers should regard them in relation to God and the church.48 
Firstly, Paul explains that the church is a field in which the apostles labour 
by sowing and watering seed—the gospel (3.7). It is God, however, who is the 
primary agent in salvation, enabling the harvest by causing its growth (ὁ αὐξάνων); 
he, therefore, is the only one who is ‘anything’ (τι) and deserving of allegiance. 
Secondly, the church is a building which the apostles construct.49 Unlike the field 
analogy, however, the structural image focuses primarily on the labourers, rather 
than on God. And instead of concentrating on the nothingness of God’s agents, this 
metaphor seeks to remind the church that the builder is responsible for how he 
builds (ἕκαστος δὲ βλεpiέτω piῶς ἐpiοικοδομεῖ [3.10]).50 In this metaphor, Christ is the 
edifice’s foundation (θεμέλιος [3.11]) and the apostles are the builders who must 
                                                        
46 David W. Kuck, Judgment and Community Conflict: Paul's Use of Apocalyptic Judgment Language 
in 1 Corinthians 3:5-4:5 (NovTSup 66; Leiden: Brill, 1992), 220. 
47 Clarke, Serve the Community of the Church, 241: ‘It may be argued that Paul’s use of the 
neuter interrogative pronoun τί, as opposed to the masculine form τίς, implies a stress on the task 
which is performed, rather than on the importance of the relationship between the διάκονος and the 
Lord. Thus, he writes that the one who plants and the one who waters are comparatively “nothing”’. 
48 Paul’s temple metaphor in 3.16-17 has been considered a third analogy, but its close 
association with the preceding building metaphor suggests that they are actually the same image; it 
is the oikonomos metaphor (4.1-5) which functions as the third. 
49 For the political use of architectural metaphors for deliberative ends, see Welborn, 
'Conciliatory': 337; Mitchell, Reconciliation, 99-111. 
50 Kuck, Judgment, 181-82: ‘[Paul] recognized that the Corinthians were attempting to 
examine, test, compare, and judge the wisdom and work of their leaders and of one another. Paul is 
telling them not only to wait and allow God to reward the labor of each (3:8b) but also to wait and see 
how each one’s work will fare before God’s judgment. Only at the final day can the quality of work be 
adequately disclosed’. See also Matthias Konradt, Gericht und Gemeinde: Eine Studie zur Bedeutung und 
Funktion von Gerichtsaussagen im Rahmen der Paulinischen Ekklesiologie und Ethik im 1 Thess und 1 Kor 
(BZNW 117; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 258-84. 
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choose carefully which materials they will employ in their construction. Their 
labour will ultimately be tested (δοκιμάζω) by God, and at that time the quality of 
their work will become apparent (φανερός; δηλόω; ἀpiοκαλύpiτω [3.13]).51 Based on 
how the work of the individual labourers fare, they will receive just payment 
(μισθός [3.14]) or penalty (ζημιόω [3.15]).52 
Paul had three central aims with these metaphors. Firstly, Paul sought to 
eliminate partisanship among believers (ὥστε μηδεὶς καυχάσθω ἐν ἀνθρώpiοις 
[3.21]) by showing God to be the one responsible for the conversion and maturation 
of believers, and the apostles as mere complementary (συνεργοί [3.9]; cf. ἕν [3.8]), 
subordinate agents of the gospel (3.5; cf. 3.22). By placing the primary focus on God, 
Paul aimed to make him alone the object of their boasting. Secondly, by portraying 
the church as the holy temple of God (3.16-17) and yet vulnerable to poor 
construction (3.13-14), Paul challenged believers to be discriminate about whom 
they regard as their teachers. While the apostles are considered colleagues, they are 
individually assigned, assessed, and compensated (ἕκαστος δὲ τὸν ἴδιον μισθὸν 
λήμψεται κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον κόpiον [3.9]) and should therefore take care how they build, 
utilising the right materials in accordance with the building’s Christological 
foundation (3.10-12). The church should at the same time be careful not to permit 
precarious building to take place, since what is poorly erected will eventually be 
tested and give way (3.13). Thirdly, Paul aimed to produce trust in himself within 
the church in order to reestablish his standing among them, by emphasising that his 
work had been faithful to the pattern he now prescribes. It is perhaps significant 
that in both the agricultural and architectural metaphors, Paul presents himself in 
the founding position (ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Ἀpiολλῶς ἐpiότισεν [3.6]; ὡς σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων 
θεμέλιον ἔθηκα, ἄλλος δὲ ἐpiοικοδομεῖ [3.10]). By doing so, Paul sought to restablish 
                                                        
51 Harm W. Hollander, 'The Testing by Fire of the Builders' Works: 1 Corinthians 3.10-15', 
NTS 40 (1994): 89-104, at 96: ‘It is God who, at the Final Judgment, will disclose their work and will 
administer justice to each of them individually’; contra Craig A. Evans, 'How are the Apostles Judged? 
A Note on 1 Corinthians 3:10-15', JETS 27 (1984): 149-50, who suggests that he testing in 1 Cor 3.10-15 
refers to the the earthly occasions when the faith and maturity of the church is assessed through 
their performance in persecution and difficult circumstances (2 Thess 1.6-10). 
52 Smit, 'Apollos': 242, is probably correct to conclude that Apollos, rather than Peter, is the 
unnamed apostle building on Paul’s work, and ‘[a]pparently his arrival has negatively influenced the 
valuation of certain believers at Corinth concerning Paul’s former visit’; contra, Baur, 'Two Epistles', 
269-81; C. K. Barrett, 'Cephas and Corinth', in Abraham unser Vater: Juden und Christen im Gespräch über 
die Bibel, ed. Otto Betz (Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Spätjudentums und Urchristentums 5; Leiden: 
Brill, 1963), 1-12; Michael D. Goulder, Paul and the Competing Mission in Corinth (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 2001), 22-23; Philipp Vielhauer, 'Paulus und die Kephaspartei in Korinth', NTS 21 (1975): 
341-52; and (possibly) Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 192. 
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his authority in the community, not in an effort to marginalise the other apostles, 
but to resecure his right to address their ethical shortcomings and to offer them 
fatherly direction in their pursuit of Christian, or Christlike, maturity (cf. 4.14-16; 
11.1). 
 
d. Summary 
Paul’s discourse up through 3.23 has been both theologically enriching and 
ethically challenging for this infantile church. One could even make the case that 
the groundwork for Paul’s apologetic and reconciliatory objectives has been 
satisfactorily laid by the end of the letter’s first three chapters. But one critical issue 
still remains unaddressed: the impropriety of the Corinthians’ criticisms of the 
apostles. Therefore, in 4.1-5 Paul will introduce the oikonomos metaphor initially to 
reiterate several of the same apostolic attributes he has already stressed, namely 
the apostles’ relative insignificance as subordinates of God who are accountable to 
him, in addition to their collegiality and responsibility to preach. But this time Paul 
will portray these attributes with a particular view toward underscoring the 
apostle’s authority and immunity from community judgment. It is only by 
emphasising these traits that Paul’s apostolic ethos can begin to be restored in the 
Corinthian church. 
 
B. 1 Corinthians 4.1-5 
Once Paul reaches the conclusion of the unit at 4.1-5, he shifts back to 
describing the role of apostles in relation to God and the church. But this time the 
tone and urgency of Paul’s discourse is significantly more emphatic, his description 
turning here into prescription as he employs the imperative mood for only the 
seventh time in the letter so far—and the first time regarding how leaders should be 
conceived. Since Paul’s instructions concern the manner of the church’s perception 
(οὕτως; ὡς),53 he clearly assumes that the Corinthians had certain preconceived 
                                                        
53 The οὕτως is cataphoric and signals the use of metaphor; cf. L. L. Welborn, Paul, the Fool of 
Christ: A Study of 1 Corinthians 1-4 in the Comic-Philosophic Tradition (JSNTSup 293; ECC; Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2005), 243; Fee, First Corinthians, 158 n. 3; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 212. For οὕτως as 
anaphoric, see Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 82; Erich Fascher, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther 
(THKNT 7/1; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1975), 142; Helmut Merklein, Der erste Brief an die 
Korinther. Kapitel 1-4 (ÖTK 7.1; Gütersloh: Echter, 1992), 290. 
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notions of church leadership.54 It was, in fact, their promotion of patronage, 
boasting, wisdom, jealousy, strife, and other such leadership principles and 
practices foreign to his cruciform ideology that granted Paul the opportunity earlier 
to charge the church with thinking and behaving as mere humans (ἄνθρωpiοι [3.3-
4]). It is for this reason that in 4.1 Paul must review how the human should regard 
apostles (οὕτως ἡμᾶς λογιζέσθω ἄνθρωpiος ὡς).55 Furthermore, the conceptual and 
collective nature of this exhortation functions to support his earlier appeal that 
believers agree with one another (τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε piάντες [1.10]).56 But what do the 
metaphors that Paul employs here indicate about Christian apostleship, and how is 
Paul’s portrayal of apostles this way supposed to bring an end to the Corinthian 
factions? It is our understanding that in 4.1-5 Paul uses the oikonomos metaphor to 
negotiate between his portrayal of apostles as subordinate, insignificant 
functionaries on the one hand, and as God’s authoritative, gospel-bearing 
representatives on the other. In the light of this objective, Paul’s final concern is to 
illustrate the immunity of apostles to the church’s evaluations and to reprimand 
them for their inappropriate behaviour. 
 
1. Apostolic Hierarchy 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the term οἰκονόμος implies the presence of 
an administrative hierarchy and the manager’s occupation of an intermediate 
position within that structure. In private administration, the rank of the oikonomos 
varied according to context. But regardless of the size and scope of the managerial 
unit to which the oikonomos was assigned, during the mid-first century CE the 
administrator nearly always served directly beneath the proprietor as his 
immediate delegate and representative. In 1 Cor 4.1-5, the oikonomos metaphor 
similarly carries certain social and structural implications which Paul seeks to 
express about his role, so that the Corinthian church will (i) understand precisely 
who, or what, apostles are, and (ii) allow this new outlook to shape both their 
ecclesiology and their ethics. 
                                                        
54 For the Corinthian church’s non-Christian perceptions of church leadership, see Clarke, 
Secular, esp. 89-107. 
55 All of Paul’s fifteen uses of ἄνθρωpiος/ἀνθρώpiινος in 1 Corinthians 1-4 seem to be 
pejorative (esp. 3.21; 4.3, 9); cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 171; Weiß, Der erste Korintherbrief, 92. 
56 Winter, Sophists, 181. 
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a. Subordination 
By applying the oikonomos metaphor to himself, Apollos, and perhaps Cephas, 
Paul underscores the subordinate role they all share within God’s administration. As 
discussed briefly in Chapter 5, this hierarchical relationship is indicated especially 
by the genitives in the construction ὑpiηρέτας Χριστοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων 
θεοῦ (4.1) and the presence of a κύριος (4.5) within the structure. This apostolic 
hierarchy is also affirmed in several other texts in 1 Corinthians. In the letter 
opening, for instance, Paul asserts that he was called to be an apostle of Christ Jesus 
(ἀpiόστολος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ) by the will of God (1.1). This genitive also points to the 
subordination of apostles to God/Christ. Moreover, as an apostle Paul could say that 
it was Christ who commissioned him (ἀpiέστειλέν με Χριστὸς [1.17]). Paul’s manner 
of speaking about his commission is exactly that used for dispatching commercial 
agents. According to one third-century CE letter, for example, Herakleidus, the 
oikonomos of the proprietor Alypios, was sent (ἀpiέστειλα τὸν οἰκονόμον) to an estate 
to make arrangements (τὴν διαταγήν) for an approaching harvest (P.Flor. 2.134). 
Paul’s repeated reference to his commission suggests that, like Herakleidus, he too 
occupies a subordinate rank, but his is in relation to God. And as God’s servants and 
administrators, apostles are ‘radikal von ihm abhängig und ihm untergeordnet’.57 
 
b. Social and Legal Status 
Paul’s oikonomos metaphor does not simply indicate ‘radical subordination’, 
but as suggested in Chapter 4, also carries social and legal connotations which Paul 
further uses to shape his portrait of apostleship. The status of Paul’s position, 
however, is often overlooked in exegetical treatments of 1 Corinthians 4 and those 
scholars who treat the issue have opposing perspectives. Dale Martin, for instance, 
whose historical analysis of oikonomoi as private commercial administrators reached 
many of the same conclusions we reached in Chapter 4, applied the concept of 
managerial slavery to Paul’s use of οἰκονομία in 1 Cor 9.17, arguing that Paul’s 
metaphor would have elicited a plurality of responses from the socially stratified 
Corinthian congregation.58 But Martin’s assumptions about the social and legal 
                                                        
57 Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, 1:320. 
58 Martin, Slavery, esp. 68-85. Martin’s assumptions about the social make-up of, and 
relational dynamics within, the Corinthian church (119, 126-28) were largely influenced by Gerd 
Theissen, 'The Strong and the Weak in Corinth: A Sociological Analysis of a Theological Quarrel', in 
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statuses implied by Paul’s metaphor have recently been challenged by a number of 
interpreters. These assessments will be handled in turn. 
 
i. The Legal Status of Οἰκονόμοι 
John Byron has contended that the oikonomos image, far from having servile 
connotations, actually casts Paul and the apostles as free and voluntary servants.59 
Byron’s detailed analysis, however, fails to account for several historical and 
exegetical insights which are critical for discerning the legal implications of Paul’s 
metaphor. Firstly, Byron criticises Martin for failing to notice that the phrase ‘slave 
of Christ’ does not appear in 1 Corinthians with reference to Paul. According to 
Byron, Martin ‘overlooks that not only does Paul not describe himself as δοῦλος 
Χριστοῦ in 1 Corinthians, also Paul never describes himself as οἰκονόμος Χριστοῡ. In 
fact, this phrase does not appear anywhere in the NT’.60 Presumably, this accusation 
is intended to suggest that if either δοῦλος Χριστοῦ or οἰκονόμος Χριστοῡ were used 
in 1 Corinthians, then Martin’s argument would find support; because they are not 
employed in 1 Corinthians, however, Martin’s argument is somehow weakened. On 
the surface Byron is correct; Paul does not employ the precise phrases Byron 
identifies anywhere in 1 Corinthians. But Byron is guilty of requiring too much 
direct terminological congruency. It simply does not follow that, because Paul 
nowhere uses these exact phrases in 1 Corinthians (or anywhere else in the case of 
the latter), then the phrase οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι in 9.17 cannot carry the 
meaning Martin attributes to it. Besides this, Paul does use, as Byron later observes, 
the phrase οἰκονόμοι μυστηρίων θεοῦ in 4.1 with reference to himself, Apollos, and 
perhaps other apostles, and this metaphor is immediately preceded by Paul’s 
portrayal of apostles as servants of Christ (ὑpiηρέτας Χριστοῦ). In the light of Christ’s 
superordinate role in Paul’s very similar, adjacent self-description, the phrase 
‘oikonomoi of the mysteries of God’ certainly denotes the same kind of position as 
‘oikonomos of Christ’. 
                                                                                                                                                               
The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 121-43. 
Curiously, Martin never considers 1 Cor 4.1-2 in his investigation. For the slave status of Paul’s 
metaphor in 4.1-2, see also Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, 1:320-21. 
59 Byron, Slavery, 241-57. Following Byron, see now Galloway, Freedom, 184 n.148, and 
perhaps John Paul Heil, The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians (SBL 15; Atlanta: SBL, 2005), 142 
n.51. 
60 Byron, Slavery, 242. The same observation is made by Harris, Slave, 129. 
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Secondly, Byron charges Martin with assuming the synonymity of οἰκονόμος 
and δοῦλος in Pauline literature, since they both stand as terms for slaves in 
Martin’s framework.61 But this accusation is simply false; Martin nowhere suggests 
that the two terms were strictly ‘synonymous’. Instead, Martin argued that 
οἰκονόμοι were mostly slaves, specifically managerial slaves, and therefore a subset 
(hyponym) of δοῦλοι.62 But even so, Martin conceded that not all οἰκονόμοι were 
slaves,63 an admission which Byron himself eventually seeks to exploit.64 Therefore, 
while Martin maintains that by the early empire οἰκονόμοι often share the same 
referent as δοῦλοι, Byron incorrectly charges Martin with strictly identifying the 
two concepts.65 
Thirdly, Byron accuses Martin of misunderstanding Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 
9.17. Martin—along with most modern scholars—regards Paul’s depiction of 
preaching involuntarily (ἄκων) in 9.17 as indicative of (moral) slavery and being 
unentitled to a wage (μισθός). Furthermore, since Paul links involuntary preaching 
with being entrusted with an administration (οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι), Martin 
considers Paul’s oikonomos (oikonomia) metaphor as an admission to being a slave. 
Incidentally, Martin interprets Paul’s portrayal of preaching involuntarily as his 
actual condition. Byron, on the other hand, interprets Paul’s preaching in 9.17, not 
as involuntary, but as voluntary (ἑκών), and as deserving of a wage. The logic of 
Paul’s argument in 9.15-18 will be treated comprehensively in Chapter 7. It is 
sufficient here simply to point out that, despite his attempt to demonstrate that 
Paul’s preaching was performed voluntarily, Byron never adequately explains how 
he is able to dissociate Paul’s explicit correlation of involuntary preaching (i.e. 
slavery) with being entrusted with an οἰκονομία; regardless of Paul’s actual 
condition, the apostle seems to link these two concepts. 
Fourthly, in order to demonstrate the statistical uncertainty of the legal 
status of oikonomoi, Byron attempts to use Martin’s catalogue of oikonomoi 
inscriptions against him. Byron observes: 
                                                        
61 Byron, Slavery, 243. 
62 Martin, Slavery, 11-15. 
63 Martin, Slavery, 17: ‘[F]or the Roman Empire as a whole and for the Roman imperial period, 
the oikonomoi were of servile status (slave or freed). Furthermore, in private life they were almost 
always of servile status and were mostly slaves’ (emphasis added). 
64 Byron, Slavery, 243. 
65 For semantic sense relations, see Moises Silva, Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An 
Introduction to Lexical Semantics (Rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 119-35. 
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Of the 81 inscriptions catalogued by Martin, only 8 can be identified as slaves, 3 as freed, 12 as free, 
and another 21 can only be listed as ‘probably’ slave or freed. A total of 41, roughly half, are of 
unknown status making identification impossible. Indeed a total of 62 of the inscriptions, roughly 75 
percent, offer no evidence in support of a conclusion that οἰκονόμος usually indicated a slave 
status.66 
Although Byron’s statistics initially appear damning for Martin’s thesis, it must be 
observed that Martin’s catalogue included both private and civic oikonomoi. Yet 
Byron repeatedly fails to discriminate between these very different kinds of 
administrators, a categorical distinction with significant socio-legal implications. 
Indeed, on two occasions Byron attempts to demonstrate the free status of the 
private oikonomoi under investigation in Martin’s study by presenting as evidence 
oikonomoi who held some form of civic office: (i) Erastus, the first-century CE 
oikonomos of Corinth (Rom 16.23);67 (ii) Philokalos, the third-century CE citizen of 
Ephesus (CIG 2717/IStratonikea 1103).68 But comparing municipal oikonomoi of the likes 
of Erastus from Romans 16 with private oikonomoi of the likes of the Unjust Steward 
from Luke 1669 is perhaps akin to comparing the rank and status of the Secretary of 
the State with the rank and status of the secretary of a small firm; obviously, the two 
persons are not comparable simply because they share the same title. In fact, nearly 
all of the oikonomoi falling within Martin’s ‘Free and Probably Free’ and ‘Unknown’ 
categories were municipal administrators and served as treasury magistrates.70 This 
classification is clearly indicated in most of those inscriptions; many even state 
explicitly the very context of their appointment (e.g. ἡ piόλις [CIG 2717]; ἡ βουλή 
[CIG 2811]; ἡ piατρίς [CIG 4132]). Therefore, while the general usefulness of Martin’s 
catalogue suffers considerably due to its integration of private and municipal 
administrators, the general reliability of his thesis should not be dismissed 
prematurely. 
 
                                                        
66 Byron, Slavery, 243-44. 
67 Byron, Slavery, 243. 
68 For the socio-legal status of the Ephesian civic oikonomos, Byron, Slavery, 244, relies on 
Reumann, 'Stewards of God': 344. 
69 For the indiscriminate use of both Erastus and the Unjust Steward, see Byron, Slavery, 243-
44. In fact, Byron’s use of the Parable of the Unjust Steward (Luke 16.1-8) as evidence for the free 
status of oikonomoi requires an unwarranted assumption about the legal standing of this particular 
manager. According to Byron, this oikonomos is ‘clearly not a slave but a “free treasurer” who expects 
to be able . . . to continue his work outside his master’s household after being removed from his 
position as steward’ (244). But what Byron assumes to be clear is in actuality still a matter of great 
dispute among NT scholars; cf. Beavis, 'Ancient Slavery': 43-53. For a more recent defense of the 
steward’s servile (slave or freed) status, see Udoh, 'Unrighteous Slave': 333. 
70 Most of these city oikonomoi were examined and discussed by Weiß, Sklave der Stadt, 51-55. 
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ii. The Legal Status of Ὑpiηρέται 
Based on his analysis, Byron concludes that οἰκονόμος is a legally ambiguous 
term and that any attempt to retrieve Paul’s meaning from 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 
would require that ὑpiηρέτης, the parallel and supposedly more legally implicit term 
from 4.1, be examined for support. It was therefore Byron’s next contention that 
ὑpiηρέτης connotes willing service, offering as confirmation several instances from 
ancient literature where the term carried this significance.71 Two objections, 
however, must be raised in opposition to Byron’s conclusions concerning the legal 
status of ὑpiηρέται. Firstly, it is quite significant that Byron, in his brief overview of 
the word, conceded that a ὑpiηρέτης could be obliged to obey when the 
superordinate figure in the hierarchy is deity.72 Since the superordinate figure in 
the apostolic hierarchy is God/Christ, then at the very least the sense of obligatory, 
rather than ‘free-will’, service associated with divinely appointed ὑpiηρέται should 
be present in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9. Secondly and more importantly, the strictly free 
status of ὑpiηρέται assumed by Byron is dubious. In fact, there remain numerous 
ancient texts which demonstrate that ὑpiηρέτης could connote slavery. These 
testimonies, however, either went undiscussed or misrepresented in Byron’s 
analysis. We will, therefore, need to take another look at the data. 
In his analysis Byron does not, for example, consider the early first-century 
BCE divinations of Artemidorus of Ephesus. Yet in his multi-volume treatise, ‘The 
Interpretation of Dreams’, Artemidorus seems to consider ὑpiηρέται as a category 
among household slaves. Explaining how a number of household articles, when 
dreamt about, correspond to various domestic servants, Artemidorus itemises these 
associations in what appears to be an ascending slave hierarchy (οἱ θεραpiεύοντες, 
ὑpiηρέται, οἰκονόμοι, ταμίαι) and even lists ὑpiηρέται and οἰκονόμοι consecutively 
(Onir. 1.74).73 Because ὑpiηρέται fall between οἱ θεραpiεύοντες and οἰκονόμοι (which 
for Artemidorus are servile positions [cf. 2.30]), it is reasonably clear that ὑpiηρέται 
were also considered slaves in Artemidorus’ servile framework. This in no way 
indicates that ὑpiηρέται, or for that matter οἰκονόμοι, were always slaves, but it 
                                                        
71 Much of Byron’s argumentation is indebted to Karl H. Rengstorf, 'Ὑpiηρέτης', in TDNT 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-1976), 532-34, 537, who repeatedly describes ὑpiηρέται as free and 
voluntary servants. 
72 Byron, Slavery, 245-46. 
73 This passage is mentioned briefly by Martin, Slavery, 34. 
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demonstrates that ὑpiηρέται could possess slave status, even in a piece of literature 
as popular as Artemidorus’ divinations. 
The legal ambiguity of ὑpiηρέται is also apparent in Aristotle’s Politics, 
another treatise that went undiscussed by Byron. In a famous passage revealing the 
philosopher’s impressions about the near personhood of slaves, Aristotle compares 
δοῦλοι to ὑpiηρέται in order to explain their auxiliary function.74 Aristotle declares 
that just as ‘an assistant [ὁ ὑpiηρέτης] in the arts belongs to the class of tools’ and 
‘every assistant [piᾶς ὑpiηρέτης] is as it were a tool that serves for several tools’, so 
slaves (δοῦλοι) are living tools (τὰ ἔμψυχα) who utilise those tools that are lifeless 
(τὰ ἄψυχα [Pol. 1253b]). Moreover, ‘if every [lifeless] tool could perform its own 
work when ordered’, then ‘mastercraftsmen would have no need of assistants 
[ὑpiηρετῶν] and masters no need of slaves [δούλων]’ (1253b). Finally and quite 
significantly, just as certain tools are instruments of production, while other tools 
are instruments of action, so an assistant (ὑpiηρέτης) of a mastercraftsman is an 
instrument of production, while ‘a slave is an assistant [ὁ δοῦλος ὑpiηρέτης]’ in so far 
as he is an instrument of action (1254a). This elaborate—and indeed tortured—
analogy demonstrates the functional overlap between δοῦλοι and ὑpiηρέται. 
Although it must be conceded that ὑpiηρέτης is not depicted here as a strict synonym 
for δοῦλος, it is clear that Aristotle observed and exploited certain similarities 
between them, which apparently were close enough that he considered a δοῦλος to 
be a subset (hyponym) of ὑpiηρέτης. 
Furthermore, in his analysis of Plato’s Politicus, Byron misrepresents the 
discourse when he implies that Plato always delineated between δοῦλοι and 
ὑpiηρέται by classifying the former as ‘tame animals’ and the latter as ‘free persons 
(ἐλευθέροι) who serve willingly’.75 While these descriptions do appear in the text, 
the legal classification that Plato attributes to these two groups is far more complex 
than Byron realises. Firstly, Byron seems to miss that in this Socratic dialogue the 
Stranger (Ξένος) considers δοῦλοι and ὑpiηρέται to comprise a single category of 
possessions, explaining at one point, ‘There remains the class of slaves and servants 
in general [τὸ δὲ δὴ δούλων καὶ piάντων ὑpiηρετῶν λοιpiόν]’ (Pol. 289c). Therein the 
Stranger couples δοῦλοι and ὑpiηρέται together under one ‘final’ rubric (τὸ λοιpiόν), 
                                                        
74 For the importance of this passage in Aristotle’s view of slavery, see, e.g., Garnsey, Ideas of 
Slavery, 122. 
75 Byron, Slavery, 246. 
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that of living property (ζῴων κτῆσιν [289b-c]). Moreover, the phrase δούλων καὶ 
piάντων ὑpiηρετῶν suggests that δοῦλοι belong to the larger category referred to as 
piάντων ὑpiηρετῶν. Secondly, the interchangeability of δοῦλοι and ὑpiηρέται is 
apparent in the Stranger’s immediately preceding statement, when he refers to the 
class consisting of δοῦλοι and ὑpiηρέται simply as δοῦλοι (289b). Finally, the close 
identification of δοῦλοι with ὑpiηρέται is made abundantly clear when later in the 
passage the Stranger—counter to his own intuition—asserts that the greatest 
servants (μεγίστους ὑpiηρέτας) were indeed those ‘bought servants, acquired by 
purchase, whom we can without question call slaves [τοὺς ὠνητούς τε καὶ τῷ τρόpiῳ 
τούτῳ κτητούς: οὓς ἀναμφισβητήτως δούλους ἔχομεν εἰpiεῖν]’ (289d-e).76  
These complex uses of ὑpiηρέτης allow us to reach several conclusions about 
how the term was used in antiquity. On the one hand, since Plato used ὑpiηρέτης 
with reference to free persons, the term should not be taken on its own to imply 
slavery. On the other hand, since authors such as Artemidorus, Aristotle, and Plato 
do on occasion refer to ὑpiηρέται as slaves, it is incorrect for Byron to maintain that 
ὑpiηρέται must have been by necessity free-will servants. One may be able to find 
additional texts to challenge Byron’s conclusions. But the preceding analysis is 
sufficient to show that the term ὑpiηρέτης was quite ambiguous and probably 
intimated less about one’s legal status than about one’s rank and function in a given 
hierarchy. Perhaps a better description, then, is that ὑpiηρέται were attendants, or 
subordinates (LSJ II.1),77 without any pre-conditioned legal status, even if in the 
majority of instances they happened to have been free.78 As Rengstorf remarked, ‘In 
all these instances ὑpiηρέτης κτλ. serve to characterise someone, whether man, god, 
or divine being, in terms of the fact that he stands and acts in the service of a higher 
will and is fully at the disposal of this will’.79 If this description is accurate, then 
Byron’s approach to the titles in 1 Cor 4.1 must be reversed. Rather than 
interpreting οἰκονόμος in the light of ὑpiηρέτης, it is better to understand ὑpiηρέτης 
                                                        
76 But lest one assume that Plato always considered ὑpiηρέται to be slaves, it should be 
observed that after announcing that the greatest servants were slaves, the Stranger abruptly 
transitioned to speak of ‘those free men who put themselves voluntarily in the position of servants 
[τῶν ἐλευθέρων ὅσοι τοῖς νυνδὴ ῥηθεῖσιν εἰς ὑpiηρετικὴν ἑκόντες]’ (Pol. 289e). Moreover, the 
Stranger then differentiated between ὑpiηρέται and persons serving (τοὺς διακονοῦντας) as heralds, 
clerks and those serving (ὑpiηρετήσαντες) in public offices. But when the Stranger asked what to call 
these public officials, the Young Socrates suggested that they ought to be labeled ὑpiηρέται. 
77 Thiselton, First Corinthians, 335. 
78 Unfortunately, the scope of this study does not permit us to confirm or challenge this final 
supposition. 
79 Rengstorf, 'ὑpiηρετης', 531. 
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in the light of οἰκονόμος. The word order progresses, therefore, from abstract to 
concrete, just as the epexegetical καί implies.80 Furthermore, it is best to consider 
private oikonomoi as normally slaves, as argued by Martin. We have sought to 
demonstrate this further in Chapter 4. The advice of H. C. Tietler on this matter is 
perhaps as appropriate here as it was there: ‘[C]onsider those who occupied 
functions as vilicus, oikonomos, actor and the like as slaves unless the contrary is 
proved’.81 
 
iii. The Social Status of Οἰκονόμοι 
Based on his conclusions about the slave status of oikonomoi, Martin argued 
that they could have possessed status inconsistency, whereby their humble legal 
status contradicted the considerable social status they acquired through managerial 
privileges and their master’s patronage. The status inconsistent nature of Paul’s 
metaphor, therefore, would have elicted a plurality of responses from his 
readership. But the contrast of impressions which Martin argues was evoked by 
Paul’s metaphor has also been subject to much criticism. Few would object that, as a 
servile position, an oikonomos would have connoted ignominy to free persons, 
especially those who possessed some degree of socio-economic status.82 But Martin 
also quite controversially claims that managerial slaves had opportunities for social 
mobility, and therefore Paul’s metaphor would have elicited admiration from those 
lower on the social spectrum.83 While Martin’s proposal about Paul’s strategy to 
portray himself as a high-status-by-association administrator has been accepted by 
some interpreters,84 a number of NT scholars have raised objections which must be 
considered. 
                                                        
80 Rengstorf, 'ὑpiηρετης', 543; Xavier Léon-Dufour, 'Jugement de l’homme et jugement de 
Dieu. 1 Co 4,1-5 dans le cadre de 3,18-4,5', in Paolo a uno chiesa divisa (1 Cor 1-4), ed. L. de Lorenzi (Rome: 
Benedictina, 1980), 137-53, at 146. Probably also Fee, First Corinthians, 159. 
81 Tietler, 'Estate Managers', 213. 
82 Richard A. Horsley, 'The Slave Systems of Classical Antiquity and Their Reluctant 
Recognition by Modern Scholars', in Slavery in Text and Interpretation, ed. Allen Dwight Callahan, 
Richard A. Horsley, and Abraham Smith (Semeia 83/84; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1998), 
19-66, at 56: ‘The wealth they acquired and influence they wielded did not give the “managerial” 
slave or freedperson any dignity or standing in the society. As literary sources, particularly satire, 
indicate quite clearly, the more wealthy and powerful the slave or freedperson, the more 
contemptuous he would be in the eyes of honourable people’. 
83 For support, Martin, Slavery, 31, refers to, e.g., P. R. C. Weaver, 'Social Mobility in the Early 
Roman Empire: The Evidence of the Imperial Freedmen and Slaves', in Studies in Ancient Society, ed. M. 
I. Finley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 121-40; Weaver, Familia Caesaris . 
84 See, e.g., Williams, Stewards, 82. 
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On the one hand, a number of weak objections have been proposed that do 
not give Martin’s thesis a fair reading. These require an initial response so that the 
more critical issues in Martin’s theory can be addressed. Some interpreters, for 
instance, have suggested that Paul’s metaphor cannot carry the positive 
connotations Martin suggests it has in 1 Cor 9.17 simply because the context for the 
metaphor in 4.1-2 will not allow for it. However, the fact that Paul describes his 
apostleship in 1 Corinthians 3-4 in various ways with diverse social implications—
that is, as a διάκονος in one instance and a σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων in another, as a μωρός 
on the one hand and as a piατήρ on the other—suggests that Paul’s portrayal of 
himself as an oikonomos need not necessitate that the metaphor be understood 
negatively simply because it surfaces near the peristasis catalogue (4.9-13); the 
context simply does not demand this understanding as some have suggested.85 
Moreover, even though some interpreters acknowledge that slavery could be 
portrayed positively in certain contexts, many remain skeptical that Paul’s 
Corinthian readers would have understood slavery so optimistically. As Murray 
Harris observes, 
“[M]iddle-level, managerial slaves” formed such a small minority that we may question whether that 
particular connotation of slavery would have ousted the dominant notion of slavery as humble 
subjection to a master in the minds of Paul’s converts. Would not Paul’s Corinthian readers or any 
typical Greco-Roman urbanites have interpreted the term doulos in light of their own experience or 
observation of slavery? And would that understanding of slavery not correspond precisely to the 
contextual indicators of 1 Corinthians 9, where the slave is someone who has no rights (vv. 12, 15, 
18) and is under obligation to serve another (vv. 16-17).86 
But while Harris’ initial observation demands consideration, his later comments 
neglect three important issues. Firstly, some slaves, such as oikonomoi, did in fact 
have certain ‘rights’. How this applies to 1 Corinthians 9 will be explained in 
Chapter 7. But it is sufficient now simply to note that obligation did not necessarily 
exclude servile privileges. Secondly, it makes no difference in this instance how 
urbanites would have interpreted the term δοῦλος, since Paul’s metaphor in 1 
Corinthians 4 and 9 is that of an οἰκονόμος. It is then the early Christians’ 
experiences and observations about this particular form of slavery that is crucial for 
interpreting Paul’s metaphor. Finally and very significantly, ‘Paul’s Corinthian 
readers’, as idenitifed by Harris, would have understood that business slaves, such 
as oikonomoi, were among the privileged slave class. We are not here suggesting that 
                                                        
85 Contra Harris, Slave, 129. 
86 Harris, Slave, 129-30. 
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this provided oikonomoi elevated social status. But because business slaves and 
freedmen formed a significant portion of the population in commercially saturated 
Corinth (as noted in Chapter 5), it is plausible that the church in Corinth would have 
been well aware of some of the material (though not social) benefits these 
managerial slaves experienced. 
At the same time, there is significant cause for doubting that many slave 
administrators would have been highly admired and honoured in antiquity as 
persons with significant social status, even by the menial slave population. 
Although slave administrators could possess representative authority within the 
organisations they managed and had access to certain material privileges (see 
Chapter 4), this hardly indicates that they acquired elevated social status. In fact, 
the material privileges enjoyed by administrators along with the right they 
possessed to abuse their subordinates could promote, not admiration and envy, but 
apathy and indifference, or even hatred and resentment, from other slaves. As Keith 
Bradley remarks, ‘As the slaveowner’s representative on the spot, the bailiff gave 
the slave orders for work, managed his daily routine, and disciplined him. In so 
doing he became the object of intense anger and defiance: he was after all only a 
slave himself’.87 Moreover, the social mobility of slaves was such an anomaly that it 
is highly unlikely that even slave administrators would have been regarded as 
possessing significant social status in the ancient world. As Richard Horsley 
explains, 
Roman imperial society generally consisted of a static pyramid of legally mandated orders and a 
relatively rigid hierarchy of statuses. For what minimal social mobility there was, slavery, even most 
“managerial” roles, would not have provided a very promising launching pad, considering the social 
stigma that still attached to the minority of slaves who became freedmen/women—unless we are 
thinking of a social mobility that happened over three or four generations. The experience of the 
vast majority of slaves cannot be mitigated by focusing on the unusual influence or atypical mobility 
of a “select few.”88 
After comparing the Roman slave system with several other slave cultures, 
Orlando Patterson’s sociological investigation reached similar conclusions. 
                                                        
87 Bradley, Slavery and Society, 72. In response to Martin, I. A. H. Combes, The Metaphor of 
Slavery in the Writings of the Early Church from the New Testament to the Beginning of the Fifth Century 
(JSNTSup 156; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 80, argues, ‘We are hampered . . . by the lack 
of evidence shaped by the attitudes of the lower classes and Martin’s use of funerary inscriptions to 
make up this deficiency is admirable. But such ritualized sentiments as those found in such a context 
cannot be regarded as complete evidence of an entirely different mindset from the enormous 
resentment that so often arose against the power of favoured slaves’. 
88 Horsley, 'Slave Systems', 57; cf. 58. Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 186, also responds to Martin by 
stating, ‘Slavery for most slaves was highly undesirable and anything but an avenue of upward 
mobility’. 
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Patterson remarks, ‘[I]f we consider not the content of what the elite slave did, but 
the structural significance of his role, we find immediately that it is identical with 
that of the most miserable of field slaves. He was always structurally marginal, 
whether economically or socially, politically or culturally. His marginality made it 
possible for him to be used in ways that were not possible with a person who truly 
belonged’.89 These objections do not indicate that there existed in Roman slave 
society anything like slave homogeneity and a shared slave identity; there did exist, 
after all, a variation of slave jobs whose desirability by slaves was dramatically 
affected by location and proximity to the master.90 But regardless of slight 
variations in rank and privilege, the vast majority of slaves were considered 
dishonoured persons.91 This is underscored by the fact that even administrators 
were subject to their master’s wrath, being vulnerable to beatings and even murder, 
and such personal bodily violations were indicative of social disrepute.92 Therefore, 
since Paul’s metaphor implies legal restraint and oppression, it is highly implausible 
that it would have also connoted social superiority. 
It should be concluded, then, that through the oikonomos metaphor Paul 
sought to demonstrate the vast insignificance of the apostles in comparison with 
their principal. Not only are the apostles subordinate to God/Christ, but they are his 
slaves who serve him out of compulsion and humility. Understood in this way, the 
apostles should not be regarded as in competition with one another.93 As 
administrators of the same principal and of the same resources, the apostles should 
rather be considered colleagues (συνεργοί [3.9]) who contribute to the growth of the 
church in complementary ways (3.6, 10).94 As Paul maintains later in the epistle, 
‘Whether then it was I or they [εἴτε οὖν ἐγὼ εἴτε ἐκεῖνοι], so we preach and so you 
                                                        
89 Patterson, Slavery, 332. J. Albert Harrill, 'Review: Dale B. Martin, Slavery as Salvation', 
Journal of Religion 72 (1992): 426-27, at 426, remarks, ‘Martin’s sharp separation of upper-class values 
and perceptions from those of the lower class looks at times artificial and exaggerated. . . . It is 
questionable whether the humble freeborn population felt “class” or even “order” solidarity with the 
servile masses. Lower-status persons often share, if not exaggerate, the values and prejudices of their 
social betters’; Harrill provides as an example Petronius’ Hermeros (Satyr. 38). 
90 Bradley, Slavery and Society, 72-73. 
91 Patterson, Slavery, 331-32; Michael Joseph Brown, 'Paul's Use of δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ in 
Romans 1:1', JBL 120 (2001): 723-37, at 731-32. Harrill, 'Review': 427: ‘[F]rom a historical perspective, 
any “honor” conferred even on high-ranking servile persons was always fragile’. 
92 Saller, Patriarchy, 134-39. 
93 Mihaila, Paul-Apollos, 212. Contra Joubert, 'Managing', 216, who curiously claims, ‘Only Paul 
had access to the “mysteries of God” (1 Cor. 2:1, 7; 4:1), and only he could communicate its contents to 
others’ (emphasis added). 
94 Victor P. Furnish, '"Fellow Workers in God's Service"', JBL 80 (1961): 364-70. 
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believed’ (15.11). By disregarding which apostle mediated the gospel and 
emphasising instead their shared rank and objectives, Paul sought to eliminate 
boasting in leaders. In this sense, the oikonomos metaphor functions like the 
διάκονος metaphor in 3.5-9, where Paul draws out the intermediary role he and the 
apostles occupy between God and the church. Likewise, the apostles in 4.1-2 are 
mere oikonomoi, authorised slave agents, commissioned by God to distribute his 
mysteries. And by illustrating the subordinate, servile, and functionary role of the 
apostles, Paul seeks to convey their exceedingly depressed status relative to Christ 
their κύριος, and thus to eliminate inappropriate adulation and partisanship in the 
Corinthian community. 
 
c. Authority 
While Paul’s oikonomos metaphor is pregnant with shameful connotations, 
the image is not entirely void of notions of influence. Even as Paul’s metaphor 
implies subordination and servility, it simultaneously casts the apostolate as a 
position of unique power. By virtue of having been appointed by the resurrected 
Christ and entrusted with the mysteries of God, Paul’s metaphor portrays apostles 
as authorised representatives sent from God to speak and act on his behalf to the 
church and all humanity. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, private administrators were appointed to 
supervise a managerial unit, which entitled them to a significant amount of 
representative authority in the handling of the principal’s resources and the 
management of his personnel. But generally speaking, administrators were not able 
to utilise the principal’s resources in any way they wished; often the slave’s 
authorisation was limited by the scope of his commission (praepositio). Paul’s 
oikonomos metaphor implies that apostles were entrusted with a similar kind of 
restricted authority. The apostle’s authorisation to speak and act for God was 
likewise limited to the domain of the resources with which they were entrusted, 
namely the mysteries of God (4.1).95 Of course apostles were also subordinated to 
these mysteries, so that their words and actions lost divine authorisation if and 
                                                        
95 Just as an administrator was not appointed until after he had first been tested by many 
trials (prius experimentis inspiciendus [Columella, Rust. 11.1.7]), so Paul asserts that he had to be 
approved by God to be entrusted with the gospel (δεδοκιμάσμεθα ὑpiὸ τοῦ θεοῦ piιστευθῆναι τὸ 
εὐαγγέλιον [1 Thess 2.4; cf. Gal 2.7]).  
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when they contradicted God’s revelation (Gal 1.8-9; 2.11-14).96 But within that realm, 
so long as their life and speech were consonant with the gospel they proclaimed, the 
words and actions of the apostles were considered authoritative (1 Thess 2.13).97 
As Paul’s analogy situates him and the other apostles equally beneath the 
Lord, the location of the Corinthians in Paul’s metaphorical framework remains 
somewhat obscure. Their relationship with the apostles is, in fact, quite dynamic. 
On the one hand, since God is the principal and Paul is the agent, those whom Paul 
seeks to ‘gain’ (κερδαίνω [9.19-22]) are at once the ‘profits’ he acquires and the third 
contracting parties with whom he conducts the ‘kerygmatic transaction’. From this 
perspective, Paul positions himself alongside of, rather than above, the church. At 
an initial glance, this would reinforce the non-hierarchical ecclesial structure which 
many scholars have suggested is implied in Paul’s letters.98 
But Paul’s oikonomos metaphor further implies that he was appointed to 
manage, not only God’s resources, but also his personnel. This was the structural 
model established in commercial enterprises, and Paul’s portrayal of apostles as 
oikonomoi, while not explicitly referring to those over whom he was structurally 
superior, at the very least suggests that they were afforded this kind of 
administrative rank and authority in the church.99 This connotation finds support 
                                                        
96 Schütz, Authority, 281-82; Hans von Campenhausen, Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual 
Power in the Church of the First Three Centuries (trans. J. A. Baker; Stanford, CA: Standford University 
Press, 1969), 36. 
97 Schütz, Authority, 282: ‘[Paul] can actually count on asserting power over against the 
churches when and where there is a power vacuum in them by virtue of the failure of Christians to 
reflect and embody the power which originally he made available to them’. Just as the apostles 
possess authority in the gospel they received through the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1.12), so they 
themselves are instantiations of that very revelation by virtue of having witnessed the resurrection 
(Gal 1.16) and having been commissioned to proclaim it (the use of ἐν in Gal 1.16 is spatial/locative, 
rather than instrumental [‘by/through’] or referential [‘to’]; cf. Gal 2.20; 4.19). Fee, First Corinthians, 
159, neglects the authority which resides in the apostle. But as Schütz explains, Paul ‘identifies 
gospel with apostle. He makes the apostle the paradigm of the gospel he proclaims. Both the message 
and the messenger proclaim grace and both embody grace, grace as event’ (135). 
98 See, e.g., Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction 
of Christian Origins (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 205-241. See also S. Scott Bartchy, 'Undermining 
Ancient Patriarchy: The Apostle Paul's Vision of a Society of Siblings', BTB 29 (1999): 68-78, at 77,  
who argues that Paul sought to create a ‘dynamic “horizontal” network of exchanges of spiritual 
power and material goods rather than affirming a fixed hierarchy of any kind’. Cf. S. Scott Bartchy, 
'Who Should Be Called Father? Paul of Tarsus between the Jesus Tradition and Patria Potestas', BTB 
33 (2003): 135-47. For Paul’s sibling language as connoting mutuality, rather than structural equality, 
see Andrew D. Clarke, 'Equality or Mutuality?: Paul's Use of "Brother" Language', in The New 
Testament in Its First-Century Setting: Essays on Context and Background in Honour of B. W. Winter on His 65th 
Birthday, ed. P. J. Williams et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 151-64. 
99 Admittedly, Paul does not expressly state that authority is bound up with the metaphor. 
But the normal practice of appointing administrators over estates and businesses, along with similar 
biblical and non-biblical, metaphorical portrayals of private oikonomoi (e.g. Luke 12.42; Gal 4.2; Titus 
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elsewhere in 1 Corinthians and Paul’s other letters where he articulates some kind 
of structural superiority over immediate delegates, local church leaders, and (lay) 
believers.100 Timothy, for instance, while remaining Paul’s ἀδελφός and συνεργός in 
the gospel (1 Thess 3.2; Rom 16.21), is also subordinate to him as the apostle’s τέκνος 
ἀγαpiητός (1 Cor 4.17) whom he commissions to visit the Corinthians and other 
churches to lead and speak on his behalf (4.17; 16.10; 1 Thess 3.2).101 Paul also sent a 
number of other delegates to represent him, including Titus (2 Cor 8.16-17, 22-23; 
12.18), Epaphroditus (Phil 2.25; 4.28), and Epaphras (Philm 23; cf. Col. 17; 4.12). Due 
to the fact that Paul commissions them, these delegates should be considered in 
some sense subordinate to the apostle.102 
Beyond his immediate delegates, however, Paul also recognises the existence 
of certain local church leaders, including the ἐpiισκόpiοι and διακόνοι in Philippi 
(Phil 1.1) and those leading (οἱ piροϊστάμενοι) in Thessalonica and Rome (1 Thess 
5.12-13; Rom 12.8). Significantly, there were also a number of named and unnamed 
local leaders in Corinth. Paul, for example, identifies such persons as Stephanas, 
Fortunatus, and Achaicus as those whom the Corinthian believers must recognise 
(ἐpiιγινώσκω) and submit to (ὑpiοτάσσω) on account of their work and toil (1 Cor 
16.15-18). Chloe, Gaius, and Crispus may have also been leaders in Corinth, since the 
former two hosted house churches (1.11, 14; Rom 16.23) and the latter was once the 
leader of the local synagogue (Acts 18.8; cf. 1 Cor 1.14). There were then those 
unnamed figures in the community who were gifted in administration (κυβέρνησις 
[12.28]), which may also indicate local leadership.103 Paul’s authority extends over all 
of these local leaders because he, as the founder of the community, is the 
ἀρχιτέκτων (3.10),104 and they are, as it were, subordinate contractors. 
                                                                                                                                                               
1.7; 1 Pet 4.10; Ign. Pol. 6.1; Epictetus, Diatr. 3.22.3), suggest that structural authority is implied by the 
image. 
100 Clarke, Theology, 81; cf. David G. Horrell, 'Leadership Patterns and the Development of 
Ideology in Early Christianity', Sociology of Religion 58 (1997): 323-41. 
101 Reidar Aasgaard, 'My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!': Christian Siblingship in Paul (JSNTSup 265; 
ECC; London: T&T Clark, 2004), 289-90. 
102 Holmberg, Power, 60; Clarke, Theology, 93; Ehrensperger, Power, 53, 57; (57). Anthony Bash, 
Ambassadors for Christ (WUNT 2/92; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1997), 121.  
103 Clarke, Theology, 84-85. 
104 Jay Shanor, 'Paul as Master Builder: Construction Terms in First Corinthians', NTS 34 
(1988): 461-71, at 465-66: ‘As ἀρχιτέκτων, Paul assumes responsibility for overseeing the coordination 
and general progress of the work, a fact to which his authoritative posture in the Corinthian Epistle 
itself bears cogent testimony’. See also Alison Burford, The Greek Temple Builders at Epidauros: A Social 
and Economic Study of Building in the Asklepian Sanctuary, during the Fourth and Early Third Centuries B.C. 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1969), 139: ‘There was no other distinction, technically 
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Finally, Paul also considers his converts to be persons over whom he 
possesses structural authority. The Corinthian believers, for instance, as Paul’s own 
work in the Lord and the seal of his apostleship (9.1-2), are nothing less than Paul’s 
spiritual ‘children’ (4.14-16). As such, Paul possesses the leverage to admonish and 
to instruct them to imitate him as he imitates Christ (4.16; 11.1). It is perhaps even 
significant that the believers in Corinth were regarded as slaves (δοῦλοι) and 
freedmen (ἀpiελεύθεροι) of Christ (7.22-23; cf. 6.20). Given this identification, Paul’s 
rank as oikonomos provides him a more senior position in the ecclesial household. 
One can then imagine up to five layers in the early ecclesial hierarchy: (i) 
God/Christ; (ii) Paul/apostles; (iii) apostolic delegates; (iv) local leaders; (v) 
believers.105 All of these instances attest to the fact that the Pauline churches had at 
least a ‘simple hierarchy’, and in some cases, like Corinth, an even more complex 
structure was present.106 
It is important to realise, however, that while Paul utilises the oikonomos 
metaphor implicitly to construct his representative authority in God’s domus, Paul 
does not here explicitly assert his authority over the community. And whereas the 
image entails an ecclesial hierarchy and thereby ascribes authority to the 
apostolate, this portrayal of apostles as managerial slaves does not undercut the 
redefined and more sensible perception of apostleship he made in the initial three 
chapters of the letter. In order to achieve his objective of eliminating inappropriate 
apostolic perceptions and partisanship Paul does not have to portray the apostles 
without any structural authority or ecclesial significance. Eventually, Paul will cast 
the apostles as last of all, criminals sentenced to death, foolish, weak, dishonoured, 
hungry, thirsty, impoverished, homeless, persecuted, slandered, the scum of the 
earth, and the refuse of all things (4.9-13). But this catalogue of hardships is still 
several verses off, in an entirely new unit (4.6-21), and Paul’s rhetoric simply has not 
escalated there quite yet. At present, Paul must only demonstrate that the rank and 
status of the apostles are vastly insignificant to that of the κύριος. 
                                                                                                                                                               
speaking, between the architect and the craftsmen who worked with him on the temple than that 
the architect was more skilled and thus competent to command them’. Cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 
192. 
105 Perhaps the most tenuous distinction in this hierarchy is between (iii) apostolic delegates 
and (iv) local leaders. But, since these delegates normally represent Paul to the communities in his 
absence, it is reasonable to conclude that they possess structural authority over those churches and 
their local leaders (cf. 1 Cor 4.17; 16.2; 1 Thess 3.2). 
106 Clarke, Theology, 80-88. 
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Despite possessing apostolic authority, servility was the general principle 
that characterised the apostle’s exercise of leadership. Paul’s apparent freedom 
from the church, yet self-enslavement for the sake of the gospel is one example of 
how apostolic authority was to be exercised not to the detriment, but for the benefit 
of the body of believers (9.19). This ethos of Christian leadership also goes some way 
to explain the hierarchy Paul constructs in the reversal of the Corinthian slogans in 
3.21-23. If the apostles are subordinate directly to Christ (4.1) and accountable to 
him alone (4.3-5), then how can they simultaneously ‘belong’ to the church (3.21-
22)? It must be that Paul and the apostles, in their effort to serve God faithfully, 
labour to achieve both the salvation and maturation of the Corinthians to the extent 
that—practically speaking—they are at the service of the community.107 
 
2. Apostolic Responsibilities 
Paul’s description of apostolic ministry in 4.1-5 does little more than imply 
what constituted his responsibilities as God’s agent. His characterisation of apostles 
as ὑpiηρέται Χριστοῦ suggests only their subordinate and auxiliary role as assistants 
in God’s administration. The construction οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ, on the other 
hand, goes further, indicating that the responsibilities of the apostles primarily 
involved the dissemination of the heavenly goods entrusted to them. As stated 
earlier, the genitive in οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων is objective, so that the apostles are 
administrators who dispense μυστήρια θεοῦ. But what is it that Paul refers to here 
as God’s mysteries? 
In both ancient Jewish and early Christian literature, the general sense of 
μυστήριον, as Markus Bockmuehl indicates, involves ‘any reality of divine or 
heavenly origin specifically characterized as hidden, secret, or otherwise 
inaccessible to human knowledge’.108 Bockmuehl further notes that God’s mysteries 
generally involve two main areas: ‘redemption (eschatology, cosmology) and 
sanctification (halakhah)’; ‘[b]oth are God’s property and prerogative . . . and can be 
described as stored up in heaven’.109 In general agreement with Bockmuehl, 
                                                        
107 The inverted pyramid of 3.21-23 must therefore be regarded as an instance where Paul 
sought, as Clarke, Theology, 101, remarks, ‘to limit the perception of his status, whilst not removing 
it’. 
108 Bockmuehl, Revelation, 2.  
109 Bockmuehl, Revelation, 125. ‘With few exceptions, however, the writers’ interest centres 
on secrets of the celestial world, where the privileged seer glimpses prepared storehouses of the 
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Benjamin Gladd adds that God’s mysteries have an inherently polemical role, 
functioning as an apocalyptic motif to subvert conventional knowledge of the 
present age.110 The mysteries to which Paul refers in 1 Corinthians imply these very 
themes. 
According to 1 Corinthians, the mysteries entrusted to the apostles consist of 
divine and eternal wisdom (2.7) specially disclosed through God’s spirit (2.10). More 
specifically, Paul equates the μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ with the message of the 
crucifixion of Jesus Christ (2.1-2), that is, the gospel (1.17-18; 15.1-8).111 In the first, 
then, God’s mysteries have a decidedly Christological focus and consistute Paul’s 
theology of the cross.112 Still further, God’s mysteries include the ‘wider implications 
of the work of God in Christ’, namely righteousness, sanctification, and redemption 
(1.30), including the unimaginable future inheritance which remains unknown to 
the ‘rulers of this age’ (2.8), yet awaits ‘those who love God’ (2.9).113 These insights 
have been disclosed to the apostles and it is they who are responsible for 
proclaiming God’s mysteries, firstly to unbelievers for the purpose of salvation (1.18, 
21, 24), and secondly to believers for the purpose of maturation (3.2).114 
Central to Paul’s understanding of his apostolic task, however, is the manner 
in which the gospel message is to be communicated. Paul maintains that he was sent 
to proclaim the gospel (εὐαγγελίζομαι), not with rhetorical flair—that is, without 
eloquent speech (σοφία λόγου [1.17; cf. 2.1, 4]) or impressive bodily presence 
                                                                                                                                                               
eschatological Heilsgüter along with other furnishings of heaven which demonstrate God’s universal 
saving sovereignty’ (125-26). 
110 Gladd, Mysterion, 105-107. Gladd also notes that Second-Temple Jewish references to God’s 
mysteries consistently allude to Daniel 2. Bockmuehl, Revelation, 124, explains that during the post-
exilic period an increasing interest in hidden wisdom arose among the various Jewish groups. ‘These 
emphases’, Bockmuehl states, ‘were further accentuated in the Graeco-Roman period, sometimes in 
response to stimuli from Hellenistic culture and religion’. 
111 For the original reading of 2.1 with μυστήριον, rather than μαρτύριον, see Veronica 
Koperski, '"Mystery of God" or Testimony of God in 1 Cor 2,1: Textual and Exegetical Considerations', 
in New Testament Textual Criticism and Exegesis: Festschrift J. Delobel, ed. A. Denaux (BETL 161; Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 2002), 305-15; cf. Gladd, Mysterion, 123-26. 
112 Bockmuehl, Revelation, 165: ‘Paul’s message about Christ crucified is called the mystery of 
God’. 
113 Bockmuehl, Revelation, 162. Gladd, Mysterion, 157, adds that ‘the μυστήριον in 2:1, 8 [sic, 2.7?] 
is the Messiah, Lord of glory reigning while he is defeated and accursed’ (original emphasis). 
114 Throughout 1 Corinthians 1-4 Paul associates apostleship almost entirely with the task of 
preaching: ἀpiέστειλέν με Χριστὸς . . . εὐαγγελίζεσθαι (1.17); ἡμεῖς δὲ κηρύσσομεν Χριστὸν 
ἐσταυρωμένον (1.23); ἦλθον . . . καταγγέλλων ὑμῖν τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ (2.1); ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ 
κήρυγμά μου (2.4); σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν (2.6); λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ τὴν 
ἀpiοκεκρυμμένην (2.7); ἃ καὶ λαλοῦμεν (2.13); οὐκ ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι (3.1); piανταχοῦ ἐν piάσῃ 
ἐκκλησίᾳ διδάσκω (4.17). This is also the case in most of 1 Corinthians 3-4, although veiled in 
metaphor: γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐpiότισα (3.2); ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Ἀpiολλῶς ἐpiότισεν (3.6); θεμέλιον ἔθηκα (3.10); 
ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα (4.15). 
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(piαρουσία τοῦ σώματος [2 Cor 10.10; cf. 1 Cor 2.3])—but by simply announcing the 
message of the crucified messiah (1.17-18; 2.2).115 Paul’s gospel, as he explains later 
in the epistle, consists of the message of the death, burial, resurrection, and 
appearances of Jesus Christ (15.1-8). And when stripped of all rhetorical adornment, 
this gospel is no less than the power of God for salvation (1.18; cf. 1.24; Rom 1.16; 1 
Thess 1.5) and the very means by which the Corinthians themselves are being saved 
(1 Cor 15.2).116 Paul, therefore, insists that his proclamation must not aim to 
manipulate his audiences, but simply to relay the revelation which he has been 
entrusted. In his ministry Paul seeks to remove unnecessary ornamentation from 
God’s message so that faith might rest on Christ’s power, rather than on Paul’s own 
persuasiveness (1.17; 2.4-5). 
It is significant that Paul’s understanding of the agency and power of the 
gospel together with his disavowal of rhetorical invention, is also underscored 
throughout 1 Corinthians 1-4 through the way he refers to his preaching. As Litfin 
explains, 
The verbs Paul uses to describe his public speaking, such as εὐαγγελίζω, κηρύσσω, καταγγέλλω, and 
μαρτυρέω, are decidedly non-rhetorical. No self-respecting orator could have used such verbs to 
describe his own modus operandi. Indeed, even though they deal with the subject of public speaking 
such verbs play no significant role in the rhetorical literature. This is understandable because these 
verbs describe a form of speaking which is at its core the antithesis of rhetorical behavior. The 
principles of rhetorical adaptation are irrelevant to the κῆρυξ. His role is not to discover the 
persuasive probabilities inherent in his subject, or search the τόpiοι for arguments that will carry 
weight with his listeners, much less to package the whole so that the message will be irresistible. 
That sort of thing belongs to the persuader. The herald’s task is not to create a persuasive message at 
all, but to convey effectively the already articulated message of another. The matter of rendering 
that message persuasive is not his affair. It is not surprising, then, that such verbs were largely 
unusable to the rhetoricians. Nor, in the light of Paul’s understanding of his mission, is it surprising 
that he should embrace such verbs for his own. He perceived his public speaking in a profoundly 
different light from the orators who were so prominent in his day. He had been entrusted with a 
message and it was his task to announce it in simplicity to all who would listen.117 
Given Paul’s manner of articulating his preaching ministry elsewhere, his portrayal 
of apostles as oikonomoi of God’s mysteries becomes more understandable. As a 
commercial agent Paul is a messenger, a mere conduit of the word of the cross.118 
His chief responsibility is to take the currency entrusted to him—the foolish 
message of the crucified messiah (1.21, 23)—and to invest it in the market of the 
                                                        
115 Litfin, Proclamation, 181-209; Winter, Sophists, 141-64. 
116 Schütz, Authority, 40-53. For the word of the cross as empowering epistemological and 
ecclesiological/ethical transformation, see Alexandra R. Brown, The Cross and Human Transformation: 
Paul's Apocalyptic Word in 1 Corinthians (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 157-67. 
117 Litfin, Proclamation, 195-96. 
118 Bockmuehl, Revelation, 166: ‘[T]his metaphor fits perfectly with the function of Paul’s 
ministry as a source of revelation’. 
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unbelieving world. But whereas commercial administrators generate profits, 
apostles produce converts (κερδαίνω [9.19-22]). Paul’s investments require neither 
flamboyance nor clever marketing, only the simple depositing of God’s heavenly 
resources (1.21; 3.5; 15.2, 11). As agents commissioned to various parts of the Gentile 
world, the apostles are simply purveyors of God’s salvific message. And all profits 
are ultimately for God’s benefit. 
 
3. Apostolic Accountability 
After expressing what role and corresponding responsibilities have been 
entrusted to the apostles, Paul proceeds to explain what God truly expects of them 
and how he secures their obedience. Verse 2 begins with the particles ὧδε λοιpiόν, a 
complicated phrase which functions to connect Paul’s preceding assertion with that 
which follows. The difficulty with the phrase lies with λοιpiός. While ὧδε in this 
instance means ‘in this case’ (BDAG 2) and draws an inference from verse 1, λοιpiός 
here can either strengthen the inferential sense already present from ὧδε (‘in this 
case, moreover [NASB]; cf. BDF §451 [6]; Epictetus, Diatr. 2.12.24) or introduce a new 
idea (‘now’ [NIV]), so that ‘λοιpiόν becomes an inceptive particle, looking forward, 
rather than an inferential connective, looking back’.119 Since the following gnomic 
statement transitions somewhat awkwardly from what precedes (see especially the 
verb’s change in person and mood), and Paul introduces it entirely for the purpose 
of addressing the matter of apostolic judgment in 4.3-5, the latter inceptive sense is 
to be preferred. Together the phrase should be translated ‘in this case, now’, so that 
ὧδε looks backward and λοιpiόν points forward.120 
However one translates ὧδε λοιpiόν, the phrase clearly makes way for Paul’s 
forthcoming proverbial statement (sprichwortartige Satz).121 As he continues, Paul 
reminds his audience that ‘it is required in administrators that one is found faithful 
[ζητεῖται ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις, ἵνα piιστός τις εὑρεθῆ]’ (4.2). The proverb recalls the 
surprise inspections to which absentee business owners subjected their 
representative agents in ancient commerce. The primacy of loyalty in servile 
                                                        
119 Margaret E. Thrall, Greek Particles in the New Testament: Linguistic and Exegetical Studies (New 
Testament Tools and Studies 3; Leiden: Brill, 1962), 26-28, here at 27. Based on Epictetus’ use of the 
phrase, Welborn, Fool, 244, suggests that it is a ‘verbal gesture of annoyance by one who is forced to 
concede that a general truth is applicable in the present case’. 
120 See, e.g., Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, 1:321 (‘hierbei nun’). 
121 Fascher, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 143. 
 168 
 
 
relationships, including private administration, was of course common knowledge 
in Graeco-Roman antiquity and was probably especially so in Roman Corinth, where 
a large portion of the population had servile roots. The primary function of this 
statement, however, is not to divulge original insight about what principals 
expected of their subordinates, but simply to raise the issue of servile responsibility 
and accountability in anticipation of verses 3-5. These are introduced through two 
evaluative verbs. The first, ζητέω, indicates the existence of the principal’s 
behavioural expectations, while the second, εὑρίσκω, reveals the future orientation 
of the principal’s judgment.122 
But Paul’s articulation of the proverb is deliberately vague, for the apostle 
maintains the ambiguity of the evaluating party by using the passive voice for both 
verbs. Of course Paul’s point is not entirely concealed; clearly the administrator’s 
principal is the only one competent to judge his manager. But Paul omits the 
identity of the evaluating party for rhetorical effect, that is, to prepare the way for 
his renunciation of phoney and inappropriate judges in the three forthcoming 
verses.123 In other words, by not disclosing precisely who judges God’s 
administrators, Paul is able to present and reject three unsuitable critics (the 
church, a court, oneself), ultimately for the sake of demonstrating the impropriety 
of just one of them—ὑμῶν. 
Paul’s censure of the Corinthians for their apostolic evaluations in verses 3-5 
marks a major escalation in the tone of the discourse. Paul has resisted addressing 
their criticisms particularly of him for the initial three chapters of the letter. But 
here the apostle meets them head-on, for Paul considers their judgments to be a 
great affront, not because he is in anyway threatened or emotionally affected by 
them, but because the subtext of judging teachers and public speakers is the 
                                                        
122 Gladd, Mysterion, 172 argues that in 1 Cor 4.2 Paul alludes to Dan 6.4 [Theo]. But his case is 
tenuous, since in the latter text εὑρίσκω has no syntactical relationship with piιστός and God is not 
the subject of the verb, as he is implied to be in 1 Cor 4.2. A better (though imperfect) parallel  is Phil 
3.9, where, following a clear commercial metaphor in 3.7-8, Paul expresses his need to be found 
(εὑρεθῶ) righteous through faith in Christ (διὰ piίστεως Χριστοῦ); the genitive is objective; cf. R. 
Barry Matlock, 'Saving Faith: The Rhetoric and Semantics of piίστις in Paul', in Faith of Jesus Christ 
(2009), 73-89, at 75-78; Richard H. Bell, 'Faith in Christ: Some Exegetical and Theological Reflections 
on Philippians 3:9 and Ephesians 3:12', in Faith of Jesus Christ (2009), 111-25, at 111-20; Preston M. 
Sprinkle, 'Πίστις Χριστοῡ as an Eschatological Event', in Faith of Jesus Christ (2009), 165-84, at 183. 
Although the two metaphors are not the same, both 1 Cor 4.1-5 and Phil 3.7-9 employ commercial 
language and Paul’s calling to account. 
123 This rhetorical strategy is exhibited especially by the way the ἵνα + aorist-passive-
subjunctive verb εὑρεθῇ in 4.2 is mirrored by the ἵνα + aorist-passive-subjunctive verb ἀνακριθῶ in 
4.3. 
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exercise of power over them. This association is easily overlooked outside the 
context of Graeco-Roman oratory. Therefore, before proceeding to Paul’s censure, it 
is important to address the power of the audience in ancient oratory, in order to 
show how criticisms were perceived by the orator. 
 
a. Corinth’s Oratorical Context 
In addition to being renowned as a focal point in trans-provincial trade, 
Corinth was also a famous centre for education during the early empire. Especially 
during the second-century CE Hellenistic Renaissance—the Second Sophistic—the 
city attracted many philosophers and rhetors,124 whose schools and oratorical skills 
became quite famous in Greece.125 Demetrius the Cynic, a late first-century intimate 
of Seneca, for instance, was a resident of Corinth,126 while Herodes Atticus 
(Philostratus, Vit. soph. 551), Aelius Aristides (Or. 46.23), Apollonius of Tyana 
(Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 4.25, 7.10), Dio Chrysostom (Or. 31.121), and Plutarch (Mor. 
723a) also frequented the city. The Corinthians even erected a bronze statue to 
Favorinus in front of the city library to stimulate the youth in scholastics (Dio 
Chrysostom, Or. 37.8).127 
Auditing speeches was one of the most popular and important spectator 
activities in the early empire. As Tim Whitmarsh explains, ‘Oratory was not just a 
gentle pastime of the rich: it was one of the primary means that Greek culture of the 
period, constrained as it was by Roman rule, had to explore issues of identity, 
society, family, and power’.128 As some orators acquired great fame for their 
rhetorical skill, others were handicapped by their failure to impress. Indeed, as a 
performance-oriented profession, oratory established a reciprocal, co-dependent 
relationship between the speaker and audience. Whether the orator delivered a 
                                                        
124 G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 17-29, 
does not include Corinth among the most visited ‘cities of the sophists’, but recognises it as a client 
city of Herodes Atticus. 
125 For the importance of an established reputation among sophists, see George A. Kennedy, 
'The Sophists as Declaimers', in Approaches to the Second Sophistic, ed. G. W. Bowersock (University 
Park, PA: American Philological Association, 1974), 17-22, at 17. 
126 Tacitus, Hist. 4.40; Lucian, Ind. 10; Seneca, Ep. 20, 62; Vit. beat. 18; Prov. 3.3, 5.5; Philostratus 
Vit. Apoll. 4.25; Ep. 36, 37. 
127 Engels, Roman Corinth, 45; Robert S. Dutch, The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and 
Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context (JSNTSup 271; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 95-138. 
128 Tim Whitmarsh, The Second Sophistic (Greece & Rome, New Surveys in the Classics 35; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1; cf. C. E. W. Steel, Roman Oratory (Greece & Rome, New 
Surveys in the Classics 36; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 54. 
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speech in order to educate or amuse, the audience offered honour in return, 
providing them a kind power over the speaker.129 This interplay was something of a 
microcosm of the entire Roman honour system. To understand precisely how this 
exchange functioned, we must therefore examine briefly the nature of honour in 
antiquity. 
 
i. Roman Preoccupation with Public Honour 
Jon Lendon describes life in the Roman world as a ‘ceaseless, restless quest 
for distinction in the eyes of one’s peers and of posterity’.130 And ceaseless it was. 
The pursuit of honour was a cultural addiction driven by a tenacious and 
competitive aspiration for public approval. Plutarch describes the competitive and 
irrepressible lust for honour and praise that saturated the early empire: 
[W]hen others are praised [ἐpiαίνοις], our rivalry [τὸ φιλότιμον] erupts, as we said, into praise of self; 
it is seized with a certain barely controllable yearning and urge for glory [δόξαν] that stings and 
tickles like an itch, especially when the other is praised for something in which he is our equal or 
inferior. For just as in the hungry the right of others eating makes the appetite sharper and keener, 
so the praise of others not far removed inflames with jealousy [τῇ ζηλοτυpiίᾳ] those who are 
intemperate in seeking glory [δόξαν]. (Mor. 546c) 
The rivalry (φιλοτιμία) about which Plutarch writes was not restricted to the 
privileged elite, but was endemic to all of Roman society. In Rome this pursuit of 
honour was, as Carlin Barton explains, ‘the fire in the bones’.131 Thus, Cicero’s 
famous motto: ‘To be equal to others in liberty, and first in honour’ (Phil. 1.34). 
But honour was not an individualistic enterprise. In ancient Rome honour 
was a public pursuit, so that the honouree acquired his or her status only through 
community recognition. ‘Renown [claritas]’,132 remarked Seneca, ‘is the favourable 
opinion of good men; for just as reputation does not consist of one person’s 
remarks, and as ill repute does not consist of one person’s disapproval, so renown 
does not mean that we have merely pleased one good person. In order to constitute 
renown, the agreement of many distinguished and praiseworthy men is necessary’ 
                                                        
129 Andrew J. E. Bell, 'Cicero and the Spectacle of Power', JRS 87 (1997): 1-22, esp. 16-20. 
130 Lendon, Honour, 35. 
131 Carlin A. Barton, Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001). 
132 A sampling of Greek and Latin terms belonging to the honour discourse are: δόξα/gloria 
(‘glory’/’reputation’); τιμή/honor (‘honour’); ἔpiαινος/laus (‘praise’). For a lengthier treatment, see 
Lendon, Honour, 272-79; David A. deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament 
Culture (Downers Grove: IVP, 2000), 27-28. 
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(Ep. 102.8).133 As Lendon explains, ‘No quality was honourable in and of itself. 
Honour was mediated through the perceptions of others, and even a superfluity of 
worthy qualities was of no use unless these qualities were publicly known, and 
approved by other aristocrats’.134 Thus, the pursuit of honour kept the typical 
Roman preoccupied with his or her public performance. Indeed, life in Rome was, as 
Henry Nguyen suggests, a ‘grand spectacle’.135 
 
ii. Conferring Honour as Power 
It is often recognised that in Rome the possession of honour implied the 
acquisition of power, since honour could be used to influence one’s peers.136 But it is 
not as often realised that the ability to confer honour also translated into power for 
the purveyor. Lendon, for instance, refers to the conferral of honour as ‘power 
directed upwards’. While recognising that honour in the realm of Roman 
government ‘contributed to the power of the rulers over the ruled’, Lendon notes 
that honour also ‘contributed to the power of the ruled over the rulers’.137 
This inversion of the power dynamic is perhaps most noticeable in the 
practice of deference in the realm of politics. Desiring to gain public approval as 
much as any other commodity, it was not uncommon in legislation for politicians to 
succumb to the wishes of the citizens when arriving at a decision. Lendon explains, 
‘A governor treated his subjects with deference not least because men . . . in whose 
hands his reputation lay, were watching. Appalling failures of deference on the part 
of governors attracted unfavourable attention, perhaps even a blistering speech 
from Libanius’.138 And if conferring honour and shame was associated with the 
                                                        
133 Sociologist J. A. Pitt-Rivers, 'Honor and Social Status', in Honour and Shame: The Values of 
Mediterranean Society, ed. J. G. Peristiany (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 21-77, at 21, 
suggests, ‘Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society’. Cf. 
Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Rev. ed.; Louisville: WJK, 
1993), 31-33. 
134 Lendon, Honour, 37. 
135 V. Henry T. Nguyen, Christian Identity in Corinth: A Comparative Study of 2 Corinthians, 
Epictetus and Valerius Maximus (WUNT 2/243; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 33. 
136 Honour manifests as power in a number of ways. See, e.g., Ramsay MacMullen, 'Personal 
Power in the Roman Empire', American Journal of Philology 107 (1986): 512-24; Peter Garnsey, Social 
Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); Richard P. Saller, Personal 
Patronage under the Early Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
137 Lendon, Honour, 24.  
138 Lendon, Honour, 204; cf. 230-34. 
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possession of power in the assembly, so it was in the ἀγορά as well. Dio Chrysostom 
explains: 
If one were acquainted with spells learned from Medea or the Thessalians which were so potent that 
by uttering them he could make any one he pleased weep and suffer pain though confronted by no 
misfortune, would not his power [δύναμις] be regarded as tyranny [τυραννίς]? While, in dealing with 
one who has become puffed up by reputation [τὸν ἐpiὶ δόξῃ καχαυνωμένον] there is none who does 
not have this power [ἰσχύν]; for by speaking two or three words you have plunged him into misery 
and anguish. (Or. 66.16-17) 
It was, then, the vulnerability of persons to the pleasure of honour and pain of 
shame that provoked them to seek, at whatever cost, the approval of their peers. 
It is also significant to observe that the power of reputation was often 
couched in judicial terms. In the public arena the honouree was considered the 
defendant and his peers functioned as the judge, jury, and witnesses. Bruce Malina 
appropriately remarks that ‘honor is all about the tribunal or court of public 
opinion and the reputation that court bestows’.139 Lendon similarly suggests that, ‘A 
man’s honour was a public verdict on his qualities and standing’.140 Dio Chrysostom 
explains: 
Is not the trial concerning reputation [ὁ piερὶ τῆς δόξης ἀγών] always in progress wherever there are 
men—that is, foolish men—not merely once a day but many times, and not before a definite panel of 
judges [δικασταῖς] but before all men without distinction, and, moreover, men not bound by oath, 
men without regard for either witnesses or evidence? For they sit in judgement [δικάζουσι] without 
either having knowledge of the case or listening to testimony or having been chosen by lot, and it 
makes no difference to them if they cast their vote at a drinking bout or at the bath and, most 
outrageous of all, he who to-day is acquitted [ἀpiολύσῃ] to-morrow is condemned [καταδικάζει]. (Or. 
66.18) 
In the light of the evidence presented here, it is clear that in the Roman world the 
pursuit of honour and praise placed an individual in a position of need and social 
subjugation to his or her peers. Perceived as if they were on trial, it is not surprising 
that orators regularly found themselves in just such positions of vulnerability to the 
audiences from whom they coveted praise. 
 
iii. Conferring Praise as Power in Oratory 
Given the centrality of honour in the Roman world, it comes as no surprise 
that orators were among Rome’s most notorious ‘popularity-seekers’ (φιλοδόξοι). 
This preoccupation with honour is apparent throughout the writings of the moral 
                                                        
139 Malina, New Testament World, 42. 
140 Lendon, Honour, 36. Barton, Honor, 212: ‘Calling on spectators—or judges, for they were 
inseparable notions in the Roman mind—of an oath or an action was a Roman’s way of saying, “Go 
ahead: put me in the spotlight. My words and my actions will stand the test of your scrutiny.” The 
presence of witnesses made every act into an ordeal’. 
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philosophers. Epictetus is but one who repeatedly and colourfuly indicated how 
common it was for orators during the early empire to covet the praises of their 
audiences. In one monologue, for instance, after Epictetus asked his interlocutor 
about the benefits of being an orator, the interlocutor responded, ‘But praise me 
[ἀλλ᾽ ἐpiαίνεσόν με]’, prompting Epictetus to enquire, ‘What do you mean by 
“praise”?’ The orator then explained, ‘Cry out to me, “Bravo!” or “Marvellous!”’ 
(Diatr. 3.23.23). The same preoccupation with praise surfaces in Epictetus’ 
instructions to orators before taking the stage. According to Epictetus, just before 
lecturing, the orator should ask himself, ‘Do you wish to do good or to be praised? 
[ὠφελῆσαι θέλεις ἢ ἐpiαινεθῆναι;]’ (Diatr. 3.23.7). The question was, of course, 
rhetorical and supposed to remind the orator that his lecture ought to benefit his 
audience, not himself. But it also reveals for the historian how often ancient orators 
were enticed by their own ambition. Epictetus, in fact, considered ‘sorry’ (κακῶς) 
those orators who were found ‘gaping for the praises of men [χάσκων piερὶ τοὺς 
ἐpiαινέσοντας]’ and counting heads in their audiences (Diatr. 3.23.19). So pervasive 
was the preoccupation with honour among orators that Aristides considered 
himself to be one of only a few orators who lectured not for the sake of ‘wealth, 
reputation, honor, marriage, power, or any acquisition’, but because he genuinely 
loved speeches (Or. 33.19-20). The significant number of orators who were 
preoccupied with praise during the early empire is even more evident in the 
orations of Dio Chrysostom (e.g. Or. 32, 33, 35), who time and again distanced himself 
from the popular philosophers (e.g. sophists) due to their self-interest. 
This lust for praise afforded spectators significant influence over orators 
before, during, and after a rhetorical performance. The fate of the orator, then, 
always rested in the hands of the audience, as it possessed the power to make or 
break the speaker’s reputation and even emotional stability.141 Epictetus, for 
                                                        
141 The power of the spectator is apparent in many areas of Roman society, especially 
politics. Bell, 'Cicero': 19, notes: ‘Virtus was a key ideological quality and, because his career was short 
of military indications that he possessed it, Cicero had no recourse but to performance at a contio in 
order to record the popular approbation that warranted his claim. The Populus, therefore, had the 
power to make Cicero the sort of man he could never be on solely his own merits’. Gregory S. Aldrete, 
Gestures and Acclamations in Ancient Rome (Ancient Society and History; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 154, explains that ‘acclamations do not just confer authority, power, and 
legitimacy upon a ruler; they also bestow power upon those who give them’. Of course orators also 
used persuassion as a form of power over their audiences. Aristides says that if he were to declaim 
frequently, ‘everything would be mine and under my spell’ (Or. 33.4). For more on the interplay 
between the political orator and audience, see Robert Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power 
in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 119-59. 
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instance, alludes to the susceptibility of the orator to the emotional impact of an 
audience’s response: 
For why is it that the orator, although he knows that he has composed a good speech, has 
memorized what he has written and is bringing a pleasing voice to his task, is still anxious [ἔτι 
ἀγωνιᾷ] despite all that? Because he is not satisfied with the mere practice of oratory. What, then, 
does he want? He wants to be praised by his audience [ἐpiαινεθῆναι ὑpiὸ τῶν piαρόντων]. Now he has 
trained himself with a view to being able to practise oratory, but he has not trained himself with 
reference to praise and blame [ἔpiαινον δὲ καὶ ψόγον]. For when did he ever hear any one say what 
praise is, what blame is, and what is the nature of each? What kinds of praise are to be sought, and 
what kinds of blame are to be avoided? And when did he ever go through this course of training in 
accordance with these principles? Why, then, are you any longer surprised because he surpasses all 
others in the field in which he has studied, but in that in which he has not practised he is no better 
than the multitude? He is like a citharoede who knows how to play to the harp, sings well, has a 
beautiful flowing gown, and still trembles when he comes upon the stage; for all that has gone before 
he knows, but what a crowd is he does not know, nor what the shouting and the scornful laughter of 
a crowd are. Nay, he does not even know what this anxiety [τὸ ἀγωνιᾶν] itself is, whether it is 
something that we can control, or beyond our powers, whether he can stop it or not. That is why, if 
he is praised [ἐpiαινεθῇ], he goes off the stage all puffed up; but if he is laughed to scorn, that poor 
windbag of his conceit is pricked and flattens out. (Diatr. 2.16.5-10) 
Thus, the vulnerability of orators to praise and blame, honour and shame, 
positioned them beneath, as it were, the power of their critics. Although not dealing 
specifically with oratory, Dio Chrysostom remarks how desperately an individual 
might respond in order to meet the expectations of his audience:  
Clearly, therefore, if a person is going to be exceedingly anxious to win the praise of the crowd as 
well [τοῦ piαρὰ τῶν piολλῶν ἐpiαίνου], believing that its praise or censure has more weight 
[κυριώτερον] than his own judgment, his every act and wish will be aimed to show himself the sort 
of person that the crowd expects [lit.: values; ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ piολλοί]. (Or. 77/78.24) 
According to Dio, the individual—orator or otherwise—who adapts his performance 
due to his anxiety of the crowd is beneath their power. 
The audience’s power over the orator is also implied when the enterprise is 
portrayed in forensic terms. According to the Athenians, it was through speech 
(λόγος) that the public was able to appraise (δοκιμάζω) the wise (Isocrates, Nic. 6-7). 
In fact, the entire goal of rhetoric was to establish a judgment (κρίσις) and, 
therefore, every auditor of speeches was, as it were, a judge (κριτής) from whom the 
orator received a verdict (Aristotle, Rhet. 1377b2).142 This was also the perception of 
rhetoric under Roman rule and is perhaps no better exemplified than in Favorinus’ 
                                                        
142 Aristotle continues, ‘[J]udgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and judicial 
proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to consider how to make the speech itself 
demonstrative and convincing [piιστός], but also that the speaker should show himself to be of a 
certain character and should know how to put the judge [τὸν κριτήν] into a certain frame of mind’ 
(Rhet. 1377b2); ‘Now the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement 
[κρίσιν]; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is 
judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to 
exhort or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single individual is 
equally a judge [κριτής], since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge [κριτής]’ 
(1391b18). 
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Κορινθιακός. In the Corinthian Oration, Favorinus famously portrayed himself 
advocating for his missing statue as if it were on trial before the Corinthians. In an 
epideictic speech posing as an apology,143 Favorinus blames the Corinthians for 
removing their statue of him: 
Then supposing some such decree were to be passed in Corinth too, prescribing that statues should 
be subjected to an accounting [εὐθύνας]—or rather, if you please, supposing this to have been 
already decreed and a trial [ἀγῶνος] to have been instituted—permit me, pray permit me, to make 
my plea before you in my own behalf as if in court [ἐν δικαστηρίῳ]. Gentlemen of the jury [ἄνδρες 
δικασταί], it is said that anything may be expected in the course of time; but he who stands before 
you is in jeopardy of first being set up [τεθῆναι] as the noblest [ἄριστος] among the Greeks and then 
being cast out [ἐκpiεσεῖν] as the worst [piονηρότατος], all in a brief span of time. (Dio Chrysostom, Or. 
37.22) 
Courtroom language pervades much of this discourse (cf. 37.16). But even in this 
brief sampling, the repeated use of words from the δικ- root (δικαστήριον, 
δικαστής), the noun ἀγών for a generic trial,144 and the technical term εὔθυνα for a 
calling to account,145 definitely signal a forensic perspective. As L. Michael White has 
additionally demonstrated, τιθέναι and ἐκpiίpiτειν form a word-play, since both 
terms have architectural and legal connotations, further indicating that a trial scene 
is in view.146 Moreover, it is significant for our purposes that Favorinus expressly 
acknowledges the power of the audience, as they possess the authority to 
pronounce nobility (ἄριστος) or villainy (piονηρότατος). 
We could of course turn to additional examples of trial language in non-
forensic speeches. But let us summarise so far. The use of forensic language was a 
familiar feature in ancient oratory and was used to convey the susceptibility of the 
speaker to the judgments of his audience. Furthermore, since oratory was caught up 
in the honour system of the early empire, the privilege to award praise or blame 
provided the audience a position of power over the orator that is often 
acknowledged even in the speech. With this context in view, let us return to 1 
Corinthians 4 to evaluate how Paul portrays and responds to the interrogation of his 
jury, the Corinthian church. 
 
 
                                                        
143 For Favorinus’ rhetorical strategy, see Gleason, Making Men, 9; White, 'Favorinus', 69-71. 
144 Significantly, ἀγών can also denote an oratorical performance (e.g. Philostratus, Vit. soph. 
526, 580, 601); cf. Whitmarsh, Second Sophistic, 39. 
145 See, e.g., Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: 
Structure, Principles, and Ideology (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 222-24; Roberts, 
Accountability, 17-18. 
146 White, 'Favorinus', 69-70. 
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b. The Rhetorical Function of Forensic Language in 1 Cor 4.1-5 
It is within the context of oratorical verdicts as ‘power directed upwards’ 
that Paul portrays and ultimately rejects his Corinthian critics. In the following 
exposition we will demonstrate that Paul repudiates these criticisms by playing the 
Corinthians, as it were, at their own game. By representing the Corinthian 
evaluations as a judicial proceeding, Paul casts the church as an audience 
scrutinising his rhetorical ability, an entirely normal procedure in the world of 
declamations. But Paul is not a rhetor and he is therefore immune to these 
judgments. Instead, Paul is an oikonomos who is accountable and acquitted only by 
his κύριος. It is the Lord alone who will announce Paul’s verdict at his coming, and 
therefore the church must cease to judge him and the other apostles. In this way 
Paul mixes oratorical and administrative metaphors in order to express the 
absurdity of the church’s behaviour. 
 
i. Forensic Language in 1 Cor 4.3-5 
Paul’s use of forensic language begins in verses 3-5, where the presence of 
courtroom terminology is quite explicit.147 Paul’s use of ἡμέρα in 4.3, for instance, is 
widely regarded as parallel to its use in 3.13 where Paul refers to the ‘Day’ of God’s 
eschatological judgment. From there it is no large step to observe that Paul uses the 
phrase ἀνθρωpiίνης ἡμέρας to refer to an earthly tribunal; this phrase even refers to 
a judicial proceeding on an early Christian amulet.148 The use of δικαιόω for 
‘acquittal’ (4.4) also clearly indicates that a courtroom motif is present in this 
pericope. Furthermore, the verb κρίνω (4.5) conveys the notion of reaching a legal 
verdict, as it does in 1 Corinthians 5-6 and elsewhere.  
The verb ἀνακρίνω, which appears three times in this passage (4.3[2x], 4), is 
also a forensic term and alludes to a judicial proceeding. The verb ἀνακρίνειν can 
carry the meanings (i) ‘to question or examine’ generally (cf. Acts 17.11), and (ii) ‘to 
discern’ a matter of information, but it can also indicate (iii) ‘to scrutinise’ in a 
                                                        
147 Kuck, Judgment, 197 n. 246, observes Paul’s abundant use of other kinds of evaluative 
terms in 4.2-5 (ζητεῖται, εὑρεθῇ, piιστός, σύνοιδα, φωτίσει, φανερώσει, ἔpiαινος). 
148 Campbell Bonner, 'A Reminiscence of Paul on a Coin Amulet', HTR 43 (1950): 165-68, at 
167. 
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judicial hearing.149 The verb, in fact, was used the latter way in Greek literature to 
refer to the performance of a preliminary judicial interrogation, the ἀνακρίσις.150 
The verb surfaces in numerous Lucan courtroom accounts referring to just such a 
pre-trial hearing (Luke 23.14, Acts 4.9; 12.19; 24.8; 28.18),151 and the noun ἀνακρίσις 
is used this way in Acts when Festus explains why he sent Paul before King Agrippa: 
‘I have nothing definite to write to our sovereign about him [Paul]. Therefore I have 
brought him before all of you, and especially before you, King Agrippa, so that, after 
we have examined him [τῆς ἀνακρίσεως γενομένης], I may have something to write’ 
(Acts 25.26 [NRSV]).152  
In Paul ἀνακρίνω appears only in 1 Corinthians, where it appears no less 
than ten times (2.14, 15[2x]; 4.3[2x], 4; 9.3; 10.25, 27; 14.24) and in a forensic sense in 
at least 9.3, 4.3-4, and probably in 2.15. Based, therefore, on the legal connotations of 
ἀνακρίνω along with the other forensic terms from 4.3-5, it is clear that Paul was 
portraying himself to be in a preliminary hearing (ἀνακρίσις) before the Corinthian 
church. Moreover, in light of the oratorical context sketched above, it is plausible 
that Paul’s use of forensic language in 4.1-5 draws on the conventional perception of 
an oration as a miniature trial. In 4.3-5, then, the Corinthians are portrayed as 
spectators/jurors who were evaluating the ministry of Paul, the orator/defendant. 
 
ii. The Rhetorical Function of the Trial Scene 
Due to the fact that Paul’s primary ministerial responsibility in this and 
several earlier texts is the faithful communication of the mysteries of God (4.1-2; cf. 
1.17; 2.1-5, 6-7, 13; 3.2, 5, 10), the church’s evaluations of Paul were probably 
                                                        
149 LSJ implies the high frequency of this judicial sense when it provides for its most basic 
definition ‘examine closely, interrogate, esp. judicially’. 
150 See, e.g., Isaeus 5.32; Andocides 1.101; Demosthenes 48.31; Aristotle, Ath. pol. 56.6; SIG 
953.46; Josephus, Ant. 17.131; Sus 45-51; A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens (vol. 2; Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971), 94-105; Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Aspects of Greek and Roman 
Life; London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 240-43. 
151 Allison A. Trites, 'The Importance of Legal Scenes and Language in the Book of Acts', NovT 
16 (1974): 278-84, at 279, observes that ἀνακρίνω is used in Acts by Jewish (4.9) and Roman officials 
(24.8; 23.14) in order to demonstrate that ‘both Paul and the Jerusalem apostles work in an 
atmosphere of hostility and contention’.  
152 Cf. Trites, 'Legal Scenes': 282. Despite Luke’s repeated use of ἀνακρίνω and ἀνακρίσις 
throughout his narrative, scholars have paid surprisingly little attention to these occurrences; cf. H. 
W. Tajra, The Trial of St. Paul: A Juridical Exegesis of the Second Half of the Acts of the Apostles (WUNT 2/35; 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1989), 124, 185. 
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targeting his oratorical ability.153 As one whose bodily presence was weak, and 
whose speech was contemptible (2 Cor 10.10), this evaluation was probably more of 
a shameful critique. As Dahl contends, 
From the statement, ‘With me it is a very small thing that I should be judged by you or by any human 
court’ (4:3), we may safely infer that some kind of criticism of Paul has been voiced at Corinth. And it 
is not difficult to find out what the main content of this criticism must have been. That becomes 
evident in phrases like, ‘Not with eloquent wisdom’ (οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου, 1:17), ‘Not in lofty words of 
wisdom’ (οὐ καθ᾽ ὑpiεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας, 2:1), ‘Not in persuasiveness of wisdom’ (οὐκ ἐν piειθοῖ 
σοφίας, 2:4), ‘Milk, not solid food’ (γάλα. . .οὐ βρῶμα, 3:2).154 
In this statement Dahl correctly observes that Paul’s seemingly amateurish 
oratorical skill is the subject of the church’s criticisms here as well as earlier in the 
letter.155 Litfin explains, ‘These status-conscious Corinthians apparently harbored 
few reservations about rendering a negative judgment of Paul’s abilities as a 
speaker. They perceived the wandering Jewish Apostle in this respect in much the 
same light as they perceived other itinerant speakers: as fair game for their 
evaluations’.156 As observed from our sketch about oratory and honour, an 
audience’s praise or blame could make or break an orator, both professionally and 
emotionally. Paul, therefore, portrays the Corinthian interrogation as if the church 
attempted to wield power over him. Whether this power was wielded intentionally 
or incidentally, the gesture itself was, in his view, quite out place. 
But Paul’s response is telling. For Paul, the evaluations of the church (ὑφ’ 
ὑμῶν), a Roman court (ὑpiὸ ἀνθρωpiίνης ἡμέρας), even himself (ἐμαυτόν), are of no 
consequence (4.3).157 When it comes to worldly opinions about his ministry, Paul is 
completely indifferent; as 4.3 indicates, he did not care in the least (ἐμοὶ δὲ εἰς 
ἐλάχιστόν ἐστιν). As an oikonomos of Christ, no opinion mattered other than that of 
his κύριος, since Christ is the one who would ultimately acquit him at the final 
                                                        
153 Welborn, 'Discord': 107, states that ‘Paul's language in 4:1-5 leaves little doubt that his 
opponents sought to “examine” his credentials in quasi-judicial proceedings’. But Paul’s language 
cannot be taken literally, as Welborn seems to suggest. The Corinthians neither had nor intended to 
examine Paul in an actual hearing. Paul’s metaphor reflects only his portrayal of a power struggle 
and is almost certainly not how it was actually devised by the Corinthians; cf. Robertson and 
Plummer, First Corinthians, 75-76; Hans Lietzmann and Werner George Kümmel, An die Korinther I/II (3. 
Aufl. ed.; HNT 9; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1969), 18. 
154 Dahl, 'Corinth', 321. 
155 Moreover, Dahl perceptively notices the thematic links between Paul’s earlier ‘conclusion 
sections’, where he explains his modus operandi (2.1-5; 3.1-4), and this ‘conclusion section’, where he 
finally addresses and ultimately dismisses the Corinthian evaluations as of no consequence to him. 
156 Litfin, Proclamation, 163. 
157 Paul is mainly concerned here with the criticisms of the church, rather than a secular 
court or his conscience. But since oratory was often practiced and evaluated in court, the reference 
to a human tribunal confirms that Paul’s oratorical ability is in view. For Paul’s examination of his 
own conscience in 4.3 as it relates to the matter of unrecognized sin, see Chester, Conversion at 
Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul's Theology and the Corinthian Church, 195-202. 
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judgment (4.5).158 As he articulates elsewhere, ‘Who are you to pass judgment on 
servants of another? It is before their own lord that they stand or fall [σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ 
κρίνων ἀλλότριον οἰκέτην; τῷ ἰδίῳ κυρίῳ στήκει ἢ piίpiτει]’ (Rom 14.4 [NRSV]).159 It 
is in this manner that Paul objects to Corinthian interrogations, for as God’s agent 
he was responsible to God alone. Paul is to be found faithful in the eyes of his master 
(1 Cor 4.2) and any alternative pursuit of approval would mean that he was serving 
another Lord (Gal 1.10). 
Paul makes a similar plea in 1 Thess 2.3-6, where he expresses his utter 
indifference toward popular opinion and the church’s evaluation of his preaching.160 
There Paul insists:  
[O]ur appeal [piαράκλησις] does not spring from deceit or impure motives or trickery, but just as we 
have been approved by God to be entrusted the gospel [δεδοκιμάσμεθα ὑpiὸ τοῦ θεοῦ piιστευθῆναι τὸ 
εὐαγγέλιον], so we speak, not to please people, but to please God who tests our hearts [λαλοῦμεν οὐχ 
ὡς ἀνθρώpiοις ἀρέσκοντες ἀλλὰ θεῷ τῷ δοκιμάζοντι τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν]. As you know and as God is 
our witness [μάρτυς], we never came with words of flattery or with a pretext for greed; nor did we 
seek praise from people [ζητοῦντες ἐξ ἀνθρώpiων δόξαν], whether from you or from others’. 
Although the congruencies in these texts are occasionally inverted—for instance, 
Paul dismisses ecclesial evaluations in 1 Cor 4.3-5, but submits to God’s testing in 1 
Thess 2.4—they are many and are often explicit.161 Most significant for our purposes 
is that Paul expresses as the sole objective of his preaching ministry the pleasure of 
God, rather than the pleasure (ἀρέσκω) and glory (δόξα) of humans. While he does 
not say so as strongly as he does in 1 Cor 4.3, Paul wholly discounts the evaluations 
of his rhetorical skill by his audiences,162 seeking instead divine approval of his 
                                                        
158 Léon-Dufour, 'Jugement', 144: ‘Le verset 5 radicalise et justifie le devoir de ne pas juger’. 
159 Hays, First Corinthians, 67. 
160 For 1 Thess 2.1-12 as a defense, Seyoon Kim, 'Paul's Entry (εἴσοδος) and the Thessalonians' 
Faith (1 Thessalonians 1-3)', NTS 51 (2005): 519-42; Jeffrey A. D. Weima, 'An Apology for the 
Apologetic Function of 1 Thessalonians 2.1-12', JSNT 68 (1997): 73-99; John M. G. Barclay, 'Conflict in 
Thessalonica', CBQ 55 (1993): 512-30, at 513; Walter Schmithals, Paul & the Gnostics (trans. John E. 
Steely; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), 137-38. Contra Abraham J. Malherbe, '"Gentle as a Nurse": 
The Cynic Background to I Thess ii', NovT 12 (1970): 203-17. See also Karl P. Donfried and Johannes 
Beutler, eds., The Thessalonians Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis? (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 3-131. 
161 Of particular significance for our study are the following parallels: (i) the seemingly 
equivalent images οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ (1 Cor 4.1) and piιστευθῆναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον (1 Thess 
2.4; cf. οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι in 1 Cor 9.17); (ii) the repetition of forensic language (ἀνακρίνω, 
ἡμέρα, κρίνω [1 Cor 4.3-5]; δοκιμάζω, μάρτυς [1 Thess 2.4-5]); (iii) the use of ζητέω (1 Cor 4.2; 1 Thess 
2.6); (iv) the ambiguous reference to believers as ἀνθρώpiοι (1 Cor 4.1; 1 Thess 2.4, 6); (v) the use of 
καρδία as the source of Paul’s qualification (1 Cor 4.5; 1 Thess 2.4); (vi) the emphasis on the internal 
dimensions of Paul’s ministry (piιστός, τὰ κρυpiτὰ τοῦ σκότους,  τὰς βουλὰς τῶν καρδιῶν [1 Cor 4.2, 5]; 
piλάνη, ἀκαθαρσία, δόλος [1 Thess 2.3]; (vii) the use of praise/honour as a ministerial incentive 
(ἔpiαινος in 1 Cor 4.5; δόξα in 1 Thess 2.6). 
162 It is striking that Paul refers to his preaching with the verb λαλέω (cf. 1 Cor 2.6-7, 13). He 
indicates that he seeks not to please men with his eloquence and tone, but to please God by simply 
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motivations (καρδία). This objective is established by the fact that God is the one 
who has tested and equipped (δοκιμάζω, piιστεύω [2.4a]) Paul for apostolic ministry 
and is the one who ultimately will call him to account (δοκιμάζω [2.4b]).163 
Paul’s stern rebuke in 1 Cor 4.1-5, then, is his response to what he perceived 
to be a power play on the part of the Corinthians. Their criticisms of Paul as Christ’s 
agent were an implicit attempt to usurp the exclusive authority of God over the 
apostle. As Richard Hays summarises, ‘Paul’s point is simply that they [the 
Corinthians] have arrogated to themselves the right to pass judgment on his work in 
a way that is inappropriate to their position and impossible for any human being on 
this side of the parousia’.164 At that eschatological hearing, Christ will not consider 
the apostle’s eloquence, physical presence, or any tangible marker of ministerial 
success, as do the Corinthians. Only the apostle’s internal qualities will matter, for 
all of his secret motivations will be laid bare (φωτίσει τὰ κρυpiτὰ τοῦ σκότους) as 
Christ alone searches the apostle’s heart (φανερώσει τὰς βουλὰς τῶν καρδιῶν [4.5]). 
This will ensure that Paul’s chief ambition is faithful compliance to the commission 
entrusted to him by God (4.2). And only after being acquitted will Paul then receive 
his grand reception of praise (ἔpiαινος; cf. Luke 16.8; Xenophon, Oec. 13.9, 12), this 
time not from a worldly audience, but from God.165 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
heralding the gospel. Thus, just as in 1 Corinthians, Paul’s concern is to distance his modus operandi 
from that of popular philosophers and sophists; cf. Bruce W. Winter, 'The Entries and Ethics of 
Orators and Paul (1 Thessalonians 2:1-12)', TynBul 44 (1993): 55-74. 
163 Abraham J. Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary (AYB 32b; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 141 suggests that Paul’s use of δοκιμάζω stems 
from the OT tradition of prophetic testing (e.g. Jer 11.20; 12.3; 17.10; 20.12; Psalm 17.3). But it could be 
that Paul had a Graeco-Roman forensic setting in view; cf. Aeschines, Ctes. 3.15; Earl J. Richard, First 
and Second Thessalonians (Sacra Pagina 11; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1995), 96; Weima, 
'Apology': 84. 
164 Hays, First Corinthians, 67. Many commentators suggest that Paul was criticising the 
church’s inability to judge others due to their ignorance of the individual heart and its private 
motivations. But while the fallibility of human assessment may be a factor, once the power 
connotations of a courtroom scrutiny are realised, it is clear that Paul believed that the Corinthians 
also lacked the authority to judge him. As Kuck, Judgment, 221, remarks, ‘Paul’s admonition not to 
judge is warranted by his appeal to the higher court of God’s judgment. The contrast is not only, or 
even primarily, between present and future judgment. It is more a matter of who does the judgment: 
Christians are ultimately accountable to God, not to one another, for their work is assigned and 
empowered by God’ (emphasis added). Cf. Calvin J. Roetzel, Judgement in the Community: A Study of the 
Relationship Between Eschatology and Ecclesiology in Paul (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 168; contra Thiselton, First 
Corinthians, 341. 
165 Kuck, Judgment, 208: ‘[ἔpiαινος] is parallel to μισθός (3:8 and 14) in that it expresses the 
thought of individually appropriate rewards, not just corporate salvation’. 
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C. Summary 
In this chapter we addressed a number of social-historical, exegetical, and 
theological issues central to the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 1-4. It was initially 
argued that, despite the resistance of many recent interpreters, Paul’s rhetoric in 
the first four chapters of the letter betray various features of apologetic. Based on 
the application of certain fundamental mirror-reading principles, a case was made 
that Paul at least perceived his apostolic authority to be the subject of criticism in 
the Corinthian church. Furthermore, we have shown that 1 Cor 4.1-5 is an integral 
unit in the rhetorical strategy of the early part of Paul’s letter. In this brief passage 
Paul aims to eliminate several ecclesial and ethical shortcomings plaguing the 
Corinthians. As Jouette Bassler astutely observes, ‘Paul thus had two serious 
problems to address—a general overvaluation of human leadership in the 
community and a criticism or undervaluation (by some) of his own ministry and 
gospel. Furthermore, he had to address these problems in such a way that his 
solution to one did not exacerbate the other’.166 It has been our contention here that 
Paul sought to resolve this dilemma by portraying himself and all apostles as God’s 
oikonomoi, thereby attributing to them certain social and structural characteristics 
that enabled him to negotiate the risky terrain of simultaneously diminishing and 
defending his apostleship. By casting apostles as legally inferior, status-depleted 
subordinates as well as divinely authorised, critically immune administrators, Paul 
seeks to censure the Corinthians for their inappropriate, power-implicit 
evaluations—and thus to reaffirm his own apostolic ethos—without also providing 
them additional grounds for adulating their leaders. For Paul, then, the apostle as 
oikonomos is a rhetorically ingenious, yet culturally subversive image, having both 
the contextual relevance to resonate with the community and the connotative 
diversity to serve its multi-purpose deployment. 
 
 
 
                                                        
166 Bassler, '1 Corinthians 4:1-5': 180 (emphasis added). 
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Chapter 7. Interpreting Paul’s Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 9.16-23 
 
As we have seen from Chapter 6, Paul utilised the image of the private administrator 
in 1 Cor 4.1-5 to illumine various misunderstood features of his apostleship. Among 
those features were Paul’s location within the ecclesial hierarchy, his responsibility 
to preach the gospel, his indifference toward popular opinion, and his expectation 
to be found faithful and praiseworthy before Christ at his coming. What was striking 
about the metaphor, however, was its ability to negotiate Paul’s status as a person of 
authority while also portraying him as a person of relative insignificance in 
comparison to God/Christ. In 1 Corinthians 9 Paul offers a similar portrayal of his 
apostolic role, but this time for a different purpose. The need has arisen again to 
clarify certain misunderstood aspects of his apostleship, not least his apostolic 
authority,1 but in this instance he does so in order to explain how it is that he has 
the right to receive financial support from the Corinthian church while 
simultaneously being compelled to minister as an apostle. The metaphor of 
administration is cast once more, but the characteristics of apostleship that the 
image conveys are more veiled this time around. 
In this chapter, therefore, we will apply what we know about first-century 
private commercial administration to Paul’s discourse in 1 Corinthians 9 in order (i) 
to elucidate the apostle’s logic and the message of the discourse, and (ii) to further 
our understanding of Pauline apostleship. But before we do so, we will briefly 
examine the rhetorical and socio-religious contexts of 1 Cor 8.1-11.1 in order to 
situate 9.1-27 appropriately. Next, the text will be analysed, certain exegetical 
cruces treated, and a general profile of Paul’s apostleship constructed. 
 
A. The Rhetorical Context of 1 Corinthians 9 
The rhetorical strategy of 1 Corinthians 9 has long been a matter of dispute 
in modern scholarship. Many have argued that the chapter is a digression whereby 
Paul defends his apostolic right to receive and refuse material support from 
churches which benefit from his preaching in order to ward off criticisms directed 
                                                        
1 Dunn, Theology, 577, regards 1 Corinthians 9 as ‘Paul’s most sustained exposition of how he 
conceived of his authority (exousia)’. 
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toward him for having plied a trade.2 According to adherents of this position, 
criticisms of Paul’s apostolic lifestyle were not voiced from the entire church, as 
there remained some in the congregation who were ‘of Paul’ (1.12; 3.4, 22). 
Nevertheless, certain believers who would have preferred to support Paul 
financially—as they did Apollos and other itinerant teachers—were accusing Paul of 
lacking what they considered to be an appropriate apostolic ethos and his apostolic 
authority was jeopardised as a result. In his response to the Corinthians, Paul 
therefore offered a defence of his apostleship (9.3), his rights as an apostle (9.6-8), 
and his decision to lay those rights aside for the benefit of certain persons in the 
community (9.12, 15, 19). 
This approach to Paul’s rhetorical strategy is to be commended for its ability 
to explain the use of such explicit forensic language as ἀpiολογία and τοῖς ἐμὲ 
ἀνακρίνουσιν (9.3). Moreover, this view adequately handles the vigor of the rhetoric 
in verses 1-14 as well as the sheer length of the interruption, which points to the 
existence of real tension between the apostle and the church.3 Further, the 
reappearance of certain themes reminiscent of 1 Corinthians 1-4—which was argued 
earlier to contain a defensive posture—suggests that 1 Corinthians 9 revisits some of 
the apologetic elements addressed earlier in the letter.4 On the other hand, this 
position fails to explain adequately the chapter’s relationship with those which 
frame it (chs 8 and 10), making for a harsh transition and an out of place digression 
in the middle of a significant dispute within the community. Further, if 8.1-11.1 
forms a unified section, as most scholars recognise, and Paul’s concluding 
admonition instructs the church to imitate him as he imitates Christ (11.1), then 
                                                        
2 Supporters of this position often recognise a secondary deliberative function of this 
passage. Still, they normally prioritise Paul’s apologetic intention. See, e.g., Barrett, First Corinthians, 
200; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 151-53; Fee, First Corinthians, 393; Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 124; Winter, 
Sophists, 166; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 353. Some advocates of this position have argued that all or 
part of the apologetic interruption is actually an interpolation; cf. Weiß, Der erste Korintherbrief, 231-
34; Jean Héring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians (trans. A. W. Heathcote and P. J. Allcock; 
London: Epworth, 1962), 75; Walter Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth: An Investigation of the Letters to the 
Corinthians (trans. John E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon, 1971), 92-93. Wilhelm Wuellner, 'Where is 
Rhetorical Criticism Taking Us?', CBQ 49 (1987): 448-63, and Vernon K. Robbins, The Tapestry of Early 
Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, Society, and Ideology (London: Routledge, 1996), 88-89, regard the passage 
as featuring a mixture of forensic and epideictic rhetoric. 
3 Barrett, First Corinthians, 200: ‘Paul would hardly have spent so long on the question of 
apostolic rights if his own apostolic status had not been questioned in Corinth’. 
4 For the thematic parallels between 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, see E. Coye Still III, 'Divisions 
over Leaders and Food Offered to Idols: The Parallel Thematic Structures of 1 Corinthians 4:6-21 and 
8:1-11:1', TynBul 55 (2004): 17-41; Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority: A Study of 1 
Corinthians 8.1-11.1 in the Light of the Jewish Diaspora (LNTS 299; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 179-85. 
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Paul’s appeal for imitation must refer to 9.1-27, since he nowhere else in those three 
chapters provides a personal example to follow. Finally, the overlapping themes 
between chapter 8, 9, and 10 seem to suggest that chapter 9 has a more organic 
relationship with its neighbours than this position would otherwise permit. 
Given the shortcomings of the strictly apologetic interpretation of 1 
Corinthians 9, a number of authors contend that Paul situated chapter 9 between 
chapters 8 and 10 for the sole purpose of offering an exemplum of self-sacrifice.5 
From this perspective, Paul’s hypothetical refusal to eat idol meat in 8.13 functions 
to transition the discourse to 9.1, where he authors a fictitious defence of his rights 
as an apostle in order to demonstrate that he has given them up for the benefit of 
the church and the progress of the gospel. The example is particularly presented for 
the benefit of those ‘strong’ Corinthians whose theological astuteness has enabled 
them to justify their participation in certain pagan meals. But these practices, while 
theologically defensible, have proved ecclesially destructive, as certain ‘weak’ 
believers have emulated the behaviour of the strong by also participating in pagan 
meals, which consequently wounded their consciences. In chapter 8, then, Paul 
exhorts the strong in the church to forgo their right to eat idol meat, and in chapter 
9 provides an example of self-sacrifice which the strong should follow. 
This position gives appropriate attention to the thematic parallels between 
chapter 9 and chapters 8 and 10. It fails, however, to take seriously the element of 
defence that is apparent both in earlier parts of the letter and in chapter 9. While it 
is plausible that most of Paul’s original readers were in full agreement with the case 
he constructs in 9.1-14, it is also true—as many scholars suggest—that Paul’s refusal 
of rights could, and probably did, elicit objections from those who disapproved of 
him plying a trade. Many supporters of this position deny that 1 Corinthians betrays 
any indication that disputes had already risen about the authority of Paul’s 
apostleship or that objections had been made about his refusal of financial support 
when Paul wrote the letter.6 However, the fact that the important topics in 1 
Corinthians 9 were already a matter of heated polemic in 4.10-13, and eventually 
                                                        
5 See, e.g., Robertson and Plummer, First Corinthians, 176, 179; Joachim Jeremias, 'Chiasmus in 
den Paulusbriefen', ZNW 49 (1958): 145-56, at 156; Wendell L. Willis, 'An Apostolic Apologia? The 
Form and Function of 1 Corinthians 9', JSNT 24 (1985): 33-48; Mitchell, Reconciliation, 246; 
Witherington III, Conflict, 203; Joop Smit, 'The Rhetorical Disposition of First Corinthians 8:7-9:27', 
CBQ 59 (1997): 476-91, at 478; Thiselton, First Corinthians, 666-67; David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians 
(BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 404-406; Galloway, Freedom, 152. 
6 Mitchell, Reconciliation, 246. 
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became a matter of open dispute in 2 Corinthians 10-13, supports the plausibility of 
at least some criticism of Paul’s policy at an early period in his relationship with the 
church. 
Having, therefore, considered the individual viability of both positions on 
Paul’s rhetorical strategy, it is likely that 1 Corinthians 9 serves not one, but two 
rhetorical purposes: in 1 Corinthians 9 Paul seeks to demonstrate through personal 
example how believers should love and edify one another at one’s own expense, and 
also to defend his refusal of a wage by explaining, albeit quite inexplicitly, his policy 
of material support.7 
 
B. The Socio-Religous Context of 1 Corinthians 9 
Few clues in the text offer any explanation for the precise socio-religous 
context responsible for giving rise to the conflicts addressed in 1 Cor 8.1-11.1.8 This, 
however, has not prevented scholars from hypothesising about the actual 
circumstances to which Paul’s discourse is addressed. Given, for example, Paul’s 
references to idolatry (8.4-6; 9.13; 10.14, 18-22), athletics (9.24-27; 10.7), and civic law 
(10.23) all within this individual rhetorical proof, Bruce Winter has quite 
insightfully suggested that this interchurch conflict was provoked by the Isthmian 
Games, specifically the presidential temple banquets which accompanied the 
contests.9  
                                                        
7 See, e.g., F. W. Grosheide, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1953), 202; Schmithals, Gnosticism, 92; David L. Dungan, The Sayings of Jesus in the Churches of Paul: The 
Use of the Synoptic Tradition in the Regulation of Early Church Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), 5-6; William F. 
Orr and James Arthur Walther, 1 Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AYB 
32; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 240; Hock, Social Context, 60-61; Marshall, Enmity, 283-84; 
Martin, Slavery, 83; Paul Douglas Gardner, The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian: An 
Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 8-11:1 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 67-68; Hays, 
First Corinthians, 146; Horrell, Social Ethos, 205; Lehmeier, Oikonomia, 241; Robinson Butarbutar, Paul 
and Conflict Resolution: An Exegetical Study of Paul's Apostolic Paradigm in 1 Corinthians 9 (Paternoster 
Biblical Monographs; Milton Keynes, England: Paternoster, 2007), 109. 
8 For a review of scholarly research on the socio-religious context of 1 Cor 8.1-11.1, see John 
Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Social-Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1-
11:1 (WUNT 2/151; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 1-48. See also, e.g., Wendell L. Willis, Idol Meat in 
Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 (SBLDS 68; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985); Derek 
Newton, Deity and Diet: The Dilemma of Sacrificial Food at Corinth (JSNTSup 169; Sheffield: Sheffield 
University Press, 1998); Alex T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline Legacy 
(JSNTSup 176; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); Phua, Idolatry, 29-125. 
9 Winter, Welfare, 166-77. Winter further argues that ἡ ἐξουσία ὑμῶν αὕτη (8.9) refers to ‘a 
civic privilege which entitled Corinthian citizens to dine on “civic” occasions in a temple’ (166); cf. 
Winter, Corinth, 280-82; Butarbutar, Conflict Resolution, 109. But as observed by David G. Horrell, 
Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Ethics (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 173, the 
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But while many of the hypotheses proposed by Winter and other 
interpreters are certainly possible, Paul simply provides the non-Corinthian reader 
too little information to be sure about what specific civic and religious events in the 
colony gave rise to the quarrel. In fact, it seems reasonably clear that Paul was 
addressing an ethical dilemma that was known to surface somewhat routinely. 
According to the discourse, the Corinthians encountered food offered to idols in 
venues that were specifically pagan (ἐν εἰδωλείῳ [8.10]; τραpiέζης δαιμονίων 
[10.21]), commercial (ἐν μακέλλῳ, 10.25), and domestic (εἴ τις καλεῖ ὑμᾶς τῶν 
ἀpiίστων [10.27). It is therefore unnecessary to isolate a single occasion that gave 
rise to these particular conflicts, since Paul may have been addressing a rather 
ubiquitous problem about which there are simply too many unknown factors.  
What is known, however, is that certain meals provided theologically astute 
believers the opportunity to eat sacrificed meat, and the exercise of this right 
applied undue pressure onto those believers who would not have ordinarily 
participated in such meals. According to Paul, when this pressure causes an 
individual to behave beyond the integrity of their own conscience, they become 
ruined (ἀpiόλλυμι [8.11]). Paul considers such negative influence to be a sin against 
the weaker believer and indeed sin against Christ (8.12). And because of the severity 
of these consequences, Paul professes that, if eating meat offered to idols caused 
another believer to stumble, he would go so far as never to eat meat offered to idols 
again (8.13). 
 
C. Paul’s Defense and Refusal of His Right to a Wage (9.1-15) 
After declaring that he would never eat meat again if it offended another 
believer (8.13), Paul begins his discourse in 9.1-27 by affirming his apostolic rights. 
The affirmation comes in the form of no less than seventeen rhetorical questions 
spanning 9.1-13.10 The opening question is one of the most perplexing. Paul asks 
simply, ‘Am I not free?’ (οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐλεύθερος [9.1a]). The kind of freedom that Paul 
has in view is debated in modern scholarship, because Paul uses the notion of 
                                                                                                                                                               
‘rights’ asserted by the Corinthians seem to have been such on the basis of theological legitimation, 
rather than civic privilege. 
10 Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 355. 
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freedom in several different ways in his letters.11 But based on the series of 
questions in verses 4-13, and the way that Paul contrasts freedom and slavery in 
verses 16-17 and 19, he probably has in view the freedom to exercise certain rights 
as an apostle. Through his next question Paul therefore aims to affirm his apostolic 
legitimacy: ‘Am I not an apostle?’ (οὐκ εἰμὶ ἀpiόστολος [9.1b]). Paul then grounds his 
apostleship in two propositions: he has seen the risen Christ (9.1c), and he is 
responsible for the conversion of the Corinthian believers (9.1d-2). 
After having established the legitimacy of his apostleship in verses 1-2, in 
verse 3 Paul enters into a lengthy defense of his apostolic rights. Each question in 
verses 4-13 aims to reveal the material privileges that accompanied various kinds of 
labour, all of which demonstrate that apostles too have the right to be supported 
financially for their service. Indeed, just as a soldier does not serve in the military 
furnishing his own meals, or a vineyard worker labour without eating his own fruit, 
or a shepherd without access to the flock’s milk (9.7), or a threshing ox without 
eating grain (9.9-10), or a priest without sharing in the temple sacrifices (9.13), so 
neither should an apostle preach the gospel without the opportunity to receive 
material support from those to whom he ministers (9.11-12a).12 The Lord, in fact, 
commanded (διατάσσω) that apostles live off of the gospel (9.14).13 But after having 
made a case for his possession of certain inalienable rights, Paul twice insists that he 
has not used any of those rights (9.12a, 15a). The grounds for Paul’s twin refusals, in 
addition to being central to the aim of the chapter, eventually direct Paul to use the 
oikonomos (oikonomia) metaphor and therefore must be explained in some detail. 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 See, e.g., Hock, Social Context, 60; Galloway, Freedom, 155-80. Cf. Hans Dieter Betz, 'Paul's 
Concept of Freedom in the Context of Hellenistic Discussions about the Possibilities of Human 
Freedom', in Paulinische Studien (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1994), 110-25. 
12 For closer treatments of Paul’s analogies, see, e.g., Chrys C. Caragounis, 'ὈΨΩΝΙΟΝ: A 
Reconsideration of Its Meaning', NovT 16 (1974): 35-57, at 51-52; David Instone-Brewer, '1 Corinthians 
9.9-11: A Literal Interpretation of "Do Not Muzzle the Ox"', NTS 38 (1992): 554-65; Peter Richardson, 
'Temples, Altars and Living from the Gospel (1 Cor. 9.12b-18)', in Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, 
Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker, ed. L. Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson (JSNTSup 108; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 89-110. 
13 Paul may have been referring to Matt 10.10 or Luke 10.7. Dungan, Sayings, 79-80, and 
Martin, Slavery, 69, suggest the former. David G. Horrell, '"The Lord commanded... but I have not 
used...": Exegetical and Hermeneutical Reflections on 1 Cor 9.14-15', NTS 43 (1997): 587-603, at 595, 
says, ‘It is just as likely that Paul is alluding to (some form of) this whole block of instruction as that 
the proverb “the worker is worthy of his wage” alone is in view’. 
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1. Grounds for Refusal #1: An ‘Obstacle’ 
In his first refusal, Paul states that he has not made use of his right to receive 
material support (οὐκ ἐχρησάμεθα τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ταύτῃ [9.12a]) because he would 
rather endure the hardships and meagerly wages of manual labour than in any way 
place an obstacle (ἐγκοpiή) in the way of the gospel of Christ (9.12b). The precise 
nature of the obstacle that Paul sought to avoid placing remains ambiguous, but 
nevertheless deserves some explanation. We can assume that some similarities 
existed between the example he offers in chapter 9 and the conflict he sought to 
extinguish in chapter 8. In the earlier scenario, certain believers with weak 
consciences were avoiding food offered to idols (8.7). Paul therefore exhorted those 
with strong consciences—those who did not avoid idol food—to forgo their right 
(ἐξουσία) to eat idol food so that their right would not become a hindrance 
(piρόσκομμα) for weaker believers (8.9). Assuming that the presentation of Paul’s 
exemplum in chapter 9 was modeled after the conflict between the Corinthians 
themselves in chapter 8, it can be plausibly deduced that the party for whom Paul 
sought to eliminate an obstacle through his refusal of material support were those 
he similarly labeled ‘the weak’ (οἱ ἀσθενεῖς [9.22]). This is supported further by the 
fact that, although Paul used the comparative particle ὡς when referring to his 
accommodation for Jews, for those under the Law, and for those outside the Law, he 
conspicuously omits ὡς in his admission to having become weak in order to win the 
weak (ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἀσθενής [9.22]), which suggests that weak believers 
were in fact those for whom Paul wished to accommodate by refusing material 
support. 
Many ideas have been proposed concerning the identity of the weak in verse 
22 and how the obstacle placed before them could function to hinder the gospel.14 
Views range from classifying the weak as those who were suspicious of greed,15 to 
those who closely associated the acceptance of tuitions fees with sophistry,16 to 
those who factiously sought to develop patron-client ties with their teachers,17 to 
                                                        
14 While not everyone assumes the identification of the weak (9.22) and those to whom the 
gospel is obstructed (9.12), the presentation of the following views is in no way compromised by 
assuming their association here.  
15 Weiß, Der erste Korintherbrief, 262; Barrett, First Corinthians, 207; John C. Hurd, The Origin of 1 
Corinthians (London: SPCK, 1965), 204-205; Nils A. Dahl, 'Paul and Possessions', in Studies in Paul: 
Theology for the Early Christian Mission (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977), 22-39, at 34. 
16 Winter, Sophists, 164-69. 
17 Hock, Social Context, 61; Martin, Slavery, 120-21; Horrell, Social Ethos, 215. 
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those belonging to a low socio-economic stratum.18 These views are not mutually 
exclusive and most scholars adopt some combination of them in their historical 
reconstructions. There remains the possibility, however, that Paul may have labeled 
this group ἀσθενής not in an effort to describe their social or theological condition, 
but simply to draw a terminological link between chapters 8 and 9. If this is so, then 
ἀσθενής refers to an actual group, but in no way provides a window into their 
particular social circumstances. 
But while it is perhaps too unclear to identify who precisely are ‘the weak’ in 
9.22, Paul provides several clues that aid in identifying how the acceptance of 
material support could function as an obstacle in certain circumstances. Firstly, Paul 
was clearly under the impression that the acceptance of material support could 
strain some of his churches (2 Cor 11.9; 12.13-16; 1 Thess 2.9). Although he 
occasionally received funds from other congregations to aid in meeting his material 
needs while serving in distant regions (2 Cor 11.8-9; Phil 4.15-16), Paul for the most 
part was self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης [Phil 4.11]).19 He, in fact, considered his refusal of 
aid to be a gesture of his love and exalation of the Corinthians, having had their best 
interest in mind (2 Cor 11.7-8, 11). Secondly, Paul apparently considered it 
dangerous to the success of his ministry if he was confused with other teachers who 
boasted of their ability to charge their students exorbitant fees.20 Paul, therefore, 
desired to distinguish himself from those teachers so that comparisons could not be 
made between them and the apostle (2 Cor 11.12). Thirdly, Paul may have thought 
                                                        
18 Weiß, Der erste Korintherbrief, 238; Dungan, Sayings, 30-31; Theissen, 'Strong', 124-40; Scott J. 
Hafemann, Suffering and Ministry in the Spirit: Paul's Defence of His Ministry in 2 Corinthians 2:14-3:3 
(Paternoster Biblical and Theological Monographs; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1990), 133. This meaning of 
ἀσθενής is supported in 1.26-27 where Paul contrasts ‘the weak’ and ‘the strong’ to create a binary 
between the wealthy, respectable people of society and the poor and shameful. In 4.10 Paul even 
identifies himself with ‘the weak’, where he associates weakness with social, economic, physical, and 
occupational disrepute, mentioning his artisanship as contributing to his weakness. But the presence 
of ‘the weak’ in 1 Corinthians 9 does not require there to be a corresponding group within the church 
characterised as ‘the strong’. Although ‘the weak in conscience’ in 1 Corinthians 8 suggests the 
existence of some who were ‘strong in conscience’, in 9.22 it is possible that Paul considered the 
entire community as ‘weak’—in whatever sense Paul means there—and in need of accommodation. In 
his criticism of the strong in 1.27  and 4.10, Paul may have, after all, been addressing the entire 
church; cf. Barclay, 'Thessalonica and Corinth': 57. Furthermore, ἀσθενής functions in a number of 
different ways in this epistle (e.g., 9.22; 11.30; 12.22) and throughout 2 Corinthians. It is therefore 
tenuous to assume, based on evidence originating from outside this passage, that ‘the weak’ in 9.22 
belong to a socio-economically defined group. For further criticisms of the socio-economic 
classification, see Justin J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 107-
108. 
19 Wilhelm Pratscher, 'Der Verzicht des Paulus auf finanziellen Unterhalt durch seine 
Gemeinden: Ein Aspekt seiner Missionsweise', NTS 25 (1979): 284-98. 
20 Winter, Sophists, 166-69. 
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that by not conforming to the contexts of the very people he aimed to save, he 
would not have been able to apply the gospel to their particular social and 
theological situation. Several times in 1 Cor 9.19-22, for instance, Paul reiterates his 
desire to conform to his target audiences, summarising his unique ministry 
approach by stating, ‘I have become all things to all people, so that by all means I 
might save some [τοῖς piᾶσιν γέγονα piάντα, ἵνα piάντως τινὰς σώσω]’ (9.22). Given 
that objective, the meaning of the statement ‘we endure anything rather than put 
an obstacle in the way of the gospel of Christ [piάντα στέγομεν, ἵνα μή τινα ἐγκοpiὴν 
δῶμεν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ]’ (9.12) might mean that Paul was willing to 
overcome the hardships of working with his hands in order to associate with the 
working class.21 Finally, Paul may have thought that receiving financial aid from 
converts who, despite their generosity, did not intend to participate in Paul’s 
sufferings could prevent the church from growing in maturity (Phil 1.7; 4.14). Paul, 
then, may have desired that the Corinthians envisage their gifts as symbols of 
partnership in Christ and the gospel before he accepted their support.22 
The trouble with identifying ‘the weak’ and how they would be obstructed 
from the gospel if Paul were to accept support remains a matter for further 
investigation in Pauline scholarship. But whatever the case, Paul’s refusal was on 
account of them so that the gospel might reach and save some (τινὰς σώσω [9.22]). 
This objective, in fact, was a matter of utmost importance for Paul, as the second 
grounds for his refusal indicates. 
 
2. Grounds for Refusal #2: Paul’s ‘Boast’ 
Paul’s second declaration of refusal is similar to the first. Initially, Paul 
affirms that he has not used any of his rights (ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ κέχρημαι οὐδενὶ τούτων 
[9.15a]).23 But this time he goes well beyond asserting that he prefers hardships to 
                                                        
21 Horrell, Social Ethos, 215; Hafemann, Suffering, 133. 
22 Timothy B. Savage, Power through Weakness: Paul's Understanding of the Christian Ministry in 2 
Corinthians (SNTSMS 86; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 98-99. The possibility of this 
as a factor at work in the Corinthian church is questionable in light of the fact that Paul promises 
never to accept pay from them (2 Cor 11.9, 11). 
23 The use of the plural τούτων (v. 15a) surely parallels τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ταύτῃ (v. 12b). Even if Paul 
has multiple rights in mind (cf. vv. 4-6), the right to material aid is the chief idea here; cf. Fee, First 
Corinthians, 416, n. 12. The ταῦτα in v. 15b, however, refers to the arguments he is currently 
presenting (ἔγραψα) in support of ‘these rights’ (15a). Further, the use of the first person pronoun 
ἐγώ in verse 15 suggests a sense of ‘individuality and emphasis’, by which Paul sets himself apart 
from those who made no such refusal; cf. Thiselton, First Corinthians, 693. 
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obstructing the gospel by stating that he would in fact rather die than have anyone 
nullify his boast (9.15b).24 Unfortunately, in verse 15 Paul does not explicitly state 
the object of his boast. Nevertheless, since in verse 16 he considers preaching the 
gospel to be a boastless activity for him (οὐκ ἔστιν μοι καύχημα) because it is 
compulsory under the terms of his commission (9.17), Paul’s boast should be 
identified with the completion of a certain task that he is not mandated to fulfil.25 
Paul’s boast, therefore, at the very least consists of his refusal of pay.26 This much is 
confirmed in 2 Cor 11.10 where Paul again refers to his ongoing policy of refusing 
payment from the Corinthians as a matter worthy of boasting (καύχησις). But the 
grounds for Paul’s boast can be further defined based on the parallels apparent 
between verses 12 and 15:  
 
(a) ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐχρησάμεθα τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ταύτῃ,  
(b) ἀλλὰ piάντα στέγομεν,  
(c) ἵνα μή τινα ἐγκοpiὴν δῶμεν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ 
(9.12) . . . 
(a1) ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ κέχρημαι οὐδενὶ τούτων. . . . 
(b1) καλὸν γάρ μοι μᾶλλον ἀpiοθανεῖν 
(c1) ἤ- τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει (9.15) 
                                                        
24 Hafemann, Suffering, 139: ‘The reason for the almost inconceivable weight which Paul thus 
attaches to his practice of self-support lies in his understanding of this practice as his “boast,” which 
would be “nullified” or “invalidated” should someone pay him for his ministry’. Paul also refers to 
his refusal to accept support from the Corinthians as καύχησις in 2 Cor 11.10. 
25 While receiving praise from others in ancient Rome was considered ‘the most pleasant of 
recitals’ (Plutarch, Mor. 539D), praising oneself was typically regarded as repugnant, since it was tied 
up with advancing one’s own social status. As Savage, Power, 41, states, ‘In Corinth, perhaps more 
than anywhere else, social ascent was the goal, boasting and self-display the means, personal power 
and glory the reward’. But, according to Plutarch, there were exceptions to this rule, so that an 
orator could justifiably affirm himself in public on certain occasions without being distasteful (Mor. 
539E). Self-praise was permissible in order to instill confidence and good repute in one’s audience 
(539F), to discredit harmful people (544F), and to counter and refute their self-praises (545E-F). 
Although Paul repudiated boasting earlier in the letter, his practice of it here is justified, because he 
does so with the intent to defend himself. For boasting in the Graeco-Roman world, see, e.g., E. A. 
Judge, 'Paul’s Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice', AusBR 18 (1968): 37-50; 
Christopher Forbes, 'Comparison, Self-Praise and Irony: Paul's Boasting and the Conventions of 
Hellenistic Rhetoric', NTS 32 (1986): 1-30; Duane F. Watson, 'Paul and Boasting', in Paul in the Greco-
Roman World: A Handbook, ed. J. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003), 77-
100; Jennifer A. Glancy, 'Boasting of Beatings (2 Corinthians 11:23-25)', JBL 123 (2004): 99-135; Michael 
Wojciechowski, 'Paul and Plutarch on Boasting', JGRChJ 3 (2006): 99-109. 
26 Paul’s boasting in his refusal of pay and toil as an artisan is ironic, because the itinerant 
teachers of the day normally boasted in their acceptance of pay and avoidance of work. Paul, however, 
subverts this practice by boasting in his poverty and labor, indeed in his weaknesses, those things 
which while culturally unimpressive, nonetheless manifest the power of God. 
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In both constructions Paul announces his refusal (a, a1), asserts his acceptance of or 
preference for an unpleasant course of action (b, b1), and reveals the negative 
consequences he avoids by virtue of that course (c, c1). Given the similarities 
between the two statements, Paul’s boast in verse 15 should be interpreted in the 
light of the ἵνα-clause in verse 12 (c), that is, Paul boasts in the fact that by refusing 
support he has voluntarily subjected himself to hardships in order to ensure the 
progress of the gospel. 
In summary, Paul boasts in the fact that he has voluntarily done everything 
within his power to save unbelievers and at great personal cost to himself. Through 
his refusal he is able to go above and beyond his apostolic mandate in order that the 
gospel might reach its intended ends. Paul’s boasting, then, is closely tied to his 
apostolic self-understanding. But in order to stress this point further in verses 19-
23, Paul must first embark on a brief digression where he explains why preaching on 
its own is insufficient for him to merit a boast. 
 
D. Paul’s Ministry as an Administration (9.16-23) 
The relationship between verses 16-18 and the sections which frame it is 
problematic for many scholars. Ernst Käsemann, for instance, suggested that verses 
16-18 introduce a complete change of topic, so that the entire section is superfluous 
(überflüssig).27 But upon close examination, it is apparent that the digression plays an 
important supportive function in the larger rhetorical strategy of the discourse. 
Paul’s argument—without necessarily exhibiting syllogistic logic—is a rebuttal to 
the anticipated criticisms of certain philosophically astute Corinthians.28 The 
passage’s explanatory nature is apparent in Paul’s repeated use of γάρ, which 
surfaces a surprising four times in verses 16-17. Through the use of the conjunction, 
the argument escalates from one clarifying thread to another until Paul eventually 
ends the digression with the paradoxical assertion that his μισθός is in fact his very 
refusal of the right to be paid. Verses 16-18, therefore, provide a unique glimpse 
                                                        
27 Ernst Käsemann, 'Eine paulinische Variation des „amor fati“', ZTK  (1959): 138-54, at 139. 
28 Käsemann, 'amor fati': 139, refers to the passage as ‘leidenschaftliche’, but ‘völlig unlogischen’. 
But even though the logic is difficult to follow, Joost Smit Sibinga, 'The Composition of 1 Cor. 9 and 
Its Context', NovT 40 (1998): 136-63, has shown through detailed statistical analysis that the ratio of 
syllables and verbal forms in 1 Corinthians 9—especially at verses 16 and 17—confirms that this 
chapter was ‘the careful and patient work of a highly trained literary craftsman, who gave full 
attention to the final shape of the whole composition as well as to the perfect form of innumerable 
details’. 
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into Paul’s apostolic profile, albeit in the form of a seemingly detached excursus. As 
Gordon Fee explains, ‘Although one has the feeling that the argument got away 
from him a bit, nonetheless the explanations of vv. 16-17 probably help us as much 
as anything in his letters to understand what made Paul tick’.29 It is this 
transparency together with the fact that Paul here refers to his commission as an 
administration to elucidate his apostolic role, rights, and responsibilities that makes 
this passage so important for our study. In what follows, then, we will examine 
Paul’s digression in order to discover how he used the oikonomos (oikonomia) 
metaphor to clarify for the Corinthians certain features of his apostleship. 
 
1. Apostolic Rights and Status: Wages and Volition (9.16-18) 
The digression begins in verse 16 with Paul’s admission to compulsory 
preaching, which he concedes in order to explain why he must refuse support to 
maintain his boast (9.16a). Compulsion, Paul states, has been laid upon him through 
his commission (9.16b), so that judgment awaits him if he does not preach the 
gospel (9.16c). But Paul immediately anticipates an objection to this concession: if 
he is under compulsion to preach, then according to moral philosophy he is a slave 
of God; and if he is a slave of God, then how can Paul be entitled to a wage? 
Recognising his vulnerability to this protest, Paul then clarifies his particular status 
as God’s slave by indicating the precise position he holds in God’s administration: he 
is God’s slave administrator (οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι [9.17]). But how Paul’s 
argument demonstrates his entitlement to a wage is unclear. In order to make the 
point, he presents what are often regarded as two opposing conditional sentences 
addressing the voluntary nature of his preaching: εἰ γὰρ ἑκὼν τοῦτο piράσσω, μισθὸν 
ἔχω· εἰ δὲ ἄκων, οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι (9.17). But did Paul preach the gospel 
willingly or unwillingly, and how does his volition affect his right to be paid? 
Although this is the very matter which Paul aims to illumine in verses 16-18, 
modern scholarship remains divided over Paul’s actual condition. We will therefore 
need to analyse Paul’s argument closely, carefully scrutinising the existing views, in 
order to elucidate Paul’s approach to his preaching. 
 
                                                        
29 Fee, First Corinthians, 415. 
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a. Paul as an Unpaid, Involuntary Preacher: Dale Martin 
In verse 17 Paul appears to present two opposing propositions involving the 
volitional aspect of his preaching: 
 
Table 3: The Clausal Structure of 1 Cor 9.17 
Protasis 1 εἰ γὰρ ἑκὼν τοῦτο piράσσω 9.17a 
Apodosis 1  μισθὸν ἔχω 9.17b 
Protasis 2 εἰ δὲ ἄκων 9.17c 
Apodosis 2  οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι 9.17d 
 
Most modern scholars interpret the former proposition to be hypothetical and the 
latter to be Paul’s actual condition, so that verses 16-18 indicate that Paul preached 
the gospel involuntarily. Supporters normally reach this position in part because 
they regard Paul’s admission to having had compulsion (ἀνάγκη) laid on him in 9.16 
to be equivalent to preaching unwillingly (ἄκων) in 9.17c.30 
But while there are good reasons for correlating ἀνάγκη and preaching 
ἄκων, this interpretation is fraught with questionable assumptions. Because 
preaching ἑκών31 is coupled with having a μισθός in 9.17a-b, most interpreters 
automatically conclude that Paul’s admission to preaching ἄκων in 9.17c indicates 
that he was not entitled to receive pay. This itself is due to the assumption that in 
verse 17c-d Paul intended to present an approach that was entirely antithetical to 
17a-b: if 9.17a is opposed to 9.17c, then it is normally presumed that 9.17b is 
                                                        
30 See, esp., Martin, Slavery, 71-85. Cf. Charles Hodge, An Exposition of the First Epistle to the 
Corinthians (New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1862), 162; Thomas C. Edwards, A Commentary on the 
First Epistle to the Corinthians (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1885), 235; Charles J. Ellicott, St. Paul's 
First Epistle to the Corinthians: With a Critical and Grammatical Commentary (London: Longmans, 1887), 
164; James Moffatt, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), 
120-21; Barrett, First Corinthians, 209-210; Käsemann, 'amor fati': 149-53; Margaret Thrall, First and 
Second Letters of Paul to the Corinthians (Cambridge Bible Commentaries on the New Testament; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 69-70; Gerhard Dautzenberg, 'Der Verzicht auf das 
Apostolische Unterhaltsrecht: Eine Exegetische Untersuchung zu 1 Kor 9', Biblica 50 (1969): 212-32, at 
227; Lietzmann and Kümmel, An die Korinther I/II, 43; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 158; Leon Morris, The 
First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians: An Introduction and Commentary (2nd ed.; TNTC 7; Leicester: 
InterVarsity, 1985), 135; Hafemann, Suffering, 141-44; Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, 2:324-26; 
Horrell, Social Ethos, 207; Hays, First Corinthians, 152-53; Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 129-30; Harris, Slave, 
130; Thiselton, First Corinthians, 696; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 425; Phua, Idolatry, 191-92; Richter, 
Oikonomia, 45; Lehmeier, Oikonomia, 230-31; Williams, Stewards, 81; Butarbutar, Conflict Resolution, 161. 
31 Gardner, Gifts, 92-93, proposes that ἑκών be translated ‘intentionally’ in order to 
emphasise purposefulness. But intentionality displaces the emphasis on the will and thus the 
philosophical implications bound up with the assertion, as discussed by Malherbe below. 
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opposed to 9.17d. After all, one expects the obverse of voluntarily preaching for a 
wage (merces) to be involuntarily preaching for free (gratuitum).32 
This interpretation also owes much to the supposition that all forms of 
slavery—managerial slavery included—connote unpaid labour. This assumption 
surfaces, for instance, in an important essay by Ernst Käsemann, who remarks, 
‘[W]hen Paul describes his preaching as something that is laid upon him and thus 
not to be looked upon as a service which brings with it a reward, he is, in his own 
way, picking up the saying of Jesus in Luke 17.10: “We are unworthy servants; we 
have only done what was our duty”’.33 Dale Martin similarly remarks,  
By stating that he is compelled to preach and that he therefore does not do it willingly, Paul explains 
why he does not receive a wage from the Corinthians. When Paul asks, in verse 18, “What then is my 
pay?” he does so having already rejected the possibility that he is entitled (that is, as Christ’s slave 
agent) to receive pay in the normal sense, thus opening up the possibility that he may receive pay in 
an abnormal sense. . . . Paul here says he is not able to accept pay because he is Christ’s slave agent.34 
The interpretation of verse 17 presented by Käsemann and Martin is representative 
of most scholars who interpret Paul’s preaching as involuntary and therefore 
without pay.35 But aside from the fact that it rests on certain baseless assumptions 
(as will be demonstrated later), this interpretation struggles to make Paul’s 
argument coherent. If Paul wished to communicate that he should not receive pay, 
then why did he not simply say so, perhaps stating, εἰ δὲ ἄκων, οὐ μισθὸν ἔχω? Or, 
why did he not portray himself as a menial slave (δοῦλος), rather than a privileged 
commercial agent (οἰκονόμος)? Moreover, this reading must turn a blind eye to 
                                                        
32 See, e.g., Fee, First Corinthians, 420: ‘[T]his first sentence [verse 17a-b] is intended merely to 
set up the opposite alternative, which in fact rules out any possibility of “reward” or “pay” in his 
case’. See also Martin, Slavery, 75: ‘One last linguistic indication that Paul is here describing himself as 
Christ’s slave agent lies in his opposition of “being entrusted with an oikonomia” to “having a wage” 
(misthos)’.  
33 Käsemann, 'amor fati': 140-41; translation from Ernst Käsemann, 'A Pauline Version of 
"Amor Fati"', in New Testament Questions of Today (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), 217-35, at 220. 
Numerous other interpreters find resonances between 9.16-17 and Lucan sayings of Jesus; see, e.g., 
Siegfried Kreuzer, 'Der Zwang des Boten: Beobachtungen zu Lk 14 23 und 1 Kor 9 16', ZNW 76 (1985): 
123-28; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 368. Cf. Marshall, Enmity, 303: ‘A slave, in most instances, could 
expect no salary, as Paul and his readers were well aware’. 
34 Martin, Slavery, 71. In order to make verse 17 cohere with verse 18, Martin must interpret 
Paul’s μισθός in verse 18 in an ‘abnormal sense’. He explains that ‘the reward Paul receives for 
preaching as a slave of Christ is the opportunity to give up his authority, his power’ (85). Cf. 
Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 368. Martin, with many other interpreters, recognises that verse 18 
expresses some kind of a paradox. But the fact that Martin must render Paul’s μισθός as ‘abnormal’ 
exposes the strain his interpretation places on Paul’s argument. Hafemann, Suffering, 143-44, avoids a 
paradoxical sense by regarding Paul’s μισθός in 9.18 as eschatological (cf. 3.8, 14). But while an 
eschatological reward awaits the faithful completion of Paul’s ministry (9.24-27), his μισθός in 9.18 
cannot refer directly to it since he expressly states that his μισθός is in fact his refusal. 
35 So, Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 158: ‘[O]nly voluntary labor deserves and gains a reward’; 
Thiselton, First Corinthians, 696: ‘Paul makes a logical point that only acts carried out from self-
motivation or self-initiative belong to the logical order of “reward”’. 
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Paul’s larger objective in the discourse—the demonstration of the refusal of his right 
to receive material support. As observed above, in verses 4-14 Paul repeatedly 
insists that he has the right to receive pay from the Corinthians.36 Käsemann and 
Martin, however, conclude that in verses 16-17 Paul contradicts what he so 
adamantly maintained for the entire first half of the chapter!37 This reading 
absolutely strips Paul of his ἐξουσία, so that he has neither the right to use nor the 
right to refuse a wage for his preaching. Beyond that, in verse 18 the question τίς οὖν 
μού ἐστιν ὁ μισθός suggests that Paul actually believes he is entitled to a wage. If 
Paul, after conceding in verse 17 that he is not entitled to a wage, immediately 
changes his mind yet again and suggests that he is entitled to pay after all (even in 
an ‘abnormal sense’ as Martin maintains), then one must conclude that Paul’s 
discourse is completely incoherent. 
This thesis, then, has the advantage of interpreting ἄκων in verse 17 as 
echoing ἀνάγκη in verse 16, and thus correctly regards 17c-d as Paul’s real situation. 
But by understanding 17d as the opposite of 17b, Martin and many other 
interpreters leave Paul without any entitlement to pay, which undercuts Paul’s 
entire argument in verses 4-14 and makes Paul’s claim to having a μισθός in verse 18 
appear out of nowhere, a leap in logic that even an ‘abnormal’ reading like Martin’s 
is unable to satisfy. 
 
                                                        
36 This discrepancy is in fact one of Malherbe’s strongest points. See Malherbe, 
'Determinism', 249 n. 35: ‘My interpretation differs from that of most commentators, who take εἰ δὲ 
ἄκων as a real condition, interpreting it in light of ἀνάγκη. This would mean that (unlike the other 
apostles) Paul had no right to financial support’. This tension is also apparent in Robertson and 
Plummer, First Corinthians, 189-90, who regarded both 17a-b and 17c-d as Paul’s actual condition. 
37 Even Richard A. Horsley, 'Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 
Corinthians 8-10', CBQ 40 (1978): 574-89, at 588, as he seeks to demonstrate that ‘Paul surely knows 
what he is doing’ in the juxtaposition of slavery and freedom throughout 9.16-19, must admit that his 
approach is ‘seemingly contradictory’. Unfortunately, this interpretive inconsistency continues to 
resurface. In her unpublished doctoral thesis, Kate C. Donahoe, 'From Self-Praise to Self-Boasting: 
Paul's Unmasking of the Conflicting Rhetorico-Lingusitic Phenomena in 1 Corinthians' (PhD Diss., 
Univ. of St Andrews, 2008), 194-95, writes, ‘Paul’s purpose in life is to preach the gospel without 
financial profit. . . . If Paul freely chose to proclaim the good news in Corinth, then he could expect a 
reward from the Corinthian community. However, since he does not preach out of his own volition, 
he is not entitled to material compensation. . . . Similar to the steward who is not entitled to pay, Paul 
likewise is not entitled to recompense from believing communities under his care. As one entitled to 
no reward, Paul asks τίς οὖν μού ἐστιν ὁ μισθός (9:18). He equates receiving payment with his ability 
to freely proclaim the gospel to everyone without any patronal obligations impeding his ministry. By 
offering the gospel free of charge (ἀδάpiανος), Paul avoids abusing his authority by making full use of 
his right (καταχρήσασθαι τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ μου) in the gospel’. But Donahoe’s recognition that ‘Paul avoids 
abusing his authority by making full use of his right’ clearly contradicts her earlier conclusion that 
Paul in fact has no right to receive pay as God’s slave administrator. 
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b. Paul as a Paid, Voluntary Preacher: Abraham Malherbe 
Given the weaknesses of the traditional reading, Abraham Malherbe has 
recently defended an alternative position which places Paul’s discourse in the 
context of Cynic-Stoic debates on predestination.38 By reading Paul’s application of 
the terms ἐλεύθερος, δουλόω, ἐξουσία, ἀνάγκη, ἑκών, and ἄκων in the light of their 
philosophical context, Malherbe seeks to make the apostle’s volition compatible 
with divine necessity.39 Malherbe argues that Paul’s preaching, while on the one 
hand a compulsion (ἀνάγκη), was nevertheless conducted willingly (ἑκών), rather 
than unwillingly (ἄκων) as traditional interpreters such as Käsemann and Martin 
understand him.40 
According to Stoicism, the wise man alone can be free, but only by ridding 
himself of all passions and desires which conflict with the predetermination of Fate. 
So, Seneca states, ‘I have set freedom before my eyes; and I am striving for that 
reward. And what is freedom, you ask? It means not being a slave to any 
circumstance, to any constraint [necessitati], to any chance; it means compelling 
Fortune to enter the lists on equal terms’ (Ep. 51.9). Epictetus agrees with Seneca’s 
Stoic conception of freedom, saying, ‘He is free who lives as he wills [ὡς βούλεται], 
who is subject neither to compulsion [οὔτ’ ἀναγκάσαι], nor hindrance, nor force, 
whose choices are unhampered, whose desires attain their end, whose aversions do 
not fall into what they would avoid’ (Diatr. 4.1.1; cf. 2.1.23).41 But while compulsions 
                                                        
38 Malherbe, 'Determinism', 231-41, masterfully traces Paul’s argument from 1 Corinthians 8 
to 9 to demonstrate the influence of Stoic thought in the discourse: ‘In 1 Corinthians 9 Paul makes 
use of Greek philosophic terminology as he discusses the compulsion under which he is to preach the 
gospel. He does so, not because he is a Greek philosopher, but partly because the practical issue that 
he is addressing was raised in philosophic terms’ (243). For the influence of Stoicism on the 
Corinthian church, see Terence Paige, 'Stoicism, ἐλευθερία and Community at Corinth', in Worship, 
Theology and Ministry in the Early Church: Essays in Honor of Ralph P. Martin, ed. Michael J. Wilkins and 
Terence Paige (JSNTSup 87; Sheffield: JSOT, 1992), 180-93. 
39 For Paul’s freedom as financial independence from the Corinthians, see Hock, Social 
Context, 61. But the philosophical, rather than social or economic, sense of freedom is to be preferred, 
as Paul seems to speak of being free as interchangeable with possessing apostolic rights. Cf. Collins, 
First Corinthians, 329; Galloway, Freedom, 164. 
40 Malherbe, 'Determinism', 249-50; cf. Reumann, 'ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ-Terms': , at 159; Hock, Social 
Context, 100 n. 113; F. F. Bruce, 1 and 2 Corinthians (New Century Bible; London: Oliphants, 1980), 85-86; 
Robbins, Tapestry, 85; Collins, First Corinthians, 348; Byron, Slavery, 249-53. 
41 A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 221: ‘It 
is virtually certain that Epictetus’ concept of a free will, far from requiring the will’s freedom from 
fate (i.e. a completely open future or set of alternative possibilities or choices), presupposes people’s 
willingness to comply with their predestined allotment. The issue that concerns him is neither the 
will’s freedom from antecedent causation nor the attribution to persons of a completely open future 
and indeterminate power of choice. Rather, it is freedom from being constrained by (as distinct from 
going along with) external contingencies, and freedom from being constrained by the errors and 
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impose themselves on all people, according to Stoicism they can be overcome 
through reason and philosophy by desiring those very things that are necessary. 
The following excerpts from Seneca instruct the Stoic how to achieve liberation: 
‘Then how can I free myself?’ you ask. You cannot escape necessities, but you can overcome them. By 
force a way is made. And this way will be afforded you by philosophy. Betake yourself therefore to 
philosophy if you would be safe, untroubled, happy, in fine, if you wish to be,—and that is most 
important,—free. There is no other way to attain this end. (Ep. 37.3) 
[T]he wise man does nothing unwillingly [invitus]. He escapes necessity, because he wills to do [vult] 
what necessity is about to force upon him [coactura]. (Ep. 54.7) 
See to it that you never do anything unwillingly [invitus]. That which is bound to be a necessity if you 
rebel, is not a necessity if you desire it [volenti]. This is what I mean: he who takes his orders gladly 
[libens], escapes the bitterest part of slavery,—doing what one does not want to do [nolit]. (Ep. 61.3)42 
These readings promote philosophy as the great liberator of the soul, since through 
reason alone one can direct his or her desires toward that which is necessary. 
Additional examples from Epictetus solidify this point: 
Come, can anyone force [ἀναγκάσαι] you to choose something that you do not want?—He can; for 
when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels [ἀναγκάζει] me to choose.—If, however, you 
despise death and bonds, do you pay any further heed to him?—No.—Is it, then, an act of your own to 
despise death, or is it not your own act? It is mine. (Diatr. 4.1.70-71) 
As for me, I told you that the only unhindered thing was the desire; but where there is a use of the 
body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted that also.—
Can anyone force [ἀναγκάσαι] you to desire what you do not want?—No one. (Diatr. 4.1.74) 
These texts support the idea that moral philosophers prescribed reason in the battle 
against the enslaving power of compulsions and those outward circumstances 
beyond one’s control. Apparently, even death, if one could resist fearing it, would 
cease serving as a person’s master, since the one who went along with his or her 
outer compulsions became, as it were, inwardly free. 
It is within this context of ancient philosophy that Malherbe reads Paul’s 
argument in 9.15-18. Malherbe initially acknowledges the dissimilarity between 
Paul and the Stoics (and the Cynics), since Paul, to the abhorrence of moral 
philosophy, grants that he has had compulsion laid upon him (9.16).43 But Malherbe 
proceeds to explain that Paul in fact closes the gap between himself and the Stoics 
through his voluntary acceptance of divine necessity: 
                                                                                                                                                               
passions consequential on believing that such contingencies must influence and inhibit one’s 
volition’. Cf. Susanne Bobzein, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), 330-57. 
42 For the relevance of Seneca’s remarks for Paul’s discourse, see especially the 
terminological overlap between Seneca and the Vulgate’s rendering of verses 16-17: nam si 
evangelizavero non est mihi gloria necessitas enim mihi incumbit vae enim mihi est si non evangelizavero si 
enim volens hoc ago mercedem habeo si autem invitus dispensatio mihi credita est. 
43 Malherbe, 'Determinism', 249; cf. Martin, Slavery, 76, who regards Paul’s admission to 
being compelled as a ‘philosophical faux pas’. 
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As we have seen . . . Stoics exercized [sic] their free will in the manner in which they conducted 
themselves within the providential scheme of things. So does Paul. He willingly does what necessity 
has laid upon him, thus exercizing [sic] his freedom, the topic that has engaged him throughout this 
long argument. That it is freedom of action that predominates in his thinking and not compulsion, is 
evident from vv. 18-19. There he provides the grounds for forgoing his exousia — his freedom did 
not compel him to insist on his exousia, but allowed him to forgo it.44 
According to Malherbe, therefore, Paul conducts his preaching functionally as a 
Stoic: like the Stoics, Paul, though outwardly compelled, cooperates with divine 
necessity by inwardly desiring his apostolic mandate. Malherbe concedes that Paul 
has been entrusted with an administration (notice the perfect tense of piιστεύω in 
9.17d), which he possesses presumably by virtue of his compulsion, so that ‘[i]f Paul 
were to preach unwillingly (εἰ δὲ ἄκων is hypothetical)’, he would have to preach 
anyway, for ‘he nevertheless has been entrusted with an οἰκονομία’.45 But even so, 
Paul’s preaching is performed willingly, thus freely and deserving of pay. 
In his examination, Malherbe insightfully applies to Paul’s discourse the 
concepts of freedom and constraint found in the Stoics. Moreover, he carefully 
notices that in verses 18 and 19 Paul possesses the right, and thus the freedom, to 
receive and refuse material support. But Malherbe’s contention for the actuality of 
17a-b and the hypothetical nature of 17c fails to account for three exegetical 
observations. Firstly, from Malherbe’s perspective, it is remains unclear why Paul 
included 17c-d in the discourse at all. If 17a-b represents Paul’s actual condition and 
becomes the subject of more focused discussion in verses 18-19, then Paul’s 
inclusion of 17c-d—particularly the disclosure of his administration in 17d—merely 
reinforces the already revealed fact that Paul is externally compelled to preach (9.16) 
and his underlying, outward condition is that of a slave of God.46 From Malherbe’s 
perspective, then, 17c-d unnecessarily detracts from Paul’s argument, thus his is an 
implausible reading. Secondly, despite Paul’s possession of his right in verse 18 and 
his freedom in verse 19, it is not clear that Paul performs his preaching willingly in 
verse 17. As intimated earlier in reference to Martin’s interpretation, Paul’s right to 
be paid does not rest exclusively on voluntary preaching, as interpreters normally 
suppose. Such is an unwarranted assumption based solely on the presumed 
                                                        
44 Malherbe, 'Determinism', 250. 
45 Malherbe, 'Determinism', 249; cf. 251. 
46 Contra Byron, Slavery, 243-53, who argues that Paul conceived of his administration as 
befitting free persons. For the use of οἰκονομία and piιστεύω (in the passive voice) as denoting a slave 
οἰκονόμος, see Artemidorus, Onir. 1.35 with 2.30; cf. Martin, Slavery, 75, 200 n. 44. 
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antithesis of the apodoses in 17b and 17d. As will be demonstrated below, Paul’s 
right is maintained in spite of the involuntary nature of his preaching. 
Finally and quite significantly, the ways in which Paul acknowledges the on-
going presence of his compulsion suggest that he had not overcome all external 
coercions, whether by reason, will, or otherwise. In addition to the texts cited 
above, there are a number of passages from Paul’s Stoic contemporaries which 
demonstrate that having any compulsion was equivalent to performing involuntary 
actions and being a slave. This point is made explicitly by Seneca, Epictetus, and 
Philo: 
I am under no compulsion [nihil cogor], I suffer nothing against my will [nihil patior invitus], and I am 
not God’s slave but his follower’ (Seneca, Prov. 5.6). 
Doesn’t it strike you as “having to do with being a slave” for a man to do something against his will, 
under compulsion [τὸ ἄκοντά τι piοιεῖν, τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον]? (Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.11) 
When, therefore, it is in another’s power to put hindrances in a man’s way and subject him to 
compulsion [ἀναγκάσαι], say confidently that this man is not free. (Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.56) 
The unhampered man, who finds things ready to hand as he wants them, is free. But the man who 
can be hampered, or subjected to compulsion [ἀναγκάσαι], or hindered, or thrown into something 
against his will [ἄκοντα], is a slave. (Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.128) 
The law-giver of the Jews describes the wise man’s hands as heavy, indicating by this figure that his 
actions are not superficial but firmly based, the outcome of a mind that never wavers. No one then 
can compel him [piρὸς οὐδενὸς οὖν ἀναγκάζεται], since he has come to despise both pain and death, 
and by the law of nature has all fools in subjection. (Philo, Prob., 29-3o) 
He who always acts sensibly, always acts well: he who always acts well, always acts rightly: he who 
always acts rightly, also acts impeccably, blamelessly, faultlessly, irreproachably, harmlessly, and, 
therefore, will have the power [ἐξουσίαν] to do anything, and to live as he wishes [ὡς βούλεται], and 
he who has this power [ἔξεστιν] must be free. But the good man always acts sensibly, and, therefore, 
he alone is free. Again, one who cannot be compelled to do anything [μήτ᾽ ἀναγκάσαι] or prevented 
from doing anything, cannot be a slave. But the good man cannot be compelled [οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκάσαι] or 
prevented: the good man, therefore, cannot be a slave. That he is not compelled nor prevented is 
evident. One is prevented when he does not get what he desires [ὧν ὀρέγεται], but the wise man 
desires things which have their origin in virtue, and these, being what he is, he cannot fail to obtain. 
Further, if one is compelled [ἀναγκάζεται] he clearly acts against his will [ἄκων]. But where there 
are actions, they are either righteous actions born of virtue or wrong actions born of vice or neutral 
and indifferent. The virtuous actions he performs not under constraint but willingly [ἑκών], since all 
that he does are what he holds to be desirable. The vicious are to be eschewed and therefore he 
never dreams of doing them [piράττει; cf. 1 Cor 9.17a]. Naturally too in matters indifferent he does 
not act under compulsion. To these, as on a balance his mind preserves its equipoise, trained neither 
to surrender to them in acknowledgement of their superior weight, nor yet to regard them with 
hostility, as deserving aversion. Whence it is clear that he does nothing unwillingly [ἄκων] and is 
never compelled [ἀναγκάζεται], whereas if he were a slave he would be compelled [ἠναγκάζετ᾽], and 
therefore the good man will be a free man’ (Philo, Prob., 59-61).47 
                                                        
47 Galloway, Freedom, 140, summarizes, ‘[T]he ἐλεύθερος [in Philo’s Quod omnis probus liber sit] 
desires only those things that are virtuous, and in achieving these goals will act willingly and not 
unwillingly. In all judgments, the ἐλεύθερος cannot be compelled or hindered but will exercise good 
sense, self-control, and justice’. For the use of ἑκών and ἄκων in literal, legal slavery, see Chariton: 
‘Do not bring a curse upon yourself! You are her master [κύριος], with full power over her [τὴν 
ἐξουσίαν ἔχεις αὐτῆς], so she must do your will whether she likes it or not [ἑκοῦσα καὶ ἄκουσα]’ 
(Chariton, Chaer. 2.6.2); cf. ‘Hence, it needs must follow that those too who have authority [ἔχοντας 
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Because these philosophers consistently identify the person under compulsion with 
one who acts involuntarily, it is clear that Paul’s admission to having a compulsion 
laid upon him—notice the present tense of ἐpiίκειμαι in verse 16—is equivalent to 
stating that his preaching is performed unwillingly. 
Further, the perpetuation of Paul’s constraint to preach the gospel is 
apparent from his fear of the consequences for not preaching: οὐαὶ γάρ μοί ἐστιν ἐὰν 
μὴ εὐαγγελίσωμαι (9.16b). What would Paul have had to fear if indeed he willfully 
preached? In Stoicism the very fear of pain and punishment was indicative of 
slavery, as explained by Epictetus: ‘[A]nd if you hear him say, “Alas! What I must 
suffer! [τάλας ἐγώ, οἷα piάσχω]” call him a slave; and in short, if you see him wailing, 
complaining, in misery, call him a slave in a toga praetexta’ (Diatr. 4.1.57).48 Epictetus 
himself apparently overcame the fear of illness, torture, and death, and was 
therefore considered free: 
But I have never been hindered in the exercise of my will, nor have I ever been subjected to 
compulsion against my will [ἠναγκάσθην μὴ θέλων]. And how is this possible? I have submitted my 
freedom of choice unto God [piροσκατατέταχά μου τὴν ὁρμὴν τῷ θεῷ]. He wills that I shall have 
fever; it is my will too. He wills that I should choose something; it is my will too. He wills that I shall 
desire something; it is my will too. He wills that I should get something; it is my wish too. He does 
not will it; I do not wish it. Therefore, it is my will to die; therefore, it is my will to be tortured on the 
rack. Who can hinder me any longer against my own views, or put compulsion [ἀναγκάσαι] upon 
me? That is no more possible in my case than it would be with Zeus. (Diatr. 4.1.89-90) 
Epictetus conquered his compulsions by desiring illness, torture, and even death if 
they were the will of God. As Epictetus states, quoting Diogenes, ‘The one sure way 
to secure freedom is to die cheerfully’ (Diatr. 4.1.30). But in his discourse Paul makes 
no such claims to desire or cheer, but only acknowledges through a prophetic ‘woe’ 
the sentence he would face should he not comply with his divine commission. 
Indeed, Paul insists that he cannot cheer or ‘boast’ (καύχημα) for preaching the 
gospel (9.16). Such is the condition of one who is compelled to preach. As Käsemann 
remarks, ‘Diese Gottesmacht drängt ihn ruhe- und schonungslos als ihren Sklaven 
durch die Mittelmeerwelt’.49 
While Malherbe’s interpretation, then, has the advantage of explaining that 
Paul is entitled to a μισθός (9.18), there is no indication in verses 16-18 that Paul 
regards himself to have overcome his compulsion, and thus is inwardly free. The 
                                                                                                                                                               
ἐξουσίαν] over some one of these circumstances are our masters [κυρίους]’ (Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.59). 
Also, Aristotle: ‘Men act voluntarily when they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion 
(ἑκόντες δὲ piοιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι’ (Rhet. 1.10.3). 
48 For the use of τάλας in the prophetic woes, see Is 6.5 (LXX): καὶ εἶpiα ὦ τάλας ἐγώ ὅτι 
κατανένυγμαι. 
49 Käsemann, 'amor fati': 150. 
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discourse suggests, rather, that Paul truly is compelled like an administrator of God, 
and his admission to being so would have in fact been abhorrent to a Stoic. Since, 
therefore, neither Martin nor Malherbe have articulated views that make coherent 
all the details in the passage, we will offer a new reading that accounts for both the 
philosophical and commercial contexts demanded of the discourse, by portraying 
Paul as a paid, yet involuntary preacher. 
 
c. Paul as a Paid, Involuntary Preacher: A New Reading 
It is our contention that, not only did Paul preach involuntarily as a slave 
administrator, but his position as administrator, far from dismissing his right to 
receive payment, actually supported his claim to being deserving of remuneration. 
Whether, therefore, he preached willingly or unwillingly—that is as a free labourer 
or a slave administrator—Paul was entitled to a μισθός. 
 
i. The Compensation of Slave Administrators 
The payment of administrators and other privileged slaves for their labour is 
certainly not a new proposal (see Chapter 4). Martin himself conceded that business 
slaves, and especially administrators, would normally have received compensation 
for their work. Yet Martin resisted the conclusion that Paul was issued a paid 
administration because of how the apostle referred to the arrangement.50 Moreover, 
Martin apparently assumes, along with the rest of Pauline scholarship, that the 
conditional sentences in 9.17 are in complete opposition to one another. In other 
words, he regarded the protasis in 17a (εἰ γὰρ ἑκὼν τοῦτο piράσσω) to be in 
opposition to the protasis in 17c (εἰ δὲ ἄκων), and the apodosis in 17b (μισθὸν ἔχω) 
to be in opposition to the apodosis in 17d (οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι). When analysed 
closely, however, one realises that the two apodoses are not antithetical; while the 
protases in 17a and 17c are opposed, the apodoses in 17b and 17d are not. Paul never 
states explicitly that he is without the right to receive a wage, but simply insists 
that he is a slave of God. And quite significantly, he is not a menial slave (δοῦλος), 
                                                        
50 Martin, Slavery, 75: ‘It is true that slaves were usually paid by their masters for their work. 
This was probably even more often true for managerial slaves than for common laborers, but misthon 
echein is not a normal way of referring to this financial arrangement’. Martin also discusses how 
slaves were able to circumvent the legal barriers which prevented them from obtaining possessions 
(7-11). 
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but a slave administrator by virtue of having been entrusted with an administration 
(οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι). And as an administrator, that is, a privileged commercial 
slave, Paul implies that he possesses the right to receive payment, an implication 
that will now be demonstrated. 
The remuneration of administrators for their labour is suggested in literary 
and non-literary texts. The privileges of slave stewards in the Latin agronomists and 
other real-life bailiffs from Roman Egypt often included some form of monetary 
compensation. Jane Rowlandson, for instance, describes how the landowners of 
Oxyrhynchus paid their administrators in cash and/or kind. ‘Like tenancy’, she 
writes, ‘agricultural wage labour took a variety of forms, from long-term employees 
(ranging in status from bailiffs to humble servants) to independent workers or 
craftsmen being paid for performing a single service. In both cases, but particularly 
the former, payment in kind was often supplemented by or substituted for cash 
wages’.51 Dominic Rathbone makes a similar distinction between the forms of 
compensation, explaining that all permanent employees of the Appianus and 
related estates in the Arnsinoite nome received either a salary (ὀψώνιον), in the 
form of ‘a fixed monthly allowance of cash and wheat and sometimes vegetable oil’, 
or a wage (μισθός).52 A mid third-century CE document from Oxyrhynchus, for 
instance, mentions a certain Calpurnia Heraclia, who in her corn registration 
reports that ‘monthly allowances [from her corn holdings] are given to the agents 
and stewards and farmers and boys and monthly workers [δίδονται μηνιαῖαι 
συντάξεις piραγματευταῖς τε καὶ φροντισταῖς καὶ γεωργοῖς καὶ piαιδαρίοις καὶ 
καταμηνείοις]’ (P.Oxy. 3048.19-20).53 The labourers, of course, could then easily 
barter these allowances in the marketplace to supply their cash needs.54 
                                                        
51 Rowlandson, Landowners and Tenants, 205. 
52 Rathbone, Economic Rationalism, 91-92. Rathbone, however, contends that there exists ‘no 
evidence that the independent administrators of the Appianus estate were paid a salary for their 
services. . . . A salary might anyway have been seen as socially demeaning. The administrators 
instead enjoyed occasional perks such as hospitality when they visited phrontides and opportunities 
to make personal profits by dealing in estate produce, but we may guess that their main rewards 
were the prestige and influence conferred by association with the estate, Appianus’ patronage and 
gifts from him’ (70-71). But the exceptional nature of the Appianus estate may be due to the fact that 
the central administrators were probably free or freedmen already in possession of some means, 
being ‘barely inferior to the owners for whom they acted’ (70). 
53 Rowlandson, Landowners and Tenants, 207, states that the labourers listed in the letter were 
‘certainly estate employees’. 
54 Rathbone, Economic Rationalism, 111-12. 
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A more common form of compensation among slave administrators was the 
grant of a peculium.55 As discussed in Chapter 4, the peculium of a slave, while legally 
belonging to the master, served as an allowance of money, provisions, and other 
slaves by which the slave could live from day to day and even increase in order to 
purchase various luxuries. Two kinds of purchases verify that administrators and 
other privileged slaves earned great sums of money which were then treated as 
their own. Firstly, the great monetary gain of some administrators is apparent in 
the epitaphs they are responsible for erecting. Although some of these inscriptions 
are modest, others are quite lavish and make a point to mention that the 
monuments were paid for by the administrator himself, presumably with his 
peculium.56 But undoubtedly the most important purchase a slave could make was 
his freedom. As Peter Garnsey remarks, ‘Unless we grant that profits could be made 
in [trading ventures and manufactures], it is difficult or impossible to understand 
how it was that slaves were able to buy their freedom’.57 Therefore, even though 
payments and allowances came in a variety of forms, it is clear that administrators 
and other privileged slaves could expect to be compensated for their labour. 
 
ii. Corresponding Apodoses: 1 Cor 9.17 and 2 Cor 5.13 
The fact that administrators normally received compensation for their 
labour has significant implications for our reading of 1 Cor 9.16-18. Far from 
implying that he is an unworthy slave who simply fulfils his duty (Luke 17.10), by 
asserting that he has been entrusted with an administration, Paul insists that he is a 
privileged slave of God who, though compelled to preach, is entitled to pay. The 
conditional sentences that make up verse 17, therefore, should no longer be 
considered completely antithetical, as the scholarly consensus maintains. Instead, 
                                                        
55 Watson, Slave Law, 90-101; Andreau, Banking and Business, 66: ‘According to several texts in 
the Digest, the slave institor would often get a salary, a merces, in return for his work (operae). But, in 
some cases, he did not receive any direct reward. In such a case, his operae were free, gratuitae, but he 
probably had other benefits (for instance, some better opportunity to run his peculium). The money 
sunk in the business was not part of the peculium of the slave-agent. But that does not mean that the 
slave did not also possess a peculium, so that in practice a certain confusion could sometimes arise 
over which sums were entrusted to the slave as part of his peculium and which were those that he 
managed in his capacity as agent’. 
56 Cf. Carlsen, Vilici, 95. Bradley, Slaves and Masters, 110: ‘From epigraphic evidence it appears 
that at times [slaves] spent what must have been substantial sums on commemorative epitaphs and 
even public monuments’. 
57 Peter Garnsey, 'Independent Freedmen and the Economy of Roman Italy under the 
Principate', Klio 63 (1981): 359-71, at 370. 
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the two apodoses correspond: if Paul preaches willingly, then naturally he is 
entitled to a wage; but (δέ) if he preaches unwillingly, as in fact he does, then he has 
been entrusted with an administration, which still entitles him to remuneration.58 
The plausibility of Paul utilising two corresponding, rather than antithetical 
apodoses in 1 Cor 9.17 is in fact supported elsewhere in the Corinthian 
correspondence. In 2 Cor 5.13, Paul states, ‘For if we are irrational, it is for God; if we 
are rational, it is for you’ (εἴτε γὰρ ἐξέστημεν, θεῷ· εἴτε σωφρονοῦμεν, ὑμῖν).59 
Having had experiences which have brought into question Paul’s rationality, here 
the apostle defends himself and his actions by contrasting, as he does in 1 Cor 9.17, 
two alternative protases in order to legitimate a single proposition about his 
ministry—its selfless nature.60 Paul’s selflessness is expressed through two 
seemingly competing apodoses: his actions are performed either for the benefit of 
God (θεῷ) or for the benefit of the church (ὑμῖν). In either case, however, whether 
Paul is found to be out of his mind or with sound mind, a single proposition is 
affirmed: he ministers for the benefit of others. As Ralph Martin verifies, ‘On the 
surface, it comes into view that no matter the state of Paul’s mind or disposition, he 
does nothing for himself; all is done for God and the Corinthians. . . .  [W]hether Paul 
speaks of his exceptional behavior or his ordinary, all of his actions are directed 
towards someone else’.61 Moyer Hubbard similarly maintains, ‘[H]owever vexing the 
parts may be, the whole is reasonably clear: Paul is stating that his actions are 
entirely free of selfish ambition and wholly “other” directed’.62 Murray Harris 
concurs: ‘Whatever the background to this difficult verse, its general import seems 
clear. Paul disowns self-interest as a motive for any of his action. . . . [A]ll is for God’s 
glory and the benefit of others’.63  
Thus, in 2 Cor 5.13 we have another example of two conditional sentences 
with antithetical protases, but corresponding apodoses, through which Paul makes 
                                                        
58 The δέ in verse 17 is adversative, but the two concepts being contrasted are ἑκών and 
ἄκων, not μισθὸν ἔχω and οἰκονομίαν piεpiίστευμαι. 
59 For the defence as targeting Paul’s rhetorical lucidity, rather than sanity, see Moyer 
Hubbard, 'Was Paul Out of His Mind? Re-Reading 2 Corinthians 5.13', JSNT 70 (1998): 39-64, esp. 61. 
60 The correspondence between 1 Cor 9.17 and 2 Cor 5.13 is further supported by the 
apologetic function of the two discourses and their shared use of γάρ. Cf. Frank J. Matera, II 
Corinthians: A Commentary (NTL; Louisville: WJK, 2003), 131. 
61 Ralph P. Martin, 2 Corinthians (WBC 40; Waco, TX: Word, 1986), 126-27. 
62 Hubbard, 'Was Paul Out of His Mind?': 39. 
63 Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 417. 
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a single point. In the light of this passage, the rhetorical approach argued for in 1 
Cor 9.17 finds strong support. 
 
iii. The Coherence of 9.16-18 
Having established that administrators were normally compensated for their 
work, we argued that Paul’s administration was deserving of pay and that 1 Cor 9.17 
should be interpreted as containing two corresponding apodoses. But how then 
should verse 17 read and how does this new reading correlate with the exegetical 
insights in verses 16-18 observed in the earlier critiques of the views represented by 
Martin and Malherbe? 
The digression begun in verse 16 is introduced in order to ward off the 
anticipated criticisms of certain philosophically astute members in the church. 
While in verses 12 and 15 Paul boasts in the fact that he has refused his right to 
receive material support and thus has endured hardship for the sake of the gospel, 
in verse 16 he explains why preaching the gospel by itself is insufficient to merit a 
boast. He must preach because God has compelled him to preach (9.16).64 In fact, 
neglect of his commission, as with the other Hebrew prophets, will be met with 
God’s judgment (οὐαί).65 But Paul anticipates that this concession will raise the issue 
                                                        
64 Throughout his letters Paul refers to a number of mechanisms which motivate him to 
preach. Paul testifies that it is the χάρις of God that set him apart for apostolic ministry (Rom 1.5; Gal 
1.15; 1 Cor 15.10). Given the instrumentality of grace in the economy of God, one can then assume 
that it is the same grace that continued to obligate him to fulfill his call. Cf. As Polaski, Power, 122; 
John M. G. Barclay, '"By the Grace of God I Am what I Am": Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul', in 
Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment, ed. Simon J. Gathercole and John M.G. 
Barclay (LNTS; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 140-57, at 151; Ehrensperger, Power, 90; Zeba A. Crook, 
'Grace as Benefaction in Galatians 2:9, 1 Corinthians 3:10, and Romans 12:3; 15:15', in The Social 
Sciences and Biblical Translation, ed. Dietmar Neufeld (SBLSS 41; Atlanta: SBL, 2008), 25-38. But beyond 
the grace of God, the very gospel itself is suggested to have compelled Paul to preach; cf. Käsemann, 
'amor fati': 150. 
65 Crook, Reconceptualising Conversion, 160, and Zeba Crook, 'The Divine Benefactions of Paul 
the Client', JGRChJ 2 (2001-2005): 9-26, at 18-19, argues that Paul’s ἀνάγκη and fear of divine vengence 
(οὐαί) indicate that he understood himself to be the client of his patron God. But Crook fails to notice 
that Paul’s compulsion rhetoric more closely belongs to the sphere of philosophy, and his use of οὐαί 
belongs to the OT prophetic tradition. As Harry P. Nasuti, 'The Woes of the Prophets and the Rights 
of the Apostle: The Internal Dynamics of 1 Corinthians 9', CBQ 50 (1988): 246-64, at 257-58, states, 
‘Paul's self-conception in v 16 is clearly such as to link him with the biblical prophets, especially 
Jeremiah’ (cf. Jer 15.10). Comparisons can also be made between Paul and Isaiah (6.5) and Baruch (Jer 
45.3 [LXX 51.33]); cf. Gunther Wanke, '’ôy und hôy', ZAW 77 (1966): 215-18; Waldemar Janzen, 
Mourning Cry and Woe Oracle (BZAW 125; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1972); Sandnes, Paul, 125-30. Nevertheless, 
Paul’s prophetic compulsion is couched in philosophical terms in order to contextualise his thoughts 
within the philosophically influenced congregation. For a criticism of the patron-client model as a 
descriptor of Paul’s call, see David J. Downs, 'Is God Paul's Patron? The Economy of Patronage in 
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of his freedom and right to receive remuneration. If Paul is compelled to preach the 
gospel, then his critics will automatically assume that he is simply a slave of God 
and labours without the right and privilege of material compensation. In order to 
circumvent this charge, then, Paul in verse 17 explains that, despite his compulsion, 
his particular role as a slave of God allows him to retain certain apostolic rights. 
After all, if Paul preached ἑκών, then naturally he would be entitled to receive a 
μισθός. But since he preaches ἄκων,66 he is also entitled to compensation because 
his particular form of privileged slavery is that of a paid administration. By the end 
of verse 17, therefore, Paul still possesses the right to material support, which he 
argued for incessantly in verses 4-14 and is required to have in order to refuse that 
right in verses 12, 15, 18, and 19. He then without any insincerity or rhetorical 
abnormality can in verse 18 ask, ‘What therefore is my wage [τίς οὖν μού ἐστιν ὁ 
μισθός]?’67 And in typical Pauline fashion he explains that his payment is, quite 
paradoxically, the opportunity not to make use of his right to receive pay. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Paul's Theology', in Engaging Economics: New Testament Scenarios and Early Christian Reception, ed. Bruce 
W. Longenecker and Kelly D.  Liebengood (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 129-56. 
66 Many reject that Paul preached unwillingly and under compulsion because they correlate 
motives with the acceptability of the service rendered. John Calvin, The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle 
to the Corinthians (trans. John W. Fraser; Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1960), 193, for instance, 
remarked, ‘[T]he true meaning, in my view, is that the service of a man, which is done grudgingly 
and, as it were, against his will, is quite unacceptable to God. Therefore, whenever God has demanded 
something from us, we are deceiving ourselves, if we imagine that we are fulfilling it properly, when 
we do it grudgingly. For the Lord expects his servants to be eager, so as to take pleasure in obeying 
Him, and demonstrate their cheerfulness by acting without any hesitation. In short, Paul means that 
the only way in which he would do justice to his calling, would be by doing his duty with willingness 
and unbounded eagerness’. Additionally, Grosheide, First Corinthians, 210, dismissed all of 9.17 as 
hypothetical ‘since the apostle does his work with joy’. It cannot be denied that Paul conveys great 
compassion for those to whom he preaches (Rom 9.1-3) and insists that he ministers out of emulation 
of Christ’s love (2 Cor 5.14). But Paul’s ministry brought upon him so many hardships, and the 
resurrection was such a consuming reality for him, that he consistently preferred (μᾶλλον) to be 
away from the body and at home with the Lord (2 Cor 5.8). In fact, when pressed to choose between 
persisting in ministry and departing to be with Christ, the apostle considered death to be more 
advantageous (κέρδος [Phil 1.21]), admitting that being with Christ was his desire (ἐpiιθυμία) and 
indeed far better (piολλῷ μᾶλλον κρεῖσσον [1.23]), even if ministering to the church was at the 
moment a greater necessity (ἀναγκαιότερον [1.24]). 
67 While it is clear why the subjects of Paul’s analogies in verses 4-14 were entitled to receive 
food directly from their respective purveyors, it is puzzling initially why Paul, as an administrator, 
was entitled to be compensated by the church (the third-party beneficiaries of his service), rather 
than God (his principal). Perhaps this is because administrators who were afforded peculia from their 
principals, rather than returning the profits immediately to their masters, normally retained and 
lived off of the sums they received from the third-contracting parties with whom they conducted 
business. Since administrators were an exceptional breed of slaves who were normally entitled to 
compensation, this interpretation offers a plausible explanation for Paul’s rare, yet strategic self-
portrayal as an administrator of God.  
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2. Apostolic Responsibility: ‘Depositing’ the Gospel (9.18) 
While re-reading how Paul used his oikonomos metaphor in verse 17 provides 
solutions to the standard exegetical problems interpreters face in verses 16-18, it is 
our contention that Paul continued to portray his role as an administrator in the 
verses which follow, and that the metaphor clarifies further some of the images that 
surface along the way. In verse 18, for instance, Paul’s metaphor is perpetuated 
through his use of the verb τίθημι. The reason that Paul employed τίθημι of all verbs 
to express his gospel proclamation has been largely overlooked by Pauline scholars, 
despite the fact that Paul uses it only rarely in relation to the gospel and that there 
is little agreement on what manner of action τίθημι denotes in this verse. Some 
translations suggest ‘make the gospel free of charge’ (KJV; ASV; RSV; NRSV),68 others 
propose ‘offer the gospel without charge’ (NET; NASB; NIV), and still others read 
‘present the gospel free of charge’ (ESV). Admittedly, the verb τίθημι has a broad 
lexical range (cf. LSJ), so that each of these translations is possible and their 
implications not mutually exclusive. But given Paul’s commercial metaphor in verse 
17 and that his concern remains with monetary matters in verse 18, it is worth 
enquiring if and how τίθημι might carry on the monetary theme by figuratively 
portraying Paul’s preaching as a commercial, or monetary, transaction. 
The possibility of interpreting τίθημι in the light of the monetary theme 
finds support in the occassional use of the verb in contexts involving banking and 
commerce (cf. LSJ II.7-8; BDAG 2; MM 5087 [2]). In the fourth century BCE, for 
instance, τίθημι was used to denote bank payments in the work of Demosthenes: 
‘And let no one of you wonder that I have accurate knowledge of these matters; for 
bankers are accustomed to write out memoranda of the sums which they lend, the 
purposes for which funds are desired, and the payments which a borrower makes 
[τιθῆται], in order that his receipts and his payments [τά τε ληφθέντα καὶ τὰ 
τεθέντα] may be known to them for their accounts’ ([Tim.] 49.5). Plutarch’s famous 
treatise on the dangers of borrowing money offers additional examples of the 
monetary use of τίθημι. Speaking of the impiety of money-lenders, Plutarch states 
that they ‘make the market-place a place of the damned for the wretched debtors; 
like vultures they devour and flay them, “entering into their entrails,” or in other 
instances they stand over them and inflict on them the tortures of Tantalus by 
                                                        
68 Cf. Thiselton, First Corinthians, 698. 
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preventing them from tasting their own produce which they reap and harvest’. 
Plutarch then reiterates his point with another startling image: ‘They say that hares 
at one and the same time give birth to one litter, suckle another, and conceive 
again; but the loans of these barbarous rascals [i.e. money-lenders] give birth to 
interest before conception; for while they are giving they immediately demand 
payment, while they lay money down [τιθέντες] they take it up, and they lend what 
they receive for money lent’ (Mor. 829b). These uses of τίθημι clearly carry 
monetary significance.  
Another important example of the monetary use of τίθημι is found in biblical 
literature. In the Parable of the Ten Mina (Luke 19.11-27), Jesus is reported to have 
told a parable about a nobleman who, before going on a long journey, entrusted ten 
commercial slaves (δοῦλοι) with one mina each, instructing them to conduct 
business (piραγματεύομαι [19.13; cf. 19.15]) until his return. Upon his arrival, the 
nobleman inspected the transactions of the slaves to find that one slave had not 
conducted any business. In the explanation for his disobedience, the slave confessed 
that he felt it was safer for him not to do business than to risk losing the mina out of 
fear of the master’s retribution. He reasoned with his master, insisting,  
‘[Y]ou are a harsh man; you take what you did not deposit [ἔθηκας], and reap what you did not sow 
[ἔσpiειρας].’ [The master] said to him, ‘I will judge you by your own words, you wicked slave! You 
knew, did you, that I was a harsh man, taking what I did not deposit [ἔθηκα] and reaping what I did 
not sow [ἔσpiειρα]? Why then did you not put my money into the bank? Then when I returned, I 
could have collected it with interest’ (Luke 19.21-23 [NRSV]) 
In this passage, τίθημι clearly carries monetary significance. Moreover, the 
translation ‘deposit’ is appropriate, since banking and investments are in view.69 
And though in this parable the nobleman is the one who ‘deposits’ and ‘takes up’ the 
investments, in antiquity administrators were also associated with the depositing of 
goods and produce. The cognate noun θέμα, in fact, is widely attested for the grain 
deposits made by landowners, perhaps through their administrators, in the papyri 
of Roman Egypt (e.g. P.Oxy. 2588-90, 4856-90; P.Ryl. 199.12 P.Tebt 120.125).70 In these 
texts, θέματα refer to private deposits in a granary and are often handled by 
                                                        
69 The relevance of this passage for 1 Corinthians is further supported by the fact that earlier 
in Paul’s discourse he figuratively referred to preaching for pay with the same agricultural analogy: 
‘If we have sown spiritual good [τὰ piνευματικὰ ἐσpiείραμεν] among you, is it too much if we reap 
your material benefits [τὰ σαρκικὰ θερίσομεν]?’ (1 Cor 9.11). 
70 See also Friedrich Preisigke, Girowesen im griechischen Ägypten, enthaltend Korngiro, Geldgiro, 
Girobanknotariat mit Einschluss des Archivwesens: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Verwaltungsdienstes im 
Altertume (Hildesheim; New York: G. Olms, 1971), 72; Rowlandson, Landowners and Tenants, 116; Nikos 
Litinas, 'Sitologi Documents Concerning Private Transactions in the Oxyrhynchite Nome', ZPE 160 
(2007): 183-202, esp. 197. 
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commercial administrators (see Appendix 4).71 Admittedly, these receipts nowhere 
suggest that the administators actually deposited the produce. But given the fact 
that absentee landowners often delegated great amounts of financial and 
commercial responsibility to their managers (see Chapter 4), it is almost certain that 
administators were those responsible for making deposits as well. 
A final example of the monetary use of τίθημι is found much closer to our 
original context. In the concluding remarks of 1 Corinthians, Paul provides 
instructions for the church regarding the Jerusalem collection. He states, ‘On the 
first day of every week, each of you is to put aside and save [piαρ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τιθέτω 
θησαυρίζων] whatever extra you earn, so that collections need not be taken when I 
come’ (1 Cor 16.2 [NRSV]).72 Again, τίθημι here undoubtedly carries a monetary 
sense and perhaps also implies the making of a deposit (BDAG 2).73 
Given, therefore, the lexical range of τίθημι and the fact that Paul himself 
uses the verb elsewhere in 1 Corinthians in a monetary sense, it is conceivable that 
the apostle also uses it in 1 Cor 9.18 to portray his gospel preaching as a kind of 
commercial transaction, perhaps in the sense of ‘deposit/entrust the gospel’. This 
translation of τίθημι is also supported in 2 Cor 5.19, where Paul portrays himself as 
the recipient of a similar kind of trust: ‘[I]n Christ God was reconciling the world to 
himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting [θέμενος] the 
message of reconciliation to us’ (NRSV; cf. ESV). 
But far from serving like ‘the many who peddle the word of God’ as a 
commodity for profit (2 Cor 2.17),74 Paul distinguishes himself as an apostle through 
his refusal of pay and by issuing the gospel free of charge (ἀδάpiανος).75 The 
                                                        
71 P.Oxy. (2008), 76. Dieter Hagedorn, 'Θέμα', ZPE 25 (1977): 197-98, along with the editor of 
P.Mich 11.604(16), suggests that θέμα can also indicate a receipt for a θέμα-payment (‘Quittung für 
eine θέμα-Zahlung’). For grain storage in Roman Egypt, see Geoffrey Rickman, Roman Granaries and 
Store Buildings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 298-306. 
72 Cf. Tobit 4.9: ‘So you will be laying up a good treasure for yourself against the day of 
necessity’ (θέμα γὰρ ἀγαθὸν θησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ εἰς ἡμέραν ἀνάγκης). 
73 See also the use of piαραθήκη as the gospel ‘deposit’ in 1 Tim 6.20 and 2 Tim 1.12-14, and 
piαρατίθημι in 1 Tim 1.18 and 2 Tim 2.2 for the ‘entrusting’ of various verbal deposits; cf. Jerome D. 
Quinn and William C. Wacker, The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New Translation with Notes and 
Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 554-57. 
74 For anti-sophistic sentiments about the peddling of wisdom and philosophy, see, e.g., 
Philo, Gig. 39; Mos. 2.212; Plato, Prot. 313c-d. The difference between the apostle as κάpiηλος 
(καpiηλεύω) and οἰκονόμος is that the κάpiηλος conducts business without ‘sincerity’ (εἰλικρινεία) 
and accountability.  Paul, however, preaches ‘as from sincerity’ (ὡς ἐξ εἰλικρινείας) and ‘in the sight 
of God’ (κατέναντι θεοῦ [2 Cor 2.17]), not seeking money, but converts (9.19-23). 
75 Frederick W. Danker, Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament 
Semantic Field (St. Louis, MO: Clayton Publishing House, 1982), 333-34. Timothy H. Lim, 'Not in 
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adjective ἀδάpiανος, a synonym of δωρεάν (2 Cor 11.7), is simply the negation of 
δάpiανος (‘charge, cost’). Paul uses verbal cognates when, after reassuring the 
Corinthians that he is still not interested in their money, he declares, ‘I will most 
gladly spend [δαpiανήσω] and be spent [ἐκδαpiανηθήσομαι] for you’ (2 Cor 12.15). In 
Paul’s approach to apostolic support, he will not accept pay from those to whom he 
currently ministers, and never from certain churches (2 Cor 11.9, 12). Instead, he 
offers his own life and body as the expense for his services (1 Cor 9.27; cf 9.18-19). 
Verse 18, therefore, should read: ‘[As an administator], what then is my reward? Just 
this: that in my preaching I may deposit/entrust the gospel free of charge, so as not to 
make full use of my right in the gospel’. The image depicted by this meaning of 
τίθημι extends Paul’s administrator metaphor from verse 17 to verse 18 and more 
thoroughly envelopes this passage in the monetary, commercial theme. 
 
3. Apostolic Objective: ‘Gaining’ Converts (9.19-23) 
Having argued that Paul’s metaphor extends into 9.18, it is our contention 
that it also continues into 9.19-23. As the γάρ at the beginning of 9.19 indicates, Paul 
closely associates what he said earlier about his refusal pay with his forthcoming 
discourse on his accommodating ministry strategy (9.19-23). Paul has already 
admitted that he is a slave administrator of God. Even so, he indicates in verse 19 
that he is ‘free from all [people]’ (ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ piάντων [9.19a]), since he 
retains the rights as an apostle not to ply a trade (9.6) and instead to receive 
financial support from the church (9.4, 12, 14). But in verse 19 Paul indicates that he 
also has the right to refuse those rights and in that way to enslave himself to others 
(piᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα [9.19b]).76 
                                                                                                                                                               
Persuasive Words of Wisdom, but in the Demonstration of the Spirit and Power', NovT 29 (1987): 137-
49, at 145: ‘For Paul, to peddle the gospel for profit is to lower the word of God to the level of a 
commodity sold in the market place’. 
76 Garland, 1 Corinthians, 425: ‘As God’s slave, Paul ultimately sets himself free from others 
(7:22-23). Some are compelled to speak because of their need for money, which in turn means that 
they are compelled to preach only to those who can pay. By refusing fees, Paul was able to exercise 
freedom to preach to one and all’. B. Hall, '"All Things to All People": A Study of 1 Corinthians 9.19-
23', in The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn, ed. Beverly R. 
Gaventa and Robert T. Fortna (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 137-57, and Galloway, Freedom, 183, 
erroneously argue that Paul’s ἀνάγκη extends even to his refusual of pay, so that his self-
enslavement is not voluntary, but is mandated by his call. But in order to do so, they must redefine 
‘slavery’, ‘right’, and ‘freedom’ and confuse those concepts to an utterly unrecognizable state, 
presumably because they fundamentally misunderstand Paul’s logic in verses 16-18. 
 212 
 
 
Several theories have been proposed about the implications of Paul’s self-
slavery in verse 19.77 Perhaps most famously, Ronald Hock has contended that Paul’s 
self-enslavement refers to the social degradation of his working as an artisan, a 
profession typically occupied by slaves (cf. 2 Cor 11.7).78 But in addition to the fact 
that such a characterisation would have been offensive to at least a good number—
almost certainly the vast majority—of the Corinthian Christians, who in all 
probability shared his status as wage labourers,79 Paul’s repeated use of Stoic themes 
throughout 1 Corinthians 8-9 (as seen above) suggests that his declaration of 
freedom in 9.1 and 19 together with his self-enslavement in verse 19 should 
probably be interpreted within the context of moral philosophy.80 By stating that he 
is free from all, yet has enslaved himself to all, Paul explains in philosophical terms 
that, while he has certain rights, he has relinquished them for the benefit of those 
to whom he ministers. 
Paul then explains how his strategy of accommodation plays out. To the 
Jews, Paul explains, he became as a Jew; to those under the law, he became as one 
under the law; to those outside the law, he became as one outside the law; finally, to 
the weak, he became weak. But driving his ministry strategy was Paul’s ultimate 
objective to see people saved, and he even summarises his approach by asserting 
that he adapts to his audiences—that is, he becomes ‘all things to all people’—in 
order that he ‘might save some’ (9.22).81 But σῴζω is not Paul’s preferred term for 
conversion in this passage. Instead, it is striking that Paul repeatedly referred to his 
missionary objective with the verb κερδαίνω. 
                                                        
77 Martin, Slavery, 86-135, argues that Paul’s approach resembles the demagogue, populist 
leader topos from antiquity. 
78 Ronald F. Hock, 'Paul's Tentmaking and the Problem of His Social Class', JBL 97 (1978): 555-
64, at 558-60; cf. Hock, Social Context, 59-62. 
79 Cf. Todd D. Still, 'Did Paul Loathe Manual Labor? Revisiting the Work of Ronald F. Hock on 
the Apostle's Tentmaking and Social Class', JBL 125 (2006): 781-95, at 787-89, and the response by 
Ronald F. Hock, 'The Problem of Paul's Social Class: Further Reflections', in Paul's World, ed. Stanley E. 
Porter (Pauline Studies 4; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 7-18. For the socio-economic level of the Pauline 
communities, see, esp., Bruce W. Longenecker, 'Socio-Economic Profiling of the First Urban 
Christians', in Urban Christians (2009), 36-59. 
80 Malherbe, 'Determinism', 251-52. 
81 Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul's Narrative Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2001), 181-92, has shown that Paul’s self-lowering in 1 Cor 9.19 closely—and probably 
intentionally—resembles the humiliation of Christ represented in Phil 2.6-8. As Gorman states, 
‘Perhaps Paul’s most sustained systematic reflection on his own experience of cruciform ministry 
appears in 1 Corinthians 9’ (181). Cf. David G. Horrell, 'Theological Principle or Christological Praxis? 
Pauline Ethics in 1 Corinthians 8.1-11.1', JSNT 67 (1997): 83-114; Seyoon Kim, 'Imitatio Christi (1 
Corinthians 11:1): How Paul Imitates Jesus Christ in Dealing with Idol Food (1 Corinthians 8-10)', BBR 
13 (2003): 193-226. 
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While many interpreters have noticed the oddity of Paul’s reference to his 
evangelistic work with κερδαίνω, very few have sought to explain Paul’s application 
of it. Abraham Malherbe and Clarence Glad, on the one hand, both suggest that Paul 
here is indebted to Cynic tradition. They both cite speeches of the Cynic 
philosopher Antisthenes, where the author juxtaposes κερδαίνω and σῴζω to 
express Odysseus’ preference to undergo ill-treatment if thereby he might gain 
something or save people.82 Margaret Mitchell and Raymond Collins, on the other 
hand, have both advocated the view that κερδαίνω here carries the rhetorical sense 
of advantage. Because Paul’s letter has significant deliberative intentions, Mitchell 
and Collins suggest that Paul’s use of the verb in 1 Corinthians is simply another 
instantiation of this rhetorical topos.83 But while Paul occassionally interacts with 
moral philosophy, and his use of the verb certainly serves a rhetorical function (one 
objective of the chapter, after all, is to serve as an exemplum), these explanations do 
not give sufficient weight to the monetary theme that has been running throughout 
the chapter.84 
David Daube additionally noticed that the application of κερδαίνω in the 
sense of ‘to win over an unbeliever to one’s faith’ is ‘quite un-Greek’; indeed, ‘[t]here 
is nothing remotely analogous in Liddell-Scott or the papyri’.85 Nevertheless, Daube 
observed that the consistent way the NT authors use the verb as a ‘missionary term’ 
(conversion [1 Pet 3.1]; turning from sin [Matt 18.15]), requires an explanation 
beyond mere coincidence. Since κερδαίνω appears nowhere in the LXX, Daube 
looked to Rabbinic Judaism, where he found a precedent for utilising commercial 
terms for ‘the gaining by God of men whom he had cast away’.86 But significantly, 
                                                        
82 Malherbe, 'Determinism', 253; Clarence E. Glad, Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in 
Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy (NovTSup 81; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 251.  
83  Mitchell, Reconciliation, 248; Collins, First Corinthians, 353. 
84 For a list of other possible scholarly views on the influence of Paul’s thought in verses 19-
23, see Margaret M. Mitchell, 'Pauline Accommodation and "Condescension" (συγκατάβασις): 1 Cor 
9:19-23 and the History of Influence', in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-
Pedersen (Louisville: WJK, 2001), 197-214, at 198. Mitchell may rightly question whether any single 
Hellenistic ‘tradition’ is responsible for Paul’s accommodation motif, but the plausibility of the 
commercial use of κερδαίνω is strengthened by the fact that it is not dependent upon Paul’s 
education or familiarity with popular philosophy. 
85 David Daube, 'κερδαίνω as a Missionary Term', HTR 40 (1947): 109-120, at 109. David Daube, 
The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion 2; London: Athlone 
Press, 1956), 352-61. Cf. Heinrich Schlier, 'κερδαίνω', in TDNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-1976), 
673. 
86 As Daube, 'κερδαίνω': 109, remarks, ‘No Rabbinic parallels have so far been adduced; but 
surely, they ought to exist, for if there had been no Rabbinic influence, it is difficult to see how the 
New Testament writers should have come to employ the verb in a way neither classical nor 
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Daube was not able to demonstrate that there was ever an association between this 
commercial sense and God’s gaining or winning over Gentiles.87 Admitting this 
shortcoming, Daube aimed to narrow the gap in 1 Pet 3.1 and 1 Cor 9.19-22 by 
attempting to show a sense of intertextual indebtedness by these NT letters to 
Rabbinic precepts. However, the associations Daube mapped out remain very weak, 
which provides room for exploring the possibility that Paul’s use of κερδαίνω in 1 
Cor 9.19-22 originated from the commercial theme already established earlier in the 
discourse. 
It is not our objective here to show how non-Pauline Christian literature 
came to use κερδαίνω in a missionary sense. Nevertheless, it is significant that in 
nearly all of its sixteen occurrences in the NT (whether literal or figurative), the 
verb retains a strong commercial or monetary sense. This meaning of κερδαίνω 
becomes explicit when on a number of occassions the verb is contrasted with its 
antonym ζημιόω. Each of the Synoptics, for instance, report Jesus cautioning his 
followers about gaining (κερδαίνω) the world and yet forfeiting (ζημιόω) their 
souls/lives (Matt 16.26//Mark 8.36//Luke 9.25).88 The verb is also used in Acts 27.21 
during Paul’s voyage to Rome where it is ironically juxtaposed with ζημία to 
indicate the ship’s ‘accruing’ of both damage and ‘loss’ (κερδῆσαί τε τὴν ὕβριν 
ταύτην καὶ τὴν ζημίαν). In Phil 3.7-8, Paul’s only use of κερδαίνω outside of 1 Cor 
9.19-22, he used it quite famously along with κέρδος,89 ζημία, and ζημιόω to 
underscore the enormous ‘gain’ he considers to have obtained by knowing Christ, in 
contrast to the ‘loss’ which was his life before Christ.90 Also quite significant is the 
occurrence of κερδαίνω in the Parable of the Talents. In this narrative the verb is 
                                                                                                                                                               
vernacular’. Daube’s conclusions are followed by, e.g., Lietzmann and Kümmel, An die Korinther I/II, 
180; Barrett, First Corinthians, 211; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 159-60 n. 17; Martin, Slavery, 209 n. 1; 
Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, 2:339; Thiselton, First Corinthians, 701; Fitzmyer, First 
Corinthians, 369. 
87 Daube, 'κερδαίνω': 117. 
88 It is striking that each of the Synoptics also uses ὠφελέω in the statement, further 
confirming that a monetary metaphor is in view, and employs σῴζω in a parallel expression in the 
immediately preceding verse. 
89 It is noteworthy that in Phil 1.21-24 Paul uses both κέρδος and ἀναγκαῖος; cf. κερδαίνω 
and ἀνάγκη in 1 Cor 9.16-22. 
90 For Paul’s use of these terms in a commercial or accounting sense, see Peter T. O'Brien, The 
Epistle to the Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 382-91; 
Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 
1997), 204-208; John Reumann, Philippians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AYB; 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 488-92. Gordon D. Fee, Paul's Letter to the Philippians (NICNT; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 316, even observes that Paul uses here ‘the language of the 
marketplace’. 
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used no less than four times to indicate the generation of great profits by 
commercial slaves for their master (Matt 25.16, 17, 20, 22). Even in the verb’s 
apparent ‘missionary’ sense regarding community discipline in Matt 18.15, it is 
perhaps significant that Jesus’ discourse progresses shortly thereafter to the Parable 
of the Unforgiving Slave, which also involves a cast of commercial slaves (Matt 
18.23-35). Finally, a commercial sense of the verb is also clear in Jas 3.1, where it is 
coupled with the explicit commercial term ἐμpiορεύομαι.91 
In the light of the consistent commercial use of κερδαίνω by a host of NT 
authors and Paul’s obvious application of the verb this way in Phil 3.8, it is highly 
plausible that Paul also intended this sense in 1 Cor 9.19-22. By using this verb, Paul 
indicates that, as God’s commercial administrator, the chief objective of his 
apostolic administration is to generate a ‘profit’ for God his principal.92 But in 
contrast to real-life administrators, Paul is not satisfied with simply producing a 
modest return for his master. Paul could certainly preach the gospel while getting 
paid by his churches and still make a respectable evangelistic ‘return’ in the 
process. But Paul goes well beyond the expectations of his master and all of God’s 
other agents by forgoing his right to a wage in order to procure an even greater 
profit than he would have been able to obtain otherwise (ἵνα τοὺς piλείονας 
κερδήσω [9.19]). 
Paul’s refusal to be paid, however, is simply one instantiation of his 
ministerial strategy of accommodation. Adaptation was the very hallmark of his 
apostleship, being the pattern by which he was able to save a host of unbelievers in 
all kinds of socio-religious contexts.93 The ‘profit-seeking’ objective of his 
ministerial strategy is apparent in the grammatically, syntactically, and verbally 
repetitive construction that spans verses 19-22: 
 
                                                        
91 Thus, the only NT passage outside of 1 Cor 9.19-22 where κερδαίνω surfaces without a 
plausible monetary theme is 1 Pet 3.1. 
92 Lehmeier, Oikonomia, 231: ‘Das Handeln eines tüchtigen οἰκονόμος strebt nach Gewinn 
(κέρδος)’. Edwards, First Epistle to the Corinthians, 237-38: ‘The word [κερδήσω] both explains μισθός 
and carries on the metaphor of the steward. He refuses payment in money that he may make the 
greater gain in souls. But the gain is that which a faithful steward makes, not for himself, but for his 
master’. Cf. Robertson and Plummer, First Corinthians, 190. 
93 H. Chadwick, '"All Things to All Men"', NTS 1 (1955): 261-75; Hall, '"All Things to All 
People": A Study of 1 Corinthians 9.19-23', ; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 249-77; Stephen C. Barton, '"All 
Things to All People": Paul and the Law in the Light of 1 Corinthians 9.19-23', in Paul and the Mosaic 
Law: The Third Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium on Earliest Christianity and Judaism, ed. James D. G. 
Dunn (WUNT 1/89; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 271--85. 
 216 
 
 
9.19 ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ piάντων piᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα 
 ἵνα τοὺς piλείονας κερδήσω 
9.20 καὶ ἐγενόμην τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὡς Ἰουδαῖος 
 ἵνα Ἰουδαίους κερδήσω 
 τοῖς ὑpiὸ νόμον ὡς ὑpiὸ νόμον, μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑpiὸ νόμον  
 ἵνα τοὺς ὑpiὸ νόμον κερδήσω 
9.21 τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος, μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ ἀλλ᾽ ἔννομος Χριστοῦ 
 ἵνα κερδάνω τοὺς ἀνόμους 
9.22 ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἀσθενής 
 ἵνα τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς κερδήσω 
 τοῖς piᾶσιν γέγονα piάντα  
 ἵνα piάντως τινὰς σώσω 
 
By implementing this particular ministry strategy, Paul seeks to save more 
unbelievers than would be possible if he had not adopted such an accommodating 
approach. In other words, although he has rights as an apostle and is therefore free 
(ἐλεύθερος), Paul has given up his rights (9.18) and so voluntarily enslaved himself 
to his churches (9.19a) in order that he might make even more profit for his master 
(9.19). 
Hock has drawn a similar association between Paul’s use of κερδαίνω and the 
monetary theme already present in the discourse. It was Hock’s contention that 
Paul was applying the verb in an anti-sophistic manner like the philosophers. For 
while the sophists pursued financial profit (κέρδος) and fame (δόξα) by entertaining 
wealthy patrons, the philosophers opted for poverty in order to acquire (κερδαίνω) 
the greater prizes of learning and friendship (Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.177; Xenophon, 
Mem. 1.2.7).94 According to Hock, Paul, in a similar anti-sophistic demonstration, 
impoverishes himself in order to acquire specific non-monetary benefits—converts, 
rather than a wage.95 But Hock fails to acknowledge the significant disparity 
                                                        
94 Hock, Social Context, 100 n. 114; cf. Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 8.7.3. Hock also lists Dio 
Chrysostom, Or. 70.5, but Dio’s use of κερδαίνω there does not appear to involve the support of 
philosophers. See also, e.g., Marshall, Enmity, 314-15; Fee, First Corinthians, 426-27 n. 24; Gorman, 
Cruciformity, 184; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 429. 
95 Hock, Social Context, 62. 
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between Paul and the philosophers.96 Whereas the philosophers sought entirely to 
benefit themselves, the ultimate beneficiary of Paul’s pursuit—aside from his 
converts—was God. Just like the commercial slaves in the Parable of the Talents, 
Paul’s ‘profits’ were not his own; just as those slaves were required to make more 
(ἄλλος) talents for their master (Matt 25.20-22), so Paul seeks to generate a sizable 
return (τοὺς piλείονας) to deliver unto his. 
Therefore, through his accommodating approach to ministry, Paul becomes 
an active participant in the gospel’s mission. As he explains at the end of the 
discourse in 9.23, Paul refuses his rights and accommodates to his audiences ‘for the 
sake of the gospel’ (διὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον), that is, to facilitate its advancement in 
Corinth and elsewhere as its ‘co-partner’ (συγκοινωνός).97 In this text, Paul’s use of 
συγκοινωνός connotes business partnership (societas) in keeping with the 
commercial theme.98 The term clearly had this precedent in antiquity (BDAG; MM 
609; cf. P.Bilabel 19.2; P.Cair.Masp. 2.67158.11)99 and probably would have been 
heard this way by the Corinthians in a discourse saturated with commercial 
terminology. But precisely how does Paul partner with the gospel? 
The application of either συγκοινωνός or συγκοινωνέω with reference to the 
gospel is unique for Paul and the rest of the NT authors. Elsewhere, for instance, 
                                                        
96 Hock, Social Context, 65: ‘Paul’s apologies of his tentmaking, and the criticisms implied 
therein, show the influence of the philosophers’ debates over the appropriate means of support, as 
we have seen in Pail’s choice of language’ (e.g. κερδαίνειν [9.19]). 
97 The enigmatic phrase συγκοινωνὸς αὐτοῦ γένωμαι is troublesome for a number of 
reasons. Chief among them is how to understand the sense in which Paul actually is a συγκοινωνός. A 
number of translations and interpreters regard Paul as a sharer ‘in the blessings of the gospel’ (e.g. 
RSV, NRSV, NIV, ESV); cf. Günther Bornkamm, 'The Missionary Stance of Paul in 1 Corinthians 9 and 
in Acts', in Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays Presented in Honor of Paul Schubert, ed. Leander E. Keck and J. 
Louis Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966), 194-207, at 197-98; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 161; Fee, First 
Corinthians, 432; Witherington III, Conflict, 213. But while the pronoun αὐτοῦ certainly refers back to 
τὸ εὐαγγέλιον earlier in the verse, συγκοινωνός must be understood in an active, rather than a 
passive sense. 
98 For the societas, see Alan Watson, The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1965), 125-46; Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition (Capetown: Juta, 1990), 451-76. J. Paul Sampley, Pauline Partnership in Christ: Christian 
Community and Commitment in Light of Roman Law (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), argues that Paul 
conceives of the Christian community (esp. the Philippians and Romans) as a societas, but does not 
apply the concept to συγκοινωνός in 1 Cor 9.23. For a critical assessment of Sampley, see G. W. 
Peterman, Paul's Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift-Exchange and Christian Giving (SNTSMS 92; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 123-27. But Paul’s use of συγκοινωνός/συγκοινωνέω 
elsewhere with reference to other persons does not negate its use here as connoting a business 
partnership. 
99 P.CairMasp 2.67158, a mid-sixth century (568 CE) business contract from Antinoopolis in 
Egypt, specifies how Aurelius Psois and Aurelius Josephus, brothers-in-law and business partners 
(συνκοινωνοί, συνpiραγματεύται) in carpentry, divide their business shares (μέρα) and 
responsibilities, including their gains (κέρδοι, ὠφέλιμοι) and losses (ζημίαι). Cf. Thiselton, First 
Corinthians, 707. 
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Paul only uses those terms for the relationship which believing Jews and Gentiles 
share in God’s promises (Rom 11.17) and the active participation of the Philippians 
in various aspects of Paul’s ministry (Phil 1.7; 4.14). The latter two examples, 
however, are significant parallels for our text. Whereas Paul accepts financial 
support from the Philippians and thus becomes their ‘co-partners’ in the 
advancement of the gospel (Phil 4.14-18; cf. 1.7), he rejects support from the 
Corinthians in order that he might become the gospel’s ‘co-partner’ towards them. In 
this sense, the gospel is an independent agent, or force, and Paul aims to cooperate 
with it as its συγκοινωνός, rather than obstruct it as its competitor.100 To this end, 
becoming the gospel’s συγκοινωνός would mean that Paul seeks to do, or not to do, 
whatever is necessary (i.e. renouncing his rights and adapting to his audiences) in 
order for the gospel to accomplish its intended goal.101 And since Paul understands 
his apostolic role as primarily involving the preaching of the gospel (1.17; 4.1), he 
must only proclaim the gospel and not impede its progress, whether through 
rhetorical adornment or by exploiting his apostolic rights (1.17; 2.1-5; 9.12). 
But in the end, Paul’s objective is not for God’s advantage alone. Just like 
many commercial slaves, Paul laboured diligently in order to secure privileges. 
Rather than working for an immediate financial payoff, Paul serves as a faithful 
administrator (4.2) in order to receive an uncorruptable prize (ἄφθαρτος στέφανος 
[9.25]; βραβεῖον [9.24]) and eschatological wage (μισθός [3.8, 14]) to be issued along 
with his master’s praise (ἔpiαινος) upon his return (4.5).102 
 
 
 
                                                        
100 Cf. Zimmermann, Law, 451: ‘Societas is thus not based, primarily, on an antagonism of 
interests; its essence is the pooling of resources (money, property, expertise or labour, or a 
combination of them) for a common purpose’ (original emphasis). 
101 As Schütz, Authority, 52, explains, ‘If vv. 19-23 repeat the same theme of renunciation as is 
found in the preceding portion of ch. 9, then Paul must mean that he has done all this to become a 
participant in the dynamic character of the gospel – to share in the gospel’s own work. He is 
commissioned to preach the gospel (v. 17), but his reward comes in sharing in the effectiveness of the 
gospel, not hindering this force. That is accomplished by disregarding “apostolic” rights and claims’. 
Cf. Morna D. Hooker, 'A Partner in the Gospel: Paul's Understanding of His Ministry', in Theology and 
Ethics in Paul and His Interpreters: Essays in Honor of Victor Paul Furnish, ed. Eugene H. Lovering and Jerry 
L. Sumney (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 83-100; Collins, First Corinthians, 356; Fitzmyer, First 
Corinthians, 372. 
102 It is because Paul’s preaching without pay in this way affords him an eschatological 
reward that he considers his refusal of his right a boast (καύχημα) in 9.15, a term which elsewhere 
also has eschatological significance (e.g. 2 Cor 1.14; Phil 2.16). 
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E. Summary 
In this chapter we attempted again to address a number of social-historical, 
exegetical, and theological issues in Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians, this time 
targeting Paul’s notoriously complicated discourse in 1 Corinthians 9. Through this 
investigation we have seen for a second time the way that Paul has utilised the 
image of the apostle as an oikonomos to articulate at once several fundamental 
characteristics of his apostolic position that were misunderstood by those in the 
Corinthian church. Firstly, we observed that the apostle, who initially defended at 
great length his right to receive material support from the Corinthians (9.1-14), 
insisted that he would not exploit that right in the church because it would prevent 
the gospel from accomplishing its intended goal (9.12, 15). In fact, we saw that Paul’s 
right to receive payment was very different from his commission to preach the 
gospel, which was not a right at all. Paul’s preaching itself was not a matter of 
choice; he was compelled to preach through his divine commission, and did so 
unwillingly (9.16-17). He was, therefore, considered a slave, not of men, but of God. 
Much to the surprise of his critics, however, Paul’s slavery to God did not nullify his 
right to receive pay, because Paul’s particular form of slavery was a private 
administration, in which he maintained his right to receive pay (e.g. peculium) 
despite being forced to preach. Nevertheless, though he was free to utilise this right, 
Paul enslaved himself to the Corinthians by refusing to accept a wage from them, 
insisting instead that, as God’s administrator, his ‘kergymatic transactions’, or 
‘deposits’, would be made without cost to their recipients (9.18). Moreover, Paul 
freely chose to assume the life of an artisan, because by forgoing his right to receive 
his own material benefits he was able to secure even greater evangelistic gains for 
God his principal than he would have been able to otherwise (9.19). This 
accommodating approach to apostolic ministry became characteristic of all Paul’s 
missionary efforts (9.19-22), for he realised that in order to maximise his 
evangelistic profits he had to cooperate, rather than conflict, with the gospel as its 
business partner (9.23). Moreover, these evangelistic gains, though strictly speaking 
they belong to God, nevertheless secure Paul’s eschatological payoff, his 
uncorruptible wage that awaits him at Christ’s return (9.24-27; cf. 3.8, 14; 4.4-5). 
Through the oikonomos metaphor, then, Paul is able to elucidate a number of 
otherwise confusing, and even conflicting, characteristics of his apostolic ministry. 
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Not only does the image portray the apostle as a slave of God who is compelled to 
fulfil his commission, but it affords him the right, indeed the apostolic authority, to 
demand financial support from the churches to which he ministers. It is also 
significant that Paul casts the image in order to evade anticipated criticisms of his 
apostleship. Right when it seems that Paul has been rhetorically cornered into 
admitting that as God’s slave he in fact does not possess the right to a wage as he 
had contended for the first half of the chapter, Paul then dramatically turns the 
table on the argument by announcing his status as God’s slave administrator. The 
metaphor not only exonerates him of the anticipated charge of financial 
disentitlement, but also rhetorically paves the way for employing the other 
commercial terms which surface in the latter part of the chapter (9.18-23). Finally, it 
is of utmost importance to this study that Paul as an apostle, who has even received 
dominical authorisation to be supported by his churches (9.14), actually forfeits his 
freedom and authority in order that God, the gospel, and Paul’s churches might be 
further enriched through his poverty (cf. 2 Cor 8.9). Paul’s exercise of authority, 
then, was not a precondition for his apostleship. Rather than asserting authority 
over his churches, Paul subordinated his authority to his greater apostolic mandate, 
the winning of converts for Christ. And in this way Paul embodies the very person of 
Christ (1 Cor 11.1; cf. Phil 2.6-11), by humiliating himself for the greater glory of God 
(1 Cor 10.31), the good of humanity (10.33)—and even the benefit of his own 
eschatological status (9.24-27).  
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
 
A. Summary 
This study has sought to elucidate the nature of Paul’s apostleship and 
especially the exercise of his authority in 1 Corinthians. Although a number of other 
passages and themes could have been explored as possible means for understanding 
these theological concepts, this investigation has concentrated on Paul’s portrayal 
of apostles as oikonomoi in 1 Cor 4.1-5 and the particular relevance of that 
designation for Paul’s own ministry in 9.16-23. Unfortunately, this aim was 
immediately recognised to be complicated by the fact that Paul’s description is a 
metaphor, and as such requires the interpreter to identify as accurately as possible 
Paul’s intended source domain. Several source domains previously proposed in NT 
scholarship were immediately ruled out as unlikely or unhelpful. Moreover, while 
Dale Martin and others have suggested that ancient managerial slavery provides an 
adequate window into Paul’s metaphor, it was shown that the criticisms and 
counter evidence marshalled against Martin’s historical assumptions and exegetical 
conclusions by other interpreters, such as Murray Harris and John Byron, were 
considerable enough to raise questions about the reliability of Martin’s thesis. It was 
therefore concluded that a full-scale reassessment of the ancient evidence was 
necessary in order to interpret Paul’s oikonomos metaphor. 
In Part 1, we surveyed the three kinds of oikonomoi most frequently attested 
in Graeco-Roman antiquity, those who served as regal, municipal, and private 
administrators. In this section we took special note of the rank and status these 
administrators possessed within their respective hierarchies, as well as their 
responsibilities and answerability to a superior person or body. In Chapter 2 we saw 
that the oikonomoi serving as regal administrators were appointed exclusively in the 
Hellenistic kingdoms. There we observed that, despite variations in chronology, 
geography, and political hierarchy, the social and structural attributes of these 
administrators were surprisingly consistent. In each of the main four political 
powers of the Hellenistic period, oikonomoi served as regional financial 
administrators and supervised significant resources in the divisions of those 
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kingdoms. Being representatives of the king in matters of finance, these figures had 
considerable authority to make decisions in their area of supervision and in their 
respective regions. These officials were subordinates, however, and they were held 
accountable for their administration by their superiors, in most instances by the 
king or by his immediate delegate. 
In Chapter 3 we observed that the oikonomoi serving as municipal 
administrators in Graeco-Roman cities were characterised by a greater degree of 
social and structural diversification than their regal counterparts. The municipal 
oikonomoi serving in Hellenistic Greek cities, for instance, were free persons and 
served as treasury magistrates. In fact, due to the poor economic conditions of 
Hellenistic cities, the men occupying this office would normally have possessed 
significant social and economic standing. This would have also been the case for 
some oikonomoi serving in Greek cities during the Roman period. However, there 
were also public slaves bearing this title who would have been from a humble socio-
economic condition. Evidence for the rank and status of oikonomoi serving in Roman 
cities, particularly Roman colonies, is much harder to come by. The question of the 
position and corresponding socio-economic status of Erastus in Corinth (Rom 16.23) 
continues to be disputed. However, an inscription from the neighbouring city of 
Patras has demonstrated that the title in an Augustan colony in Achaea can refer to 
a local dignitary serving as quaestor, the civic treasury magistrate. But regardless of 
the socio-economic status of the persons who bore the title in a municipal context, 
these oikonomoi were neither entrusted with a great amount of authority, nor 
situated in a deep administrative hierarchy, nor always subject to an accounting. 
And when these magistrates were held to account, they were normally answerable 
to a local governing body (ἐκκλησία/δικαστήριον; ordo decurionum), rather than an 
individual sovereign (κύριος). 
In Chapter 4 we examined the oikonomoi serving as private commercial 
administrators. There we observed that the persons bearing this title (or any 
number of Greek and Latin equivalents), while being free gentlemen farmers during 
the Classical Greek period, almost always were slaves or freedmen during the 
Roman period, normally serving a κύριος/dominus as business managers. In this 
capacity they were given the responsibility of making profits for their owner 
through the production, trade, and investment of various goods and resources. 
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Thus, they were also entrusted with a considerable amount of authority to speak 
and act on behalf of their principal, commanding whatever staff that served 
beneath them and representing the master to third contracting parties. Because of 
their legal condition, they possessed very humble social status, though they 
possessed at the same time rather unique rights and privileges, including 
opportunities to circumvent the legal restraints preventing them from having 
money and other kinds of possessions. But as slaves, they were vulnerable to various 
forms of punishment, including violent abuse and death. 
Having outlined in Part 1 the major social and structural differences between 
the oikonomoi serving in regal, municipal, and private administration, in Part 2 we 
sought to compare the portraits assembled in Part 1 to the oikonomos metaphor Paul 
applied in 1 Corinthians, in order to identify its source domain and to interpret how 
Paul used the metaphor to meet his rhetorical and theological objectives. In Chapter 
5 we briefly analysed 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, observing that, because in 1 Corinthians 
4 Paul’s apostolic framework was a hierarchy with a κύριος in the superior position, 
and in 1 Corinthians 9 Paul’s metaphor concerned his entitlement to a wage, Paul’s 
source domain was probably private administration. This was further confirmed 
through an analysis of the commercial prosperity of Roman Corinth. There we 
demonstrated that Corinth was an affluent commercial emporium during the early 
empire where private servile administrators would have been familiar figures in the 
marketplace. Lastly, it was shown from his experience as an artisan and his 
knowledge of commercial terminology that Paul himself was probably familiar with 
many of the normal practices of conducting trade and making investments in the 
commercial world of the Roman empire. 
With the private administrator in view, we then turned to Paul’s metaphor 
in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 in order to examine how Paul utilised the oikonomos 
metaphor for his rhetorical strategy. In Chapter 6 we examined 1 Corinthians 1-4 
initially to demonstrate that the church in Corinth was facing two major ecclesial 
and ethical shortcomings: the inappropriate adulation of apostles and the undue 
criticism of Paul’s own ministry. This enabled us to suggest that Paul utilised his 
oikonomos metaphor in 1 Cor 4.1-5 both to underscore the social and structural 
insignificance of the apostles in relation to God/Christ, and to emphasise the 
authority of the apostles as well as their immunity to the criticisms of the 
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Corinthians. In addition to restoring his own apostolic ethos to its proper place in 
Corinth, Paul sought to censure the Corinthians for passing judgment on him and 
his colleagues as if the church possessed the authority either to acquit or to convict 
the apostles. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 we examined Paul’s metaphor in 1 Corinthians 9 where, 
in a discourse with both apologetic and deliberative intentions, he portrayed 
himself as God’s administrator in order to resolve the matter of his apostolic right 
to receive and refuse a wage. There we traced Paul’s argument from the beginning 
of 1 Corinthians 9 and showed that the complexity of Paul’s logic required that we 
critically assess the two prevailing interpretive options. Rather than concluding 
that Paul preached voluntarily with the right to receive pay, or that Paul preached 
involuntarily without such a right, we revisited what we observed in Chapter 4 
about the monetary privileges of private administrators and concluded that Paul’s 
metaphor was skilfully employed in order to demonstrate that he could be a slave of 
Christ while simultaneously being entitled to some kind of monetary allowance, 
probably a peculium. Our impressions about the pattern of Paul’s logic in 1 Cor 9.17 
was even shown to find strong support in a similar literary formula in 2 Cor 5.13. 
Then, contrary to the scholarly consensus, we argued that Paul’s metaphor 
continues into 1 Cor 9.18, where Paul’s preaching activity was portrayed as a 
financial deposit, and even into 9.19-23, where we argued that Paul’s ministry 
objective of gaining converts and partnering with the gospel were probably also 
metaphorical depictions of his apostleship as a commercial administration. Quite 
significantly, however, we saw that the apostolic right which Paul incessantly 
defended for the first half of the chapter was sacrificially forfeited for the ultimate 
benefit of the gospel, his converts, and God his principal. Through Paul’s self-
enslavement to the Corinthians by virtue of his plying a trade, we argued that Paul 
subjected his apostolic right and authority to his greater mandate to make as many 
converts as possible. 
By interpreting Paul’s oikonomos metaphor in this double-sided sense (social, 
legal, and structural degradation + authority, immunity, and privilege) in both 1 
Corinthians 4 and 9, this study has shown that Paul’s deployment of the image is far 
more versatile than NT scholarship has previously considered it to be. Although 
another case for the multi-dimensional interpretation of this metaphor was 
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proposed two decades ago by Dale Martin in his examination of 1 Corinthians 9, in 
this study we not only took into consideration Paul’s employment of the metaphor 
in 1 Corinthians 4, but we have also sought to demonstrate that Paul’s use of the 
image is quite dissimilar to Martin’s analysis. It was Martin’s contention that Paul’s 
metaphor connoted different things to different people. Martin argued that because 
oikonomoi were slaves, they would have been despised by the elite. But since they 
were empowered through patronal ties to their master, they would have been 
honoured and envied by those from a low socio-economic condition. In the light of 
the status inconsistency of oikonomoi, Martin argued that Paul’s status-laden 
metaphor would have elicited disrepute from the privileged believers in Corinth, 
but respect from his lowly converts. 
In this investigation, however, we have argued for a significant revision of 
Martin’s construal. It was our contention that Paul’s metaphor sought to portray 
apostles as socially and structurally inferior to God, therefore eliminating 
inappropriate adulation of leaders. At the same time, Paul used the image to cast 
apostles as having both unique rights and authority by virtue of their commission. 
Paul used the image, therefore, simultaneously to emphasise the servility and 
privilege of apostleship in both 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, underscoring his 
insignificance and compulsion as well as defending his immunity and rights. It is 
our thesis, then, that Paul’s metaphor is double-sided, but was employed to impart 
the same theological insights to, and elicit the same sociological response from, the 
entire Corinthian church. 
 
B. Theological Implications 
This study has a number of implications for Paul’s theology of apostolic 
authority. Because the metaphor we analysed and the passages we examined cannot 
address every aspect of Paul’s authority, we will of course not be able to exhaust the 
topic. Nevertheless, this study, which has been sensitive to the relevant power-
dynamics operative in Corinth (methodology), carries with it implications for both 
Paul’s construction of authority (ideology) and his assertion of authority (sociology) 
in 1 Corinthians. 
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1. Methodology 
Because Paul’s power relations are quite complex, it was important in this 
study not to over-simplify the concept and instead to take into consideration a 
number of socio-historical and rhetorical factors. In this investigation, therefore, we 
explored Paul’s power rhetoric and power dealings, as Andrew Clarke has 
recommended, ‘within their wider context, including the ways in which Paul 
defined the limits of his power, the ways in which he undermined the power that 
was inherent in his own position, [and] how he responded to the power plays of 
others’.1 Accordingly, this study sought to interpret Paul while being cognisant of 
the power struggles present in Corinth and the numerous parties competing for 
prominence. By placing Paul’s discourses in their socio-rhetorical context, we have 
demonstrated that Paul’s power assertions were neither unprovoked nor unilateral. 
It was shown in both 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 that Paul at least perceived himself to be 
the subject of the church’s criticisms and power plays. His self-representation as an 
oikonomos and the power intrinsic to that position, then, were presented in response 
to such threats and were highly defensive in posture.  
 
2. Ideology 
It was shown from 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 that Paul utilises the oikonomos 
metaphor to construct a portrait of his apostolic authority. In 1 Cor 4.1 Paul’s 
authority was explained as both structural and derivative from God through Paul’s 
apostolic appointment. Because Paul was entrusted with the mysteries of God, he 
was afforded the authority to speak and act on God’s behalf to the church and all 
humanity. But the authority that the apostle possessed was not, as some 
interpreters assume, unique to Paul, so as to imply an ecclesial despotism. Sandra 
Polaski, for instance, argues that through his use of grace language, ‘Paul 
emphasizes the universality of God’s act in Christ and seeks to reserve to himself 
unique authority as interpreter of the divine gift’.2 But as we observed through the 
plurality of the oikonomoi which Christ commissioned, Paul’s authority as a mediator 
of the gospel was unique neither among the apostles nor even in the Corinthian 
church. Of course Paul’s authority in Corinth was also neither ordinary nor entirely 
                                                        
1 Clarke, Theology, 106. 
2 Polaski, Power, 123. 
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equivalent with that of Apollos and Cephas; Paul underscores his role as the 
church’s founder (4.14-16; 9.1-2) precisely to claim some kind of exceptional status 
among them. But his depiction of all apostles as oikonomoi of Christ indicates that 
each possessed the revelatory authority to offer and interpret God’s grace. In fact, 
this is exactly one of the points Paul seeks to establish through the metaphor, for 
only by demonstrating that all of the apostles who ministered in Corinth were 
entrusted with God’s mysteries is Paul able to extinguish the partisanship which 
permeated the church. 
But just as Paul does not claim unique authority as one of several of Christ’s 
oikonomoi, so it must also be recognised that Paul’s claim to authority as an agent of 
Christ does not confuse his position with Christ’s. Elizabeth Castelli, for instance, 
remarks, ‘However imitatio Christi is defined, Paul’s act of imitation is an act of 
mediation. But it is also a presumptuous move on Paul’s part, because he is setting 
himself in a structurally similar position to that of Christ. . . . Paul does appear at 
times to confuse his own position with that of Christ or God. Here, the call to 
imitation is interwoven with this confusion of identity’.3 But as we observed in our 
study, Paul’s aim for the oikonomos metaphor is completely at odds with Castelli’s 
assertion. Paul deployed the image precisely to distinguish him from Christ, to 
establish himself as but Christ’s servile intermediary. Even if Paul’s place in the 
apostolic hierarchy is situated between Christ and the church so that the church 
receives the gospel from the apostle rather than Christ, Paul’s function was entirely 
to serve the church (3.21-22) and to do everything in his power to ensure their 
salvation and maturation (3.1-2; 9.19-23). Thus, Paul’s oikonomos metaphor is 
incompatible with Castelli’s understanding of Pauline imitation language and the 
strategy of power it instills. 
Beyond this, it is significant that Paul’s oikonomos metaphor portrays Paul’s 
apostolic ministry as an obligatory task. Because Paul is compelled to preach the 
gospel and to fulfil his apostolic mandate as a slave of Christ, Paul’s exercise of 
authority and power is itself a compulsion and merely an extension of the authority 
being exercised by God over the apostle. That is to say, to some extent, the power 
Paul asserts, so long as it is in keeping with the gospel, must be attributed to the one 
who compels Paul to speak and to act, for Paul’s ministry was carried out under the 
                                                        
3 Castelli, Imitating, 112. 
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expectation of eschatological judgment (4.5; 9.16). This nuance is often ignored in 
examinations of Paul’s apostolic authority, especially by those who charge Paul with 
manipulation. But as an administrator of God, Paul exercised his authority in loyalty 
and as obedience rendered to his Lord. 
 
3. Sociology 
Paul’s oikonomos metaphor also has significant implications for how we 
regard Paul’s assertion of authority. As mentioned in Chapter 1, previous studies, 
such as those by Shaw, Castelli, and Polaski, have identified in Paul’s letters, and in 1 
Corinthians in particular, various assertions of power in Paul’s interaction with his 
churches. While this investigation has no intentions of denying that Paul exercised 
power and authority in Corinth and his other churches, it has sought to bring 
balance to the scholarly portrayal of Paul as one who exercises his authority 
manipulatively and unrelentlessly as if he were committed to retaining it at all 
costs. On the contrary, this study has demonstrated that in certain circumstances 
Paul portrayed himself as an authorised agent of God, but refused to exercise the 
authority intrinsic to his position. 
In 1 Cor 4.1-5, for example, Paul used the oikonomos metaphor to construct a 
figurative representation of his apostleship, which entailed a significant amount of 
authority derived from the gospel. But though Paul’s metaphor was pregnant with 
notions of power, he did not apply it in an attempt to place himself over, as it were, 
the Corinthian church. Rather, Paul’s metaphor was applied primarily to 
demonstrate the impropriety of the power being exercised by the Corinthians 
themselves. Far from being domineering, then, Paul’s assertion of power in this 
instance is to be characterised by its ironic absence in the face of opposition. 
Furthermore, the studies by Shaw, Castelli, and Polaski all fail to mention 
that Paul did not exploit his authority in the manner perhaps most expected from 
an apostle, that is, through the acceptance of material support. Though Paul 
possessed the right to receive financial aid from the Corinthians, he did not assert 
this authority, but instead subjected it to his greater apostolic mandate, the 
production of as many converts as possible. For when Paul’s authority in some way 
becomes an obstacle to that greater objective, it is entirely appropriate for him to 
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relinquish his authority, so that the gospel, the church, God, and even Paul himself 
will all benefit. 
Given Paul’s refusal to receive support, it then becomes clear that Paul’s 
authority was afforded for the purpose of obtaining converts and enabling them to 
reach maturity. With this particular outlook, the authority entrusted to Paul begins 
to resemble what Kathy Ehrensperger describes as ‘transformative power’. As 
explained in Chapter 1, it was Ehrensperger’s contention that Paul’s apostolic 
authority was afforded to him in order to empower the church toward maturation. 
While Paul provides no indication, as Ehrensperger supposes, that the apostolic 
hierarchy sought to render itself obsolete, Paul’s apostolic authority does appear to 
have an empowering objective. For this reason, when Paul’s rights and authority 
obstruct the saving power of the gospel and thus in some way prohibit the 
maturation of the believing community, he subjects that authority to his greater 
apostolic mandate.  
When Paul’s authority is recognised as having this pedagogical purpose, his 
assertion of power begins to appear far more benevolent. Of course not every 
authority figure in ecclesiastical history has regarded their appointment in just this 
way. For this reason modern interpreters of Paul are in some sense justified for 
their suspicions of the apostle’s claims to and exercise of authority. But it is my 
hope that this exposition of two important, yet underappreciated Pauline texts will 
go some way towards exonerating Paul of some of the charges raised against him by 
modern scholars, and providing a model of sensible church leadership for twenty-
first century practioners. 
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Appendix 1: Municipal Οἰκονόμοι Titles 
Reference Date Region Province City Greek Text 
IPriene 83; IPrieneMcCabe 
39 
2nd BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Priene [10] τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς piόλεως 
IMylasa 301; 
IMylasaMcCabe 3; 
Landvogt p.45 
Late 2nd 
BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Mylasa [19] οἰκονόμοις τῆς φυλῆς 
IPriene 109; 
IPrieneMcCabe 51 
120 BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Priene [266] τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς piόλεως 
IPriene 99; IPrieneMcCabe 
77 
100 BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Priene [13] τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς piόλεως 
IPriene 117; 
IPrieneMcCabe 50 
1st BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Priene [71] τὸν οἰκονόμον | τῆς piόλεως 
Romans 16.23; Weiß 
p.51 
55 CE Greece Achaia Corinth Ἔραστος ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς piόλεως 
SEG 18.496; ISmyrna 761; 
ISmyrnaMcCabe 110; 
Hellenica (11-12) p.228-
230; Weiß p.54 
1st CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Smyrna [4] ∆ιόδωρος νεώτε||ρος οἰκονομῶν 
Imylasa 364; 
IMylasaMcCabe 222; 
Weiß p.55 
93-94 CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Mylasa [7] οἰκονομικός, Μολης | [οἰκο]νομικός. 
SEG 47.1662 (39.1316); 
Weiß p.53 
1st-2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Troas Kyme [2] Ἀpiολλωνίδης οἰκονό|μος τῆς || piόλεως 
CIG 3162; ISmyrna 771; 
ISmyrnaMcCabe 124; 
Weiß p.54; Landvogt 
p.27 
125-138 
CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Smyrna [30] οἰκονόμος | Πάμφιλος ∙ νε(ώτερος) 
TAM 5.743; Weiß p.51 2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Lydia Julia Gordus [2] ο[ἰ]|[κ]ονόμον piάσης piόλεως βουλῆ[ς] | <τ>ε μεγίστης Φάϊνον 
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JÖAI 16 (1913), Beibl.72; 
MAMA 5 Lists I(i):182,45; 
Weiß p.51 
2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Phrygia Dorylaion [10] Εὐτύχ|ους οἰκονόμου τῆς piό|λεως 
IG 5.1.40; Weiß p.54 2nd CE Greece Achaia Sparta [6] Φιλοδέσpiοτος | οἰκονόμος 
SEG 24.496; Weiß p.54 2nd-3rd CE Greece Macedonia Stobi ∆ιαδούμενος οἰκονόμος τῆς Στο|βαίων piόλεως καὶ οἱ σύνδουλοι | τὰς Νύμφας ἐpiοίησαν. 
ILeukopetra 78; Weiß 
p.51 
230-232 
CE 
Greece Macedonia Beroea [2] Κοδ[ρ]ᾶτος οἰκον[όμ]ο̣ς̣ | τῆς Βερ̣οια̣ίων piόλεως 
IG 10.2.1.150; Weiß p.54 3rd  CE Greece Macedonia Thessalonica [16] Ζώσιμος οἰκο|νόμος τῆς piό|λεως τὸν εὐερ|γέτην 
CIG 2717; IStratonikea 
1103; 
IStratonikeiaMcCabe 199; 
Weiß p.54; Landvogt 
p.45 
Late 3rd 
CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Stratonicea [2] Φιλοκάλου β΄ οἰκονόμο[υ] 
CIG 3777; TAM 4.276; SIG 
1231; Weiß p.53; 
Landvogt p.26 
3rd-4th CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nicomedia [1] [Γ]άϊος [Τ]ρύφωνος οἰκον[ό]|[μ]ος 
IKosPH 310; Isc.diCosFun 
EF6; Weiß p.52; 
Landvogt p.24 
Roman Aegean Cos Cos Φιλήτου | οἰκονόμου | τῆς Κῴων | piόλεως || οἰκον[ο]μή|σαντος ἔτη | κγʹ | ἀμέμpi[τ]<ω>ς. 
CIG 2512; IKosPH 308; SIG 
1252; Weiß p.52; 
Landvogt, p.24 
Roman Aegean Cos Cos ∆ιονυ|σίου piό|λεως Κῴ|ων οἰκο||νόμου. 
KFF (Herzog) 129; Weiß 
p.53; Landvogt p.24 
Roman Aegean Cos Cos ∆ημητρίου | ο[ἰκ]ονόμου | γε̣ρ̣ουσίας | ἐτῶν -- λγ. 
SEG 26.1044; Weiß p.51 Roman Aegean Crete Arkades 
[1] οἱ οἰκονόμοι | ἐpiεμ[̣ελήθ]ην τῶ βαλανε[ίω ἐκ] τῶν [τᾶς] piόλεος . . . || οἰκονόμοι 
Σωκλῆς Πρατο|μήδους, Φίλινος ∆ινοκλέος 
CIG 2811; IAphrodMcCabe 
302; IAphrodSpect 85; 
Weiß p.51; Landvogt 
p.44 
Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Aphrodisias 
[1] [ἡ βουλὴ? Μέναν]δ̣ρο[ν βʹ?] τοῦ Μ[ενάνδρου] | υἱὸν Μενάν|δρου τοῦ οἰκο|νόμου 
αὐτῆς 
TAM 2.1151; Weiß p.53 Roman Asia Lycia Olympus [1] ∆ιονύσιος, οἰκονόμος τῆς piόλε|ως 
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Minor 
TAM 2.1163 Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Lycia Olympus [6] Μακαρίῳ, οἰκονόμῳ τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνους 
IGRR 4.1630; Weiß p.53; 
Landvogt p.27 
Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Lydia Philadelphia [6] τῆς ἀναστάσεως τοῦ τῆς | piόλεως οἰκονόμου | Ἀντωνίου 
SEG 45.418 Roman Greece Achaia Patras [1] [τὸ]ν̣ Οἰκονόμον τ̣[ῆς] | κολωνείας Νεικό[στρα]|τον 
SEG 38.710; Weiß p.54 Roman Greece Macedonia Thessalonica [1] Λονγεῖνος οἰκονόμος τῆς | piόλεως 
CIG 3793; IKalkhedon 
101; Weiß p.51; 
Landvogt p.26 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Chalcedon [1] ∆ιονύσιος οἰκονόμος Χαλχηδονίων 
IAphrodMcCabe 275; L. 
Roberts, EA, p.299; Weiß 
p.51 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Aphrodisias [2] piιστότατον οἰκονόμον | τῆς piόλεως Εὔφρωνα 
Crowfoot & Anderson, 
JHS 19 (1899) p.124 
(#136); Weiß p.54; 
Landvogt p.48 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Galatia At-kafasi [1] Γάλλικος (ὁ) οἰκονόμος Πλομμέων 
IEph 3863 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Ephesus [6] Ἡγησίpipiου Ὀpiι|[.....]ο̣υ οἰκονόμου τῆς Καιρήνων̣ | [κατοικί]ας 
IPriene 108; 
IPrieneMcCabe 66; 
Landvogt p.37 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Priene [347] τὸν οἰκ[ονόμον τῆς piόλε]|[ως] 
IPriene 115; 
IPrieneMcCabe 102 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Priene [7] οἰκονόμος τε γενόμενος κ̣α̣ὶ̣ ν̣ε̣ω̣piο̣ί̣ης τῆς piόλεως 
IKilikiaBM 2 105,91; Weiß 
p.53 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Pamphylia Laertes τοῦτον ἔτευξε Κόνων αἰώνιον οἶκον ἑαυτ[ῷ] | οἰκονόμος piόλεως piᾶσί τε τοῖς ἰδίοις. 
IGRR 4.813; IHierapJ 35; 
Weiß p.51; Landvogt 
p.47 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Phrygia Hierapolis [11] τῶν | οἰκονόμων | τῆς piόλεως Τατιανοῦ | καὶ ∆ιοκλέους 
CIG 6837; Landvogt p.48 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Phrygia Unknown [1] Ἀμέριμνος οἰκονόμος τῆς piόλεως 
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Appendix 2: Municipal Οἰκονόμοι Payment Formulas 
Reference Date Region Province City Greek Text 
Clara Rhodos 10.27,1; IG 
12.6.1.150 
Late 4th 
BCE 
Aegean Cos Cos 
[24] τὸν δὲ οἰκον[ό]||μον εἰς τὸ ἀνάλωμα ὑpiηρετῆσαι . . . [31] τὰ δὲ ψήφισμα τόδε 
ἀpiοστε[ῖλαι τοὺς] | piρυτάνεις καὶ τὸν οἰκονόμον εἰς Κῶ τοῖς piρ[ο]ξ[ένοις τοῖς] | 
[ἀ]γαγοῦσι τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ ἀξιοῦ piο[ιῆ]σα[ι αὐτοὺς piάντα] | [κα]τὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα 
IEph 1448; IEphMcCabe 
108; IBM 448; SIG 352; 
OGI 352 
302 BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Ephesus 
[10] τοῡ δὲ ἀναλώματος τοῡ εἰς τὴν θυ[σίαν ἐpiιμελεῑσθαι] | τ[ὸν ο]ἰκονόμον . . . [15] τοῡ 
δὲ στεφάνου ἐpiιμε[λεῑσθαι τὸν οἰκονόμον] 
IPriene 6; IPrieneMcCabe 
71; Landvogt p.36 
330-200 
BCE 
Asia Ionia Priene [29] [τὸ] || [δὲ ἀν]άλωμα ὑpiηρετῆσαι τὸν οἰκο[νό]|[μον] 
SEG 48.1404; Preatti 
175/179,1 
300-250 
BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Colophon 
[30] τοὺς δὲ piωλητὰς | ἀpiοδόσθαι τὸ ἔργον, τὸ δὲ ἀργύριο[ν] | τοῦ ἔργου δοῦναι τὸν 
οἰκονόμον. 
OGI 707; IGLSkythia 1.65; 
SIG 3.707 
300-250 
BCE 
Thrace Scythia Olbia 
[39] τ[ὸ] || [δὲ] ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς τὸν τελαμῶνα δ[οῦ]|[ναι] τοῦς οἰκονόμους ἀφ' ὧν 
χειρίζουσ[ιν] | [αὐτ]οί 
SEG 52.659 
300-250 
BCE 
Thrace Thrace Agathopolis [7] τὸ δὲ ἀν[άλωμα δοῦναι τοῦς οἰκονόμους] 
OGI 51; IGPtol 36; Prose 
sur pierre 6; CairoMus. 
18.9284 
285-246 
BCE 
Egypt Egypt 
Ptolemais 
Hermiou 
[25] τὸ δ' εἰς ταῦτ' ἀνάλωμα | δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον Σωσίβιον 
SEG 49.1502; REG (1999) 
2,1 
281-261 
BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Colophon 
[49] τὸ δὲ ἔργον τῆς κατασκευῆς τῆς στήλης καὶ τῆς ἀναγρα||φῆς τῶμ ψηφισμάτων 
μισθῶσαι τὸν οἰκονόμον Κόρωνον καὶ τῶι μισθωσαμένωι δοῦναι τὴν δόσιν, συγγραφὴν 
δὲ τὸν ἀρχιτέκτ|ονα γράψαι· δοῦναι δὲ καὶ τῶι piρεσβευτῆι τὸν οἰκονόμον Κόρωνον | 
ξένια τὰ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου. 
IPriene 18; IPrieneMcCabe 
57; IBM 415; OGI 215; SEG 
30.1360; Landvogt p.36 
270-262 
BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Priene [18] τὰ δὲ ἀναλώματα τὰ γενόμενα ὑpiηρετεῑν τοὺς | οἰκονόμους 
OGI 50; IGPtol 35; 
CairoMus. 17.9270; Prose 
sur pierre 3 
269-246 
BCE 
Egypt Egypt 
Ptolemais 
Hermiou 
[12] τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα | τὸ εἰς τὴν στήλην δοῡναι τὸν οἰ[κον]όμο[ν] | Σωσίβιον 
IMagMai 15.b; 222 BCE Asia Caria Magnesia [19] τὸ δὲ ἐσόμενον ἀνάλωμ[α εἴς] || [τε τὴν στήλην] καὶ τῆν ἀναγραφήν, τῶν ἐγδόσεων 
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IMagnMcCabe 99; SEG 
4.497 
Minor γενομ[ένων,] | [δότωσαν οἱ οἰκο]νόμοι ἐκ τῶν ἐψηφισμένων piόρων ἐμ μηνὶ 
Ἡ[ραιῶ]|[νι]· 
ILampsacus 33 (cf. 
IPrieneMcCabe 14) 
3rd BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Phrygia Lampsacus 
[27] τὸ δὲ ἔργον τῆς κατασκευῆς τῆς | [στή]λης καὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τοῦ ψηφίσματος 
[ἐγ]|[δ]οῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον Φανόδικ[ο]ν, καὶ τῶι μισθωσα[μέ]|νωι δο[ῦ]ναι τὴν δόσιν· 
SEG 51.936 3rd BCE Thrace Scythia Histria 
[19] [τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα δοῦναι] τὸν οἰκονό||[μο]ν, μερ[ίσαι] δὲ [τοὺς μεριστάς] . . . [36] τὸ | 
[δὲ ἁνάλωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμο]ν, με|[ρίσαι δὲ τοῦς μεριστάς] 
IGLSkythia 1.6 3rd BCE Thrace Scythia Histria 
[3] τὸ δὲ | ἀνάλωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον, || μερίσαι δὲ τοὺς μεριστάς· ἀpiο|στεῖλαι δὲ 
αὐτῶι καὶ ξένια τὸν οἰ|κονόμον· 
IGLSkythia 1.14 3rd BCE Thrace Scythia Histria [1] [τὸ δὲ ἐσόμενον ἀν]άλωμα δοῦναι τ[ὸν οἰκονόμον ἀpiὸ τῶν piροσόδων] 
IGLSkythia 1.19; SEG 
24.1099 
3rd BCE Thrace Scythia Histria [15] [τὸ] δὲ ἀνάλ[ωμα δοῦναι] | [μὲν τὸν οἰκονόμο]ν [μερίσα]ι δ[ὲ τ]οὺς μερ[ιστάς]. 
IGLSkythia 1.11; SEG 
16.430 
3rd BCE Thrace Scythia Histria [6] [τ]ὸ ἐσόμενον [ἀνάλωμα δο]|[ῦν]αι δὲ τοὺ[ς οἰκονόμους]· 
IGLSkythia 1.21; SEG 
24.1094 
3rd-2nd 
BCE 
Thrace Scythia Histria [4] [τὸ δὲ ἀνά]||[λωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμο]ν, με|ρίσαι δ[ὲ τοὺς με][ριστάς] 
IGBulg 12.37(2) 
3rd-2nd 
BCE 
Thrace Thrace Odessus 
[15] τὸ δὲ ἀνά|λωμα τὸ γινόμενον εἰς τὴν ἀναγραφὴν τῶμ piροξε|νιῶν τῆς τε Εὐδόξου 
τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ τῶν δικασ|τῶν δοῦναι τοὺς οἰκονὀμους ∆ιονύσιον καὶ Σωκράτην | 
ἐκ ὧν χειρίζουσιν. 
IMagMai 98; 
IMagnMcCabe 2; SIG 589; 
Landvogt p.31 
197 BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Magnesia 
[64] τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα τόδε ἀναγρά||ψαι τοὺς οἰκονόμους εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ ∆ιὸς εἰς τὴν 
piαραστά|δα, ἀναλισκέτωσαν δὲ εἰς ταῦτα piάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα οἱ [οἰ]|κονόμοι ἐκ τῶν 
piόρων ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς piόλεως διο[ίκησιν] 
IMagMai 94; IG 12.6.1; 
IsamosMcCabe 33*5; 
Landvogt p.33 
2nd BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Magnesia 
[9] [το]ὺς δὲ οί[κο]||[νόμους το]ὺς μετὰ Τόννιον ὑpiηρε[τῆ]σαι τὸ ε[ἰς] τὴν ε[ἰκόνα] | 
[ἀνήλωμα ἐκ τῶ]ν piόρων ὧν ἒχουσιν εἰς piόλεως διοίκησ[ιν]· 
IGLSkythia 1.34 2nd BCE Thrace Scythia Histria [7] [τὸ δὲ εἰς ταῦτα ἐσόμενον] | ἀνάλωμα ὑpiοτε[λεῖν - - - - - - - - τὸν οἰκο]|νόμον· 
IGLSkythia 1.40 2nd BCE Thrace Scythia Histria [1] τὸ δ[ὲ ἀνάλωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον,] | μερίσαι δὲ το[ὺς μεριστὰς----] 
IOlbia 36 2nd BCE Thrace Scythia Olbia [4] [τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν] ἐσόμεν̣[ον ἀνάλωμα] || [δοῦναι τοὺς οἰκονόμ]ους· 
IGLSkythia II 6 1st BCE Thrace Scythia Tomis [19] τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμ[α τὸ γενόμενον] || [δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμ(?)]ον 
IKalkhedon 4 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Chalcedon [8] [τὸ δὲ ἀν]ά[λωμα δι]|[δόμεν τοὺς οἰκο]νόμ[ους] κὰ[τ τὸ]ν [νόμον]. 
IMagMai 12; Unknown Asia Caria Magnesia [17] εἰς δὲ | τ̣[ὴν σ]τήλην ὑpiηρετῆσ[αι] | [τοὺς] οἰ̣κονόμους κ[α]τ̣ὰ [τὸν] || [νόμον --] 
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IMagnMcCabe 83; 
Landvogt p.34 
Minor 
IMagMai 89; 
IMagnMcCabe 98; 
Landvogt p.34 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Magnesia 
[84] [τ]ὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ ἐσόμενον εἴς τε τὴν στήλην καὶ τ[ὴν ἀναγρα]||[φ]ὴν τῶν 
ψηφισμάτων ὑpiηρετῆσαι τοὺς οἰκονόμους [ἐκ τῶν piό]|[ρ]ων ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς piόλεως 
διοίκησιν· 
IMagMai 101; 
IMagnMcCabe 106; 
Landvogt p.32 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Magnesia 
[88] τὴν δὲ ἐσομένην δαpiάνην | χορηγησάτωσαν οἱ οἰκονόμοι, κομισάσθωσαν δὲ ἐκ 
piροσψη||φισθησομένων piόρων. 
IMagMai 103; 
IMagnMcCabe 100; 
Landvogt p.33 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Caria Magnesia [66] [-- τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα -- δό]|τωσαν οἱ οἰκονόμοι ἐμ[--] | τὰ ξὲνια. 
IKolophonMcCabe 7 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Bulgurca 
[9] τὸ δ' ἔργον τῆς κατασκευῆς τῆς στήλης καὶ τῆς || ἀναγραφῆς τοῦ ψηφίσματος καὶ τῆς 
ἀναθέσεως ἐγδοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον | Ἀpiολλόδοτον καὶ τῶι μισθωσαμένωι δοῦναι τὰς 
δόσεις ἀpiὸ τῶν piόρων ὧν ἔχει | εἰς τὴν διοίκησιν 
IEph 3513b Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Ephesus [4] [piρὸ]ς τὴν θέσιν τῶ[ν στηλῶν] || [οἰ]κονόμου δόντος 
IPriene 57 (restored as 
ταμίας); ΙPrieneMcCabe 
14 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Priene 
[8] [τὰ δ' ἔργα τῆς κατασκε]υῆς τῆς στήλης καὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τοῦ ψηφίσματος 
μισθωσά[τω ὁ οἰ]|[κονόμος -- καὶ] τοῖς μισθωσαμένοις δότω τὰς δόσεις ἀpiὸ τῶν εἰς τὴν 
διοίκησιν·] 
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Appendix 3: Private Οἰκονόμοι + Principal Inscriptions 
Reference Date Region Province City Greek Text 
ILaod.Lyk. 1; Aperghis 
(2005: 325-26 [§8]); 
Chiron 5, p.59-87 
267 BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Phrygia Laodicea Βανά|βηλος ὁ τὰ τοῦ Ἀχαιοῦ οἰκονομῶν 
OGI 225; Didyma 20; 
Welles, RC 20; Aperghis 
(2005: 315-18 [§20]); 
Landvogt (1908: 29) 
254-253 
BCE 
Asia 
Minor 
Ionia Didyma Ἀρριδαίωι τῶι οἰκονομοῦντι τὰ Λαοδίκ|ης 
SEG 28.1033; Bithynische 
St. 3.12; INikaia 192; 
NewDocs. 3.10 
1st CE  
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia 
ἐνθάδε γηράσαντ’ Ἰταλὸν κατέθαψε δακρύσας | οἰκονόμον piιστὸν Χρῆστος 
ἀpiοφθίμενον | ἀντ’ ἀγαθοῦ δὲ βίου καὶ δουλοσύνης φιλοεργοῦ | τὴν ὁσίαν αὐτῷ τήνδ’ 
ἀpiέτεισε χάριν.  
SEG 48.1562 1st CE Late 
Asia 
Minor 
Lycia Balboura [Φ]ιλόστρατος οἰκο||νόμος Μαρκίου | [Τι]τιανοῦ 
TAM 3.258 1st CE Late 
Asia 
Minor 
Pisidia Termessos 
Ἀ̣piελλῆς γʹ ὁ καὶ Οἰ̣̣κ̣[ονο]μικός, ἀpi[ε(λεύθερος)] κ̣(αὶ) pi(άροικος) Οτα̣ν[̣ειτος, 
κατέστ]|ησε τὴν θήκην | Ἀpiελλῆ καὶ Πυθι|άδι γο(νεῦσιν) καὶ ἑαυτῶ καὶ | τῆ γυ(ναικὶ) 
αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς | ἐξ αὑτοῦ μόνον· | ὁ δὲ piαρὰ ταῦτα piει|ράσας ἔνοχος ἔσται | ἀσεβεία τῆ 
εἰς τοὺς κατοι|χομένους. 
SEG 44.1000; 
IHadrianopolis 19; 
Landvogt (1908: 25-26) 
1st-2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Cretia Κλαυδίου Σευήρου ||  Ὠφελίων οἰκο|νόμος 
INikaia 1336 1st-2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia [Κυ]ιρῖνος, Εὐανγέλου | οἰκονόμος ζήσας | ἔτη κα΄. Χαῖρε 
SEG 28.1045; IPrusa 165; 
Pfuhl-Moebius 2.1142 
1st-2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia 
Prusa ad 
Olympum 
Ἓσpiερος Ἑσpiέρου υἛσpiερος Ἑσpiέρου υἱός, Τιβερίου δὲ | Κλαυδίου Πωλίωνος Φαίτρου 
οἰ|κονόμος 
SEG 48.1606; IGRR 4.895; 
Corsten (2005: 41 [§12]) 
1st-2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Lycia Kibyra Ἀρτέμων Μ(άρκου) · Καλpiουρν[ί]|ου Λόνγου δοῦλος οἰ|κονόμος 
SEG 48.1563 150 CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Lycia Balboura [-- οἰκονόμος? Τ. Μαρ]|κίου ∆ηιοτηρια|νοῦ 
SEG 30.725; IGBulg. 150-250 Thrace Thrace Pautalia  - - -ιος οἰκονόμος  Ἀλεξάνδρου 
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5.5787 CE 
SEG 34.1263; TAM 4.57 2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia Μ. Σκρειβωνίου | Καpiετωλίνου οἰ|κονόμος 
AnSt 16, p.129 2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Lycia Patara Ἄφθορος οἰ|κονόμος | Κλαυδίου Τιτι|ανοῦ 
AnSt 17, p.117 2nd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Pisidia Antioch Νεικηφόρος | Μαρυλλείνου | οἰκόνομος 
IG 2.2.11492; CIG 963; CIL 
3.555; Landvogt (1908: 
22) 
2nd CE Greece Attica Athens 
Q. ∶ Calpurnio ∶ Eutucho ∶ | Philetus p(u)bl(ici) XX [vigesimae] lib(ertatis) vi<li>cus fecit. 
| Κ. ∙ Καλpiουρνί<ῳ> ∶ Εὐτύχ<ω̣> Φίλητος | εἰκοστῆς ἐλευθερίας ∙ ἰκονόμος ∙ | ἐpiοίησεν ∙ 
γνη<σίῳ> ∙ στρατι<ώ>τηι. 
IG 10(2).2.9 160 CE Greece Macedonia Zivojno Γλαυκίας Ἀνχαριηνοῦ Ἀ[δα]ίου οἰκο|νόμος 
RECAM 2.34; Anderson 
(1937: 19) 
161-180 
CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Galatia 
Böyük Idi-
Agatch 
Εὐτύχη|<ς> Σεββ(αστῶν) οἰκόνο|{ν}μος χωρίων Κωνσιδιανῶ[ν] 
Grabdenmäler 78; JDAI 
84, 179 (R89) 
180 CE Greece Macedonia Langadas Ὀνήσιμος Αἰλίου Μηνογένους οἰκονό|μος 
TAM 5.88 
194-195 
CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Lydia Saittai Ἐpiίκτητον οἰκο|νόμον Μαρκίας 
IGBulg. 5.5577 
200-250 
CE 
Thrace Thrace 
Augusta 
Traiana 
Σειγηρὸς οἰκονό|μος Φλ(αουίου) ∆ινεος | Λονγείνου 
SEG 37.1087 2nd-3rd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Pontus Amisos Ἐpiίκτησιν | Ἀντ(ωνίου) Κέσpiου | οἰκονόμον 
Milne, Cairo Mus. 9365 2nd-3rd CE Egypt Egypt Unknown Τατετρῖφις ∆ιο|νυσίου γυνὴ | Παχούμιος οἰκ(ο)|νόμου κοιράν(ου). 
SEG 33.528; IG 10(2).2.8 2nd-3rd CE Greece Macedonia 
Herakleia 
Lynkestis 
Φαβρίκιος  οἰκονό[μος] | τῆς συνβίου Ἐλpiίδος καὶ τοῦ | Ἐλpiε[ι]δηφόρου τεθνώτω[̣ν] 
SEG 19.786; cf. SEG 
48.1535 
Before 212 
CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Pisidia Olbasa [Ῥ?]εντων, Μελίτωνος κα[ὶ] | Ῥωμανοῦ οἰκονομῶν 
SEG 43.441; SEG 39.620 
229-230? 
CE 
Greece Macedonia Agrosykia Εὐφρᾶς, οἰ|κονόμος Αἰλίας | Σαβίνης 
INikaia 1057 3rd CE 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia Κοσμιανὸς οἰκο|νόμος ὑpiὲρ τῶν | δεσpiοτῶν 
INikaia 1062 3rd CE Asia Bithynia Nikaia Γρά|piτος, Ἀννίας Ἀσ|τίλλης τῆς κρατίσ|της οἰκονόμος 
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Minor 
SEG 49.858; IG 
10(2).2.295 
3rd CE Greece Macedonia Pelagonia Συνφό[ρῳ] | τῷ γλυκυ<τά>τῳ ἀνδρὶ οἰ|κονόμῳ Παραμόνο[υ] 
SEG 28.1034; Bithynische 
St. 3.13; INikaia 196 
Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia Φίλων Κλαυδίας | Γαλλίτης οἰκονόμος 
SEG 20.32; IPrusias 103 Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Prusa Παντάγαθος | Τ. Φλ. ∆ομιτιανοῦ | ∆ημοκράτους | οἰκονόμος 
IPrusa 68 Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia 
Prusa ad 
Olympum 
Ἄνθουσα Φοί|βου γυνή, οἰκο|νόμισσα Τει|μοθέου 
RECAM 2.324 Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Galatia Yurtbeyci Φιλήμων Ἀpi|piουλείας Κο|νκο[ρ]δίας οἰ|κονόμος 
SEG 48.1593 Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Lycia Kibyra Μάρ[κ]ου Καλ|piορνίου Λό[ν]|γου οἰκο[νόμος] 
TAM 2.437 Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Lycia Patara Ζώσιμος οἰκονόμος Τιβερί[ου] | Κλαυδίου Ἀγριpipiείνου 
SEG 41.1325 Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Pamphylia Karain Σουρίνας οἰκονό|μος Ἄγαθος 
SEG 52.1361 Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Phrygia Tyriaion [Ὑpi]ὲρ κυ[ρίου] | [Λ.?] Κ(αλpiουρνίου) Πρόκλο[υ] | σωτηρίας | Εὔκαρpiος | οἰκονόμος  
IG 9.2.1124; Landvogt 
(1908: 22) 
Roman Greece Thessaly Magnesia Φιλόλ[— — —] | Σεβασ[τοῦ(?)] {Σεβασ[τῶν](?)} | οἰκον̣[ό]|μο[ς]. 
IKios 46; IGRR 3.25; CIG 
3738; CIL 3.333; ILS 1539; 
Landvogt (1908: 26) 
Roman 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Kios 
[Ge]nealis, Caesaris Aug(usti) | [se]rvos {servus} verna, dispens(ator) . . . Γενεάλ|̣[ιος] 
Καίσαρος δούλου οἰκο|νόμου ἐpiὶ τοῦ σείτου {σίτου} 
IG 12.8.221 Unknown 
Aegean 
Islands 
Samothrace Samothrace Γ. Ἰούλιος | Νίγερ, Τ. Ῥουτειλίου Ποτείτου Οἰκονόμος 
SEG 28.1015; TAM 4.150 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Dakibyza Σωσύλος Ῥη̣γλι̣[α]|νοῦ Ἵpipiωνος οἰκον[ό]|μ[ος {οἰκονόμος} 
TAM 4.276; CIG 3777; SIG 
1231; Landvogt (1908: 
26) 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nicomedia 
[Γ]άϊος [Τ]ρύφωνος οἰκον[ό]|[μ]ος . . . δὲ καὶ ἐλευθε|[ρίᾳ] piαρὰ τῶν κυρίων μου 
φιλαν|θρώpiων piολειτῶν | [τῷ] <θ>ετῷ μου τὰ piροσ<κ>είμ<ε>|[να τ]ῶν τόpiων ἀpiεδόμην 
Κ<λ>.Τα[——]|[ῳ Κ]αλλίστῳ. 
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INikaia 1201; Robert 
(1970: 242) 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia ∆ορύφορον τῆς κρα|τίστης Κ[λ](αυδίας) Εἰάδος | {δ} οἰ̣κονόμον 
INikaia 1413 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia Εὐάνγελος, Ἀντιpiατρί|δος οἰκονόμος 
INikaia 1466 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia Εὐpiραξία, Γ. Κ|ατιλλίου Κλ|αυδιανοῦ Θρ|άσωνος οἰκ|ονόμισα 
SEG 29.1306; INikaia 205 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Bithynia Nikaia Κλαύδιος Θάλλος, | Γ. Κλαυδίου | Καλpiορνια|νοῦ οἰκονόμ|ος 
TAM 2.518 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Lycia Pinara Συμφό[ρου] | οἰκονόμου Κλαυδίας Πλατωνίδ[ος]. 
MAMA 6.246 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Phrygia Yenice Ὀνήσιμος Βάσ|σου καὶ Πο|τείτου | καὶ Μάρ|κου Πωλ|λίων οἰκο|νόμος 
MAMA 8.399 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Pisidia Çavundur Εἰρήνη Λονγιλλιανοῦ καὶ | Σεουήρου οἰκονόμισσα 
IGRR 3.279; Landvogt 
(1908: 48) 
Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Pontus Euchaita Κάλλιστις οἰκο(ν)όμος? Οὐαλερίου [Λόν?]γου τριβούν|ου 
St.Pont. 3.194 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Pontus Euchaita Κάλλισ|τος οἰκο|νόμος | Χαγόν|δας 
ISalymbria 185 Unknown 
Asia 
Minor 
Thrace Byzantium Ἑρμάφιλος, Θρά|σωνος οἰκονόμος 
IG 14.688 Unknown Italy Italy Venusia Βριτ̣τ̣ίου Πραί|σεντος | Σάγαρις οἰκο|νόμος. 
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Appendix 4: Private Administrators Handling Bank Deposits (θέματα)  
Reference Date  Translation 
P.Oxy. 621 162-163 CE 
Dionysia, alias Diogenis, daughter of Amm( ), from the city of Oxyrhynchi, through Didymos, gr(ammateus?), and Sarapas, oikonomos 
[οἰκονόμου], to sitologi of Taampemou, greetings. Transfer to . . . of Diogeneis, two artabas . . . from the amount which you hold in deposit 
[ἐν θέματι] for me from the wheat-crop of the past 3rd year of Antoninus and Verus the lords of Augusti. (2nd hand) I, Sarapas, oikonomos 
[οἰκονόμος], have signed.  
P.Oxy. 2588 
24 September 
148 CE 
Diogenes, former agoranomos and former gymnasiarch, by Hermias his steward [οἰκονόμου], to the sitologi of the upper toparchy, Sko 
district. Transfer to Thonis, son of Thonis and grandson of Thonsius, of Oxyrhynchus, 19 ½ artabae of wheat (making nineteen and a half 
artabae of wheat) out of those you hold in deposit [ἐν θέματι] for me from the wheat-crop of the 11th year of Antoninus Caesar the lord. 
P.Oxy. 4859 120/21 CE 
Herma-us, steward [οἰκονόμος] of Claudius Munatianus, to the sitologus of Pacerce Eastern, greetings. Transfer, from the amount you hold 
on deposit [ἐν θέματι] for Claudius Munatianus, from the wheat-crop of the 4th year of Hadrianus Caesar the lord, to Herais . . . of 
Sarapion, eight (and) one-eighth artabas, total 8 1/8 art.  
P.Oxy. 4862 122 CE 
Claudius Germanus, steward [οἰκονόμος] of Claudius Munatianus the younger, to the sitologos of Ophis, greetings. Transfer, from the 
amount you hold on deposit [θέματος] for the aforesaid Claudius Munatianus, to Demetrius or to whomever he chooses, from the wheat-
crop of the 6th year of Hadrianus Caesar the lord, thirty-four (and) a half (and) one-quarter artabas, total 34 art.  
P.Oxy. 4863 
26 September, 
122 CE 
Claudius Munatianus to the sitologus of the district of Ophist(?), greetings. Transfer, from the amount you hold on deposit [θέματος] for 
me, from the wheat-crop of the past 6th year of Hadrianus Caesar the lord, to Didymus son of Ptolemaeus, grandson of Ptolemaeus, 
mother Prima, seven hundred artabas, total 700 art. . . . (2nd hand) I, Leontas, overseer [ἐpiίτροpiος] of the aforesaid Claudius Munatianus, 
have countersigned the aforementioned seven hundred, total 700 art.  
P.Oxy. 4870 c. 122-3 CE 
Euphemus, steward [οἰκονόμος] of Agathocleia alias Apollonia, daughter of Ischyrion, to the sitologus of Ophis, greetings. Transfer the 
(artabas) that you hold on deposit [ἐν θέματι] for me, from the wheat-crop of the . . .  year of Hadrianus the lord, to Apollo—. . .  
P.Oxy. 4871 c. 122-3? CE 
Valeria Artemidora through Epaphroditus, steward [φροντιστοῦ], to the sitologi of the eastern toparchy, district of Ophis, greetings. 
Transfer, from the amount you hold on deposit [ἐν θέματι] for me, from the wheat-crop of the past (nth year) . . .  
P.Oxy. 4879 
29 August – 27 
September 
141 CE 
Claudius Chaeremon to the sitologi of the eastern toparchy, district of Phoboou, greetings. Transfer, from the amount you hold on deposit 
[ἐν θέματι] for me, from the wheat-crop of the 4th year of Antoninus Caesar the lord, to Claudia Ptolema through Epaphroditus, steward 
[οἰκονόμου], twenty artabas of wheat.  
P.Oxy. 4881 
20 September 
147 CE 
Dionysis [sic] son of Anti—, through Nomerius [sic], freedman and steward [οἰκονόμου], to the sitologi of the eastern toparchy, district of 
Seneceleu, greetings. Transfer the remaining (artabas) that I hold on deposit [ἐν θέματι], from the wheat-crop of the 10th year of 
Antoninus Caesar the lord, to Pnepheros son of Hermias, (for his account) at the hamlet of Horus. . . . I, Nemeris, freedman of the aforesaid 
Dionysius, have submitted (this).  
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